A v R (Recognition of Divorce)

1. I am concerned with an application for the annulment of a marriage.

2. In matrimonial proceedings the practice is to refer to the parties by their marital status (i.e. Husband and Wife) notwithstanding that the marriage may have long ended, both as a matter of fact and even as a matter of law. However given that the issue in dispute in these proceedings is whether the parties have that very status to refer to them in spousal terms would be to presume what is at the epicentre of this hotly contested litigation. Instead I shall opt to refer the parties as A (the Applicant) as R (the Respondent).

3. By an application dated 27 February 2025 and issued by the Divorce Court at Bury St. Edmonds on 17 March 2025 A sought the annulment of his marriage to R which took place on 16 February 2023 in Lagos, Nigeria.

4. R has, from the outset, disputed the jurisdiction of the court to entertain this application. R does not dispute that she was married to A, nor would she disagree with him that their marriage, as short as it was not sweet, was long ago emptied of anything approaching what might pass for love or mutual respect. Instead R claims that there should not now be an annulment because there has already been a divorce and, as such, there is no longer any marriage over which to litigate.

5. R’s case is that she was the Petitioner in proceedings in Lagos State in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (‘Nigeria’), the jurisdiction where the parties were married, and where she issued a petition for dissolution in October 2023 which resulted in an order for Decree Nisi being made on 12 December 2024 which was made absolute on 11 March 2025 and so ended the marriage. That divorce, R contends, was legal, valid and binding upon the parties and, importantly for the purpose of these proceedings, should be recognised in this jurisdiction.

6. In direct opposition A contends that there was no proper process undertaken in Nigeria and what R how produces as her evidence of a valid divorce is nothing but a sham which she has fabricated. In the alternative, A asserts that if it was the case that steps were taken to initiate a valid process for the obtaining of a divorce then whatever was done does not pass the test for recognition in this jurisdiction because he was given no proper opportunity to engage with the Nigerian proceedings and so his application should not be dismissed as the marriage exists for the purposes of this jurisdiction and he is entitled to pursue his application to conclude it.

7. The proceedings therefore are about a marriage but the issue is about a divorce and specifically whether it should be recognised as being effective in this jurisdiction. If it should then A’s application for an annulment should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. If it should not have be recognised in this jurisdiction then his application should be allowed to proceed in order to conclude a marriage in respect of which even A and R can agree ended in any emotionally meaningful sense long ago. The relevant background prior to the marriage

8. I have attempted below to set out the marital history of the parties and the legal steps each has taken to end the marriage in their chronological order. However identifying exactly what happened when from the various documents filed by the parties has not been an altogether straightforward exercise. Despite having the benefit of two parties who are highly intelligent educated to professional levels neither is a lawyer and neither sought, at least in these proceedings, either legal advice or representation. As a result and despite my best endeavours to find a single, coherent narrative a degree of uncertainty cannot be eradicated using the documents each party has authored for the purposes of building an accurate Chronology. In particular, the limited confidence in the accuracy of dates as I can have about events prior to the marriage pales into insignificance when set against the competing contentions as to what happened during it and, especially, when the couple separated.

9. A and R are both Nigerian nationals who were born, raised and educated in their homeland. At some point prior to 2021 A left Nigeria to pursue educational opportunities in North America and is now settled in Canada. In that year R also left Nigeria moving to this jurisdiction which she has since made her personal and professional base.

10. In the summer of 2022 the parties first came across each other via an online social platform and communication via the internet took place over some months.

11. Despite neither party having met each other in person towards the end of 2022 an agreement was made to marry after A had, according to R, proposed to her.

12. Notwithstanding that neither party was living in Nigeria nor had lived there for at least a year it was decided that the marriage would take place there and both parties duly arrived in Lagos in or about the beginning of February 2023.

13. There is some indication even at that early stage in their history that matters between the parties were not proceeding smoothly. On 2 February 2023 A was in some form of communication with R’s father. It is not clear whether this was over a videophone or face to face but A thought that R’s father had spoken to him in an abusive and/or insulting fashion as he set out in a text message to R on 3 February. According to A he was already then considering whether to ‘end the marriage for the second time.’ Falling out with your father-in-law may not be a unique or even unusual experience for husbands but it normally tends to happen once the couple has been married for a while whereas these difficulties apparently occurred before the parties themselves had even met. As an omen for their future this was not a positive one.

14. The lack of physical proximity of the parties was also an issue at the first of the two weddings which took place. Before the civil ceremony there was first what has been described as a traditional wedding which took place on 11 February 2023. Nigeria is a multi-faceted state with a legal system which reflects the interconnectedness of its federal, state and customary layers. Add in differing religious traditions alongside tribal identities and it is clear that marriage in Nigeria is a not uncomplicated affair. The multi-ceremony approach has been described as far more than not untypical wedding extravagance witnessed all over the world but reflecting ‘the layered nature of Nigerian identify, where traditional ethnic heritage, religious faith, and modern legal frameworks all demand recognition and respect, Each ceremony serves distinct purposes and satisfies different stakeholders in the marriage process.’ In far less prosaic terms the combination of having both a traditional and a civil marriage is a concept referred to in Nigeria as a ‘Double Decker marriage.’ Segun Dukeh, The Guardian (of Nigeria), 29 January 2026

15. For reasons set out below these proceedings have not been illuminated with expert evidence on Nigerian matrimonial law, notwithstanding both parties agreeing that such would have been of value given the issues in dispute. Such an expert would not only have provided clear and accurate evidence as to proper process and the authenticity of documentation but may also have been able to shed some light on whether the absence of the central characters from a traditional wedding is the norm as neither A nor R attended their own traditional wedding, instead it being conducted via family members. Nothing requiring determination turns upon this point but it perhaps serves to provide a little context as to how the parties appeared to be treating this significant milestone in their lives.

16. With the traditional wedding completed by proxy A arrived in Nigeria at 12:40 on 12 February 2023. However in the first of several conflicting references A later stated at paragraph 13.2 of his Answer to R’s petition that their period of cohabitation ran from 11 th – 24 th February.

17. In contrast to the uncertainty over these dates there is no doubt that a civil (described by both parties as a ‘court’) wedding took place on 16 February 2023 at the Federal Marriage Registry in Ikoyi, Lagos. There is nothing about the ceremony itself in any document from either party which indicates that anything went wrong, a necessary step was not taken nor some required ingredient for legitimacy was absent. A would later in his own application in this jurisdiction raise an issue about coercion to marry but nothing about any illegitimacy of the process on the day itself. The Wedding Reception does feature in R’s case for dissolution where she is critical of what she described as A’s discourteous behaviour towards her and her family. Events after 16 February but prior to the Nigerian proceedings being initiated

18. Following the marriage the couple, as they now were, moved to an apartment in Lagos. How long they spent in the same accommodation is not clear as is set out below but what is not disputed is that even whilst they were sharing the same apartment the marriage was never consummated. The reasons for that state of affairs, like much else regarding the parties’ individual histories of this time, are contested but the resolution of those factual disputes is not necessary for the determination of this application. Like the absence from their traditional wedding it serves to set the parties’ marriage in a context.

19. In her petition at paragraph 6(iv) R claims that A deserted R on 20 February when he left for Canada without prior information to R (‘unannounced’) and has never spent time with R since. However at paragraph 4(d) it was stated that ‘the parties ceased to cohabit on 28 March 2023 when [A] moved to Canada unannounced.’ This discrepancy is relied upon by A as part of his case that the document is fraudulent.

20. However a different date of departure of 24 February is offered by A in his Answer to R’s petition when he asserts that they both separately left the country to return to Canada and the UK respectively. Yet in the same document A refers to the marital period as being from 16 February to 26 March and later refers to terminating the marriage in April 2023 (paragraph 7.3 of his Answer). One of the exhibits A included in his Answer to R’s petition was a copy of an email sent to R’s step-father in which he asserted that the separation took place on ‘28 th March.’ That email is dated 30 June 2023.

21. In the judgment from the Nigerian divorce proceedings which R has supplied it was her evidence that A left for Canada on 28 March and the same date is put forward by A as being when R ‘absconded’ from the marriage only to return on 9 April, a claim not repeated in his June email referred to above. A claims that he informed R on 20 April of his decision to seek the annulment of the marriage whereas the evidence upon which he relies for that proposition is a social media message (possibly a WhatsApp) in which he wrote: ‘I am writing to inform you that following the breakdown in our relationship and marriage, I will not be meeting with you this Saturday as initially planned.’ No separate mention is made of any decision to end the marriage let alone secure an annulment. In addition, no explanation is given as to whether that referred to a physical meeting and, if so, whether one party had travelled to the other’s location and, if so, for how long they remained in that jurisdiction, or merely a virtual conversation online.

22. In his Answer to R’s petition A has also included a message, purportedly from R dated 5 May 2023 in which she appears to seek a rapprochement with A but accepts that she is not ‘physically there with you’. Again in contrast to other evidence R has suggested that that decision to end the marriage was a mutual one and was made on 28 March 2023.

23. It follows that the parties have between them made it difficult to obtain any clear understanding of how each party conducted themselves in the short period when the marriage was more than simply a dispute about how to end it.

24. On 25 May 2023 A contacted R to inform her that he had directly messaged R’s parents as well as his own father of his intention to seek an annulment of the marriage. No indication is given in that message as to the jurisdiction in which this annulment will be issued but in November 2023 A took initial steps to issue proceedings in Nigeria but took them no further following receipt of R’s documents from her own dissolution application.

25. What can be stated with certainty, perhaps because of rather than despite the confusion, is that the life of this marriage was measured at its longest in weeks and in reality in days. Whatever the precise calculation it was certainly over well before three months had elapsed since it began and over the Summer and into the Autumn of 2023 each party took steps to demonstrate their clear view that the marriage was over.

26. As part of the custom in Nigeria a ‘bride price’ had been paid by A’s family (apparently by A himself) to R’s father. The return of this money is apparently considered to be a recognised form of evidencing the end of a traditional marriage and the first request for its return was made on 8 June 2023 and it had been paid back, at least to A’s father, by August 2023.

27. On 11 October 2023 R returned the ring/s she had received from A to him by posting them to his address in Canada, which receipt he acknowledged in his later documentation. The Nigerian proceedings

28. On 26 October 2023 Suit LD/143MGL/2023 was filed in the High Court of Lagos State in the Lagos Judicial Division, Holden at Lagos by an attorney acting for R which marked the start, says R, of her own dissolution proceedings. The petition is dated 26 October 2023 and was, according to the judgment of the Honourable Justice O. Atinuke Ipaye, Presiding Judge, filed and sealed on 27 October 2023.

29. It is not disputed by A that those proceedings were started. In seeking to bolster his own case as to a potential fraudulent divorce being fabricated A took it upon himself to search the ‘Judiciary Information System’ a portal-type platform operated, according to A, by the Lagos State Judiciary which A described as an open-access online case-management database. A proceeded to screenshot the information gleaned from accessing the above system / case number. A’s purpose in seeking to provide that information (it was not filed in any formal sense but merely attached to an email sent to the court) was to demonstrate the limited information held on the system and, in particular, the lack of any reference to the case having progressed beyond the stage identified on the system. What it does appear to show is that the case in question existed, that it was not a random case number invented by R but appears to relate to an application she said had been made on her instructions by the lawyer she instructed. In her oral evidence to me on 23 December when being interrogated by A as to the possible fraudulent nature of her suit R shot back that if she had intended to operate a fraudulent case why did she start a real one. A had no answer to that point. But it was a good point and she made it well.

30. Further evidence for both the existence of and validity of these proceedings comes from A’s response at the time.

31. According to A in his response to R’s petition he had attempted to issue a nullification petition in Nigeria and have it served upon R by email. There is a copy of an email addressed to R from the email address of an entity known as ‘Deals and Gavels’ dated 23 November 2023 in which reference is made to correspondence which was attached but which does not appear to have been included within the papers lodged for these proceedings. I have not seen a document which would appear to be a petition issued in Nigeria from A. However in his Nullity application issued in this jurisdiction at Bury St Edmunds dated 27 February 2025, A stated that on 23 October 2023 his Nigerian attorney filed a petition for nullity of marriage in Enugu State giving a case reference of E/1480/20 and in respect of which he stated that ‘the respondent was not served due to unforeseen circumstances.’ Those circumstances were never elaborated upon in any greater detail and no further reference is made to this intended application in any documents filed thereafter. Neither has there been any indication as to why a different state was preferred by A as the base for initiating proceedings for a nullity of a marriage undertaken in Lagos.

32. Further A later stated that his attempt to initiate proceedings in Nigeria was overtaken when, on 22 December 2023, he was notified that he would be receiving a parcel delivery coming from the Lagos State High Court which, when it was received on 2 January 2024, was the documentation in respect of R’s petition for dissolution. This follows on from what R stated was the next stage in her own proceedings. R and A had been married for less than the statutory minimum period of two years before a dissolution could be sought. Under Nigerian law it would appear that a marriage must subsist for a minimum of two years before an application for dissolution can be made save where leave is given to issue earlier. In addition, A was residing outside of the jurisdiction and therefore permission of the court was required on both counts in order for the suit to proceed.

33. This is clear from the order which was made on 5 December 2023. In this case the period in question was well within that statutory minimum and permission was sought and received from the Registrars. In addition permission was sought and obtained for substituted service by ‘reputable courier’ upon A at his address in Canada.

34. On 2 January 2024 A received the following documents all of which were dated 15 December 2023 unless dated otherwise below: a. A copy of the court order dated 5 December 2023. b. A Notice of Petition. c. A Decree of Dissolution setting out the basis upon which R sought the end of the parties’ marriage, including various allegations levelled at A. d. An affidavit sworn by R verifying the contents of the petition e. A certificate relating to non-reconciliation of the parties. f. A Notice of address for service. g. An Acknowledgment of service (not completed). h. An affidavit of verification in the name of A (not completed).

35. It is important to set out in a little more detail the contents of some of those documents.

36. The Notice of Petition was addressed directly to A. It not only drew his attention to the petition but set out the steps needed to be taken in relation to it. Those steps included: a. The requirement to complete the Acknowledgment of Service received and return it using the stamped addressed envelope provided. b. In the event that he sought to dispute the matter or to seek any specific relief, the filing of an Answer and serving of it upon the Petitioner. c. A warning that a failure to take steps could result in orders being made in his absence. d. Being informed about the possibility of travel costs being met in order to attend in Nigeria to participate in the proceedings.

37. There is no indication from A that he ever returned the Acknowledgment of Service form despite the clear instruction to do so and being provided with the envelope in which to send it. What A did do was to prepare a letter addressed to the High Court of Lagos which he entitled Response to Petition in which he confirmed that he had received R’s documents on 2 January 2024. This document is dated 17 January 2024. As an aside I note that throughout his conduct of the litigation before me and the English litigation generally when it was at Bury St. Edmunds it has been A’s practice to respond to court direction by sending emails in the form of letters addressed to the judge and sent to the court office. Such a style leaves open the real possibility that A never troubled himself to respond via any Acknowledgment of Service and any failure to do so would certainly explain later references within the Nigerian proceedings to A having failed to engage in the litigation.

38. Returning to R’s documentation the petition set out the basic details of the marriage. Two paragraphs are of particular relevance. At paragraph 4, entitled ‘Cohabitation’ R alleged that A had behaved in a strange manner on the day of the wedding ‘in the full glare of the guests’ and that thereafter had engaged in ‘constant harassment and threat’ to R and by allegations that R was ‘nagging’ A whilst he was living with another woman back in Canada. In paragraph 6 (‘Facts’) R made a series of sweeping allegations against A: a. That he acted cruelty and disdain towards R; b. The he had assaulted her so as to cause her to be hospitalised; c. That A had regularly, frequently and without good reason chastised R in the presence of others; d. That he had left R on 20 February and thereafter failed to provide documents necessary for her to complete an application to immigrate into Canada. e. A failed to restore normal marital relations thereafter despite efforts by R to persuade him to do so; f. That since A’s departure R had been bombarded with anonymous phone calls in which her life was threatened and which had been reported to the police; g. That R had suffered ‘constant physical assault, harassment and abuses and wild accusation that [R] was emotionally and mentally disturbed.

39. I pause here to note that having worked through all the available documents in considerable detail there is little, if any, evidence in the papers to indicate that such behaviour was taking place and certainly no contemporary documentation which supports these allegations. Other than the affidavit in support of her petition R has not relied upon these allegations in these proceedings and did not rely upon the majority of them in her evidence according to the judgment delivered therein.

40. Notwithstanding the above there was an Affidavit sworn by R which averred to the truth of the allegations made.

41. Turning to the document by which A responded it is not unfair to say that as R had included within her petition matters which, if true, would portray A in a very poor light so A missed no opportunity to retaliate in equal if not greater terms. It is not necessary for the purpose of this judgment to set out every detail but a summary of his document is set out below: a. A sought a decree of nullity claiming that the marriage was void because R persistently and intentionally mispresented her true intentions of merely using the marriage to secure permanent residence status in Canada. b. An order that R pay to A 100 million Naira (equivalent to nearly £54,000) ‘in defamatory damages’ c. A perpetual injunction against R d. ‘An order to reprimand the Petitioner through imprisonment’ e. The revocation of the licence to practice of R’s attorneys f. Costs g. Any other additional remedy the court considered appropriate ;considering the unique circumstances of this suit.’

42. There followed a point by point rebuttal of all of R’s allegations and, in each case, an attempt to turn the allegation back against R. Having worked through the matters set out in the petition A then turned to the certificate of non-reconciliation of the parties and set about criticising R, opining upon why false accusations are made by a spouse and then providing a detailed and highly flattering description of his personal academic profile. Having taken sixteen pages to set out the above he concluded his document with his own version of events and re-stated the various penalties, consequences and outcomes he sought against R.

43. Whilst on this point it is noteworthy that in his witness statement prepared by A pursuant to directions given following the transfer of his application to this court A highlighted the potential criminal sentences which could follow a conviction for perverting the course of justice (life imprisonment) and forgery (10 years imprisonment) as he exhorted that ‘[this] court exercise its full powers and discretion to ensure that [R] is held accountable … for wilfully bringing fraudulent documents before his Honourable Court.’ The impression was clearly made that A is as concerned with judicial retribution against R as he is on effecting a final separation from her.

44. A’s document, together with ten exhibits, was duly lodged with the Lagos Judicial Information system on 22 January 2024 and emailed to R’s attorneys on 24 January 2024. A apparently paid 700 Naira (sterling equivalent = 38 pence) to achieve the former.

45. Whilst there is no doubt as to the actions A took before the end of January 2024 what is not clear is the extent to which his document amounted to a formal Answer and whether, if there had been a failure to complete the Acknowledgment of Service form with which he had been provided, the self-authored document he did file was recognised as an appropriate and therefore accepted response.

46. That lack of clarity is directly as a result of the fact that when invited by the court to jointly agree (and fund) the instruction of an expert in Nigerian matrimonial law, each party declined to do so. However despite that evidential lacunae I have the benefit of the judgment of the Honourable Justice O. Atinuke Ipaye which sets out the following: The originating processes namely the Notice of Petition, the Petition, the Affidavit Verifying the Petition, Certificate Relating to Reconciliation and Acknowledgment of Service were all served on the respondent on 02/01/2024. The respondent as is his prerogative elected not to respond to the petition or participate in the proceedings . In compliance with Order 6 rule 39, Order 11 rule 46(1) and Order 11 rule 46(5) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules (hereafter referred to as MCR) 1990, LFN, statutory forms 31, 32 and 24 of MCR were duly served upon the respondent. (emphasis added by underlining)

47. Subject only to the issue as to whether the judgment in question is genuine it would appear therefore that A’s actions did not amount to an acceptable response which enabled him to participate in the proceedings.

48. However despite that conclusion the judgment handed down recorded that whilst there was an initial hearing on 9 October 2024 at which R gave evidence the matter was adjourned to 11 November 2024 ‘to give the respondent an opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner.’

49. From the papers provided by the parties it can be seen that between 9 October and 11 November 2024 the following actions were taken: a. On 15 October 2024 R was contacted by her Nigerian attorney who was seeking A’s telephone number (which was provided) and confirming the cost of postal service upon A (N107,450; in sterling £57.98); b. On 22 October 2024 R’s father provided to R’s Nigerian attorneys the monies required to serve A in Canada; c. On 24 October 2024 the Nigerian attorneys confirmed receipt of the monies; d. On 29 October 2024 A received from R’s Nigerian attorney ‘a document presented as though it was from the court’ (see A’s letter to District Judge Stuart / statement in support of his application for nullity dated 3 July 2025).

50. The document received is entitled ‘THE PETITIONER’S WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE’ and is dated 21 October 2024. The document is probably best understood as a formal Statement of Case or Written Argument and sets out not only the legal basis for the dissolution sought. Importantly under the opening heading ‘Brief History’ the history of the proceedings was set out to date, including the hearing on 9 October, the absence of A from it and the perception that the litigation is proceeding as an undefended action. The document contains the name and professional address of R’s attorney and, possibly, a telephone number. I am not familiar with Nigerian telephone numbers but a little research suggests that it is a telephone number for the Lagos area

51. On 8 December 2024 A sent an email to R’s Nigerian attorney in which he complained about the process adopted on behalf of R and how he had sought to comply with the requirement to indicate his opposition to the application. More pertinently for the purposes of this judgment A wrote the following: I am writing to express my grave concerns regarding the upcoming judgment for Case LD/143MGL/23, [R vs. A], scheduled for December 11, 2024, as reflected on the Lagos State High Court website.

52. In fact the judgment is dated 12 December 2024 but was scheduled to be handed down the day before a delay occurring due to the court being closed on that day for reasons unspecified. The judgment made reference to the document dated 21 October 2024 having been sent to A.

53. For the sake of completeness it should be made clear that in accepting the evidence of R in respect of her petition for dissolution the learned judge made no express findings in relation to several of the allegations set out in the petition, confining herself to A’s behaviour on 16 February 2023, his ‘suddenly abandoning’ R ‘sometime in March 2023’ and ‘the final straw’ being that R ‘was ‘ghosted’ by him [A]’. There is no reference to injury, assault, hospitalisation or any of the other matters relied upon in the petition.

54. The dissolution of marriage as sought by R was granted and a Decree Nisi was accordingly made dated 12 December 2024.

55. On 11 March 2025 following the expiration of three months the decree was made absolute and the marriage ceased to exist under Nigerian law. The English proceedings and the hearing before me

56. Four days later on 17 March 2025 the divorce centre in England and Wales at Bury St. Edmunds issued A’s application for a Nullity in this jurisdiction. It was received by R on 16 April 2025, apparently having been sent to an old address initially, who contacted the divorce centre at Bury St. Edmunds on the same day to assert her prior divorce. Thereafter on 17 April 2025 R signed an Answer to which she annexed an additional statement setting out her assertion of a dissolution having been obtained in Nigeria.

57. It is not necessary for the purposes of this judgment to set out the procedural history of A’s application because there is no dispute in respect of it other than whether there is jurisdiction for it to progress. In outline only R having indicated her opposition based upon jurisdictional grounds the matter was transferred to the court in proximity to her and listed before a District Judge who determined that the existence of a jurisdiction issue meant it was better placed upon a Circuit Judge. I dealt with final directions in November and listed the matter for a final hearing on 23 December 2025.

58. On that date both parties attended remotely and I heard evidence and submissions from each.

59. R gave evidence first. She was clear that she had engaged appropriate and professional lawyers in Nigeria in order to prosecute a dissolution because despite there being agreement between them that the marriage should be legally recognised as ended no steps had been taken for several months by A. R attested to having remotely attended the hearing on 9 October 2023, having given her evidence and followed the instructions of her attorney thereafter. She was clear that she had not attended, either remotely or in person, the second hearing on 11 November 2024 but had been informed by her attorneys as to the outcome and had secured copies of the Decrees Nisi and Absolute as soon as she was made aware that A was seeking this application in order to avoid double litigation over the same issue.

60. I listened to R’s evidence and in particular how she attempted to answer the various detailed questions from A about the process. There were undoubtedly confusions in her answers, particularly as to the correct date of the hearing at which she participated but I did not form the impression of a person being unable to remember the details of a concocted story. In her evidence R gave a classic example of being flustered by intelligent questioning as opposed to trying to lie through her testimony. In listening to the exchanges between A and R at this point in the hearing I was reminded of the old proverb that ‘the greatest fool can ask more questions than the wisest [wo]man can ever answer.’ Let me assuage any offence which might be felt: A is no fool, in fact far from it, he is a highly intelligent, highly educated individual who demonstrated impressive powers of forensic interrogation. However R is also an intelligent and educated individual and if, as A asserts, she was running a case based upon a wholly fictitious process I have no doubt that she would have been more than capable of being a precise liar.

61. A thereafter gave his own evidence. A was clear that the proceedings in Nigeria were fraudulent because of what he identified as errors and inconsistencies in the documentation. Insofar as there were errors they were in respect of the names used and the written details. The primary inconsistency he was keen to press was between the documents provided by R and the statutory forms he had taken the trouble to email to the court, which he suggested were so different from each other that it only allowed for the conclusion that fake documents were being relied upon. These discrepancies amounted to the proceedings being nothing but a scam which also explained what he was clear was his complete lack of notice after his response to the petition had been provided and the continuing failure to communicate with him thereafter.

62. A was also clear that R’s failure to provide original versions or at least certified copies of all the documentation relied upon in the Nigerian proceedings, verified by the Nigerian Embassy in London, was fatal to her case. He further sought to assert that there now needed to be proof of jurisdiction in Nigeria through residence, domicile or habitual residence of R in Nigeria at the material time. In the absence of the same the only conclusion I could draw, he submitted, was that the action was fraudulent and his own application should proceed.

63. I reserved judgment. The law in relation to the recognition of divorces obtained outwith this jurisdiction

64. The relevant legislation with which I am concerned is ss.45 – 51 of the Family Law Act 1986 . The provisions of the Act relevant to the question of recognition of an overseas divorce obtained by means of proceedings are as follows: provides that: Section 45(1) ‘Subject to … section 51 of this Act , the validity of a divorce … obtained in a country outside the British Islands (in this part referred to as an overseas divorce …) shall be recognised in the United Kingdom if, and only if, it is entitled to recognition — (a) By virtue of Sections 46 to 49 of this Act …’ provides that: Section 46(1) ‘The validity of an overseas divorce … obtained by means of proceedings shall be recognised if — (a) The divorce … is effective under the law of the country in which it was obtained ; and (b) At the relevant date either party to the marriage (i) was habitually resident in the country in which the divorce … was obtained; or (ii) was domiciled in that country; or (iii) was a national of that country .’ provides that ‘the relevant date’ in Section 46(3) s 46(1) (b) means: ‘(a) in the case of an overseas divorce … obtained by means of proceedings, the date of the commencement of the proceedings;’ Section 48 (proof of facts relevant to recognition) provides as follows: ‘(1) For the purposes of deciding whether an overseas divorce … obtained by means of proceedings be entitled to recognition by virtue of section 46 and 47 of this Act , any finding of fact made (whether expressly or by implication) in the proceedings and on the basis of which jurisdiction was assumed in the proceedings shall— (a) if both parties to the marriage took part in the proceedings, be conclusive evidence of the fact found; and (b) in any other case, be sufficient evidence of that fact unless the contrary is shown. (2) In this section “finding of fact” includes a finding that either party to the marriage— (a) was habitually resident in the country in which the divorce … was obtained; or (b) was under the law of that country domiciled there; or (c) was a national of that country. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) above, a party to the marriage who has appeared in judicial proceedings shall be treated as having taken part in them.’ (refusal of recognition) provides: Section 51 ‘(3) ….. recognition by virtue of section 45 of this Act for the validity of an overseas divorce … may be refused if — (a) In the case of a divorce … obtained by means of proceedings, it was obtained — (i) without such steps having been taken for giving notice of the proceedings to a party to the marriage as, having regards to the nature of the proceedings and all the circumstances, should reasonably have been taken ; (ii) without a party to the marriage having been given (for any reason other than lack of notice) such opportunity to take part in the proceedings as having regard to those matters he should reasonably have been given ; or (b) [omitted] (c) ………. recognition of the divorce … would be manifestly contrary to public policy. (4) [omitted] (5) Nothing in this Part II shall be construed as requiring the recognition of any finding of fault made in any proceedings for divorce, annulment or separation…. (emphasis by underlining added)

65. It follows therefore that there are two questions to be considered: a. whether the divorce obtained in Nigeria is effective; and b. if so, whether it should not be recognised by reason of being obtained: i. without the taking of steps to give notice which should reasonably have been taken; or ii. without the other party other than for reasons of lack of notice having been given a reasonable opportunity to take part. Is the Nigerian divorce effective?

66. Pursuant to s.46(1) above the divorce obtained in the High Court of Lagos State should be recognised if it is both effective under the law of the country in which it is obtained and at the relevant date either party to the marriage was a national of that country.

67. Dealing with the second aspect first there is no dispute that both A and R, despite their now long term residences abroad, are Nigerian nationals.

68. In relation to the issue of the effectiveness of the Nigerian divorce in Nigeria this raises the secondary issue raised by A that the divorce was an entirely false creation on the part of R and part of a wider fraud on her part to deceive A, the Lagos state and this court.

69. This point is hinted at by A rather than directly raised and he does so through a number of queries: a. A questions the format of the documents put forward by R as being provided to her by the court system in Lagos, in particular he asserts that they do not resemble the statutory precedents he has annexed to an email. b. A queries the surnames used as part of the name of R and suggests that they are incorrect which he then suggests might be indicative of having been falsified. c. A invites me to have regard to an article, a copy of which he annexed to a statement he filed, in which it is asserted that there is a high degree of false divorce documents originating from Nigeria. d. Finally he prays in aid his principal ground of the lack of any notification to him as being of itself evidence that these documents emerged other than from a valid judicial process.

70. I have no hesitation in rejecting this basis of challenge for the following reasons: a. An English court does not without very good reason scrutinise the orders and judgments of foreign courts to decide whether they were true bills or fabrications. This is not just by reason of the respect to be accorded to the judicial administration within a foreign state but also to uphold judicial comity and the validity of orders made. To create a situation where an issue of such importance as personal status (e.g. whether a person is married or not) is dependent upon where that question is asked and thereby to create the possibility of a marriage both simultaneously existing and not existing with all the rights, obligations and consequences both to the individual in question but also to third parties is a possibility which should be avoided if at all possible. b. Certainty of status and comity of orders is best achieved by having issues taken with a judgment purportedly made within a foreign state being litigated within that state by way of direct challenge and not indirect accusation through another judicial system. If A has issues with what he asserts is not a divorce lawfully obtained in Nigeria his remedy is not to seek a finding in an English court that it was not properly obtained but to issue an appeal, an application for review or such other domestic (i.e. Lagosian / Nigerian) challenge. Despite his clear knowledge of the proceedings including the handing down of the Nigerian judgment now over a year ago he has done none of these things. c. Querying the format of documents used in a foreign process and asserting that they are other than what purport to be standard forms is evidentially inadequate to mount a case for forgery. This court is in no position to state with any degree of certainty what orders obtained in a foreign legal system should look like nor to determine that the use of one form over another is indicative of falsity. The parties were invited to instruct an expert in Nigerian matrimonial law and each declined so to do. In the absence of expert evidence this court is in no position to determine any issue based upon such weak assertions. What this court can note is that notwithstanding the longstanding existence of precedents and even prescribed standard forms for court orders in this jurisdiction orders are not always identical and different formulations frequently appear and are valid despite their departures from preferred formulations. Uniformity of documentation may be strongly desired to the point where it is the cause of frequent requests, directions and even edicts for its achievement by judges across jurisdictions but, certainly in this jurisdiction, it remains a utopia rather than a reality. d. This point as to the inadequacy of evidence applies equally if not more so in respect of the allegation that falsified court documents emanating from Nigeria is widespread. A first raised this evidence by reference to articles he sourced from the Internet. During his oral evidence at the final hearing I informed him that notwithstanding his Nigerian nationality and his background growing up, studying and living in Nigeria he was in no position to offer his views as to the frequency of fraudulent divorces in Nigeria. References to internet-published articles are not evidence, let alone evidence of sufficient weight and standing to justify an assertion of impeachment of a foreign judicial decree for which there is clear evidence of a formal court-based process. e. The further point relied upon by A was what he asserted to be errors or inconsistencies in the information contained in the documentation. It is my unhappy experience that errors in information is a commonplace occurrence in the court process. The misspelling of names, errors in recording dates of birth, wrongly dating events, misappropriating actions to incorrect individuals are all occupational hazards for this judge and, I surmise, probably the lot of judges far beyond the Family Court. It comes with the territory. The position is no different whether a party is professionally legally represented or a litigant in person. The represented party runs the dual risk of instructions being misunderstood and the client failing to properly check the resulting statement; a not uncommon combination in my experience. Where parties are unrepresented they avoid the problem of miscommunication but no one is checking for errors in the statements they prepare for themselves.

71. The last point can be illustrated even within these proceedings. I attempted to accurately set out the chronology of the marriage using the parties own documents and in the end have had to give a warning in this judgment about confusion and uncertainty. These parties each offer several different dates as to when their marriage ended, they cannot be clear as to who was in which country when and there is even confusion about when they first actually met. If I were to apply A’s logic to his own proceedings I would be going some way to concluding that these proceedings are fraudulent. However I am satisfied that neither the action in Nigeria nor this one launched in Bury St Edmunds is fraudulent. Errors are the stuff of law as well as the stuff of life. They do not signify fraud, merely the apparently inexhaustible capacity of people to make mistakes.

72. The final point to raise here is in relation to A’s assertion that in the absence of certified documents verified by the Nigerian Embassy I should conclude that the proceedings were fraudulent. I reject that submission as being entirely wrong. It does not fall to A to decide what procedural hoops R must jump through to satisfy him as to validity. The test for effectiveness is not the individual satisfaction of one party. I have received documents, ironically from A, which not only purport to come from the High Court of Lagos but which he says he acted upon on receipt and went to considerable trouble to respond to. Nowhere in his document does he assert that the documents he received are fraudulent. Whilst A makes reference to ‘the integrity of the judicial process’ at para. 16.13 of his document in response it is clear that he is questioning whether a valid court has ‘adequately assessed the validity of the petition before granting it audience’ rather than suggesting that a false flag is being flown by these proceedings as a whole.

73. In conclusion on this point there is no basis to assert that the Nigerian proceedings are not effective for the purposes of the Act . The only effective issue of challenge for A is not as to the validity of the divorce but whether there are grounds for the non-recognition of that divorce in this jurisdiction by reason of a lack of notice given to A within those proceedings. The issue therefore upon which the matter turns is the proper interpretation of s.51(3) (a) of the 1986 Act . What is the proper process of notification?

74. Section 51(3) (a) of the 1986 Act has been the subject of significant judicial consideration over the years and several authorities assist in the proper understanding of the analytical framework to be applied in the question of non-recognition derived from a failure to notify.

75. The starting point is the decision of Wall J in D v D . The question was whether the English court should recognise a dissolution of a valid Ghanian marriage undertaken according to customary law. In considering the proper interpretation of [1994] 1 FLR 38 s.51(3) Wall J, as he then was, set out the following: In my judgment the terminology of s 51(3) (a)(i) is important and I accordingly repeat it: ‘Subject to section 52 of this Act [which is not material for current purposes], recognition by virtue of section 45 of this Act of the validity of an overseas divorce, annulment or legal separation may be refused if – (a) in the case of a divorce, annulment or legal separation obtained by means of proceedings, it was obtained – (i) without such steps having been taken for giving notice of the proceedings to a party to the marriage as, having regard to the nature of the proceedings and all the circumstances, should reasonably have been taken.’ It is immediately to be noticed that the section does not say ‘without notice of the proceedings having been given to a party to a marriage’: it says, ‘without such steps having been taken for giving notice of the proceedings’ and that phrase is itself qualified by the further phrase ‘as, having regard to the nature of the proceedings and all the circumstances of the case, should reasonably have been taken’. It follows, in my judgment, that what constitutes ‘reasonable steps’ must be a matter of fact in each case : it also follows that it would be possible for a divorce to be recognised where reasonable steps had been taken by one spouse to notify the other but those steps had not been successful. It is also possible, in my judgment, to envisage circumstances, albeit they would be highly unusual, in which it would be reasonable to take no steps. (emphasis by underlining added)

76. In that case the conclusion reached was that the procedural failings in Ghana on the part of the spouse seeking recognition in England were such that the marriage could not be regarded as effective in Ghana but further that, even if it had been, the lack of notice to the respondent spouse about the Ghanaian proceedings was such that the dissolution should not be recognised in this jurisdiction.

77. Further consideration was provided by Jeremy Richardson QC (as he then was) in 2005 in the case of Duhur-Johnson v Duhur-Johnson (Attorney-General Intervening) . In this instance the overseas divorce was pronounced in the High Court of Justice of the Delta State of Nigeria in the Warri Judicial Division. Again the issue was the nature of the notice provided to the respondent to the Nigerian proceedings which in this case amounted to no notice at all, not least because the husband had informed his lawyers in Nigeria that the wife was living in Warri despite the fact that he was aware that she had remained in London after he had summarily evicted her from the family home there. [2005] 2 FLR 1042

78. Having indicated the assistance provided by the authority of D v D (supra) the judge went on to set out the following at paragraph 44: It seems to me that the relevant law can be distilled into the following propositions: (1) The power contained in s 51(3) as a whole provides for wide judicial discretion…. The important point to note is that the judicial discretion is wide and the applicability of the section will vary depending on the many and varied circumstances of each case. (2) When considering s 51(3) (a)(i) a judge must ask whether reasonable steps have been taken by the petitioning spouse to notify the respondent spouse of the divorce proceedings in advance of them taking place. (3) In answering that question the judge must look at all the circumstances of the case and the ‘nature of the proceedings’ in the overseas jurisdiction. (4) Whether reasonable steps to notify the other party have been taken is to be judged by English standards, having regard to the nature of the overseas proceedings. (5) Whether reasonable steps have been taken is a question of fact in each case (it must also be remembered that there are cases where reasonable steps have been taken but they were unsuccessful or, in rare cases, where it is entirely reasonable for no steps to have been taken). (6) It is important to note that whether the respondent spouse has notice of the proceedings is not the issue. It is whether the petitioner spouse has taken reasonable steps to notify the other party . The focus of inquiry is upon the actions of the petitioning spouse, not simply a question of whether the respondent spouse knew about the proceedings. (emphasis by underlining added)

79. That distillation of principle into those six propositions was further considered and applied by Holman J in Olafisoye v Olafisoye 2011] 2 FLR 564 . Again the substantive judicial act was a divorce pronounced in Nigeria (the Grade A Customary Court Apapa in Lagos State) and in those proceedings an allegation of fraud was levelled which was not upheld by Holman J who then proceeded to focus upon the question of notice.

80. Holman J adopted the propositions set out in Duhur-Johnson v Duhur-Johnson (supra) and made the following observations pertaining to the issue of recognition: [33] First, …. , the issue is very fact specific and requires an intense focus on the steps which were taken and all the circumstances of the particular case. Second, the focus under sub-para (i) is not upon whether or not, or when, the respondent party actually had notice, but upon the steps which were or were not taken by or on behalf of the applicant party to give notice… [34] Third, it is very important to keep in mind that under the sub-para there are two stages in the approach of the court. First, it must make as assessment or judgment whether such steps were not taken as ‘should reasonably have been taken.’; but even if the court adjudges that they were not, that merely opens the door or gateway to the second stage and overall exercise of discretion whether or not to recognise the overseas divorce…. [35] In exercising the second stage of discretion, if the gateway is open and it arises, the court should, in my view, still be very slow to refuse recognition of the decision and order of the foreign court, at any rate when, as here, it is clearly that of an independent, properly constituted court operating a procedure and applying substantive law (as is clear from the documents in this case) which substantially accords with our own. It is not simply a matter of ‘comity’ or respect for the foreign court. Orderly legal relationships in the international world require that, so far as possible, judicial outcomes in one country can be relied upon in all others provided there was (as here) a proper connection with the first country. [36] The effect of non-recognition here of a divorce which is valid or effective in the country where it was made is to create a so-called ‘limping marriage’ i.e., that the parties are treated as still being married here, when they are not so treated elsewhere. That is so obviously undesirable that the court leans, so far as possible and consistent with the legislation and justice, against exercising a discretion so as to produce a limping marriage.

81. The approach set out above has been followed in two more recent authorities, namely: Ivlea v Ivlea (Peter Jackson J, as he then was) and by Peel in [2014] EWHC 554 (Fam) J v J [2021] 3 FCR 549 . This appears to be the settled approach to the issue of determining both whether reasonable steps were taken and, if not, whether the resulting discretion should be exercised as that the dissolution should not be recognised in this jurisdiction.

82. For the benefit of the parties to these proceedings neither of whom are professional lawyers, the matters raised in the above cases can, in my view, be expressed as a series of questions: a. What steps were taken by R to notify A of the proceedings? b. Where the steps which were taken reasonable: i. Given the nature of the proceedings?; and ii. In all the circumstances of the case? The above questions are matters of fact deriving from all the available evidence in the case c. If the steps which were taken were not reasonable, a discretion arises as to whether recognition should be refused in which case what is the best outcome when the benefits and detriments of recognition and its refusal are weighed and considered against each other? Discussion and Conclusions A. What steps were taken to notify A?

83. Firstly, I must make findings as to what steps were taken, if any, to notify A of the application.

84. Having worked through the chronology of events (as best as the evidence allows) I am satisfied as to the following: a. On 26 October 2023 R completed a petition for a dissolution of her marriage to A. b. That petition was issued on 27 October 2023. c. There was a hearing in the High Court of Lagos when leave was given both to pursue a dissolution within the statutory two year period and to serve A at his address in Canada; d. Documents for the purpose of notification of the petition and including an Acknowledgment of Service were prepared on 15 December 2023. e. A was made aware on 22 December 2023 of an ‘impending delivery’ from Lagos State High Court. f. On 2 January 2024 A received a full set of documentation including a Notice of Petition which set out directions for the filing of an Answer. g. On 17 January 2024 A signed and dated his letter / statement in response. h. A lodged his documents (including exhibits) with the appropriate court portal on 22 January 2024. i. A sent a copy of the documents to R’s Nigerian attorney on 24 January 2024. j. On 29 October 2024 A received further documentation from R’s Nigerian attorney which included the fact of the hearing which had taken place on 9 October 2024. k. On 8 December 2024 A contacted R’s Nigerian attorney to complain about what he asserted be a lack of notification given that he was aware from checking the Lagos High Court website of the scheduling of the handing down of a judgment for 11 December 2024.

85. I therefore find as follows: a. A was informed of R’s application upon it being issued. b. He was served with a full set of documentation. c. He was informed as to what steps he needed to take. d. He was provided with the necessary forms to register his intentions regarding the suit. e. Whilst he did respond to the petition he did so by way of a document which he authored and which may or may not have met the test for the filing of a formal Answer. f. A ensured that document was uploaded to the appropriate court portal as well as R’s attorney. g. There is no evidence that A filed the Acknowledgment of Service provided or that he sought to file an Answer in accordance with the instructions received and the relevant Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Rules 1990. h. In accessing the appropriate court portal and ensuring his documents were uploaded to it A was therefore in a position not only to obtain court information about the proceedings but to engage administratively with the court process by means of that portal, if he so chose. i. A was made aware of the progress of the suit and of the fact that it was regarded as an undefended action in Nigeria prior to its conclusion. j. A took no step following receipt of that information in October 2024 to engage with the proceedings in Lagos whether via the court’s portal, R’s attorneys or even R herself. Specifically A has taken no step to challenge the understanding of the court that the suit was not being defended. k. In December 2024 A was aware of the intended date of judgment having checked the court portal. It is not clear how he came to check that portal and whether he had not done so earlier, particularly given that he had uploaded documents to it months before. l. Despite knowing of a judgment date A still took no step to engage in the proceedings before or after the handing down of judgment nor to challenge the decisions made therein. m. Despite his knowledge of them A has done nothing about the Nigerian proceedings other than to file a response document in which he sought remedies far beyond that which a divorce court could contemplate.

86. Casting those findings in terms of R’s actions it is clear that: a. R informed A of the application. b. In so doing A was made aware of the appropriate court portal. c. R, through her attorney, informed A of the position the proceedings had reached by October 2024. d. In enabling A to be made aware of the court portal R enabled A to follow the proceedings and to be aware of important dates for the suit. B. The reasonableness of those actions

87. The next issue is whether those steps were reasonable given the nature of the proceedings and in the light of all of the circumstances of the case.

88. I have no hesitation to concluding that they were. I arrive at the judgement for the following reasons: a. R followed the accepted process upon securing the appropriate leave of the court. b. There is no dispute that A was served the appropriate documentation at his home address and provided with the means to indicate his position. c. Similarly the evidence is clear that the information provided to A within the received documentation enabled him to understand the steps he needed to take and the means by which those steps could be taken. d. A was fully aware of the case, of its place in the court administration and of the system by which its progress could be tracked. e. A was updated with information during the case which he could have challenged or which could have at least alerted him to the progress the case was making. He took no step so to do. f. A was aware of the impending judgment and therefore was fully on notice that steps had been taken within the proceedings and which he could have sought to challenge had he so wished.

89. The questions of whether such actions as were taken were reasonable must also take into account the nature of the proceedings in question (see Duhur-Johnson (supra)). Looking at those proceedings I consider that the following matters are also relevant when considering the nature of those proceedings: a. These were proceedings to dissolve a marriage which in the view of both parties had ended long before. b. A dissolution was anticipated on both sides and had been raised months earlier. c. The unravelling of one of the marriages, the traditional marriage, had already occurred with the repayment of the bride price in or around August 2023. d. In his response to R’s petition A did not dispute the necessity for ending the marriage, he went a stage further and sought to claim that it was in fact a void marriage, but his issue was the allegations levelled against him in the petition. e. The issue therefore which was driving A was not any desire to defend his status as being the husband of R but by his unhappiness at the allegations she was raising as the basis for the dissolution. f. A was entitled to feel aggrieved about some of the allegations being raised given the absence of any contemporaneous evidence in support of them. However in her evidence before the court in Lagos on 9 October 2024, as referenced in the judgment thereafter delivered, it would appear that R did not rely upon the majority of those allegations posited but instead focused upon A’s initial behaviour and his departure from Nigeria in the two months following the wedding. There is no reference in the judgment to threats, assaults or hospitalisation. g. It would appear therefore that the battle over dissolution was in reality not a battle of whether the parties were ever married not whether they each wanted to end their marriage but only a battle over who was made to look worse in the inevitable finalisation of their separation. Whilst R’s allegations were probably excessive and certainly unevidenced in fact they fell away in the final judgment when quite probably a wiser head and certainly a properly legalistic one dealt with the matter fairly and proportionately.

90. Finally, when considering all the circumstances of the case it is not inappropriate to consider that the marriage itself appears to have been at best superficial and at worst a contrivance for ulterior ends. A in his documentation in the Nigerian proceedings made multiple allegations that the purpose of the marriage was so that R could secure the right to immigrate and reside in Canada. It is a theme he repeated in the English proceedings but then went further. In his Statement of Case contained within his nullity application form A asserts that he was under duress to marry, that he was pressurised by R, that emotional coercion was involved, that R was mentally unfit by reason of trauma and had even manipulated A by reason of her being two years older than him. I should add that even though there is not a shred of evidence to support any of A’s contentions (save for that involving Canada) it has had the undoubtedly desired effect of generating a vehement response from R in which she sets about refuting each allegation on a point-by-point basis. Entirely similar to what he did in relation to her in the Nigerian proceedings. A tit-for-tat response on both sides.

91. In her judgment in the Nigerian proceedings the Honourable Justice O. Atinuke Ipaye recorded R’s evidence as being that immediately after the wedding A was supposed to enable R to obtain a Canadian spousal visa and that it was his failure to follow through with this by his departure which caused the marriage to collapse and so start the descent into acrimony. I have no hesitation in concluding that Canada was at heart of this whole episode. It would appear that this was not so much a marriage made in Heaven but a marriage aimed at Ontario.

92. Insofar as R has asserted in these proceedings that immigration into Canada played no part in her decision to marry A I reject the same. It was everything and she has failed to be truthful about this fact.

93. Deceit, however, is not proprietorial to one party in this case.

94. In addition to his allegations pertaining to R set out in his application for a nullity issued in this jurisdiction A specifically asserted that R sought to ‘obstruct the legal process for obtaining a decree of nullity.’ There is no word within his application that in fact R had obtained a dissolution in Nigeria nor that he commenced but failed to pursue his own application in Nigeria.

95. In this regard it is noteworthy that in his communications with this court A resorted to sending emails in which he purported to proffer what he termed a witness statement which was in fact only further attempts to shift the ground upon which the application was being considered. In a document dated 27 November 2025 A raised his ‘concern’ about the authenticity of the documentation relied upon by R and proceeded to cite various parts of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 in support of his contentions. A was either seeking to deliberately mislead the court or significantly misinformed (a third possibility being that his AI model was hallucinating) as each of his references to various rules was completely inaccurate. In the same document A invited (post-hearing) a direction that all documents should be verified by the Nigerian embassy. The invitation was ignored.

96. In a further email again received only after the final directions hearing A turned to the Lagos court portal and sought to inform me (not in a statement or other document evidencing his opinions) that the Judiciary Information System, the portal for the Petitioner’s dissolution suit, was a record of case progression and it did not show, he asserted, evidence of progress within the suit. A never explained how his attempts at relying upon that portal squared with his reliance upon it to make himself aware of the impending judgment on 8 December 2024.

97. I find that A has been singularly dishonest in these proceedings and has sought to manipulate the court process to suit his own ends.

98. The questionable nature of this marriage as mutually asserted is, in my judgement, a relevant circumstance in the question of the reasonableness of the steps which were taken in terms of the nature of the proceedings in question. Where the originating marriage itself has all the appearance of being a sham and its termination through dissolution has no negative impact upon either party but in fact achieved only that which both had long sought then questions of reasonableness of notice must be seen in that context.

99. Finally on this point there is a further relevant circumstance which is set out in s.51(5) of the 1986 Act and repeated here for ease of reference: (5) Nothing in this Part II shall be construed as requiring the recognition of any finding of fault made in any proceedings for divorce, annulment or separation….

100. In recognising the Nigerian dissolution in this jurisdiction I am not required to accept any of the findings made by the High Court in Lagos. With the greatest respect to the Honourable Justice O. Atinuke Ipaye the findings made in her judgment have to be seen by me in the context of the wider and deeper evidence now available, which was not, of course, available to that court. Given the reliance by both R and A on wild, unevidenced and extravagant claims in their documents, on R’s failure to evidence or pursue her allegations at trial in Lagos and A’s dishonest and dissembling approach to evidence generally and his inability to maintain anything approaching a semblance of accuracy or reliability in his assertions it serves no purpose to rely upon the facts as set out therein. Perhaps the only reliable conclusion to be drawn from both parties’ evidence (in its widest sense) is that neither of them is reliable.

101. Taking into account the law as set out and the facts as I have found my clear conclusion is that the steps taken by R to ensure that A had notice of the dissolution proceedings were reasonable both as a matter of fact and when seen in the context of the proceedings and when viewed against the circumstances as a whole.

102. It follows therefore that I do not consider that the discretionary gateway is opened and that the dissolution obtained in the High Court in Lagos should be recognised in this jurisdiction but as a bare dissolution without the associated facts as found by that court.

103. In the circumstances no question about the exercise of a discretion arises. However despite it not now being necessary but for the sake of completeness I add the following. If in fact the discretion had arisen as to whether I should exercise a discretion to refuse to recognise the dissolution obtained in Nigeria the following factors would, in my view, have been relevant as to whether I would have exercised my discretion so to do.

104. In respect of matters in favour of recognition of the Nigerian dissolution are the following: a. Neither party is prejudiced by the granting of a dissolution; b. There are no ancillary issues in terms of financial remedies or the welfare of children. c. Litigating in this jurisdiction would have been pointless and unhelpful to the parties, not least because of my findings as to their credibility generally. Neither would have emerged from that process with their reputations undamaged and each has demonstrated that they value their professional standing far more highly than the importance of being honest with a court. d. A limping divorce, recognised in Nigeria but not in the UK, would not have assisted either party, particularly R who is based here. Each party retains ties to Nigeria and having a different status in a country of residence and a domicile of origin is unhelpful. e. Too much court time has been taken up by this issue in comparison to the period of the marriage. It is a sanguine fact that more time has been spent litigating the conclusion of this marriage than the parties actually spent in it.

105. In respect of matters in favour of non-recognition there are only these: a. The marriage would not have limped for long because a nullity would have been granted in short order. b. There is no doubt that each party is fully engaged in the English proceedings and questions of notice, service and participation are not up for dispute in this jurisdiction.

106. Had the matter fallen to the question of the exercise of discretion I would have unhesitatingly exercised it in favour of recognition of the Nigerian dissolution.

107. It follows from all of the above that I will grant a declaration recognising the Nigerian dissolution in this jurisdiction.

108. As a consequence the application for nullity fails for want of jurisdiction and is hereby dismissed.

109. Two final matters arise. One of dissemination outside of the jurisdiction and one of publication in it.

110. If at all possible I shall provide a copy of this judgment to the Honourable Justice O. Atinuke Ipaye of the High Court of Lagos for her information and as an acknowledgment of the importance of comity between courts. I am making a declaration which recognises her decision in this jurisdiction, the judge should be aware of the same.

111. I am considering whether I should publish a copy of this judgment on the National Archives repository for judgments. Issues of this nature are only infrequently litigated and whilst this judgment neither asserts new principle nor deals with a unique factual scenario the accumulation of examples of the application of the relevant principles renders a benefit which I consider merits the publication of the judgment. However my view as to publication has been formed only following the hearing in question and the parties are entitled to raise any views they have for or against publication prior to my making a final determination. Therefore if they wish to raise any issue they may do so by 4 pm on 13 March 2026 (UK time). Coda

112. Upon receipt of my judgment in its initial form A immediately communicated his dissatisfaction with the decision and sought to advance further arguments emphasising points he had previously made. It was necessary to explain that the determination was not a process but an event and that the decision was final. Thereafter he made clear his intention to appeal and, consistent with his previous behaviour, set out in detail his grounds for so doing in a further twenty four page document entitled ‘Final Written Address and Appeal’.

113. That document, whilst polished, admirably clear and well-argued is no more than a reiteration of all of the points previously relied upon within the copious documentation already filed. It fails to address any issues raised in the judgment, to identify any errors of law or to argue that the factual findings made were outwith the evidence base available to the court. In short it both fails as an argument for review and as an application for permission to appeal. Accordingly the application for permission to appeal is rejected and A must seek to persuade a Judge of the Division of the merits of his case.

114. In respect of the question as to publication the parties found common ground in that they were agreed that neither neither wished for this judgment to be published in an unanonymised form. In fact A did not wish for it to be published at all asserting that there is a potential appeal (or at least he intends to seek permission to do so) and that it would be wrong to publish names and outcomes whilst the decision may yet not stand.

115. In my judgement that is not an argument for non-publication. The purpose of publishing Family Court judgments is to ensure that the public as a whole are better informed about the work of the Family Court, to understand what is being done in their name and so to enable effective public scrutiny and accountability of a public institution. A modern democracy should expect no less. Accordingly in the event that there is an appeal and if that appeal identifies an error, whether of fact or law, in the determinations set out in this judgment then the publication of that judgment as well as this one will better enable the public to understand the position as well as demonstrating not only how decisions are made but that the system is capable of correcting itself when necessary.

116. However it is important to acknowledge that whilst there are benefits to publication there are problems in identification. In the twenty first century publication of a judgment does not mean entombing it in the pages of a book of law reports to sit on a shelf gathering dust only infrequently, if ever, opened by lawyers researching a dry point of law. Publication today means being uploaded to a public-facing website with instantaneous search facilities available to anyone with a keyboard. When the ever-growing capability of Google (other search engines are available) as well as the advent of AI then a visit to a specific website is no longer a prerequisite of access to information as Large Language Models sweep the internet gathering data from across multiple sources. In such circumstances privacy, whether through jigsaw identification or simply the range and power of advanced algorithms, becomes ever more difficult to uphold.

117. But privacy is a right which people do not forfeit simply by being a litigant.

118. Throughout these proceedings A and R emphasised the importance which each ascribes to their professional status and online profiles. Much time has been taken by each to set themselves up in the most favourable terms and to underline how successful each has been in their professional career. In contrast to their views of themselves I have made serious findings about each party’s honesty within these proceedings, findings which I consider carefully and properly made. Despite the fact that neither party’s professional occupation is dependent upon personal integrity and probity and neither is involved with third parties which would require disclosure of such findings as part of their professional obligations there is a risk that each could be detrimentally affected by being permanently tarred with the findings that I have made by reason of that combination of permanency of record with widespread public accessibility. Furthermore whilst this episode reflects very poorly on the two individuals concerned it is the case that litigation frequently brings out the worst in people but such lows are not always the only true reflection of character. Most of us would like to believe that we are better than our worst behaviours.

119. Although I have concluded in favour of publication of this judgment I do not think any purpose is served in publicly fixing each of the parties with all the negatives set out in this judgment which would certainly result if I identified them directly. They will therefore remain as A and R.

120. That is my judgment. 17 March 2026