Bahader Ghulam Hassankhel v Cordell Javan Limton

MR JUSTICE MOODY: Introduction

1. It is late in the day but I am going to give an oral judgment now because of the importance of this matter to the parties, and the need for clarity as to the state of the proceedings. The parties need to know where they stand in the light of the serious allegations that have been made, and they also need to get on with dealing with the substance of this case. Background

2. There are two applications before the court: the Claimant's application of 24 October 2025 to discharge the freezing injunction currently in force under claim number QB-2019-0038971, which I will call the 2019 proceedings, and the Defendant's application of 6 February 2026 for a replacement freezing injunction in claim number KB-2023-004491, which I will call the 2023 proceedings.

3. In substance, these two applications raise the same issue: should the freezing order continue until final determination of this claim?

4. In support of the application to set aside the freezing injunction, I have read the witness statement of Adam Haffenden dated 24 October 2025 and the third witness statement of the Claimant dated 3 rd February 2026. In opposition, I have considered the witness statement of Kellie Baptist dated 14 January 2026 and the affidavit of Joanne Pizzala dated 6 February 2026. I have also considered for the Defendant, Andrew Grahamsley’s affidavit of 3 January 2024, his affidavit of 31 July 2024 in the 2023 proceedings, and his witness statement of 23 March 2023.

5. I observe at this stage that the Claimant's application to discharge the freezing order is underpinned by allegations that it was obtained as a result of the Defendant's solicitors and/or counsel and/or the Defendant acting in breach of their duty of full and frank disclosure. These applications were due to be heard by Lambert J on 20 January 2026, but she was sufficiently concerned that the serious allegations made against the Defendant's solicitors and counsel were inadequately particularised that she adjourned the hearing so that proper particulars could be provided. It is therefore necessary to rehearse the background in a little detail.

6. This is an action for damages for personal injury which the Claimant sustained on 20 November 2016. It is alleged that he suffered a traumatic brain injury and the Claimant's schedule put the value of his claim at about £12 million. He was deemed to lack capacity and he acted through his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor, who in turn instructed Moore Barlow solicitors. The defence is conducted by UK Insurance Limited (“UKIL”).

7. The Defendant's case was always that the Claimant was exaggerating the effect of his injuries and the Defendant obtained surveillance evidence to support their stance in this regard. The Defendant was granted permission to rely upon the surveillance evidence and the Claimant was granted permission to serve responsive evidence dealing with the surveillance.

8. The action was settled on 20 January 2022 by the acceptance of an offer of £2.5 million. The sum paid to the Claimant was held by Helen Goatley of Moore Barlow in her capacity as the Claimant's financial deputy.

9. In the underlying action, the Claimant relied upon a number of witness statements which supported his account as to his level of his disability, together with expert medical evidence. One of the statements he relied upon was from David Mansour. He and the other witnesses gave statements explaining the Claimant's level of disability in light of the surveillance evidence.

10. From about June 2022, Mr Mansour sought to resile from his first witness statement on the basis that it was untrue and that the Claimant's disability was far less than claimed. He approached UKIL, the Defendant’s insurer, but it appears that his approaches were only escalated up to Mr Grahamsley, who had conduct of the matter, on about 8 August 2022. Mr Mansour gave the Defendant a further witness statement dated 22 March 2023.

11. Remarkably to my mind Mr Gideon for the Claimant submitted at one point today that there was little difference between the two statements. In fact, the essence of the second statement was that Mr Mansour resiled from the first witness statement and he said that the first witness statement was untrue in several respects. In particular, he said that the Claimant had no difficulty in following instructions or using public transport. These were matters which were in issue because they went directly to the severity of the Claimant’s brain injury. Recognising that the implication of Mr Mansour's changed evidence was that the settlement had potentially been procured by fraud, the Defendant applied on 27 March 2023 to set aside the settlement. The application was made pursuant to CPR 3.1(7).

12. There was an issue as to what happened to the damages in the meantime pending the resolution of the application. Initially, this was not a particular concern because the money was held by the Claimant's deputy. Moreover, on 9 October 2023, the deputy gave an undertaking that no sums exceeding £25,000 would be paid out without 7 days’ notice being given to the Defendant. On 27 October 2023, the Defendant sought an undertaking that if the Claimant regained capacity, the fund would be paid into court. I understand that the undertaking was refused.

13. As well as making the application to set aside the settlement in the 2019 proceedings, the Defendant decided to issue the 2023 proceedings seeking the same relief. The second set of proceedings was issued on 13 November 2023.

14. On 14 December 2023, the Court of Protection made an order without a hearing and without notice that the Claimant had recovered his capacity to manage his property and affairs, and on 19 December the Defendant was notified that the deputy had been discharged.

15. The Defendant had made clear to the Claimant that, if the Claimant recovered capacity and the deputy was discharged, it had concerns as to the security of the fund pending resolution of its application to set aside the settlement. The Defendant therefore sought appropriate undertakings and made clear in a letter of 27 October 2023 that, if necessary, it would seek a freezing injunction. This was repeated on 10 November 2023. I observe that the Defendant was therefore giving notice of a potential application for a freezing injunction, and that is an unusual step.

16. On 19 December the Claimant wrote to the Defendant's solicitor providing the order of the Court of Protection that the deputy was discharged and stating that a payment of £150,000 was to be paid out to the Claimant's new solicitors early in the new year.

17. On 22 December the Defendant wrote saying that they had no option but to issue an application for a freezing injunction. The Defendant elected to issue the application in the 2019 proceedings because the Claimant was represented in those proceedings and he was not, as I understand it, then represented at that stage in the 2023 proceedings.

18. The application for the freezing injunction was issued on 3 January, and on 4 January Moore Barlow wrote acknowledging receipt of the application and saying that they were in a conflict situation which I infer is the reason that they chose not to attend the hearing.

19. They also stated in their letter of 4 January that Ms Goatley, the deputy, was about to write to the banks informing them that her deputyship had been discharged, and thereafter the accounts would be restored or put into the Claimant's name. At that point the hearing had been listed for 24 January and so the Defendant sought, on the same day, 4 January, an undertaking that the funds should not be released pending the hearing. Ms Goatley declined to provide the requested undertaking and the balances were transferred at 18:15 hours on 4 January 2024.

20. Since the requested undertakings were not forthcoming, the Defendant took steps to arrange an urgent hearing of the application and it was this that came on the following day before May J, as she then was. The matter came before her in court 37 on 5 January, the significance of that being that it was an urgent application and heard in the vacation. Mr Sam Way of counsel appeared for the Defendant.

21. It is relevant to note that the Defendant did notify the Claimant of the pending application and indeed the Official Solicitor instructed leading counsel to attend on the Claimant's behalf. Fenella Morris KC confirmed that there was no objection to the terms of the order sought, although she did not consent to the principle. Moore Barlow did not attend or instruct counsel.

22. In support of the application, May J had a skeleton argument from Mr Way and an affidavit from Mr Grahamsley that set out the background which I have just described, albeit in rather more detail.

23. It is relevant to note that Mr Way's skeleton argument at [49] set out that the Defendant recognised its duty of full and frank disclosure. At the beginning of the skeleton argument there was a reading list which included six items. Although there can be no certainty about this, it looks as if May J may have completed the reading list because the transcript of the hearing shows that she clearly had a good grasp of the report of Dr Kassim, which was the last item on the reading list.

24. Much of the hearing was taken up addressing the Judge's concerns about the representation of the Claimant and Moore Barlow's conflict of interest. However, the Judge went on to make the injunction as requested. She was satisfied that the Defendant had a good arguable case that the settlement should be set aside on the grounds that it was procured by fraud. She was satisfied that there was reason to believe that there was a risk of dissipation of the fund, and she was satisfied that the balance of convenience fell in favour of making the order.

25. The return date was 24 January 2024. The matter came before Soole J on that date, and the order was simply extended by consent. It came back again on 24 June 2024 before Thornton J, and again it was extended by consent.

26. The application to set aside the settlement in the 2019 proceedings was subsequently withdrawn by consent. On 31 July 2024 the Defendant applied in the 2023 proceedings for the freezing order to be transferred to those proceedings. As I understand it, the delay in listing the matter has been because of the need to resolve issues about the Claimant's capacity to conduct litigation, as opposed to his capacity to manage his property and affairs. The application in the 2019 proceedings was subsequently withdrawn and replaced with a new application for a freezing injunction in the 2023 proceedings.

27. On 28 February 2025, Master Davidson handed down judgment holding that the Claimant had recovered his capacity to litigate. On 24 October 2025, the Claimant issued the current application to set aside or vary the freezing injunction.

28. That application and the Defendant's application from July 2024 to transfer the injunction both came before Lambert J on 20 January 2026. As I have indicated, she raised concerns at the hearing as to the manner in which serious allegations were being made by the Claimant in relation to the conduct of the Defendant's insurers, solicitors and counsel. She therefore directed that the Claimant should serve full and proper particulars of the allegations of breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure by the following day. The principles governing the grant of a freezing injunction

29. I turn to the principles which govern the grant of a freezing injunction, and I can detect no real difference between the parties on this. They are, in my judgment, correctly set out in Mr Colton's skeleton argument at [62] to [68] and in particular in the decision of Convoy Collateral v Broad Idea International Ltd & Anor [2021] UKPC 23 : 63.3. The current practice of the Courts is as follows (at [101]): “In summary, a court with equitable and/or statutory jurisdiction to grant injunctions where it is just and convenient to do so has power – and it accords with principle and good practice – to grant a freezing injunction against a party (the Claimant) over whom the court has personal jurisdiction provided that: (i) the Defendant has already been granted or has a good arguable case for being granted a judgment or order for the payment of a sum of money that is or will be enforceable through the process of the court; (ii) the Claimant holds assets (or, as discussed below, is liable to take steps other than in the ordinary course of business which will reduce the value of assets) against which such a judgment could be enforced; and (iii) there is a real risk that, unless the injunction is granted, the Claimant will deal with such assets (or take steps which make them less valuable) other than in the ordinary course of business with the result that the availability or value of the assets is impaired and the judgment is left unsatisfied.” The Claimant's discharge application.

30. As I have indicated, the application is brought on the basis that it is said that the Defendant was in breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure.

31. When seeking a freezing injunction, the Defendant is under a duty to provide full and fair disclosure. The law on this is set out fairly in the Defendant's skeleton argument at paragraphs [69] to [74].

32. The duty of a party seeking an order without notice to the other side is best described as a duty of fair presentation, as set out by Carr J (as she then was) in Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 645 (Comm) .

33. When faced with an application to discharge an order for breach of the duty, the overriding consideration is the interests of justice: Mex Group Worldwide v Ford [2024] EWCA Civ 959 at [120]-[121].

34. As Carr J explained in Tugushev , fair presentation means a fair presentation of the material matters of fact, law and procedure which might influence the court. A due sense of proportion must be kept: Mex at [12].

35. It need not be said, but an allegation of deliberately misleading the court levelled against the legal representative is a grave allegation that must be taken seriously. It is fair to say that the Claimant's case on the Defendant's alleged breaches of duty has developed over time. The discharge application was supported, first of all, by the witness statement of Adam Haffenden. This says at paragraph 36 that the Defendant's skeleton argument for the hearing before May J made no reference to the duty of full and frank disclosure. This is wrong because it is expressly referred to in paragraph 49 of the skeleton argument of Mr Way. At the hearing before Lambert J it appears that Mr Roseman, counsel for Claimant, submitted that in terms of intentional misconduct, the only allegation being made, at that stage was against Mr Grahamsley.

36. Lambert J made an order that proper particulars of the allegations needed to be given and her order provided as follows: "By 4.00 pm on 21 January 2026 the applicant shall file and serve a summary of his allegations of the breaches of the duty of full and frank disclosure, which shall include (a) Specifying the person against whom each allegation is made; (b) Specifying any allegations that the court was misled; (c) If it is alleged that the court was deliberately misled the basis on which it is alleged that the conduct in question was deliberate; and (d) The effect of those alleged breaches."

37. It is apparent, therefore, that Lambert J required precision as to the nature of the allegations which were being made. The document, which was signed by Mr Roseman, set out nine complaints, together with a number of sub-complaints as follows: “ 1. Save as set out in paragraphs 2(i)(c) and (ii) below, the breaches of the duty of full and frank disclosure set out hereinbelow are not alleged to have been made deliberately.

2. For the following reasons, the Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) breached their respective duties of full and frank disclosure when making the application for a freezing order on 5 January 2024: (i) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) either: a. Submitted to the court that the only evidence served on behalf of the Claimant in response to the covert surveillance was limited to a witness statement of the Claimant and Mr Mansour; and/or b. Failed to bring to the court’s attention that, in addition to the Claimant’s and Mr Mansour’s respective witness statements, 4 other witness statements and 6 expert reports were served on the Claimant’s behalf in response to the covert surveillance evidence, along with 4 expert reports from the Defendant; and/or c. Having heard May J’s ex tempore judgment, failed to bring to the court’s attention that the judgment was based on an erroneous factual premise being that the only evidence the Claimant served in response to the covert surveillance evidence was a witness statement from each of the Claimant and Mr Mansour, whereas the correct position is that set out in paragraph 2(i)(b) above. As regards the breach in paragraph 2(i)(c), this amounts to a breach by counsel of rule rC3.1 (see guidance gC4.2) of Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales. The reason for this that paragraph 4 of the Defendant’s skeleton argument prepared by and relied on by his counsel only refers to the Claimant and Mr David Mansour having served evidence in response to the covert surveillance evidence. However, as the said skeleton argument directed the court to read Andrew Grahamsley’s witness statement, dated 23 March 2023, it stands to reason that counsel, by the date of the hearing on 5 January 2024, had himself read the said witness statement. The said witness statement, contrary to paragraph 4 of the aforementioned skeleton argument, states that, in response to the covert surveillance, 8 witness statements were served on behalf of the Claimant and that each party served additional expert evidence. (ii) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing), by reason of Mr Grahamsley’s witness statement, dated 23 March 2023, wrongly represented to the court that: a. Mr Mansour’s evidence was crucial to and/or formed the basis of firm advice to increase an offer to settle and/to settle the dispute, and/or that the decision to make an increased offer of £2.5m was “due to the direct impact of the apparent independent statement made by David Mansour”; and b. Mr Mansour was a “ completely unrelated and independent witness”. These wrongful representation were made deliberately by the Defendant and/or Mr Grahamsley. The said breach in paragraph 2(ii)(a) was deliberate as it is clear from the documents provided by the Defendant on 5 December 2025 that, to Mr Grahmsley’s knowledge, Mr Mansour’s evidence was not crucial and/or did not form the basis of any firm advice to increase the settlement offer. The breach in paragraph 2(ii)(b) was deliberate as, to Mr Grahamsley’s knowledge Mr Mansour’s first witness statement made it clear that he was in a sexual relationship with the Claimant. (iii) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) failed to bring the court’s attention that the court’s jurisdiction to set aside a settlement for fraud was akin to an action for deceit, with the consequence that, if, on the evidence, the Defendant would have settled regardless the alleged fraud, his/UKIL’s claim would fail; the Defendant, in this context, failing to bring the matters set out in paragraphs 2(iv)(a)-(c), 2(v) and 2(vi) below to the court’s attention. (iv) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) failed to bring to the court’s attention the following material matters in respect of Mr Mansour’s evidence, being that: a. Mr Mansour’s first statement was limited to dealing with a single day in respect of months of covert surveillance evidence; b. Mr Mansour’s second witness statement did not materially alter or contradict his first witness statement; c. Alternatively, to the extent it can be argued Mr Mansour’s second witness statement was materially inconsistent with his first witness statement, this was limited to Mr Mansour having originally stated he had to provide detailed directions by electronic communication to the Claimant; however, prior to settlement, the Defendant raised the possibility of obtaining Mr Mansour’s electronic communications but decided, based on leading counsel’s advice, not to request such documents; d. Mr Mansour’s evidence was unreliable because he had fabricated emails purportedly dated 11 June 2022, which undermined the veracity of his evidence; e. By the date of the hearing on 5 January 2024, Mr Mansour’s conduct against the Claimant had resulted in a non-molestation order being granted, which undermined the veracity of Mr Mansour’s evidence; f. The Defendant had received electronic communications from Mr Mansour, which evidenced he had embarked on a sustained campaign of abuse against the Claimant, was jealous of the Claimant seeing other people, was seeking to blackmail the Claimant and he repeatedly threated him and, therefore, Mr Mansour’s evidence should be treated with extreme caution; the said evidence also providing a motive for Mr Mansour to lie in his second witness statement; and g. Although the Defendant relied on Dr Akim Kassim’s report as regards to ‘risk of dissipation’, Dr Kassim’s report also referred to Mr Mansour’s malicious behaviour, which was caused by a denial for financial favour and the Claimant’s refusal to yield to Mr Mansour’s pressure; the said facts providing a motive for Mr Mansour to lie in his second witness statement. (v) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) failed to bring to the court’s attention that, prior to entering into the settlement, Mr Mansour (a) sent an email on 24 April 2022 to Direct Line offering them assistance to defeat the Claimant’s claim and (b) sent numerous messaged to the Claimant stating that he had been in contact with Direct Line providing information to undermine the Claimant’s to set aside the settlement for fraud. (vi) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) failed to bring to the court’s attention that the Claimant would raise the following defence to the underlying claim to set aside the settlement, being that the claim amounted to an abuse of the court’s process as, at all material times before settling, the Defendant had in his counter-schedule and in the context of his legal advice, believed the Claimant was ‘lying’ and was being ‘dishonest’ about the impact of his personal injuries and that there were a plethora of inconsistencies in his evidence, and, therefore, were abusively seeking to reopen the litigation to raise points they could and should have pursued to trial. (vii) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) failed to inform the court that there was a non-molestation order in effect from 22 September 2022 until 3 March 2023, which prevented Mr Mansour from divulging any personal information about the Claimant be divulged. The said facts meant that Mr Mansour was committing a criminal offence and, to the extent the Defendant was aware of the order and requested and received personal information during its currency, the Defendant would also be committing a criminal offence and, therefore, was not coming to court with ‘clean hands’. (viii) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) failed to bring to the court’s attention that the allegations relating to Mr Mansour informing Moore Barlow that he wished to withdraw his statement did not support any allegation that the Claimant had been dishonest in any way. At all material times, Moore Barlow were not instructed by the Claimant but by the Official Solicitor and therefore, the Claimant was not responsible for the matters set out in paragraph 44 of the Defendant’s skeleton argument (and any actions taken in respect of the 2019 Proceedings more generally) (ix) The Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors (who attended the hearing) failed to bring to May J’s attention that the draft freezing order placed before May J omitted: a. the standard wording in the precedent as regards to the right of the Claimant to be released from the order in the event that he provided security; and b. any cross-undertaking in damages from Direct Line Ltd in circumstances where the said undertaking had been expressly offered in Mr Grahamsley’s affidavit dated 3 January 2024.

3. The effect of the aforementioned breaches (whether taken individually and/or collectively) is that the freezing order should be immediately discharged, that no further freezing order should be granted and that the Defendant should be ordered to pay the Claimant’s costs on the indemnity basis.”

38. On 29 January the Claimant's solicitors made a new allegation that the Defendant's solicitor had encouraged Mr Mansour to breach a non-molestation order. The Defendant served a witness statement, together with an application for relief from sanctions to rely on that evidence and expand the particulars of breach. Whilst I gave permission for the Claimant to rely upon the witness statement, I ruled that the Claimant should be strictly confined to the pleaded particulars.

39. In submissions today the Claimant's allegations ranged far and wide. I gave Mr Roseman some latitude to make the points in the way that he wanted to, but I will decide this application on the basis of the pleaded particulars.

40. Lambert J's order required that the document should specify the person against whom each allegation was made. In fact that has not been done. In relation to each of the allegations they all begin “the Defendant and/or his counsel and/or solicitors who attended the hearing”. In other words there is no clarity as to whether the allegation is being made against the Defendant and his counsel and his solicitor, or any one or two of them. The result is that professional people faced with serious allegations do not have the clarity that is required and which was ordered by Lambert J. I consider that the particulars are not compliant with her order in this respect. Furthermore, each of the particulars implicates “the Defendant”. This is incoherent. Mr Limton has had no involvement in the case.

41. Lambert J's order also required the Claimant to identify the effect of the breaches. However the particulars say only that the effect of the aforementioned breaches is that the freezing order should be immediately discharged. It says nothing at all as to the effect of the breaches in the sense of whether they were causative of the order made by May J, or whether the order would not have been made if the breach had not been committed.

42. Thus the Defendant has not grappled with the causative effect of the alleged breaches at all. In this respect also the particulars are not compliant with Lambert J's order. The alleged breaches: analysis

43. I now turn to deal with the alleged breaches. Ground (i)

44. This is the failure fairly to present to May J that in essence there was additional evidence to support the Claimant's case: see paragraph 2(i)(a) and (b). The nub of the allegation here is that at the hearing, Mr Way submitted that in response to the surveillance evidence, the Claimant had served two witness statements, one from the Claimant himself and one from Mr Mansour, when the true position was that there were a total of eight statements responding to the surveillance evidence, including one from the Claimant himself.

45. The disparity between the two witness statements of Mr Mansour was fairly disclosed, and Mr Way drew express attention to the fact that Mr Mansour’s evidence could be challenged. Drawing on the report of Dr Kassim, he said this in his skeleton argument at paragraph 55: "The defendant understands that the claimant's defence to the allegation that Mr Mansour's original witness statement was false and that the claimant himself was dishonest is that malicious behaviour by a friend he had a relationship with and had denied requests for financial favour."

46. So the fact that Mr Mansour's evidence could be challenged as being untruthful was very clearly drawn to the court's attention by Mr Way in his skeleton argument. Furthermore, May J was plainly aware that Mr Mansour’s evidence might be untrue. She said this at [6]: “He has since provided a second statement giving details of the claimant's functioning and ability from which, if true , it appears doubtful that the claimant received any serious and/ or any lasting injury in the accident.” [underlining added]

47. I do not accept that there was a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure. The key point in establishing a good arguable case was the changed evidence of Mr Mansour which was plausible and also supported by a number of messages between him and the Claimant. This clearly established a good arguable case that the settlement had been procured by fraud. The fact that there were other witness statements which supported the Claimant’s case did not alter that position. It was not necessary to draw to May J's attention every factual dispute which might arise for determination at trial.

48. It is not alleged that the alleged non-disclosure was deliberate. Ms Pizzala accepts that the submission was “misleading”. I accept that it was inadvertent. However, I note that the witness statement of Mr Grahamsley at paragraph 24 explained the correct position and this was on May J’s reading list.

49. At paragraph 4 of her judgment May J referred to the fact that there were two witness statements. I consider it unlikely that if May J had known that there was a total of eight statements this would have made a difference to her decision. The overriding point was the changed evidence of Mr Mansour. Indeed, May J said precisely this at paragraph 12 of her judgment.

50. During the course of his submissions this morning, Mr Roseman said that paragraph 4 of the skeleton argument was untrue. The skeleton argument reads as follows: "During the course of proceedings the Defendant obtained evidence of the Claimant by covert surveillance and was granted permission to rely on that evidence. In response to that evidence, the Claimant served witness statements from himself and Mr Mansour. That witness evidence sought to explain various elements of the surveillance evidence, which were prima facie detrimental to the claimant's case."

51. I have read that paragraph carefully, but I cannot see how it is untrue in any way. It does not mention the other witness statements, but the paragraph as it stands is true. I consider that the Claimant's case on this point is overstated.

52. It is then said at paragraph 2(1)(c) of the particulars that, having heard May J's judgment, the Defendant failed to bring to the court's attention the fact that the judgment was based on an erroneous factual premise. Assuming the judgment was indeed based upon an erroneous factual premise, which I do not accept, I do not consider that any failure to bring this to the court's attention was deliberate on the part of counsel or solicitors.

53. The Claimant appears to allege that Mr Way dishonestly chose to remain silent. I can see no reason why he or his instructing solicitor would have deliberately sought to conceal such information, given that it had been disclosed in evidence supporting the application. There is no reason in my judgment to go behind the affidavit of Ms Pizzala (paragraph 21) where she explains the position and rejects this allegation on her own behalf and on behalf of Mr Way.

54. I consider that even if this breach were to be established it would have made no difference to the outcome. But in any event, I do not accept that this was a breach of the duty of full and fair disclosure. The fact that there were other witness statements which supported the Claimant's case did not, in my judgment, affect the good arguable case.

55. Indeed Mr Roseman has not submitted, and the Claimant still does not say, that there was not sufficient material to establish a good arguable case. It is striking that the Claimant does not seek and has not sought in the last two years to set aside the order on the footing that there was not a good arguable case. Ground (ii)

56. I turn to ground (ii) which is an allegedly false representations made to May J regarding the significance of Mr Mansour's evidence. The allegation is that the Defendant (ie Mr Limton who has had no involvement in this case) and/or Mr Grahamsley deliberately wrongly represented to the court (a) that Mr Mansour's evidence was crucial and formed the basis of the advice to increase the offer and (b) that Mr Mansour was a completely unrelated independent witness.

57. As to whether Mr Mansour's evidence was crucial or not, that is a matter which is in dispute here and it will have to be investigated at the trial. Mr Roseman makes this point himself in his skeleton argument of paragraph 49. I accept the point made by Mr Colton by reference to Tugushev , that it is inappropriate to seek to set aside a freezing order where proof of non-disclosure depends upon proof of facts which are themselves an issue in the action. That is the position here. Furthermore, again, May J was no doubt aware that it would be disputed whether Mr Mansour's evidence was crucial to the decision to settle.

58. The second element of the allegation is to the effect that Mr Grahamsley misrepresented Mr Mansour as a completely unrelated and independent witness. But that is not the position. That description of Mr Mansour related to Mr Grahamsley’s state of mind in late May or early June 2022 when he saw the first statement of Mr Mansour. This is explained at paragraph 26 of his witness statement of 23 March 2023. I therefore reject ground (ii). Ground (iii)

59. It is said that the Defendant and/or his counsel and or solicitors failed to bring to the court's attention that the court's jurisdiction to set aside a settlement for fraud was akin to an action for deceit, with the consequence that if, on the evidence, the Defendant would have settled regardless of the alleged fraud, the Defendant's claim would fail.

60. I reject this. First of all, May J would not have needed to have been told what needed to be established in order to set aside a judgment on grounds of fraud. But in any event, Mr Way's skeleton from the hearing at paragraph 59 correctly set out the position by reference to the case at Tinkler v Esken Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 655 . I therefore reject ground (iii). Ground (iv)

61. This is that the Defendant failed to bring to May J's attention a host of other material matters concerning Mr Mansour's evidence and which cast doubt on his credibility.

62. This strikes me as unreal and going well beyond what is required at a hearing of this nature. It was perfectly clear that there was a sharp disparity between the two witness statements of Mr Mansour. May J was not engaged on an exercise which required the detailed scrutiny of the two witness statements and, as I have said, Mr Way set out at paragraph 55 of his skeleton argument the essence of what the Claimant would say about Mr Mansour. May J was aware, if only from her reading of the report of Dr Kassim, which she referred to in argument, that the Claimant and Mr Mansour had fallen out very badly.

63. In my judgment it was obvious that one or other of the two witness statements was untrue in one or more material respects. May J did not need to be told that Mr Mansour had allegedly fabricated emails, nor indeed that a non-molestation order had been granted. She was not being asked to decide whether Mr Mansour was a truthful witness. The point at issue was whether the Defendant had a good arguable case.

64. As I have indicated, she concluded at paragraph 5 that if Mr Mansour's second witness statement was true it was doubtful that the Claimant had received any serious and lasting injury in the accident. On that basis she was entitled to conclude that there was a good arguable case, and I consider that she was right to do so. Furthermore, assuming these additional points relied upon by the Claimant should have been made, I consider it unlikely they would have made any difference to the outcome and I therefore reject ground (iv). Ground (v)

65. This is that the Defendant and/or counsel and/or solicitors failed to bring to the court's attention that prior to entering into the settlement, Mr Mansour had sent an email on 24 April 2022 to Direct Line (part of UKIL) and sent numerous messages to the Claimant stating that he had been in contact with Direct Line.

66. The Claimant says that these facts would have undermined the Defendant's claim to set aside the settlement. Once again it seems to me that the position is that the Defendant did not need to bring to May J's attention every detail about the Defendant's contact with Mr Mansour. They needed to give her a fair presentation of the evidence in order to establish a good arguable case. Once again the fundamental point was that Mr Mansour had provided two witness statements and, if the second witness statement was true, that supported a good arguable case. Ground (v) is rejected. Ground (vi)

67. This is that the Defendant and/or counsel and/or solicitors failed to bring to the court's attention that the claim would raise a defence of abuse of process.

68. This seems to me to be wrong on the facts. Mr Way explained to May J that the Claimant might take issue with the fact that the Defendant was seeking to set aside the final order pursuant to CPR 3.1(7) at paragraph [49] of his skeleton. I consider that there was no breach in this respect and ground (vi) is rejected. (I note also in passing that the abuse of process argument was in fact not advanced until June 2025.) Ground (vii)

69. This is that the Defendant and/or counsel and/or solicitors failed to inform the judge of a non-molestation order obtained by the Claimant against Mr Mansour.

70. This was in fact set out in Mr Grahamsley's first witness statement at paragraph 36. Once again I regard this as a piece of evidence about the relationship between Mr Mansour and the Claimant and this is no doubt a matter that can be gone into at trial. It was no part of the Judge's function to investigate these points in detail. Again, all that needed to be established was a good arguable case and the Judge considered that the second witness statement of Mr Mansour established this. I consider that she was right to do so and I reject ground (vii). Reference is made in the particulars to a potential criminal offence by “the Defendant” but no express allegation is made and so I do not address it further. Ground (viii)

71. This is that the Defendant and/or counsel and/or solicitors failed to draw to the court's attention that the allegations relating to Mr Mansour wishing to withdraw his statement did not support any allegation that the Claimant had been dishonest in any way. I do not understand this. The fact that Mr Mansour wanted to withdraw his first witness statement, which had been supportive of the Claimant was, if true, capable of supporting a submission that the Claimant had been dishonest. If the allegation relates to a failure on the part of Moore Barlow to disclose that Mr Mansour had approached them, then that was not germane to the issues which May J had to decide. Ground (viii) is rejected. Ground (ix)

72. This is that the Defendant and/or counsel and/or solicitors failed to bring to May J's attention the fact that the standard wording in the precedent had been omitted in relation to the right of the Claimant to be released from the order in the event that he provided security and it also omitted the cross undertaking in damages.

73. It is true that it was an omission not to include the right of Claimant to be released from the order if he provided security and May J should have been told about this. I am satisfied that this was an inadvertent oversight. Furthermore, I note that leading counsel for the Official Solicitor had no objection to the terms of the order and so it was technically agreed between the parties and at that point, strictly speaking, counsel was relieved of his duty of full and frank disclosure.

74. But in any event this is not a case where the Claimant would have made any use of the provision for security and indeed when the matter came back before the court on 24 January and 24 June the Claimant did not seek to change the order. So far as the failure to record the cross undertaking by the Defendant's insurer was concerned this was also overlooked, and indeed it was also overlooked by leading counsel for the official solicitor. I am satisfied that it was an inadvertent omission. The willingness to make the undertaking was set out in Mr Way’s skeleton at [72].

75. It was corrected on the face of the order from 24 January 2024 and so therefore there were 19 days during which period of time the cross undertaking had not been given. I do not believe that if these matters had been drawn to May J's attention they would have made any difference to the substance of the order that she made. Conclusion

76. It follows therefore that I reject the submission that the Defendant breached his duty of full and frank disclosure, whether by himself and/or through counsel and/or through solicitors. I consider that the allegations which have been made are either wrong on the facts and/or address matters which were indeed drawn to May J’s attention and/or relate to evidential matters which need not have been brought to the court's attention in the context of establishing a good arguable case. I consider that the Claimant has overstated the depth and breadth of the duty of full and frank disclosure.

77. I would make the following further observations.

78. First, the allegations which have been made have changed and altered over time such that it has been difficult for the Defendant to be clear as to the allegations it was facing. I deprecate this lack of clarity and precision, and I consider that the manner in which the allegations were drafted in the particulars did not comply with the order of Lambert J.

79. Secondly, the Claimant has put its case very high, as Lambert J observed. As she also noted, the Claimant took a rather “cavalier” approach to these allegations. Mr Roseman's skeleton argument uses words like “deliberate”, “outrageous”, “egregious”, “misconceived”, “contumelious”, “false” and “deplorable”. In my judgment the Claimant's approach has not been justified and I consider that it is inappropriate to advance these thin allegations with such overheated language. Coulson LJ, in Metropolitan Housing Trust Ltd v Taylor [2023] EWCA Civ 630 , emphasised the need to retain a sense of proportion in this type of application and I consider that his comment is apposite here.

80. Thirdly, there has been a long delay in making the application to discharge. The order has stood for more than two years and there were opportunities on 24 January and 24 June 2024 to seek to discharge the order, but the application was not brought until 24 October 2025.

81. Standing back, I am quite satisfied that the overarching interests of justice require this injunction to remain in place and that any failings which have been identified, which were minor, do not justify its discharge. For all these reasons I therefore dismiss the application to discharge the freezing order. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected]