BLV, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

DHCJ Bates: INTRODUCTION

1. This case is about a man (the Claimant) who has been deaf since birth, has severely impaired eyesight, and who also suffers with major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder. He is an asylum seeker and is living in accommodation provided for him by the Defendant under s.95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“IA 1999”). That accommodation is a flat in Enfield, north London, (“the Flat”) which has its own kitchen and bathroom facilities. The Claimant also receives financial and in-kind support from the Defendant under s.96 IAA 1999 , including the standard weekly financial allowance (currently £49.18) which is paid to asylum seekers who live in self-catered accommodation. That standard amount has been calculated by the Defendant in a way that assumes that an asylum seeker will need to spend around £4 per week on meeting essential communications needs, such as making phone calls for maintaining social connections with relatives and friends.

2. Ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 , read with other applicable legislation, effectively oblige the Secretary of State to provide accommodation and support for asylum seekers who would otherwise be “ destitute ”. Such support is typically of a basic level, being provided only for ensuring that asylum seekers and their dependant family members are not left without “ adequate ” accommodation and/or their other “ essential living needs ” being met. Many asylum seekers are accommodated in shared accommodation facilities where, unlike the Claimant, they do not have their own kitchen or bathroom. The Defendant’s policy, consistent with the legislation, is that s.95 accommodation is provided on a ‘no choice’ basis and may be located anywhere in the United Kingdom. The Defendant generally seeks to accommodate asylum seekers outside areas, such as London and South-East England, where available accommodation is in relatively short supply and relatively expensive.

3. The relevant statutory duties of the Defendant are not, however, limited to duties arising directly under the IAA 1999 . The Defendant is a public authority and, as such, is required to carry out her duties under the IAA 1999 in such a way as also complies with her duties under the Equality Act 2010 (“ EA 2010 ”) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”). This case raises the following overarching question: In relation to the Defendant’s provision of accommodation and other support for the Claimant, has the Defendant sufficiently adjusted her general approach to providing support under the IAA 1999 to take account of the Claimant’s specific circumstances and needs as a disabled person, to comply with her duties under: (a) the IAA 1999; (b) the EA 2010 ; and (c) the HRA?

4. Before me, it was common ground between the parties that, whilst the IAA 1999 is intended to provide able-bodied asylum seekers with no more than a basic level of subsistence, the Defendant is required to take account of the specific needs of disabled persons. Accommodation or financial support that may be “ adequate ” for, and meet the “ essential living needs ” of, an able-bodied person might not meet those standards in the case of a person with disabilities. Such a person might, for example, have mobility needs, or living costs, which are greater than those of an able-bodied person. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the outcomes required by ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 remain the same. A disabled person is not entitled, by reason of being disabled, to accommodation that is better than “ adequate ”, or support that goes beyond what is required for meeting “ essential living needs ”.

5. The Claimant has pointed to two specific aspects of the supports provided for him under ss.95 -96 which he says amount to failures by the Defendant to comply with her duties: (1) The first aspect is his accommodation in the Flat. He says it is not adequate for him, for essentially two reasons. The first is location: it is too far away from his support network, including the church in Finchley which he was attending whilst he was in two previous accommodation placements (which were in Dulwich and Cricklewood respectively). The second reason is that he cannot safely come and go from the block of flats, because he is afraid to use the disabled persons’ lift which exits into a car park, and the only other exit involves descending a steep flight of stairs from the main door of the building, down to the road. I will refer to the Claimant’s case, so far as it relates to the adequacy or otherwise of his accommodation, as the “ Accommodation Complaint ”. (2) The second aspect is that he has not been provided with stable and reliable internet access (or additional financial support enabling him to self-source such internet access). He claims that the support with which he has been provided – which includes the £49.18 weekly allowance – is inadequate for him, given his circumstances as a deaf person with mental health problems that are being exacerbated by social isolation. As a deaf person, he cannot communicate effectively using voice-calling, since he needs to use face-to-face communication and sign language. He claims to have found it impossible to access mental health and other support services provided via sign language, as the mobile phone signal strength in his accommodation is too poor. The Claimant also says he has been using over 200GB of data per month, which is costing more than he can afford. I will refer to the Claimant’s case, so far as it relates to the adequacy or otherwise of his access to the internet, as the “ Internet Access Complaint ”.

6. As explained further below, whilst these proceedings were already in progress, the Defendant has taken a new decision on the Claimant’s requests for a change in accommodation placement and for better internet access. That new decision (the “New Decision”) was set out in a letter dated 4 July 2025, and these proceedings have thereafter been progressed by the parties on the basis that the judicial review claim is challenging the New Decision.

7. I have found it convenient to structure my judgment by, first, setting out the factual background and summarising the relevant law, before then considering each of those two complaints – i.e. the Accommodation Complaint and the Internet Access Complaint – in turn. In analysing each of those complaints, I deal with the Claimant’s grounds of challenge to the extent that those grounds relate to that complaint. THE FACTS

8. The Claimant is 30-year-old man. He was born in Iran and is an Iranian national. He travelled to the United Kingdom from Iran at the end of May 2022 and claimed asylum. His asylum claim was refused by the Defendant in February 2024, but he has appealed that refusal to the First-tier Tribunal and the appeal proceedings remain in progress.

9. The Claimant has Usher syndrome, an inherited genetic condition that affects hearing, vision, and sometimes balance. It causes progressive damage to the hair cells in the inner ear, causing hearing loss, and to the light-sensing cells in the retina, leading to vision loss. The Claimant has been deaf since birth, and his sight loss is now so severe that he is legally blind. He has tunnel vision, significant impairment of his central vision, and is night-blind. He cannot see in conditions of either near-darkness or bright light. He also suffers with major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder.

10. It is clear from the evidence I have read that the Claimant faces considerable communication challenges in this country. The language in which the Claimant can communicate most effectively is Farsi Sign Language (“FSL”) – a form of communication requiring face-to-face communication, whether in person or by video calling. He can also read and write basic Farsi, and he therefore has some ability to communicate with public services by writing Farsi text and translating it to English using an online translation website. He has some limited understanding of British Sign Language (“BSL”). Given his deafness and the small number of people in the United Kingdom who communicate in FSL, it has been challenging for the Claimant to develop a social network, and it is perhaps unsurprising that he feels isolated.

11. From the time of the Claimant’s arrival in the United Kingdom, he has been provided with accommodation and support by the Defendant under the IAA 1999 . Between June and August 2022, the Claimant was provided with initial asylum accommodation in a hostel in Dulwich, south London. Then, between August 2022 and April 2023, his accommodation was a room in a house in Cricklewood, north London.

12. It appears that, whilst the Claimant was living in those locations, he was able to develop some social connections. These included membership of the church community of an Iranian church in Finchley (the “Iranian Church”), which he first started attending whilst he was still being accommodated in Dulwich and which includes other deaf people who can communicate in FSL. Whilst he was being accommodated in Cricklewood, he was able to become familiar with the local area sufficient that he could travel independently by bus to the Iranian Church and to a BSL course in Holborn.

13. Since April 2023, his accommodation has been in Enfield at the Flat. It is the adequacy or otherwise for him of that accommodation which is the subject matter of the Accommodation Complaint.

14. The Claimant says that the location of the Flat has been a barrier to his travelling independently and maintaining social connections. He seeks to be accommodated either in Finchley (where the Iranian Church is located) or Hammersmith (where he has a friend and from which he could catch a bus to the Iranian Church).

15. The Flat is in a building situated on a busy road. The Flat is on the first floor of the block. The block has two entrances. The main entrance is on the first floor (the same floor as the Flat), which is one floor above street level. Outside the main entrance is a flight of stairs leading down to the street. Anyone wishing to move from the main entrance to the street needs to descend those stairs. The Claimant says he cannot safely do this unaided, because of his poor eyesight and the risk of falling.

16. The other entrance is the building’s wheelchair-accessible entrance from the car parking area on the ground floor. It would be physically possible for him to take the lift from the first floor to the ground floor, and to then walk from the lift exit to the road without encountering any stairs. The Claimant says, however, that this route would also involve safety risks, as the exit/entrance route from the car park to the road is used by vehicles and there is no separate pathway for pedestrians. He also says that the area of the car park where the lift is situated is poorly lit and has various obstacles, which makes it difficult for him to navigate, given his vision impairment. In addition, he is afraid to use lifts, due to a past incident in Iran when he found himself stuck in a lift and was unable to communicate with anyone for seeking help. He claims that, given these circumstances, he cannot come and go unaided from the block of flats and has thus been unable to access his local area.

17. A further concern raised by the Claimant regarding the Flat is that other residents of the block have made complaints to the Police about him or behaved in an aggressive way towards him. It appears from the evidence that his neighbours have sometimes been unhappy about the level of noise coming from his Flat, but that the Claimant’s deafness may have prevented him from realising that he was making noise of a level likely to disturb his neighbours.

18. The Claimant’s Internet Access Complaint relates to both the quality of internet access available to him, and his lack of financial support to meet the costs of his internet usage. There is no WiFi available at the Flat. He is therefore having to use mobile data for accessing the internet, but the mobile signal in his Flat is, he says, poor, with the consequence that trying to use mobile data for video calling can be frustrating. This lack of stable and reliable internet access is said to be preventing him from accessing deaf-specialist remote mental health support provided using sign language communication via video calling. His mobile phone on which he accesses mobile data is on a monthly contract maintained by his former girlfriend and provides him with a data allowance of 200GB per month, which he says he uses up within 2-3 weeks, meaning that additional charges are incurred. He says that, as he has been unable to fully reimburse the girlfriend for the monthly mobile phone bills, he has accumulated a debt to her that now amounts to around £2,000.

19. Enfield Council provides the Claimant with 10 hours per week of in-person support from support workers who can communicate in BSL. The support they provide during those hours includes helping the Claimant to go out into the community, attend medical appointments, buy and cook food, and write emails. The legal basis for Enfield Council’s provision of this support appears to be the discretion under s.19(1) of the Care Act 2014 (the “Care Act”) to meet ‘non-eligible needs’, since the care and support assessment carried out by the Council did not identify the Claimant as having ‘eligible’ care and support needs under that Act . (The correctness or otherwise of that assessment is not a matter before the Court in these proceedings, to which Enfield Council is not a party.)

20. In my assessment, the Claimant’s evidence has sometimes given an inaccurate or incomplete picture of his circumstances, and his case as to why the Flat is not adequate accommodation for him has evolved over time. Examples include the following: (1) The Claimant’s first witness statement gave the impression that there were stairs both outside and inside the block of flats which he had to climb in order to access his Flat. As he accepted in his third witness statement, however, whilst there are stairs outside the main entrance to the block, which is on the first floor, he does not then have to climb any stairs inside the building in order to reach his Flat. He attributed the error in his first statement to a “ misunderstanding [that] occurred because of the difficulties in communicating via two sign language interpreters with [his] solicitor ”. (2) The Claimant’s witness statement evidence was originally that the only way he could leave the block was to descend the external stairs between the main entrance and the road. His third witness statement stated: “ My accommodation has a flight of 10 steps on the outside of the building, leading up to the main door. There is no other way to access the building apart from via this flight of stairs. There is a lift inside the building, but this is irrelevant to me and my accommodation, because my flat is on the same level as the front door, and the bottom of the lift. ” As noted above, however, the lift can be used to travel from the first floor to the ground floor, from which he could then access the car park area and walk from there to the road, without needing to climb or descend any stairs. In response to this being pointed out in the Defendant’s New Decision, the Claimant has pivoted, putting forward a new witness statement, made by his solicitor on his behalf, in which he has, for the first time, asserted that he is not able to use the lift as he has a fear of being stuck in lifts and he cannot safely navigate from the car park to the street. But those alleged impediments to his using the lift were not clearly communicated to the Defendant prior to the date even of the New Decision and therefore cannot fairly be a basis for impugning that decision. (3) The Claimant has asserted that he has been unable to report issues to the Advice, Issue Reporting and Eligibility (“AIRE”) service which receives queries and service requests from asylum seekers regarding accommodation and support. The AIRE service is operated by the charity Migrant Help under contract to the Home Office. The service receives communications from asylum seekers by various methods, including phone call to a freephone helpline number, email and webchat, all of which the Claimant claims he is unable to use. It is apparent from the evidence I have seen, however, that the Claimant has sometimes been able to raise requests with Migrant Help. This is not surprising, given that he can use online translation websites to translate text from Farsi to English, and the support workers provided by Enfield Council can help him communicate with public service organisations, such as by helping him to write an email, or by making a phone call on his behalf. (4) The Claimant’s witness statement evidence alleged that adaptive equipment provided for him in the Flat, namely a vibrating pillow fire alarm and flashing doorbell, were not working. Evidence filed by the Defendant indicates, however, that these items were in place at the time when the Claimant moved into the Flat and were no longer working only because he had disconnected them from the mains power supply. The Claimant had not raised a request with Migrant Help for the equipment to be fixed. (5) The report of Dr Pethania, the clinical psychologist commissioned by the Claimant’s solicitors, appears to have been written on the basis that the Claimant was being accommodated in shared accommodation. His Flat is, in fact, self-contained, having its own kitchen and bathroom facilities.

21. I make no criticism of the Claimant’s solicitors, who have made extensive efforts to overcome barriers to communicating with the Claimant. They are to be commended for the work they have done for enabling access to justice for him. It would not be surprising if confusion had arisen in relation to certain factual matters. Nor do I think that the Claimant has deliberately been less than candid about his circumstances. It is clear to me, however, that – consistent with his medical diagnoses of major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder – he has a very negative perception of his current accommodation and his situation generally, which is likely to have coloured the accounts and descriptions he has provided to his solicitors and third parties. I note that those medical conditions appear to have pre-dated his move to the Flat and therefore do not appear to have been caused by his living in the Flat (albeit I cannot rule out as a possibility that living in the Flat may have aggravated his feelings of anxiety and depression).

22. Given that I have found the Claimant’s evidence about his accommodation not to have been entirely reliable as providing a full and fair picture of his circumstances, I also view his evidence regarding his internet communication difficulties with a degree of circumspection. I note that if, as he claims, mobile phone signal in his accommodation is poor and he is unable to maintain a stable connection good enough for video calling, then it is not clear how he has nevertheless been able to use more than 200GB of data a month. 200GB would be a very high level of mobile data use, even for a person who does not have WiFi access and frequently makes video calls. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND LITIGATION CONDUCT

23. The Claimant first requested that the Defendant provide him with additional support by way of WiFi internet access in September 2024. The Defendant refused that request on 6 November 2024 (the “First Refusal Decision”).

24. On 11 December 2024, the Claimant made a further request, this time for relocation to adequate accommodation, as well as for additional support. The Defendant refused that request on 6 January 2025 (the “Second Refusal Decision”).

25. On 5 March 2025, the Claimant started the present judicial review proceedings, challenging both the First Refusal Decision and the Second Refusal Decision. The Defendant initially resisted the claim on the basis, inter alia , that those decisions were lawful.

26. On 10 April 2025, permission to apply for judicial review was granted by Fordham J, who gave procedural directions truncating the timetable to trial. Those procedural directions required the Defendant to file her Detailed Grounds and evidence by 9 May 2025, and required the Claimant to file a hearing bundle, together with any application to rely on evidence in reply, by 9 June 2025. Fordham J directed that this substantive hearing be listed for the first available date after 9 July 2025. It was on that basis that the hearing before me was listed for 24 July 2025. That timetable allowed sufficient time for the proceedings to be progressed in a fair and orderly way.

27. On 11 June 2025, after the Defendant had already filed and served her Detailed Grounds, and after the deadline for the Claimant to file a hearing bundle had also passed, the Government Legal Department (“GLD”) sent a letter to the Claimant’s solicitors purporting to withdraw both the First Refusal Decision and the Second Refusal Decision and indicating that the Defendant would take a new decision by 2 July 2025. GLD’s letter was not a proposal for an agreed way forward, but was expressed in the following terms: “My client, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, gives the Claimant notice that the above-mentioned decisions are withdrawn and that further, that she will proceed to make a new decision on the Claimant’s entitlement to additional support payments and accommodation within 21 days of the date of this letter … (absent special circumstances). To assist her in making a new decision, the Secretary of State for the Home Department requests the following evidence not later than 7 days after the date of this letter: … [LIST OF REQUESTED ITEMS SET OUT].”

28. There followed an exchange of correspondence in which the Claimant’s solicitors expressed concern at the impact of the Defendant’s position on the procedural timetable and explained that it would not be possible for the Claimant to provide all the requested evidence within a 7-day period.

29. On 18 June 2025, the parties agreed between themselves a draft consent order which set out a new procedural timetable providing for the Defendant to take a new decision by 2 July 2025, and for these judicial review proceedings then to be progressed effectively as a challenge to that new decision. The parties appear to have assumed that it was open to them to agree between themselves that the 24 July listing be used as a substantive hearing for a claim challenging that new decision. I note that the Court had not granted permission to apply for judicial review in respect of any such new decision – a decision that did not yet exist at the date when the parties were agreeing this new procedural timetable between themselves. At no time did either party suggest that the 24 July listing be vacated or that the Court be invited to consider whether it was willing to allow these proceedings to transmogrify into a challenge to a new decision.

30. The New Decision was not provided on 2 July: it was set out in a letter dated 4 July 2025. By the New Decision, the Defendant refused the Claimant’s request to be relocated to self-contained accommodation in the Finchley or Hammersmith areas and for WiFi to be installed in his accommodation and/or for additional funds to pay for mobile data. The Defendant refused the Claimant’s requests on the basis that his current accommodation was adequate for his needs and that he had not demonstrated that he needed WiFi, but invited further information from the Claimant to inform further consideration of his needs in terms of access to mobile data.

31. Following the coming into existence of the New Decision, the parties have focussed on preparing for a substantive hearing of a challenge to that decision. Given the very short period remaining between the date of the New Decision (4 July) and the date of the substantive hearing (24 July), this has involved frenetic activity. The Claimant made a Part 18 request for further information on 8 July. The Claimant filed an Amended Statement of Facts and Grounds, dated 16 July 2025, challenging the New Decision. Unhelpfully, it was not until that same date that the Defendant responded to the Part 18 request. On 17 July, the Defendant filed a witness statement which, including exhibits, ran to 275 pages. (This was the first witness statement filed by the Defendant in these proceedings: the Defendant’s original Detailed Grounds, filed on 17 May 2025, was not accompanied by any witness evidence.) On 21 July, the Defendant filed Amended Detailed Grounds, indicating that she would rely on that same document as her skeleton argument. Replacement core and supplementary bundles had to be filed so as to incorporate all this new material.

32. There have then, within the few days prior to the hearing, been various applications by the parties seeking permission to rely on new material. This new material included a second supplementary bundle which contained, amongst other documents, a further witness statement filed by the Defendant, dated 22 July. On 23 July, the Claimant filed a new witness statement from his solicitor which objected to the late service of evidence by the Defendant, whilst also providing additional material relating to certain of the matters that had been raised by the Defendant in that evidence. These multiple late filings have placed significant additional burdens on the Court.

33. As the Court of Appeal made clear in R (Dolan) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2020] EWCA Civ 1605 , [2021] 1 W.L.R. 2326 , at [118], a judicial review claim challenging a specific decision should not be allowed to morph into a ‘rolling’ process in which the Court is being asked to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over a series of further decisions or developments. In line with that principle, the Administrative Court Guide 2025 (the “Guide”) states as follows at para 7.11.4: “If the defendant has made a new decision superseding the decision under challenge, and the claimant wishes to challenge the fresh decision, in most cases the appropriate course will be to end the claim and file a new one. Although there is no hard and fast rule, it will usually be better for all parties if judicial review proceedings are not treated as “rolling” or “evolving”. An exception to this rule may be justified where, for instance, a new decision is taken at a late stage of the proceedings and the public interest demands an authoritative determination of the legality of the new decision on an expedited basis.”

34. That paragraph of the Guide cross-refers, by footnote, to the recent judgment of Chamberlain J, the Judge in Charge of the Administrative Court List, in Al-Haq v Secretary of State for Business and Trade [2025] EWHC 173 (Admin) , where he stated at [36]: “In general, fresh decisions should be challenged by fresh claims …. Dolan makes clear that exceptions should be rare. There are, however, cases where exceptions may be justified. One scenario is where a new decision is taken at a late stage of the proceedings, the new decision is challenged and the public interest demands an authoritative determination of the legality of the new decision on an expedited basis. If so, the court may take the view that a need for fresh proceedings would cause undesirable delay and therefore allow the new decision to be challenged by way of amendment. However, even then, careful consideration should be given to whether the directions should allow for consideration of the arguability of the amended claim before any final or rolled-up hearing.”

35. The subsequent paragraph of the Guide – para 7.11.5 – highlights “ a number of matters to note ” where “ an application is made to amend to challenge a later decision ”. It is apparent from that paragraph that the Guide envisages that the parties will apply to the Court for permission to extend the scope of the claim to include the new decision, so that the Court can consider whether this is appropriate and, if so, what procedural directions should be given and whether a fresh consideration of permission to apply for judicial review is required.

36. In my view, this case, far from justifying an exception, illustrates why, as Chamberlain J stated, exceptions to general position that “ fresh decisions should be challenged by fresh claims … should be rare ”. The Claimant has been placed in the unfair position of having to rapidly reformulate his case, within a very short timescale, into a challenge to the New Decision by criticising, and seeking to counter the reasons given in, that fresh decision. The Court has had to grapple with bundles still containing arguments and evidence relating to a challenge to decisions that have ceased to be the target of the claim. Had a fresh claim been brought, then the material before the Court would have been focused on the challenge to the New Decision. Further, the preparation and exchange of evidence would have proceeded in an orderly sequence, without last-minute exchanges of new additional evidence and additional bundles, some of them coming after skeleton arguments had already been filed.

37. Whilst I understand the Claimant’s keenness to progress these proceedings and to keep the benefit of Fordham J’s grant of permission to apply for judicial review, those concerns did not, in the circumstances of this case, properly justify a ‘rolling review’ approach (as opposed to issuing a new claim). These proceedings are not extremely urgent. The Claimant had been living in his Flat for nearly 2 years prior to starting these proceedings, and his reasons for seeking alternative accommodation and better internet connectivity do not relate to any recent change in his circumstances.

38. It follows that the position taken by the Defendant in GLD’s letter of 11 June 2025 was inappropriate. The Defendant should have recognised that her withdrawal of the challenged decisions, and her intended reconsideration, had rendered the existing proceedings academic and made it appropriate for those proceedings to be ended. She should have explained her reasons for wishing to take a new decision and proposed terms – in particular, as to costs – on which the existing proceedings be concluded by consent. If her reasons genuinely related to a need to take account of either (i) a material change in circumstances that had arisen, or (ii) new information that had been provided to her, only after the dates of the challenged decisions, then the appropriate costs order would probably have been ‘no order for costs’. If, however, the Defendant’s reasons were, in truth, that she recognised that her existing decisions were unlikely to withstand challenge, and she wished to take a replacement decision that she would have a better chance of successfully defending, then she should have offered to pay the Claimant’s costs. If the parties were unable to reach agreement as to the appropriate costs order, then they could, as a last resort, have agreed a draft consent order providing that the claim be withdrawn and setting out a procedural timetable for the Court to resolve the costs issue based on short written submissions. This would have enabled the Court to make a paper determination as to the appropriate costs order, applying the principles in M v London Borough of Croydon [2012] EWCA Civ 595 , analysed in R (IX) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Judicial review, Costs) [2025] UKUT 00154 (IAC) (Swift J and UTJ Smith).

39. Given, however, that the hearing came on before me on 24 July in circumstances where both parties had come prepared to argue the merits of a challenge to the New Decision, and I had already done the pre-reading, I have ultimately taken the pragmatic course of determining that challenge. Accordingly, I permitted the Claimant to amend his claim as per his Amended Statement of Facts and Grounds, and I grant permission, insofar as may be required, for the grounds of challenge set out therein.

40. I have also granted the parties’ respective late applications to adduce additional evidence. The need for the Claimant to file additional evidence arose because of the Defendant’s taking of the New Decision. No such justification applies to the Defendant’s applications to adduce, at a very late stage, new witness evidence relating to historical events pre-dating the New Decision. Nevertheless, I decided that it was in the interests of justice to permit reliance on that new evidence, given that: (a) it exhibited contemporaneous documents relating to specific factual matters that were relevant to issues in the proceedings; and (b) I would assess that evidence bearing in mind that the Claimant had had little opportunity to prepare responsive evidence.

41. These pragmatic decisions will not prevent me from taking account of the parties’ litigation conduct when deciding what costs orders to make. GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE TO THE NEW DECISION

42. The Claimant’s amended grounds of challenge allege that the New Decision is unlawful on each of the following bases: (1) Breach of the Defendant’s statutory duty under s.95 IAA 1999 ; (2) Irrationality and/or contrary to the Defendant’s published policies; (3) Unlawful discrimination because of the Claimant’s disability, contrary to EA 2010 , ss.6 , 15, 20(3), 21(1) and 29(6); and (4) Breach of the Defendant’s duty under s.6 HRA 1998 by reason of incompatibility with the Convention Rights, specifically Article 8 and Article 14 (with Article 8). LEGISLATION AND CASE-LAW IAA 1999

43. S.95 IAA 1999 empowers the Defendant to provide, or arrange the provision of, “ support ” for asylum seekers who would otherwise be “ destitute ”. The term “ destitute ” is defined in such a way as to capture only persons who do “ not have adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it ” or who “ cannot meet [their] other essential living needs ”.

44. Pursuant to s.96(1) IAA 1999 , the “ support ” that may be provided under s.95 includes the provision of, inter alia , “accommodation appearing to the Secretary of State to be adequate for the needs of the supported person and his dependants” and “ what appear to the Secretary of State to be essential living needs of the supported person and his dependants ”.

45. It is apparent from ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 that Parliament has restricted the support available under those provisions to a basic level of support needed for rescuing asylum seekers from destitution that they would otherwise suffer whilst their asylum claims are being determined. As I observed in R (TMX) v London Borough of Croydon and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWHC 129 (Admin) at [77], such support is “ intended to catch only those people who have been unable to benefit from any other safety net, doing so just before they reach the ‘destitution’ bottom of the pit of homelessness and penury ”.

46. The power under s.95 to provide accommodation and other support to a destitute asylum seeker is effectively converted into a duty by reg.5 of the Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2005 (the “Reception Conditions Regs”), which provides that if an asylum seeker applies for support and the Defendant considers him to be eligible, the Defendant “ must offer the provision of support to the asylum seeker… ”. (See R (Refugee Action) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 1033 (Admin) (“ Refugee Action ”), [13], [85], [88].)

47. By virtue of reg.5 Reception Conditions Regs, the Defendant must not provide accommodation or support which falls below the minimum standard required to ensure that asylum seekers receive “ a dignified standard of living ” which is “ adequate for the health of claimants and capable of ensuring their subsistence ”: R (JK (Burundi)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 W.L.R. 4567 (“ JK (Burundi) ”), [59]. “ Health ”, in the context of s.95 IAA 1999 , is not limited to the physical health of a supported person but includes mental health and physical safety: R (NB) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 1489 (Admin) , [2021] 4 W.L.R. 92 , [156].

48. “ Adequate accommodation ”: It is apparent from s.96(1) (a) IAA 1999 (quoted above) that accommodation will be “ adequate ” only if it meets “the needs of the supported person ”. S.95(5) provides that the Secretary of State, in determining whether a person’s accommodation is “ adequate ”, “ must have regard to such matters as may be prescribed ”. Those matters, prescribed in reg.8(3) of the Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (the “Asylum Support Regs”), include “ whether it would be reasonable for the person to continue to occupy the accommodation ” and “ whether the person can secure entry to the accommodation ”.

49. Accommodation under s.95 IAA 1999 is provided on a ‘no-choice’ basis as to locality and type of accommodation. S.97(2) IAA 1999 prohibits the Secretary of State, when providing accommodation under s.95 , from having regard to “ any preference that the supported person … may have as to the locality in which the accommodation is to be provided ” (emphasis added) (see also s.95(5) (b) read with (6)(d)). But this does not preclude the Secretary of State from taking into account the individual’s circumstances , such as disabilities or health conditions, which may indicate a need for the accommodation to be within a particular geographical area. On the contrary, the Defendant is required to have regard to the special needs of a “ vulnerable person ” who is in receipt of support under s.95 IAA 1999 : reg.4(2) Reception Conditions Regs. The term “ vulnerable person ” is defined at reg.4(3) Reception Conditions Regs as including “ a disabled person ”.

50. The Defendant’s published policy on asylum accommodation acknowledges that she is “ obliged to consider the individual circumstances of each applicant, including their needs…” ( Allocation of Accommodation (version 13.0, 4 June 2025), p.7). Where requests for are made for accommodation in a specific area for reasons relating to disability, medical treatment, or a need to be within reasonable travelling distance of a particular place of worship, these must each be considered. The advice of the Home Office Medical Adviser or Psychiatrist may be sought for their opinion on the disruption of any medical care and/or treatment and related assistance the individual is receiving.

51. In R (SA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1787 (Admin) (“ SA ”), Fordham J provided the following guidance as to the approach to be taken by a court for assessing whether the accommodation being provided for an asylum seeker is “ adequate ”: “[8] There is a twin-track test for deciding whether the Home Secretary's duty has been discharged. … Under the twin-track test, a first question is whether the Home Secretary's response meets an 'objective minimum standard', whose delineation is a hard-edged question for the judicial review court. A second question is whether the response involves an evaluative judgment which is reasonable, another objective standard but one involving the familiar secondary judgment, which respects the latitude afforded to the primary decision-maker. … [9] As with essential living needs, the question whether adequate accommodation is being provided in discharge of the statutory duty, requires this principled approach. (1) Adequacy must be tested by reference to the needs of those persons to whom the duty is owed, in a context where accommodation is being provided to prevent destitution …. (2) Adequacy must be tested by reference to – and so measured against – the individual circumstances and needs of each relevant individual, including each dependent, having regard to the age of any child …. (3) Adequacy must ensure, as an objective minimum standard, a dignified standard of living, which is adequate for health and is capable of ensuring subsistence …. (4) The evaluative judgment of adequacy of accommodation, carried out for the Home Secretary, must satisfy basic standards of reasonableness (and any other relevant public law grounds) …. (5) These are high thresholds for an asylum seeker to meet …. [10] Adequacy is informed by length of time …. (1) Accommodation may be adequate only in the short-term …, and not adequate on a long-term basis …, becoming unsuitable by reason of the passage of time …. (2) It is necessary to look at the totality of accommodation …, the conditions and how long they are being experienced …. (3) There may also be a change in circumstances or change in needs which mean accommodation is no longer adequate …. (4) It is relevant to consider the prospective picture and the explanation given: the period during which the accommodation was or is "likely to be" occupied …, the "uncertainty" …, whether the "stay was only to be a short one", and whether those affected were "reliably informed that this was the case, so that they had the comfort of knowing that their stay was finite" ….”

52. “ Essential living needs ”: Reg.10(2) Asylum Support Regs sets out that, where the Defendant has decided that a person should receive support under s.95 IAA 1999 , the “ general rule ” is that the “ essential living needs ” of that person will be met by a weekly cash payment of £49.18. The effect of reg.10 is that the Defendant is under a duty to pay the asylum seeker that amount per week unless the Defendant has made a determination under reg.10(5) to reduce that amount so as to reflect the extent to which the individual’s “ essential living needs ” are being met as part of the accommodation provision being made for him (as may be the case where, for example, the accommodation is on a ‘bed-and-breakfast’, ‘half-board’ or ‘full-board’ basis and therefore includes meals).

53. The Defendant may pay the individual a higher amount of cash payment than the standard amount where the circumstances of the individual’s case are “ exceptional ”: s.96(2) IAA 1999 . As Popplewell J (as he then was) observed in Refugee Action at [36]: “This is not a power to provide in exceptional circumstances for needs which are not essential living needs, because it is expressed to be the provision of “ support under ” which can only be for non-accommodation needs if they are essential living needs …”. s.95

54. Equally, however, the Secretary of State should exercise her power to pay an individual a higher cash payment amount, or to otherwise make additional in-kind provision for that individual, in a way that accords with the statutory purpose of ensuring that the person’s “ essential living needs ” are met. The “ general rule ” weekly rate of £49.18 is calculated with a view to meeting the essential living needs of individuals within the category of persons for whom that amount is prescribed and which “ may be anticipated as normal for each category as a whole ”: Refugee Action , [37]. (The category of persons for which the £49.18 amount has been prescribed comprises all asylum seekers and their dependants, apart from pregnant women and children under 4 years of age for whom a higher rate of payment is prescribed by reg.10A Asylum Support Regs.) As Popplewell J noted, “ the needs of individual asylum seekers with particular physical or mental disabilities may well be [exceptional] ” ( Refugee Action , [38]) as such disabilities may give rise to “ essential living needs ”, or costs of meeting such needs, which are “ outside the scope of what can be anticipated as being normal for the cohort as a whole ” ( Refugee Action , [37]).

55. The Defendant has produced a guidance document, Applications for additional support (version 1.0, 16 March 2017), which her caseworkers are to apply when determining applications for additional support.

56. When a court is determining whether a refusal by the Secretary of State to pay a higher cash payment or provide other additional support constitutes a breach of her duties under ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 , the court will apply the “ twin-track test ” to which Fordham J referred in SA at [8] (quoted above at para 51). As Flaux J set out in R (SG) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2639 (Admin) (whose decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in JK (Burundi) ) at [138]-[140]: (1) The court will first determine for itself whether the Secretary of State has complied with the “ minimum standard ”, which is “ an objective one to be determined by the court ”. “ The Secretary of State must make provision … which ensures full respect for human dignity and a dignified standard of living, maintains an adequate standard of health and meets the subsistence needs of the asylum seeker. ” (2) Even if that objective minimum standard has been met, the court will go on to consider whether the Secretary of State’s judgement that provision of the requested additional support was not required for meeting the individual’s essential living needs was compliant with public law standards including rationality.

57. When the court is assessing lawfulness under the second part of that “ twin-track test ”, it is appropriate to keep in mind Popplewell J’s observation in Refugee Action at [91]: “An assessment of what is essential and the extent to which something is a need involves a value judgement. The function of making that value judgement is conferred by Parliament on the elected government, in the person of the Secretary of State. Subject to compliance with the minimum content required by the [EU Reception] Directive, her judgment on whether goods or facilities constitute a need which is essential is only open to review on the high threshold of Wednesbury unreasonableness or other established public law grounds.”

58. A person’s “ essential living needs ” include communication needs, since communication is essential for maintaining essential interpersonal and social relationships as well as cultural and religious life: Refugee Action , [115]. But, as Farbey J noted in JM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 2514 (Admin) , [2022] PTSR 260 , (“ JM ”), [25]-[26]: (1) whilst asylum seekers must have the “ possibility of communicating ” with relatives, etc., this “ is not the same as having a right to make as many phone calls as a person may wish to make at public expense ”; and (2) “ communication needs may be met in kind rather than cash by giving access to communication devices such as a phone ”. EA 2010

59. Disability is a “ protected characteristic” for the purposes of the EA 2010 : s.6(1) EA 2010. A person who is “ certified as blind, severely sight impaired, sight impaired or partially sighted by a consultant ophthalmologist ” is conclusively deemed to have a disability: reg.7 of the Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010.

60. S.29 EA 2010 imposes on persons who are exercising public functions or providing services to the public, duties to avoid discriminating against a person with a protected characteristic.

61. S.15 EA 2010 identifies as a form of ‘discrimination’ the subjection of a disabled person to unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of his disability, where the person responsible for that treatment cannot show that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

62. S.29(7) provides that a “ duty to make reasonable adjustments ” applies to “ a service-provider ” and “ a person who exercises a public function ”. The duty is set out in s.20 , read with Schedule 2, EA 2010 . By s.21(2) , a failure to comply with that duty is a form of ‘discrimination’. The duty comprises three requirements, each of which applies independently of the others. The first of those requirements is set out in s.20(3) : “The first requirement is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A’s puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage.”

63. As to how that requirement is to be interpreted: (1) The phrase “ provision, criterion or practice ” (“PCP”) is to be interpreted broadly: Ishola v Transport for London [2020] EWCA Civ 112 , [2020] I.C.R. 1204 , [28], [31], [35]-[38]. (2) “ Substantial ” means “ more than minor or trivial ”: s.212(1) EA 2010 .

64. When considering whether a PCP has the effect of producing a substantial disadvantage between those who are, and those who are not, disabled, it is not necessary to demonstrate that every member of the affected class suffers the disadvantage: Essop v Home Office [2017] UKSC 27 , [2017] I.R.L.R. 558 , per Lady Hale at [27]. That disabled and able-bodied people may both be affected by a PCP does not preclude substantial disadvantage in circumstances where the likelihood or frequency of the impact is greater for the disabled person: Pipe v Coventry University Higher Education Corp [2023] EAT 73 , [2023] I.R.L.R. 745 , per Eady P at [125]. HRA 1998

65. The right to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention Rights set out within Schedule 1 to the HRA (which replicates Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”)) encompasses the right to “ establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ”: Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1, [61].

66. Article 14 of the Convention Rights provides that enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the other Articles shall be secured without discrimination on the ground of any “ status ”. Article 14 protects against both ‘indirect discrimination’ and ‘ Thlimmenos discrimination’. The latter kind of discrimination arises “ when states without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different ”: Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 15, [44] (see also R (Donald) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWHC 1492 (Admin) , [126], [128], [133]).

67. Where the difference in treatment alleged is on a suspect ground, such as disability, the court requires “ very weighty reasons ” to justify any discrimination: R (SC) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2021] UKSC 26 , [2022] A.C. 223 , [112]-[113].

68. The courts often ask four questions in deciding whether there has been discrimination for the purposes of Article 14: (i) Does the subject matter of the complaint fall within the ambit of one of the substantive Convention rights? (ii) Does the ground upon which the complainant has been treated differently constitute a ‘status’? (iii) Have they been treated differently from other people not sharing that status who are similarly situated or, alternatively, have they been treated in the same way as other people not sharing that status whose situation is relevantly different from theirs? and (iv) Does that difference or similarity in treatment have an objective and reasonable justification? (See, e.g., R (DA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Shelter Children’s Legal Services intervening) [2019] UKSC 21 , [2019] 1 W.L.R. 3289 , [136], per Lady Hale; and R (Vanriel) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 3415, [2022] Q.B. 737 , [44], per Bourne J.) ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMANT’S GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE

69. As noted above, the Claimant’s challenge to the New Decision raises essentially two complaints: (1) the Accommodation Complaint; and (2) the Internet Access Complaint. The legal duties identified by the Claimant’s four amended grounds are relevant to each of those two complaints. I have therefore found it convenient to set out my analysis of the claim by taking the two complaints in turn, rather than by considering each of the four grounds sequentially. THE ACCOMMODATION COMPLAINT General assessment

70. On a human level, I have considerable sympathy for the Claimant and his desire to be provided with accommodation in a location where he can more regularly access his community at the Iranian Church in Finchley. His congenital deafness, progressive loss of vision, and the fact that his language is FSL, all make it difficult for him to forge new social connections in this country. He is experiencing a sense of social isolation which is exacerbating his depression and anxiety disorders. It must have been a huge comfort to him to have become part of a church community that includes deaf people with whom he shares a cultural background and who communicate in his language. I accept that, if he were relocated back to Cricklewood or another area from which he could resume regularly travelling to the Iranian Church, it is likely that his mood and quality of life would improve. I suspect that reconnecting him with that support network would also, in the long run, benefit the public interest by enabling him to become more independent and access community support, potentially reducing his dependency on public services.

71. The Court, however, needs to apply legal standards for determining whether the Defendant’s refusal to accede to the Claimant’s relocation request is unlawful. Asylum support under ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 is a context in which Parliament has provided a ‘last resort’ safety net to rescue asylum seekers from destitution. In this context, it would be wrong in principle for the Court to find the Defendant’s refusal to relocate the Claimant to be unlawful merely because the location or characteristics of his current accommodation are ‘sub-optimal’ or because his mental or physical wellbeing might well be improved if his relocation request were granted. Many people in this country are required, through force of circumstances, to live in locations, or in properties, that are sub-optimal for them and may be impeding improvement in their mental health. Asylum seekers, even if living with serious disabilities, cannot realistically expect to be accommodated at whatever location would be most beneficial for them.

72. I have focussed primarily on the location of the Claimant’s current accommodation as this appears to be his principal concern. In my assessment, the other issues he has raised regarding his current accommodation are ones he is raising essentially as supplementary points for bolstering his case that his current accommodation is unsuitable for him, so that he can be moved back to the Cricklewood/Finchley area. For example: (1) His concern that other residents of the accommodation block have been unfriendly or aggressive towards him, and have on occasions called the Police, because of the level of noise coming from his Flat (of which he was himself oblivious) relates to an issue that could exist if he were accommodated in any residential building most or all of the other residents of which are non-deaf people. But the Claimant is not seeking to be accommodated in a residential facility exclusively for deaf people. The remedy he has sought from the Defendant, and now seeks from this Court, could, if granted, result in his being accommodated in a block of flats in the Finchley area where similar noise complaint issues could arise. (2) Although he has raised points regarding the adaptive equipment provided to him (such as the vibrating pillow and flashing doorbell) not working, the remedy he seeks is not that the adaptive equipment be fixed. Rather, his focus is on seeking a move to the Finchley or Hammersmith areas. (3) Likewise, his concerns regarding the lighting and wall paint colour in the communal corridors being too bright for him to be able to navigate them safely, whilst a genuine issue, is not central to his true concerns. In any building to which the Claimant might be moved, but at which the other residents did not have the Claimant’s vision difficulties, the lighting and colours in the communal corridors could be sub-optimal for him. He might therefore need to engage with the Defendant to request that the managers of the building make reasonable adjustments for him by modifying the lighting or changing the decoration of the corridors. But the making of such modifications in the common areas he uses at his current accommodation is not the remedy he is seeking in these proceedings.

73. The New Decision, in setting out the Defendant’s reasons for refusing to relocate the Claimant, engages with his concerns regarding the location of the Flat and the extent to which this is impeding his ability to maintain social connections and access his support network. As the New Decision points out, he was able to establish social connections whilst living in the places where he was previously accommodated, and the same opportunity is available to him in Enfield. On that basis, the New Decision concludes essentially that the Defendant’s ‘no choice’ approach to the allocation of s.95 accommodation should be maintained, at least in relation to the location of his accommodation within London, and should not give way to the Claimant’s preference to be accommodated close to the Iranian Church or to his friend in Hammersmith.

74. As the New Decision notes, the Defendant has already made concessions from her general approach by agreeing, in line with advice from her medical advisers, that the Claimant be accommodated: (a) in self-contained accommodation, so that he does not have to share kitchen or bathroom facilities; and (b) in London, so that he can more easily travel to appointments at Moorfields Eye Hospital in East London. These are significant concessions from the Defendant’s general approach to accommodating single asylum seekers, many of whom are dispersed to shared accommodation in places outside of London and the South-East.

75. I cannot say that the Defendant’s refusal to relocate the Claimant to one of his preferred locations within London is baseless or irrational, or that the Defendant’s medical advisers are wrong not to have advised that the Claimant’s mental health required that he be moved to one of those locations. There are many churches in the Enfield area, and there is no reason to think they would not welcome the Claimant and be keen to assist him. There will also be many deaf people, and services for deaf people, in the Enfield area. Further, the Claimant is not socially isolated. He benefits from spending 10 hours a week in the company of deaf support workers provided by Enfield Council, with at least one of whom he has established a personal friendship. He is also visited by various friends, even if such visits are not as frequent as he would like. Indeed, at least one of the instances when his neighbours called the Police appears to have been driven by the level of noise coming from the Flat whilst the Claimant was being visited by friends who were still with him in the early hours of the morning.

76. I accept that these social opportunities are not as valuable for him as being able to regularly attend the Iranian Church, which I understand is one of five Iranian churches in London but the only one that provides accessibility for deaf people, such as live translation of services into Farsi text or FSL. It is a pity that it is now difficult for him to travel there, albeit he can still maintain some connection with his friends in the congregation. But it does not follow that his current accommodation is not legally “ adequate ” accommodation. The Defendant’s duty to provide accommodation that is “ adequate ” for meeting the Claimant’s needs (which include the human need for social interaction and connections) does not mean that the accommodation must be ideal or optimal for enabling the Claimant to maximise his social connections or for promoting his wellbeing.

77. With regard to the Claimant’s complaint that the physical features of the block of flats make it impossible for him to safely come and go from it unaided, the New Decision notes that the block benefits from step-free access to street level via the lift and the ground floor car park. As noted above at para 20(2), the Claimant has sought to respond to the New Decision’s reliance on this point by pivoting to a contention that he is afraid to use lifts and, in addition, finds the car park difficult to navigate safely. But that contention cannot properly assist the Claimant in challenging the New Decision, the lawfulness of which is to be assessed based on the facts that had been placed before the Defendant at the time when that decision was taken.

78. Moreover, the limitations on the Claimant’s ability to safely travel unaided in the community are not solely attributable to difficulties in navigating from his Flat to the street outside. The sad reality is that, as the Claimant’s sight progressively deteriorates, there will be increasing risks for him in moving around in the community unaided. In that regard, I note that the care and support assessment carried out by Enfield Council, though not internally consistent in all respects, contains text suggesting that the Claimant ought anyway to be assisted by another person when he goes into the community; for example: “ He is at risk of falling when going outside alone without support, due to his visual impairment. A care worker should accompany him when leaving the home to reduce this risk. ” The 10 hours per week of assistance he receives from care support workers can be used partly for moving around in the community, whether for going shopping, attending medical appointments, or participating in social activities. Thus, he plainly is able to spend some time away from his accommodation and to connect with people and activities in the community – albeit not as much as he would like.

79. Further, the witness statement from one of the support workers shows that the Claimant does sometimes, without being accompanied, “ take the bus that goes directly from his accommodation to the Tube station, but because he has Usher’s Syndrome, he is only able to manage this journey in daylight. … If it is dark, he cannot go out at all. ” Again, this is consistent with the Claimant being able to fulfil his human need for social interaction and connection, whilst being accommodated at the Flat – albeit not as much, or as fully, as he would like. Is the accommodation that the Defendant has provided for the Claimant “adequate” within the meaning of ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 ?

80. I apply the “ twin-track test ” laid down in the case-law to which I have referred at paras 51 and 56 above. Accordingly, the first question I need to consider is whether the Claimant’s accommodation at the Flat suffices to provide for him, as an objective minimum standard, a dignified standard of living, which is adequate for health and is capable of ensuring subsistence. In light of my analysis set out at paras 70-79 above, I am satisfied that it does. Whilst it would be more advantageous for the Claimant to live in ground floor accommodation close to the Iranian Church, his being temporarily accommodated at the Flat whilst his asylum claim is progressing through the appeals system is not preventing his human need for social interaction and connections from being met.

81. I therefore move on to the second part of the test. Is the Defendant’s judgment, in her New Decision, that the Flat is “ adequate ” for meeting the Claimant’s needs irrational or otherwise in breach of public law standards? In light of my analysis at paras 70-79 above, there is no basis for me to answer that question in the affirmative. The Defendant’s reasons in the New Decision show that she has carefully considered the Claimant’s circumstances and has reasonably concluded that the location and physical accessibility of the Flat are not such as to prevent his needs from being met. Her conclusion is supported by the advice of her own medical advisers, on whom she is entitled to rely notwithstanding alternative opinions expressed by the clinical psychologist the Claimant has instructed. Moreover, even that clinical psychologist’s report does not identify the Claimant’s current accommodation as the operating cause of his depression and anxiety. Rather, the psychologist opines that the current accommodation is a contributory factor in “ maintaining and exacerbating his current distress and symptoms ”, whilst acknowledging that it is one of multiple factors that have cumulatively contributed to his poor mental wellbeing. Those factors include his unhappy experiences whilst he was still in Iran, the rejection of his asylum claim, and his sense of uncertainty about his future. The Defendant was also entitled to place weight on the fact that s.95 accommodation is intended to be temporary.

82. These are conclusions I reach despite applying an ‘intensive scrutiny’ approach when assessing the Defendant’s reasons in the New Decision. As authority for the proposition that intensive scrutiny is appropriate in this case, the Claimant’s Counsel relied on R (KM) v Cambridgeshire County Council [2012] UKSC 23 , [2012] P.T.S.R. 1189, per Lord Wilson at [36]. It is important to note that Lord Wilson did not say that the intensity of the court’s review would always be high in a case relating to provisions made for a person with disabilities. Rather, he stated that “ in community care cases the intensity of review will depend on the profundity of the impact of the determination ”. The present case does not concern whether the Claimant should be accommodated at all, or whether he should receive social care support. Rather, it is concerned with ‘second order’ matters of detail – albeit details that are important to the Claimant – relating to his accommodation (such as the precise location of his self-contained accommodation within London) and to the precise support package he needs for video calling. Nevertheless, I have consciously approached the New Decision keeping in mind, and seeking to apply, the “ anxious scrutiny ” approach described by Fordham J in R (Al-noor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 922 (Admin) , [2025] 4 W.L.R. 57 , at [28]. I am satisfied that the New Decision withstands such scrutiny. It is a carefully reasoned decision that has, in my judgment, taken care to consider all the significant points in favour of granting the Claimant’s requests, informed by expert advice from the Defendant’s medical advisers.

83. This case serves to highlight the radical difference between (i) the objective of, and requirements imposed on the Defendant by, ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 , and (ii) the objective of, and requirements imposed on local authorities by, the Care Act. The IAA 1999 is directed at ensuring the provision for asylum seekers of a minimum level of support so as to rescue them from destitution, i.e. from conditions of life so poor that their basic needs would be unmet. This implies a duty for the Defendant to meet essential needs but no more. Such a duty is fundamentally different in objective and character from the duty of local authorities under s.1 of the Care Act “ to promote [an] individual's well-being ”, including in relation to “ control by the individual over day-to-day life ”, “ participation in work, education, training or recreation ”, “ social and economic well-being ”, and “ the individual's contribution to society ”, and doing so having regard to “the individual's views, wishes, feelings and beliefs ”. A duty to meet basic human needs is not to be equated with a duty to promote human flourishing or to ensure that a person who has disabilities can live as full and as independent a life as possible. Does the Defendant’s refusal of the Claimant’s request to be relocated from the Flat constitute an unlawful departure from her own policies?

84. I see no basis for finding that the Defendant’s refusal of the Claimant’s request to be relocated from the Flat constitutes an unlawful departure from her policies. The Defendant’s Allocation of Accommodation policy (see para 50 above) envisages that requests to be accommodated in a certain location, or in accommodation with particular features or characteristics, will be considered by reference to the individual’s circumstances. In her New Decision, the Defendant has considered the Claimant’s circumstances and explained why, in her judgement, those circumstances do not justify acceding to the Claimant’s accommodation change request, albeit they do justify providing him with accommodation that is self-contained and in London (as he already has by way of the Flat). Is the Defendant’s refusal of the Claimant’s request to be relocated from the Flat a breach of the EA 2010 ?

85. The Claimant has put his case under the EA 2010 , so far as relates to his Accommodation Complaint, in two ways.

86. The first is that the Defendant’s failure to provide him with “adequate” accommodation as required by constitutes discrimination of the type described in s.95 IAA 1999 s.15 EA 2010 , i.e. unfavourable treatment of the Claimant because of something arising in consequence of his disability, and without showing that this unfavourable treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. For the reasons I have already set out above, however, the Defendant has not failed to provide the Claimant with “ adequate ” accommodation; so the starting assumption for this complaint falls away.

87. Even if I were to reframe the Claimant’s case in relation to s.15 EA 2010 as an allegation that the Defendant’s refusal of the Claimant’s request to be relocated from the Flat constituted discrimination (without that allegation being predicated on a breach of s.95 IAA 1999 ), I would still dismiss it. The Defendant is not, by refusing the Claimant’s request, treating him unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of his disability. The Defendant’s refusal to accede to the Claimant’s request to be moved to Finchley or Hammersmith is an application of the Defendant’s ‘no choice’ accommodation allocation approach which applies to all asylum seekers receiving support under s.95 IAA 1999. The Claimant’s request has not been refused because of anything arising in consequence of his disability.

88. It may be that the Claimant’s case on discrimination would have been more appropriately advanced in reliance on s.19 EA 2010 (‘indirect discrimination’), but it would still have failed. That is so even assuming, in the Claimant’s favour, that the Defendant’s refusal of the Claimant’s request is the result of an application of policies and practices for allocating accommodation to asylum seekers which constitute a PCP, notwithstanding that the ‘no choice’ approach to allocating asylum seekers’ accommodation is effectively mandated by statute in the form of s.97(2) IAA 1999 .

89. I accept it is arguable that such a PCP could put people with disabilities “ at a particular disadvantage ” as compared with able-bodied people, given that people with disabilities are more likely to be disadvantaged by an approach to allocating accommodation without regard to the individual’s preferences. In my judgment, however, such a PCP would be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, given that: (a) adherence to the ‘no choice’ approach pursues a legitimate aim, namely to confine s.95 support in accordance with Parliament’s intention that such support be a safety net of last resort and meet an individual’s basic needs, and that there be ‘no choice’ as to geographical location; and (b) the Defendant’s policy is to consider a disabled individual’s circumstances when allocating accommodation and to ensure that the accommodation meets his or her needs, taking into account the disabilities. It is because the Defendant is operating that policy that the Claimant is being accommodated in self-contained accommodation in London, and not in shared accommodation away from the South-East (as would probably be his situation if he did not have disabilities).

90. The second way that the Claimant puts his case under the EA 2010 is that the Defendant has failed to make reasonable adjustments to a PCP, as per s.20(3) EA 2010. In my judgment, this complaint, so far as it relates to the Accommodation Complaint, fails for essentially the same reasons as stated in the preceding paragraph in respect of s.19 EA 2010. Even if the Defendant is applying a PCP that puts a disabled person at a “ substantial disadvantage ”, the Defendant has, in my judgment, taken “ such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage ” by adopting and applying a policy of considering the disabled person’s circumstances when allocating accommodation and ensuring that the accommodation is adequate for meeting his needs. Is the Defendant’s refusal of the Claimant’s request to be relocated from the Flat a breach of s.6 HRA?

91. The Claimant’s complaint that the refusal of his request to be relocated from the Flat is a breach of the Defendant’s duty under s.6 HRA is put in two ways.

92. The first is that his conditions of life in the Flat are so poor as to constitute a breach of Article 8 of his Convention Rights. This is hopeless in circumstances where, as I have found, his accommodation is “ adequate ” for him in terms of meeting his (basic) accommodation-related needs, including his human need for social interaction and connections. In Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2004] Q.B. 1124 , at [43], the Court of Appeal observed that, whilst “ article 8 is capable of imposing on a state a positive obligation to provide support ”, it was “ hard to conceive … of a situation in which the predicament of an individual will be such that article 8 requires him to be provided with welfare support, where his predicament is not sufficiently severe to engage article 3. ”

93. The second way that the Claimant puts his complaint of breach of s.6 HRA is that the Defendant has breached Article 14 (with Article 8). As explained at para 66 above, Article 14 protects against both ‘indirect discrimination’ and ‘ Thlimmenos discrimination’. I dismiss the Claimant’s allegation that the Defendant has breached Article 14. My reasons are essentially the same as those I have given for dismissing the allegation of breach of the EA 2010 . Far from treating disabled people and other people in the same way as one another, and doing so without objective justification, the Defendant’s policy is to be willing to examine the individual circumstances of disabled asylum seekers so as to allocate them accommodation that is “ adequate ” for meeting their basic needs. The Flat in which the Claimant is living is adequate to that standard. There is no realistic basis for the Claimant to assert an entitlement under Article 14 to accommodation that meets some higher standard (such as that it enables him to live as rich and as full a life as he would like to live despite his disabilities). THE INTERNET ACCESS COMPLAINT General assessment

94. The amount of the “ general rule ” weekly cash payment fixed by reg.10(2) Asylum Support Regs has been calculated by the Defendant by estimating the costs of a ‘basket’ of goods and services likely to be needed by able-bodied asylum seekers. The amount is subject to periodic review by the Defendant. Determination as to the contents of the ‘basket’ and an assessment of the costs of those contents were made in June 2020 based on market research that had been carried out for that purpose. The most recent review was published in May 2024, in which the element relating to meeting communications needs was uprated to £4 per week, by reference to the Consumer Prices Index rate of inflation. Of that £4, £2.50 (representing around 5% of the total weekly cash payment amount) is assumed to relate to mobile phone top-ups, which the Defendant has calculated as the ‘minimum level’ required to meet this aspect of the communications needs of the “ average able-bodied adult asylum seeker ”.

95. As explained in Refugee Action (see paras 53-54 above), the “ general rule ” weekly cash payment amount should be determined by the Defendant in a way that provides for the costs that asylum seekers within the category for which that amount of weekly payment has been prescribed normally need to incur for meeting their “ essential living needs ”. The Defendant may be required to accede to requests from individual asylum seekers for higher cash payment amounts, or to provide additional in-kind support, where the individual can point to exceptional circumstances by reason of which their essential living costs are higher than the costs provided for by the “ general rule ” amount.

96. For many people living with disabilities, a consequence of their disabilities is that their costs of living are increased. A disabled person may, for example, need to buy certain equipment or supplies, be more reliant on taxis (rather than public transport) for travelling, or need to pay for tasks to be done for them which they cannot do themselves, for reasons relating to their disabilities. This does not mean that every disabled person’s costs of meeting their “ essential living needs ” will be greater than the costs to an able-bodied person. It depends on the circumstances.

97. In terms of communication needs, an able-bodied asylum seeker can meet his need to keep in touch with friends and family primarily by using voice calling and can limit video calls to occasional short calls. The Claimant’s situation is different. Given that he is deaf and his language is FSL, he requires face-to-face communication and needs to use video calling. I accept that this means that meeting his essential communication needs involves usage of a significantly greater amount of internet data than would be the case for an able-bodied asylum seeker. I also accept that he needs a good quality stable internet connection – whether that is via WiFi linked to a fixed line connection, or via mobile broadband with good signal strength – in order to be able to make video calls that are not being repeatedly disrupted by connectivity issues.

98. I acknowledge that 20 years ago, internet video calling was relatively uncommon and would not have been considered an “ essential living need ” even for a person with the Claimant’s disabilities. The concept of ‘need’ is, however, intrinsically a value-judgement and is affected by technological progress and consequent changes in societal expectations. Perceptions of ‘needs’ today are not invalidated by the fact that those ‘needs’ might have been considered exorbitant, and would not have been being met for most people in this country, 200 years ago. There is no greater justification for seeking to divine what constitute “ essential living needs ” today by considering what was technologically possible in the past. The situation in this country today is that internet-based communication is a part of everyday life, and that access to such communication has become essential for interacting with other people and accessing public services. Public services for deaf people in particular are provided in ways that effectively assume access to video calling technology.

99. The Claimant also has a specific need for video calling in order to access a course of therapy from an NHS mental health support service for deaf people, which would involve therapy sessions provided via video calls requiring a stable internet connection. It would not be realistic to expect him to receive confidential therapy by accessing the internet via WiFi in a public library or other public place.

100. I accept the Claimant’s evidence that his current mobile internet access, which is through the ‘3’ mobile phone network under a monthly contract, is not good enough. The Claimant’s witness statement evidence about poor mobile signal in his Flat is supported by mobile phone screenshots filed on his behalf. I note that a signal strength of one or two bars of 4G or 5G connection would probably be sufficient for voice calling but may not be sufficient for stable video calling. The Defendant’s evidence with regard to the signal strength data shown on the ‘3’ mobile network’s website for the location of the block of flats may not be a wholly reliable indicator of the signal strength that is actually available within a particular flat most of the time.

101. It does not automatically follow, however, that the Claimant’s essential communications needs will be met only if he is provided with a WiFi connection and no longer has to rely on mobile internet. WiFi linked to a fixed line connection would certainly be one way of securing for the Claimant internet access capable of meeting his communication needs. Based on the evidence I have seen, however, I am not able to conclusively rule out the possibility that the Claimant might be able to obtain the requisite quality of internet access over a mobile network (which need not be the ‘3’ network). The Claimant’s own witness evidence acknowledges that better signal strength appears to be available on another network (the ‘O2’ network), though he says that the relatively higher prices charged by that network are prohibitive for him.

102. The monthly contract with ‘3’ is in the name of the Claimant’s ex-girlfriend, and the bill is paid from her bank account by Direct Debit. The Claimant says this is a loan to him and he is required to pay her back. The monthly subscription price was previously £13.75 a month but is now £27.50 a month. It may be that the lower rate was an introductory rate for the first year (or some other period) and this is why the price has increased, but this is not clear from the evidence I have seen. The contract price is for a package that includes 200GB of data per month.

103. The Claimant’s witness evidence asserts that he uses up that 200GB within 2-3 weeks and that, as a result, he has to incur costs of buying additional data which sometimes come to as much as £30 a month. He has not, however, provided documentary evidence to support that assertion. The bank website screenshots he has provided show monthly Direct Debit payments of £27.50, which reflects the monthly subscription cost. Those screenshots therefore do not show that the monthly bill being paid by the ex-girlfriend are being increased above the £27.50 figure by data usage exceeding the 200GB inclusive level.

104. The Claimant also asserts that he has now accumulated debts to the ex-girlfriend amounting to around £2,000, but he has not provided any breakdown showing how, and over what period, that amount of debt has been accumulated and that it relates to mobile data costs. Even if he owes the ex-girlfriend that sum, I do not accept that it relates wholly or mainly to the bill for his mobile phone. In that regard, I note that, even if the contract was costing him £50 a month and had been in place for 2 years, and he had not made any repayments to the ex-girlfriend, his debt would be no higher than £1,200. I therefore find the Claimant’s assertions to be poorly evidenced and possibly exaggerated.

105. Nor do I accept that the Claimant requires over 200GB per month of data in order to meet his essential communication needs. As the New Decision notes, text on the ‘3’ network’s website suggests that 100GB inclusive data per month is functionally equivalent to an ‘unlimited’ data allowance for most users. Moreover, even if the Claimant consumes more than 200GB of data each month, it does not follow that this level of consumption is necessary for meeting his essential needs. In my judgment, an asylum seeker’s essential communication needs relate to keeping in regular contact with family and friends, necessary contact with public services, and potentially also accessing remote health and support services, such as NHS ‘talking therapy’ services. But they do not include streaming films or music, or long social calls (whether via voice or video calling): see JM (cited above at para 58).

106. A further difficulty with the Claimant’s evidence is that it does not include any documents showing that he has: (a) investigated the options available to him in terms of monthly contract or ‘pay-as-you-go’ deals with mobile networks other than ‘3’ and the associated monthly costs; or (b) tested, perhaps using friends’ mobile phones from which screenshots have been taken, the mobile signal strength available in his Flat using other mobile networks. The Claimant’s approach to his difficulties in obtaining reliable internet access in his Flat using the ‘3’ network has been to leap directly to insisting that he needs a WiFi connection. Whilst I accept that a WiFi connection to fixed line internet access would be the more consistently effective – and therefore the optimal – means of providing the Claimant with a stable internet connection, it does not follow that this is the only option lawfully open to the Defendant for meeting the Claimant’s essential communication needs.

107. The New Decision refuses to provide the Claimant with a WiFi connection but does not rule out providing him with additional cash or in-kind support to better assist him in accessing mobile data. The thrust of the reasons given in the New Decision for that position is that the evidence provided by the Claimant in support of his communication-related requests was inadequate. The New Decision stated, for example: “ You have not provided any supporting evidence to demonstrate the claims of poor signal or the amount of data being used each month, which has been requested several times, or that you cannot change to a different package or network provider. ” “ Although you have stated that your tariff has become more expensive since 22 nd May 2025, no explanation other than inflation has been provided, [and] no further evidence has been provided to explain this or … to explain your actual current data usage. ” “ You have further indicated that using your former girlfriend’s account, you regularly go over your data limit which can cost up to an additional £30, however, this has not been evidenced in the documents available despite obtaining payment information from her. ” These points were, in my view, fair ones for the Defendant to have made, based on the documentary evidence that had been provided to her as at the date of the New Decision (and therefore excluding any material that the Claimant has provided only afterwards).

108. I have some misgivings about aspects of the New Decision’s reasoning. In particular: (1) The reasons refer to the £4.00 per week amount included within the weekly cash allowance which notionally relates to meeting essential communication needs, and states that this amount could be used by the Claimant to pay for mobile data. This reasoning approach fails to recognise that the £4.00 figure is intended to cover all communication needs, not just phone and internet communication, and would also need to cover, in the long run, costs of buying a mobile phone or other necessary equipment. As noted above, the allowance within the weekly cash amount which notionally relates to mobile phone top-ups is only £2.50. (2) Further, the Defendant’s reasoning approach does not consider whether the Claimant’s weekly payments should be increased to enable him to enjoy substantive parity with able-bodied asylum seekers in terms of the extent to which his communication needs are being met. As I have noted, the extent to which the Claimant requires video, rather than voice, calling for remote communication means that he requires more data than able-bodied asylum seekers if he is not to be substantially disadvantaged in comparison to them. Given the Defendant’s ‘reasonable adjustments’ duty under s.20(3) of the EA 2010 , the Defendant may be required to provide additional support for the Claimant in order to avoid such disadvantage.

109. The New Decision did not, however, refuse to provide any additional support. On the contrary, it invited the Claimant to submit further evidence so that his need for additional support could be further assessed. The New Decision stated: “Once you provide any additional information from your phone or phone provider in relation to your actual data usage; current data allowance under the ‘3’ mobile plan you are using and the specific mobile data plan that you require additional funds to purchase or have purchased, this can be submitted with a section 96 request, which can be considered and where evidenced, funds provided to cover any shortfall between your weekly communication payments and the cost for a reasonable mobile data package.”

110. I note that the evidence filed by the Defendant on 22 July 2025, just one clear day before the hearing, asserts that in January 2023 Migrant Help provided the Claimant with a mobile phone and a monthly data allowance of 20GB per month for six months which could have been renewed for a further period. I have not attached any significance to this evidence as part of my analysis, given that: (a) it was introduced very late, denying the Claimant a reasonable opportunity to respond to it; (b) the New Decision does not rely on any such equipment or data allowance having been provided to the Claimant; and (c) such provision, if made, occurred some 2½ years before the date of the New Decision and there is no evidence that the Claimant is still able to make use of that equipment or data allowance. Is the provision made by the Defendant for the Claimant to access broadband internet sufficient to meet his “essential living needs” as required by ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 ?

111. As noted above, I accept that the Claimant’s current mobile phone plan is not providing him with a sufficiently stable and reliable internet connection for meeting his essential communications needs. The costs of meeting his internet access needs may well be significantly greater than the £2.50 per week allowed by the Defendant within her calculation of the £49.18 weekly cash payment amount. I do not, however, consider myself to have a sufficient basis, within the evidence placed before me by the Claimant, to find that the Defendant is breaching her duty to the Claimant under ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 .

112. I have so concluded after applying the structured approach provided by the “ twin-track test ” as per the case-law to which I have referred at paras 51 and 56 above.

113. The first part of that test requires me, in the present context, to consider whether the Defendant’s provisions of support for the Claimant, including the weekly payment of the £49.18 “ general rule ” amount, is failing to provide for the Claimant, as an objective minimum standard, a dignified standard of living, which is adequate for health and is capable of ensuring subsistence. For the following two reasons, I am unable to answer that question in the affirmative: (1) First , as already explained above, I have not seen evidence sufficient for showing that the only way that the Claimant’s essential communication needs can be met is by providing him with access to WiFi, not data accessed over a mobile network. I therefore have no basis for finding that, by reason of the Defendant’s refusal to provide the Claimant with WiFi access, he is being denied an objective minimum standard of living consistent with his human dignity. (2) Secondly , with regard to the adequacy of the amount of the weekly cash payment, I do not have sufficient evidence to justify a finding that the amount of that payment is insufficient to meet the Claimant’s “ essential living needs ”. Neither the £4.00 figure notionally relating to communications needs generally, nor the £2.50 comprised within that figure which notionally relates to mobile phone top-ups, is an amount provided to asylum seekers which is hypothecated to communications. Those figures are simply part of the calculations used by the Defendant for estimating the cost of an overall ‘basket’ of essential goods and services. Supported asylum seekers are free to use their £49.18 weekly cash payment as they wish. I have not seen any evidence that the total costs that the Claimant needs to incur for meeting his essential living needs, including but not limited to communication needs, exceeds the £49.18 allowance provided to him. It may be that meeting his essential communication needs would cost more than £4.00 per week Merely by way of example, the cost, including a mobile data contract for the quantity of data he might need (e.g. 100GB per month), might be £5.00 a week, which is higher than the £2.50 and £4.00 figures, but would still less than 15% of the weekly cash payment amount. The fact that an individual asylum seeker’s costs of meeting one element of his essential living needs is higher than the amount assumed as part of the Defendant’s ‘basket’ calculation used for estimating the total cost that asylum seekers normally need to incur for meeting their essential living needs, does not suffice to show that the Defendant’s treatment of that individual asylum seeker has fallen below the objective minimum standard.

114. The second part of the “ twin-track test ” requires me to consider whether the Defendant’s New Decision, so far as it relates to communication needs, was irrational or otherwise in breach of public law standards. I have no basis for finding it to be so. In that regard: (1) The New Decision’s refusal to provide a WiFi connection was not unreasonable, given that (as explained above) the Claimant had not submitted evidence showing that his essential communication needs could only be met using WiFi and not by mobile data. (2) The New Decision did not refuse to provide the Claimant with additional financial or in-kind support to assist him in meeting his needs to communicate via video calling. Rather, the New Decision invited him to submit additional information and evidence, so that the Defendant could assess what support might be required, bearing in mind that support under ss.95 -96 is intended to meet “ essential living needs ”. That was a reasonable approach for the Defendant to have taken, given the limitations of the evidence that had been provided to her by the Claimant (and which are, to some extent, reflected in my assessment of the limitations of the evidence the Claimant has placed before the Court: see paras 103-106 above). Is the Defendant’s refusal to provide WiFi for the Claimant, or to pay a higher weekly allowance to the Claimant so as to take account of the costs to him of meeting his communication needs, an unlawful departure from the Defendant’s own policies?

115. I have not detected any mismatch between the Defendant’s approach in her New Decision, and her policy as set out in Applications for additional support (see para 55 above). That document makes clear that an asylum seeker requesting additional support must provide information and evidence showing that such additional support is required and for enabling the amount of the required additional support to be assessed. Is the Defendant’s refusal to provide WiFi for the Claimant, or to pay a higher weekly allowance to the Claimant so as to take account of the costs to him of meeting his communication needs, a breach of the EA 2010 ?

116. The Defendant’s duty under s.20(3) EA 2010 is to make “ reasonable adjustments ” to avoid her PCPs placing disabled people at a substantial disadvantage. The object of the reasonable adjustments duty is to ensure equivalence between disabled and non-disabled people: R (Lunt) v Liverpool CC [2009] EWHC 2356 (a decision on the predecessor provision in s.21 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 ), [58]-[59], per Blake J. As Fordham J noted in R (Rowley) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2021] EWHC 2108 (Admin) , [2022] 1 WLR 1179 , at [20], the purpose of the duty is to secure for disabled persons the closest access that is reasonably approximate to non-disabled persons to promote their “ entering everyday life as fully as possible ”. Further, the duty is to make anticipatory reasonable adjustments for a class of people as well as the continuing duty to make adjustments in individual cases: R (VC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] 1 WLR 4781 , [157], per Beatson LJ.

117. The Defendant has a discretion as to the categories of asylum seekers for which she prescribes a standard tariff rate of weekly cash payment in her Asylum Support Regs. She has chosen to fix a standard rate of £49.18 per week for all asylum seekers (including disabled asylum seekers), apart from pregnant women and young children. In my judgment, the setting and payment of that rate constitutes a PCP for the purposes of the EA 2010 . As noted above, disabled people’s costs of meeting their “ essential living needs ” are often greater than the costs to an able-bodied person. The PCP is therefore liable to put a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled. In relation to such disabled persons, the Defendant must (in the words of s.20(3) ) “ take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage ”.

118. Accordingly, the Defendant should be alert to the risk that a disabled asylum seeker receiving the “ general rule ” weekly cash payment amount of £49.18 might not be able to meet his needs to the same extent as an otherwise comparable able-bodied person. The Defendant should take reasonable steps to avoid that disadvantage. In my judgment, the proper approach for the Defendant to take for so doing is to seek to ensure approximate parity between the disabled person and typical able-bodied asylum seekers in terms of the extent to which their relevant needs – in this case, communication needs – are met. That will be so even where: (a) the standard weekly amount has not been shown to be inadequate for enabling the disabled person to meet the objective minimum standard required by the first part of the “ twin-track test ” used for assessing whether the Defendant is complying with her duty under ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 ; and (b) the Defendant’s decision not to provide additional support is, or would be, rational and otherwise lawful, and would thus also pass the second part of the “ twin-track test ”, if the EA 2010 did not exist.

119. That approach must be right if the ‘reasonable adjustments’ duty in the EA 2010 is to have any meaning or value in the asylum support context. Ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 are not concerned with ensuring parity between disabled asylum seekers and other asylum seekers, but simply with providing a minimum level of support for meeting essential needs. The EA 2010 , by contrast, has a different focus and is concerned with mitigating and reducing substantial disadvantages to disabled people arising in connection with the provision of public benefits and services, thus securing substantive parity. The extent to which ss.95 -96 IAA 1999 affords the Defendant an in-built margin of discretion in identifying an asylum seeker’s “ essential living needs ” and in deciding how those needs should be met, suffices for the Defendant to be required, under the EA 2010 , to exercise that discretion in a way that includes taking reasonable steps to avoid disabled persons being placed at a comparative disadvantage.

120. That is the lens through which the Defendant is required by the EA 2010 to assess whether additional support should be provided to the Claimant to assist him in making video calls. If and insofar as he can show that he is being comparatively disadvantaged in terms of the extent to which he can communicate remotely, because such communications must, in his case, be by video (as opposed to voice) calling, which requires him to use more data, then the Defendant should take this into account. She should do so endeavouring to secure for him a substantive result which affords him parity with able-bodied asylum seekers in terms of the extent to which their communications needs are being provided for. Precisely how she does so is a matter for her judgement and discretion, but achieving parity in substantive result should be the target she is seeking to hit.

121. As noted at para 108 above, I am concerned that the reasons given in the New Decision do not show that the Defendant has recognised the legal significance of her duties under the EA 2010 to her decision-making as to what (if any) additional support she should provide to the Claimant for meeting his essential communication needs. Those concerns are not, however, a sufficient basis for me to find the New Decision to be unlawful by reason of the EA 2010. As explained above, the New Decision is not a final decision to refuse to provide any additional support. Rather, the New Decision invites the Claimant to provide additional information and evidence to inform the Defendant’s decision-making as to what additional support is required. In my view, the Defendant’s position in the New Decision is reasonable, and not a breach of the EA 2010, given the gaps and inadequacies in the information and evidence that the Claimant had provided. Is the Defendant’s refusal to provide WiFi for the Claimant, or to pay a higher monthly allowance to the Claimant so as to take account of the costs to him of meeting his communication needs, a breach of s.6 HRA?

122. I accept that the Defendant’s provision of support to the Claimant for meeting his essential communication needs engages Article 8 of the Convention Rights. It follows that Article 14 of the Convention Rights applies so as to prohibit discrimination – including any ‘indirect discrimination’ or ‘ Thlimmenos discrimination’ – by the Defendant in relation to the provision of such support.

123. Given that the New Decision does not refuse to provide any additional support for the Claimant, but instead reasonably invites him to provide further information/evidence, there is no realistic basis on which I could find that decision, as it relates to communications needs, to be a breach of the Claimant’s Convention Rights.

124. Moreover, even if the Defendant had refused to provide any additional support and I had found that refusal to breach the EA 2010 , it does not follow that I would also have found a breach of Article 14. The EA 2010 lays down a detailed code of equality duties which is not directly based upon, and which goes beyond, the obligations of public authorities under Article 14. The Convention Rights lay down fundamental human rights and, in order for a public authority’s conduct to be found to have been incompatible with any such right, the substantive treatment of the individual must have crossed certain thresholds of seriousness or severity. For example, in Toplak and Mrak v Slovenia (2022) 74 E.H.R.R. 20, the Strasbourg Court stated (at [111]) that, when it is deciding whether a state has failed to “ treat differently people whose situations are significantly different ”: “a certain threshold is required in order for the Court to find that the difference in circumstances is significant. For this threshold to be reached, a measure must produce a particularly prejudicial impact on certain persons as a result of a protected ground, attaching to their situation and in light of the ground of discrimination invoked …”. Thus, even if the Defendant had taken a substantive decision to refuse additional support to the Claimant in circumstances where the result was to fail to secure for him a result substantively comparable with the treatment of able-bodied asylum seekers, I would have required considerable persuasion that this sufficed, in the circumstances, for establishing a breach of a Convention Right. CONCLUSION

125. For the reasons I have given, the Claimant’s claim for judicial review is dismissed.