Catriona Margaret Archer v James Wallis Archer & Ors

1. In this judgment the Appellant shall be referred to as the wife and the First Respondent as the husband.

2. There is pending before the lower court financial remedy proceedings between the wife and husband in which the Second and Third Respondents - the husband’s parents - have intervened to establish their beneficial ownership of a property known as The Barn at Northwood Farm in Derbyshire (“The Barn”). HHJ Watkins heard the Intervenors’ application as a preliminary issue between 2-5 December 2024. On 6 March 2025 HHJ Watkins circulated by email a written judgment on that preliminary issue. He found, based on proprietary estoppel, that the Intervenors were the beneficial owners of The Barn. HHJ Watkins ordered that The Barn be transferred to the Intervenors free of mortgage.

3. The wife’s legal representatives sent a request for clarification of the judgment and provided proposed corrections of typographical and other obvious errors on 11 March 2025. There was no response to that request as the learned judge was on vacation.

4. The Appellant’s Notice on its face states that it was filed on behalf of the wife on 1 April 2025. However, I note that the Grounds of Appeal are dated 25 March 2025 and that there is correspondence in the bundle before me that the Notice was submitted to the appeals county court in Nottingham on 27 March 2025. It is the wife’s case that there was an administrative error in the court office in Nottingham and that the filing date of 1 April 2025 was inserted by that court. On behalf of the wife, it is argued that the Appellant’s Notice was filed within time and, in any event, any delay was not the responsibility of the wife. The Intervenors and the husband argue that the wife’s Appellant’s Notice is out of time and that this court should not extend the time in which an application for permission should be made.

5. At paragraph 11 of the Appellant’s Notice the wife sought a stay of the transfer of The Barn to the Intervenors pending permission to appeal being considered, and, if permission was granted, until the appeal itself was heard. The application for a stay came before me on 7 April 2025. I determined the application on the papers, without oral hearing. The recitals to the order I made contain the following: And upon the court referring the parties to Re F (a Minor) (Permission to appeal) [2025] EWHC 638 (Fam) and querying whether the judgment has indeed been formally handed down. And upon the court granting a stay to hold the balance of convenience pending determination of the application for permission to appeal if validly made. Accordingly, I stayed the transfer of The Barn to the Intervenors pending determination of the application for permission to appeal and gave directions to enable the application for permission to appeal to be determined. Those directions included a requirement that the order made by HHJ Watkins should be filed.

6. As it transpired the order made by HHJ Watkins was not perfected at the time that judgment was handed down. Instead, a hearing was listed on 19 May 2025: i) to finalise the terms of the order arising from the judgment ii) to make directions needed to progress the substantive proceedings iii) to address any consequential matters arising from the preliminary issue judgment.eg.costs. The court ran out of time at that hearing and HHJ Watkins reserved judgement.

7. At the hearing on 19 May 2025 HHJ Watkins confirmed that he had intended the judgment circulated by email on 7 March 2025 (dated 6 March) to be formally handed down on 6 March and that date is reflected in the preamble to his order dated 8 July 2025. However, I note that later in his judgment of 8 July 2025, at paragraph 33 (a) he gives the hand down date as 7 March 2025.

8. Following the hearing on 19 May 2025 HHJ Watkins handed down a supplemental judgment on 8 July 2025 together with the perfected order. In his judgment dated 8 July 2025 he declined an invitation to give a further judgment supplementing that given in March 2025 with a consideration of the Intervenors’ application based on constructive trust; re-affirming that he had made his original judgment based on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.

9. On 8 July 2025 HHJ Watkins made the following order:

1. There be judgment for the Intervenors.

2. The Applicant and the Respondent shall by Tuesday, 22 July 2025 discharge any charges and other securities over The Barn (full address given) and transfer The Barn to the Intervenors for nil consideration in the form of the draft transfer annexed hereto (save as for such variations which may be agreed by all parties) to give effect to the equity to which the Intervenors are entitled by proprietary estoppel.

3. The parties have liberty to apply in relation to the transfer in accordance with paragraph 2 above.

4. The Intervenors shall be discharged from the proceedings upon the completion of the transfer in accordance with paragraph 2 above.

5. The Applicant shall pay the Intervenors’ costs relating to the preliminary issues to be subject to detailed assessment on the standard basis if not agreed. The costs shall be paid at a time to be determined at the conclusion of the financial remedy proceedings between the Applicant and Respondent.

6. The Applicant and Respondent shall inform the court of the outcome of the application for permission to appeal, and if successful, the substantive appeal, as soon as is practicable, whereupon the court will give further directions for the conduct of the application for the financial remedy order

10. On 16 July 2025 a FP244 was issued on behalf of the wife. By that notice she sought:

1. To stay the order of HHJ Watkins dated 8 July 2025, paragraph 2 2.

2. Permission to extend the appeal to include the costs order made in the order dated 8 July 2025 paragraph 5

3. Costs in the application

11. On 22 July 2025 the Intervenors issued an Appellant’s Notice by which they sought permission to appeal paragraph 5 of the order of 8 July 2025 and sought an order in its stead to read as follows:

5. The Applicant shall pay the Intervenors costs relating to the preliminary issue to be subject to detailed assessment on the standard basis if not agreed and the Applicant shall pay a payment on account of costs of £100,000 within 14 days . On the same date they issued an application for the stay to be lifted.

12. On 28 July 2025 and on the papers, I considered the cross-applications which had been made by the wife and the Intervenors that month and ordered that:

1. Paragraph 2 of the order dated 8 July 2025 is stayed pending consideration of the application for permission to appeal, and if granted, pending determination of the appeal.

2. Permission is granted to the appellant to extend the orders appealed to include the costs order at paragraph 5 of the order dated 8 July 2025.

3. The FP161 and FP244 on behalf of the Applicants and the FP161 and FP244 on behalf of the Intervenors shall be heard together. I then proceeded to give directions to facilitate a rolled-up hearing before me later that year.

13. On 19 November 2025 I heard the two applications for permission to appeal on the basis that if I granted permission, I would proceed to hear the appeal(s) I had permitted.

14. At the hearing before me the wife was represented by Ms Allman of Counsel and the Intervenors by Mr Upton of Counsel. I am grateful to each for the succinct, knowledgeable and eloquent way they advanced their arguments orally and in writing. I am also grateful to the husband who represented himself before me with clarity. The Relevant Factual Chronology

15. The non-controversial factual history is as follows: a) the husband and wife married in September 1995. b) the husband and wife purchased Northwood Farm (The Farm) on 21 February 1997 for £225,000. The Farm was registered in their joint names. The Farm had a number of outbuildings. c) At the time The Farm was purchased, the Intervenors provided £50,000. d) In April 1997 the husband signed a loan note for £50,000 although the Intervenors’ case is that neither party regarded it as a loan e) Shortly after the purchase of The Farm, it was agreed that the Intervenors would renovate one of the outbuildings, The Barn, at their own expense and live in it as their home. f) In relation to that renovation, the Intervenors instructed the architect, applied for planning permission and paid the builders at a cost of about £130,000 g) There were no express discussions about the ownership of The Barn. h) In 2000 the Intervenors sold their previous home and moved into The Barn. They have lived there ever since paying for its upkeep and paying all utility bills. i) In 2003 The Barn was registered under a separate title number in the joint names of the husband and wife. The Intervenors evidence was that they did not know it remained registered in the wife and husband’s joint names. j) In 2013 husband and wife obtained a mortgage to renovate a building on The Farm known as the Granary and the gym. The mortgage was secured against The Barn. The Intervenors signed an occupier’s consent form consenting to the mortgage and agreeing that their interest in The Barn would be subject to Handelsbanken’s rights under the mortgage. k) The husband and wife separated in July 2020. l) On 15 November 2021 the wife initiated Financial Remedy proceedings. The Ultimate Positions of the Parties at First Instance

16. At first instance the Intervenors claimed beneficial ownership of The Barn. The wife’s final position was that the Intervenors had a life interest in The Barn. The husband’s case was that he did not agree that the Intervenors should be entitled to the entire beneficial interest, arguing that the husband and wife had contributed to improvements, such as landscaping, driveways and work on shared infrastructure which enhanced The Barn’s value and accordingly believed that the court should determine proportions reflecting each party’s input. The Hearing before HHJ Watkins and his Judgment

17. HHJ Watkins heard the trial of the preliminary issue over 4 days. He heard oral evidence from the Intervenors, the wife and the husband.

18. HHJ Watkins’ judgment begins by setting out the uncontentious facts before at paragraph 7 turning to summarise the evidence of the parties.

19. HHJ Watkins begins his discussion at paragraph 41 of his judgment. Within paragraphs 42-46 he details the inconsistencies in the wife’s evidence before concluding at paragraph 47 that: Taking these points together, I was left with the clear impression that W did not have a full grasp of what had happened, leading to her confusion in respect of the positions that she later adopted as to the position of the Interveners . He then states this: 48) I looked carefully at such contemporaneous documents as there were, but they are thin on the ground. I note the letter dated 7 January 1996, written by H to Mr C...., where he speaks of his parents "contributing towards the purchase of Northwood Farm to the value of £50,000. To achieve this, they are remortgaging their existing home to release the necessary funds. Then, in the long term, they are intending to develop one of the outbuildings as their retirement home." 49) I found that helpful in considering what was actually being discussed between the parties at the time .

20. At paragraph 51 of his judgment HHJ Watkins then turns to his findings. Within the next paragraphs HHJ Watkins makes a number of micro findings before finding at paragraph 57 Thereafter, it is clear that all parties treated the occupation of the barn by (The Intervenors) as being done on the basis that they owned it, although, as there is an obvious significant family context to the arrangements, There was some flexibility in making use of the barn to raise money for renovation. And throughout their occupation, until the failure of H&W's marriage, that continued to be the case.

21. In the following paragraphs HHJ Watkins then proceeded to find that: i. The £50,000 advanced by the Intervenors reflected the value of The Barn following negotiations- paragraph 58. ii. The £50,000 was neither a gift nor a loan. Such contemporaneous documents as he had spoke of it being advanced to be part of the purchase price of The Farm. In relation to the loan note, he stated that: I am satisfied that the loan note was a method of recording the need to provide capital to (the Intervenors) in the event that they were, through planning problems, unable to convert the barn. I accept the evidence of Paul, Peggy and H on that point. What they say is sensible in the circumstances that they then found themselves and I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that what they say about that is correct - paragraph 59. iii. In relation to The Barn being used as security for the mortgage, he accepted that the transactions were not commercial or at arm's length, but part of arrangements made in a family context in order to meet a family need.

22. Then at paragraph 61 – 62 he found as follows:

61. Standing back and looking at the circumstances and considering the evidence given, I am satisfied that when (the Intervenors) entered into the process of advancing £50,000 and moving from their former home, which of course they later sold, they did so believing that they would be moving to live in circumstances where they would be with their son and daughter-in-law and grandchildren. I am satisfied that they, through the process of paying £50,000, discussing moving to be with H and W, not only at “the tea and cake” viewing, but also afterwards when they chose that The Barn would be their property, and thereafter, in the full knowledge of H and W, incurred significant expenditure renovating the barn, 62) As far as I can tell, there being no other, as far as I can tell, none of the parties treating (the Intervenors) on any other basis than that the barn was their home and would continue to be so.

63. In the event that I was wrong as to what was in all of the party's minds, and that H and W did believe that (the Intervenors) were not the beneficial owners of the barn, that they stood by and allowed (the Intervenors) to carry out all of the work. 64) In those circumstances, I find as a fact that (the Intervenors) relied upon the insurance that they would acquire ownership in the property by purchasing it, not insisting that they be registered as separate proprietors or as joint proprietors, not requiring that a declaration of trust be executed, or in some other way to publicly protect their interest in what was their home.

23. At paragraph 71 HHJ Watkins defined the real question before him as whether this promise or understanding gave the Intervenors full beneficial ownership or merely a right to occupy for life. The Intervenors’ position was charactered (sic) as a claim to outright beneficial ownership, relying on a long period of conduct and reliance, as opposed to W’s more limited concession of a life interest.

24. Having made the above findings, HHJ Watkins then turned to set out the applicable law in brief before concluding that: 74) Proprietary estoppel can arise through various “strands,” including both active encouragement and acquiescence. While a case based purely on acquiescence might rely on the owner’s silent failure to intervene, Counsel submitted that here there was at least encouragement of the Interveners’ belief, if not a clear promise, that they would own the barn. 75) Counsel emphasised that an assurance need not be explicitly worded as a formal promise; it can be oblique or inferred from a long course of conduct. In this case, the Interveners argued there was a pattern of conduct and statements over 25 years that reasonably conveyed an assurance of ownership rather than mere permission to occupy. 76) On detrimental reliance, Counsel submitted that detriment may take many forms; commonly financial expenditures or foregoing alternative arrangements, but ultimately the court should stand back and ask if the Interveners’ reliance was substantial enough that it would be unjust for the legal owner to renege. This case, Counsel said, involved extensive financial outlay, the sale of a previous home, relocation, and the complete renovation of the barn at the respondents’ expense, all consistent with believing they would own it. 77) For the reasons I have set out above, I am satisfied that in so far as reliance is concerned, there was reliance placed by the Interveners on clear representations given to them by both H and W as to ownership of the barn and the basis of their occupation. It was agreed that the barn would be the Interveners home. The details of the arrangement were not discussed, but I am satisfied that there was an understanding between the parties as to the 78) Clearly, in this case, there was significant reliance upon that, as I have set out above, just as I have recorded that the Intervenors acted to their detriment. 79) I am satisfied, therefore, that the Intervener's case on proprietary estoppel is made out, and I am satisfied that I should make orders that place the Intervenors in the position that they were expressly led to believe they would be in, namely, owners of the barn. As the Interveners (sic) expected remedy was full ownership of the barn mortgage-free, reflecting the original understanding that they would have the barn to themselves without an encumbrance imposed by W, I am satisfied that I should make an order that puts them in the position of being owners. In so far as the mortgage is concerned, that will be for H and W to resolve. It was never the case that the Interveners would expect to be in a property subject to a mortgage. It should be transferred to them mortgage-free. The arguments the Learned Judge referred to above were those of Counsel for the Intervenors. The Wife’s Grounds of Appeal

25. The Grounds of Appeal accompanying the initial Appellant’s Notice on behalf of the Wife can be summarised as follows:

1. Ground 1- The judgment has not sufficiently established the “promissory” element of a claim for proprietary estoppel. (i) Taken as a whole, the judgment is unclear and internally inconsistent on the issue of the assurances said to have been given to the Intervenors sufficient to found a proprietary estoppel, and how they were conveyed; (ii) Taken as a whole, the judgment is unclear and internally inconsistent as to the state of the appellant’s knowledge regarding whether the 2 nd and 3 rd respondents believed they owned the Barn, and, if so, whether the appellant knew this; vi) Whether the Intervenors believed they owned the Barn, and, if so, whether the appellant knew this; (iii) The judgment does not adequately distinguish the state of knowledge or belief of, or assurances given by the appellant as distinct from the 1st respondent or consider the implications of such a difference. (iv) The alternative basis of establishing a proprietary estoppel founded on ‘standing by’ is inadequately addressed by reference to the law and the facts such that it is not possible to ascertain whether the learned judge accepted or considered the submission that if he found the appellant encouraged the Intervenors to do acts consistent with having some right or interest over the property, they must be only consistent with them having an ownership interest in the property for that encouragement to found a claim in ownership.

2. Ground 2- The following findings are (1) findings which no reasonable judge could reach on the evidence and/or the judgment does not adequately explain how they were reached on the evidence. i) All parties treated the occupation of the barn by the Intervenors from the time that it was agreed that they would renovate the barn as being done on the basis that they owned it; ii) The Intervenors placed reliance on clear representations given to them by both husband and wife as to the ownership of the barn and the basis of their occupation; iii) The Intervenors were expressly led to believe that they would be owners of the barn; iv) The Intervenors relied upon the insurance (sic – assurance) that they would acquire ownership in the property by purchasing it v) The Intervenors’ expected remedy was full ownership of the barn mortgage free reflecting the original understanding that they would have the barn to themselves without an encumbrance imposed

3. Ground 3 - The learned judge was wrong to determine that the appropriate remedy is to put the Intervenors in the position of being owners of the Barn mortgage free immediately based on the 2nd and 3rd respondent’s expectation, and in any event the reasons provided for the remedy were inadequate.

4. Ground 4- The learned judge erred in law in purporting to make an order within Matrimonial Causes Act proceedings for the Appellant and 1st Respondent to transfer title to the Intervenors mortgage free. This, it is said, is not an order which the court has jurisdiction to make within Matrimonial Causes Act proceedings.

26. The wife’s subsequent additional Ground of Appeal are as follows: (i) Substantive: the costs order arises from the determination on the preliminary issue. If the appeal is allowed in respect of the preliminary issue, it must follow that the order for costs is also wrong. (ii) Procedural: HHJ Watkins did not have sufficient time at the hearing on 19 May 2025 to hear a costs application. The Intervenors invited him to make a costs order and made submissions. The appellant invited him to list the issue of costs for a discrete hearing and to direct skeleton arguments, alternatively, if the application for a separate hearing to take place to determine costs was refused, to hear further submissions on the issue of costs. HHJ Watkins did neither on that occasion, indicating that he had no further time in the hearing to make any determinations. Accordingly, the costs order was made without hearing substantive submissions from the appellant on the issue of costs The Intervenors’ Grounds of Appeal

27. The Intervenors seek to appeal paragraph 5 of the order of 8 July 2025.

28. CPR r44.2(8) (which applies by FPR, r28.3(3)) provides: Where the court orders a party to pay costs subject to detailed assessment, it will order that party to pay a reasonable sum on account of costs, unless there is good reason not to do so.

29. The Intervenors grounds are that: 1) There was no good reason for not ordering a payment on account in this case. 2) Further, the costs should be paid in the usual way following detailed assessment. There is no basis for ordering the costs to be paid “at a time to be determined at the conclusion of the financial remedy proceedings between the Applicant and Respondent”. The Law relating to Permission to Appeal and Appeals

30. The role of the appellate court and its approach to applications for permission to appeal are determined by the provisions of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (“FPR”) and by case law.

31. FPR r30.4(2) provides that (subject to paragraph (3) which does not apply), an appellant must file the appellant’s notice at the appeal court within – (a) such period as may be directed by the lower court at the hearing at which the decision to be appealed was made or, if the hearing is adjourned to a later date, the hearing on that date (which may be longer or shorter than the period referred to in sub-paragraph (b)); or (b) where the court makes no such direction, 21 days after the date of the decision of the lower court against which the appellant wishes to appeal.

32. The date of the decision of the lower court which the appellant wishes to appeal for the purpose of FPR 30.3 is the date that the decision is formally announced in court: see Re F (a Minor) (Permission to appeal) [ 2025] EWHC 638 (Fam) (applying McDonald v Rose [2019] 1 WLR 2828 on the equivalent rules in the CPR). It is not the date of the order made giving effect to the decision.

33. I have to decide whether or not to permit the wife to bring this application out of time. Consequently , I have specifically reminded myself of the judgment of Mrs Justice Knowles in IC V RC (slip rule) [2020] EWHC 2997 (Fam) . At paragraphs 16-19 Mrs Justice Knowles stated the following:

16. Whilst an application for permission to appeal out of time is not an application for relief from sanctions, it is analogous to such a situation (see paragraph 16 of Altomart Limited v Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd [2014] EWCA 1408). FPR Rule 4.6(1) provides a list of factors to be taken into account when considering relief from sanctions as follows: “(a) the interests of the administration of justice; (b) whether the application for relief has been made promptly; (c) whether the failure to comply was intentional; (d) whether there is a good explanation for the failure; (e) the extent to which the party in default has complied with other rules, practice directions court orders and any relevant pre-action protocol; (f) whether the failure to comply was caused by the party or the party's legal representative; (g) whether the hearing date of the likely hearing date can still be met if relief is granted; (h) the effect which the failure to comply had on each party; and (i) the effect which the granting of relief would have on each party or a child whose interest the court considers relevant. " I note that, the court is required to consider "all the circumstances " when applying rule 4.6(1) and that an application for relief must be supported by evidence ( rule 4.6(2) ).

17. Paragraphs 40-41 of Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 provide guidance on the approach to be adopted to applications for relief from sanctions. These can be summarised as follows: (i) if the failure to comply with the relevant rule, practice direction or court order can properly be regarded as trivial, the court will usually grant relief provided that an application is made promptly; (ii) if the failure is not trivial, the burden is on the defaulting party to persuade the court to grant relief; (iii) the court will want to consider why the default occurred. If there is a good reason for it, court will be likely to decide that relief should be granted, but merely overlooking the deadline is unlikely to constitute a good reason; (iv) it is necessary to consider all the circumstances of the case before reaching a decision that particular weight is to be given to the factors specifically mentioned in the rules. In Denton and others v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 , the Court of Appeal affirmed the guidance given in Mitchell and identified in paragraph 24 a three stage approach to applications for relief from sanctions in the context of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 . The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply or default; the second is to consider the reason for the failure or default; and the third is to consider all the circumstances of the case so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application.

18. R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1633 dealt with several issues of general application on relief from sanctions. So far as is relevant to financial remedy proceedings, Moore-Bick LJ held as follows; a) Shortage of funds does not provide a good reason for delay. It is understandable that litigants would prefer to be legally represented and that some may be deterred by the prospect of having to act on their own behalf. However, the inability to pay for legal representation cannot be regarded as providing a good reason for delay. Unfortunately, many litigants are forced to act on their own behalf and the rules apply to them as well (paragraph 43); b) Litigation is a complex process, and it is understandable that those who have no previous experience of it should have difficulty in finding and understanding the rules by which it is governed. If proceedings are not to become a free-for-all, the court must insist on litigants of all kinds following the rules. Being a litigant in person with no previous experience of legal proceedings is not a good reason for failing to comply with the rules (paragraph 44); c) In most cases the merits of the appeal will have little to do with whether it is appropriate to grant an extension of time. Only in those cases where the court can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak will the merits have a significant part to play when it comes to balancing the various factors that have to be considered at stage three of the process. In most cases, the court should decline to embark on an investigation of the merits and firmly discourage argument directed to them (paragraph 46).

19. The approach of the family court to this issue is set out in Cooper-Hohn v Hohn [2014] EWCA Civ 896 where Ryder LJ emphasised the need for compliance with rules and practice directions when dismissing an appeal from a refusal to grant a very late application to adduce expert evidence (see paragraphs 41-46). In Re W (A Child) Re H (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1177 the President stated that the court was entitled to expect strict compliance with orders and non-compliance could be expected to have and would usually have a consequence [see paragraph 52]. In Re H (Children) (Application to Extend Time: Merits of Proposed Appeal) [2015] EWCA Civ 583 , the President stressed that the approach to relief from sanctions in family cases should not differ from that applied in the ordinary civil jurisdiction. He noted that this was a point that might be considered in more detail on a future appeal whilst indicating that the underlying merits of the case were a potential consideration (see paragraphs 38

34. The test for granting permission is set out in FPR rule 30.3(7) which provides that permission will be granted where: a) there is a real (realistic as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success or b) there is some other compelling reason to hear the appeal.

35. In terms of the authorities, the issue of the test for permission to appeal was clarified fairly recently by the Court of Appeal in Re R (A Child) [2019] EWCA Civ 895 where Peter Jackson LJ said: “The test for the grant of permission to appeal on an application to the Court of Appeal or to the High Court or Family Court under the first limb of the relevant sub-rule is that the appeal would have a real prospect of success”.

36. The case of Tanfern v Cameron MacDonald [2000] 1 WLR 1311 confirms that “the prospect of success must be realistic rather than fanciful”

37. FPR rule 30.12(3) provides that an appeal may be allowed where the decision was wrong or unjust for procedural irregularity.

38. In Re F (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 546 , Munby P summarised the approach of an appellate court to decisions of the lower court as follows:

22. Like any judgment, the judgment of the Deputy Judge has to be read as a whole, and having regard to its context and structure. The task facing a judge is not to pass an examination, or to prepare a detailed legal or factual analysis of all the evidence and submissions he has heard. Essentially, the judicial task is twofold: to enable the parties to understand why they have won or lost; and to provide sufficient detail and analysis to enable an appellate court to decide whether or not the judgment is sustainable. The judge need not slavishly re-state either the facts, the arguments or the law. To adopt the striking metaphor of Mostyn J in SP v EB and KP [2014] EWHC 3964 (Fam) , [2016] 1 FLR 228 para 29, there is no need for the judge to "incant mechanically" passages from the authorities, the evidence or the submissions, as if he were "a pilot going through the pre-flight checklist.

39. The task of this court is to decide the appeal applying the principles set out in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360 (at 1372): The exigencies of daily court room life are such that reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. This is particularly true of an unreserved judgment such as the judge gave in this case. These reasons should be read on the assumption that, unless he has demonstrated the contrary, the judge knew how he should perform his functions and which matters he should take into account. This is particularly true when the matters in question are so well known as those specified in section 25(2) [of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 ]. An appellate court should resist the temptation to subvert the principle that they should not substitute their own discretion for that of the judge by a narrow textual analysis which enables them to claim that he misdirected himself.

40. On appeal the court will only intervene on a determination of fact if that determination was plainly not open to the Judge on the evidence before him/her; or failed to give any weight to what was clearly a relevant issue; or gave an irrational amount of weight to an irrelevant issue.

41. I have reminded myself of the case law that sets out the proper approach of an appellate court to an appeal against findings of fact. In Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at paragraphs 114-115 Lewison LJ stated:

114. Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them. The best known of these cases are: Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1977] RPC1; Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360 ; Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Service Ltd [2007] UKHL 23 [2007] 1 WLR 1325 ; Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33 [2013] 1 WLR 1911 and most recently and comprehensively McGraddie v McGraddie [2013] UKSC 58 [2013] 1 WLR 2477 . These are all decisions either of the House of Lords or of the Supreme Court. The reasons for this approach are many. They include i) The expertise of a trial judge is in determining what facts are relevant to the legal issues to be decided, and what those facts are if they are disputed. ii) The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show. iii) Duplication of the trial judge's role on appeal is a disproportionate use of the limited resources of an appellate court, and will seldom lead to a different outcome in an individual case. iv) In making his decisions the trial judge will have regard to the whole of the sea of evidence presented to him, whereas an appellate court will only be island hopping. v) The atmosphere of the courtroom cannot, in any event, be recreated by reference to documents (including transcripts of evidence). vi) Thus even if it were possible to duplicate the role of the trial judge, it cannot in practice be done.

115. It is also important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties and, if need be, the Court of Appeal the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view, not to spell out every matter as if summing up to a jury. Nor need he deal at any length with matters that are not disputed. It is sufficient if what he says shows the basis on which he has acted. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2002] EWCA Civ 1039 [2003] Fam 55 ; Bekoe v Broomes [2005] UKPC 39 ; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318; [2006] UKCLR 1135 .

42. Further in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 Lewsion LJ at paragraph 2 stated:

2. The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled: i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong. ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him. v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable. vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract .”

43. Where there is a proposed challenge to the exercise of a discretion the correct approach of the appellate court was set out by the House of Lords in G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] FLR 894 . The appellate court should only intervene if it is satisfied that the judged exercised his/her discretion on a wrong principle, or the decision was so plainly wrong that s/he must have exercised the discretion wrongly. The Law Relating to Proprietary Estoppel

44. In Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd (Note) [1982] QB 133 at page 144 Mr Justice Oliver (as he then was) treated as uncontroversial the following summary by counsel of the remedy of proprietary estoppel If A under an expectation created or encouraged by B that A shall have a certain interest in land, thereafter, on the faith of such expectation and with the knowledge of B and without objection by him, acts to his detriment in connection with such land, a Court of Equity will compel B to give effect to such expectation.

45. Later within his judgment Mr Justice Oliver stated: The fact is that acquiescence or encouragement may take a variety of forms. It may take the form of standing by in silence whilst one party unwittingly infringes another’s legal rights. It may take the form of passive or active encouragement of expenditure or alteration of legal position upon the footing of some unilateral or shared legal or factual supposition. Or it may, for example, take the form of stimulating, or not objecting to, some change of legal position on the faith of a unilateral or a shared assumption as to the future conduct of one or other party. I am not at all convinced that it is desirable or possible to lay down hard and fast rules which seek to dictate, in every combination of circumstances, the considerations which will persuade the court that a departure by the acquiescing party from the previously supposed state of law or fact is so unconscionable that a court of equity will interfere. before concluding at page 151 H-152B that: Furthermore the more recent cases indicate, in my judgment, that the application of the Ramsden v. Dyson, L.R. 1 H.L. 129 principle—whether you call it proprietary estoppel, estoppel by acquiescence or estoppel by encouragement is really immaterial—requires a very much broader approach which is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a. party to be permitted to deny that which knowingly, or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment than to inquiring whether the circumstances can be fitted within the confines of some preconceived formula serving as a universal yardstick for every form of unconscionable behaviour. So regarded, knowledge of the true position by the party alleged to be estopped, becomes merely one of the relevant factors—it may even be a determining factor in certain cases—in the overall inquiry. This approach, so it seems to me, appears very clearly from the authorities to which I am about to refer.

46. In Uglow v Uglow [2004] EWCA Civ 987 , a case on proprietary estoppel before the Court of Appeal in which a testator had orally assured one member of the family that they would inherit a particular farm and which they had failed to give effect to, Lord Justice Mummery giving the lead judgment set out 6 general principles. Namely (1) The overriding concern of equity to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the different elements of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel: assurance, reliance, detriment and satisfaction are all intertwined. (2) The broad inquiry in a case such as this is whether, in all the circumstances, it is unconscionable for a testator to make a will giving specific property to one person, if by his conduct he has previously created the expectation in a different person that he will inherit it. (3) The expectation may be created by (a) an assurance to the other person by the testator and intended by him to be relied upon that he will leave specific property to him; (b) consequent reliance on the assurance; and (c) real detriment (not necessarily financial) consequent on the reliance. (4) The nature and quality of the assurance must be established in order to see what expectation it creates and whether it is unconscionable for the testator to repudiate his assurance by leaving the property to someone else. (5) It is necessary to stand back and look at the claim in the round in order to decide whether the conduct of the testator had given rise to an estoppel and, if so, what is the minimum equity necessary to do justice to the claimant and to avoid an unconscionable or disproportionate result. (6) The testator's assurance that he will leave specific property to a person by will may thus become irrevocable because of the other's detrimental reliance on the assurance, even though the testator's power of testamentary disposition to which the assurance is linked is inherently revocable

47. The next relevant case in time to which I have been referred is the House of Lords decision of Thorner v Major [2009] 1WLR 776 . Within his judgment at paragraph 29 Lord Walker stated this; My Lords, this appeal is concerned with proprietary estoppel. An academic authority (Simon Gardner, An Introduction to Land Law (2007), p 101) has recently commented: “There is no definition of proprietary estoppel that is both comprehensive and uncontroversial (and many attempts at one have been neither)” Nevertheless most scholars agree that the doctrine is based on three main elements, although they express them in slightly different terms: a representation or assurance made to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance: see Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property, 7th ed (2008), para 16-001; Gray & Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed (2009), para 9.2.8; Snells Equity, 31st ed (2005), paras 10-16 to 10-19; Gardner, An Introduction to Land Law (2007), para 7.1.1.

48. As to the character and quality of the representation or assurance made, their Lordships held that whether a representation had sufficient clarity to establish a proprietary estoppel depended upon the context in which it had been made with Lord Walker saying this at paragraphs 55-56

55. “… But if all proprietary estoppel cases (including cases of acquiescence or standing-by) are to be analysed in terms of assurance, reliance and detriment, then the landowner’s conduct in standing by in silence serves as the element of assurance. As Lord Eldon LC said over 200 years ago in Dann v Spurrier (1802) 7 Ves. Jr. 231 at [235]–[236]: ‘this Court will not permit a man knowingly, though but passively, to encourage another to lay out money under an erroneous opinion of title; and the circumstance of looking on is in many cases as strong as using terms of encouragement’.

56. I would prefer to say (while conscious that it is a thoroughly question-begging formulation) that to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant assurance must be clear enough. W hat amounts to sufficient clarity in a case of this sort, is hugely dependent on context .” Later at paragraph 58 he stated this The commercial, social and family background against which a document or spoken words have to be interpreted depends on findings of fact. When a judge, sitting alone, hears a case of this sort, his conclusion as to the meaning of spoken words will be inextricably entangled with his factual findings about the surrounding circumstances.

49. I have also been taken to Hoyl Group Ltd V Cromer Town Council [2015] EWCA Civ 782 wherein Lord Justice Floyd held that although the claimant must believe he has or would receive an interest in land owned by the defendant, it is not necessary for that belief to be based on a promise- it is enough for the defendant to have encouraged that belief.

50. The current law of proprietary estoppel has recently been comprehensively examined by the Supreme Court in Guest v Guest [2024] UKSC 27 . Lord Briggs gave the lead majority judgment (with whom Lady Rose and Lady Arden agreed). Given the case before him was based on an actual promise or assurance, Lord Briggs left aside cases about informal assurances of a supported existing right. Lord Leggatt, however, in a dissenting judgment with which Lord Stephens agreed, examined the cases of estoppel by acquiescence where the proprietary assurance is based not on a promise but on the acquiescence or encouragement of a mistaken belief of a property right. In that context and before turning to the controversy in the cases stated as follows: 155 It is an open question whether these three strands of the doctrine- in which the “assurance” consists, respectively, of a representation, a promise or acquiescence- are best understood as resting on a single underlying principle or on different legal principles. It is unnecessary to address that question on this appeal as, like most recent cases in which the doctrine has been invoked, the present case involves only its promissory form. It should, however, be noted that it is only the promissory strand which has taken on a life of its own and emerged as an independent basis for acquiring property rights. To avoid confusion, it seems to me that, where the doctrine operates in this way, it would be better to shed the label “estoppel” and adopt a name which reflects, at least broadly, the nature of the claim. Without pre-judging the controversy to which I am about to turn, I would suggest the description “property expectation claim”. The Issues I Need to Determine

51. The issues to be determined by the court have been helpfully enumerated on behalf of the Intervenors as follows: (1) What was the date of the decision of the lower court which the wife wishes to appeal for the purpose of FPR 30.3 - the date he handed down judgment (6.3.25) or when the order was made (8.7.25). (2) Whether the wife’s application for permission to appeal was made out of time and, if so, whether an extension of time should be granted. (3) Whether the court below erred in finding that the husband and wife made an assurance that the Intervenors would own and/or did own The Barn sufficient to establish an equity by proprietary estoppel (Ground 1). (4) Whether the judge made findings of fact which no reasonable judge could have reached on the evidence and/or whether the judge failed to give sufficient reasons (Ground 2). (5) Whether the remedy ordered – the transfer of The Barn “mortgage free” – was wrong (Ground 3). (6) Whether the court has jurisdiction to order the husband and wife to transfer The Barn to the Intervenors (Ground 4). (7) Whether the court below was wrong to order the wife to pay the Intervenors’ costs of the preliminary issues. (8) Whether the court below was wrong to refuse to order the wife to make a payment on account of the costs. (9) Whether the court below was wrong to order that the date by which the wife is required to pay the Intervenors shall be determined at the conclusion of the financial remedy proceedings between the husband and wife. (10) Whether the stay(s) granted by this court to prevent the transfer of The Barn at Northwood Farm to the Intervenors pending consideration of the application for permission to appeal by the wife should be set aside or lifted.

52. Given that this is a “rolled up” hearing I consider that the tenth issue as identified by the Intervenors is now academic. Thus, it can be removed from the list of issues I need to determine.

53. Similarly, given the outcome of this appeal, I need not determine issues 5-9 inclusive. An Extension of Time, the Grounds of Appeal and My Conclusions

54. This appeal arises out litigation which is highly contentious, hard-fought, complex, and costly.

55. The first issue I have to decide is the date of the decision of the lower court. That was clarified by HHJ Watkins on 8 July 2025. The relevant date is 6 March 2025. On behalf of the wife, it is argued that the Appellant’s Notice was filed in time. I have already set out the basis upon which that argument is made at paragraph 4 above. It appears to me that the Appellant’s Notice was filed in this court on 1 April 2025 and issued on 3 April 2025. It was therefore issued out of time. However, whilst no formal application had been made for extension of time to file the Appellant Notice, that application is, in my judgment, implicit in the phrase any delay is not the responsibility of the wife. I have therefore proceeded to consider whether I should permit an extension of time. I have decided that I should. The delay here is measured in a small number of days. The failure to comply was not intentional and appears to me to have occurred because the Notice was filed initially at the wrong court office. The reason for the delay was a mistake which was quickly rectified. The mistake did not prejudice the husband or the Intervenors’ ability to respond to the Appellant’s Notice. Indeed, all parties have engaged fully with the appeal before me and no party has been prejudiced in the presentation of their case by the delay. In the circumstances, I have decided to grant the wife an extension to bring the Appeal out of time. Grounds 1 and 2

56. Having granted that extension, I proceed to consider the grounds of appeal. Grounds 1 and 2 are, in my judgment, interlinked. Both are ultimately questions of fact.

57. Ground 1 is helpfully summarised by Mr Upton as whether the court below erred in finding that the husband and wife made an assurance that the Intervenors would own and/or did own The Barn sufficient to establish an equity by proprietary estoppel. In my judgment whether the relevant assurance is clear enough is a matter of fact. I have rightly been reminded that context is hugely important as to whether an assurance is sufficiently clear, and the judge is best placed to evaluate that issue, having had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. I readily acknowledge that HHJ Watkins is an experienced and respected judge who had the benefit of hearing all the parties. It is for that reason that I have set out above the relevant law in relation to appeals against findings of fact and have reminded myself of the parameters of the function I must carry out.

58. At first instance the Intervenors’ primary case was that a representation or assurance that they would and/or did in fact own The Barn should be implied from the indirect statements and conduct of the parties over a long period of time; both before and after The Farm was purchased. They also argued that the wife and husband encouraged them to believe they owned The Barn whilst they renovated it at their own expense. It is, I accept, irrelevant whether the wife or the husband intended the Intervenors to own The Barn- Thorner v Major (above). The real question for the court to decide was whether the wife and husband’s words and acts would reasonably have conveyed to the Intervenors an assurance that they did or would do so. The relevant assurance must be clear enough, but what amounts to sufficient clarity is hugely dependent on context- Lord Walker at paragraph 56 in Thorner v Major. I accept that context is hugely important when determining whether the assurance is sufficiently clear - Liden v Burton [ 2016] EWCA Civ 275.

59. Although the Intervenors must have believed that they have or would have received an interest in land owned by the wife and husband, it is not necessary for that belief to have been based on a promise- it is enough that the wife and husband encouraged that belief - Hoyl (above). In Smyth-Tyrrell v Bowden [2018] EWHC 106 (Ch) , having considered Hoyl, HHJ Paul Matthews QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) held at paragraph 77 that a claim can be based on the claimant’s reliance on a belief that the defendant will in the future give the claimant a right, even in the absence of a promise by the defendant, if the defendant either knows of the claimant’s belief and does nothing to disabuse it or, even if the defendant does not know of the claimant’s belief, the defendant “nonetheless positively encourages [the claimant] to act in ways only consistent with [the claimant] having such a belief (so that, objectively speaking, it should be obvious to [the defendant] what is going on)”.

60. On behalf of the wife, it was properly submitted before me that: 1) to establish a claim in proprietary estoppel based on representation or assurance that the Intervenors owned The Barn, the court had to consider carefully the distinction between an assurance that the Intervenors could live in the property as their home and one that they would own it. 2) to establish a claim in proprietary estoppel based on acquiescence, it is necessary for the court to consider the distinction between a state of knowledge or belief as to ownership and one of occupation. Therefore, when considering whether the Intervenors had established a claim for proprietary estoppel based on representation or assurance that the Intervenors owned The Barn, or whether they had established a claim for proprietary estoppel based on acquiescence, it was necessary for the judge at first instance to properly consider the distinction between an assurance or belief they could live in The Barn as their home and the assurance or belief that they owned The Barn. Whether or not there was an assurance or belief of ownership rather than a right to occupy was a matter of fact for the judge to determine.

61. I accept the submission on behalf of the Intervenors that at first instance HHJ Watkins correctly identified the central question before him at paragraph 71 as being whether the Intervenors had full beneficial ownership or merely a right to occupy for life. Further at paragraph 75 of his judgment HHJ Watkins stated this In this case, the Intervenors argued there was a pattern of conduct and statements over 25 years that reasonably conveyed an assurance of ownership rather than mere permission to occupy. On behalf of the Intervenors, it is submitted that having acknowledged the distinction between an assurance of ownership and that of an assurance of a right to occupy, it is inconceivable that he did not then proceed to properly consider that distinction. However, on behalf of the wife it is argued before me that that is exactly what has happened. I have accordingly reminded myself that I should read the judgment on the assumption that, unless he demonstrated the contrary, the judge knew how he should perform his functions and the matters which he should take into account - Piglowski.

62. I accept the Intervenors’ submission that a finding that there were no express discussions about ownership of The Barn is not of itself inconsistent with a finding that there was a clear representation as to ownership as an assurance can be implied and/or be inferred from words or conduct - see Thorner v Major (above). Further I accept the submission that the wife had accepted at first instance that the Intervenors had a beneficial interest in The Barn- a right to occupy- , and that there must therefore have been an assurance or common understanding to that affect. However, in my judgment, that submission does not address the central issue, namely, was the assurance that they would own the property or that they would have a right to occupy it. That was the central factual issue to be decided and one upon which, in my judgment, the learned judge ought to have provided a sufficiently detailed analysis to enable the parties to understand why he had concluded that the assurance in this case was one of ownership rather than one of a right to occupy. In coming to that conclusion, I have reminded myself that I should avoid a narrow textual analysis and I should, as already stated assume that the Learned Judge knew the function he had to fulfil. However, in my judgment HHJ Watkins failed to address that central issue.

63. Instead within his judgment he elided the issues of ownership and occupation. That is illustrated by the following: 1) At paragraph 57 HHJ Watkins concludes that “ it is clear that all parties treated the occupation of the barn by the Intervenors as being one on the basis that they owned it ”. 2) At paragraph 61 the Learned Judge considered the process by which the Intervenors advanced £50,000 and moved from their former home to the one in which they “ would be moving to live” . 3) At paragraph 62 he states, “ As far as I can tell, there being no other, as far as I can tell, none of the parties treating the Intervenors on any other basis than that the barn was their home and would continue to be so” (sic). 4) At paragraph 63 the learned judge goes on to say “In the event that I was wrong as to what was in all of the party’s minds (sic), and that H and W did believe that the Intervenors were not the beneficial owners of the barn, that they stood by and allowed the Intervenors to carry out all of the work ” . 5) At paragraph 77 of the judgment, it is stated that “ there were clear representations given to Intervenors by both the wife and husband as to ownership. It is also said it was agreed that The Barn would be the Intervenors’ home .” The paragraph goes on to say the details were not discussed.

64. As to the findings which form the substance of Ground 2, namely: 1) At paragraph 57 -Thereafter, it is clear that all parties treated the occupation of the Barn by the Intervenors as being done on the basis that they owned it, although, as there is an obvious significant family context to the arrangements, there was some flexibility in making use of the barn to raise money for renovation. And throughout their occupation, until the failure of the husband and wife’s marriage, that continued to be the case 2) At paragraph 77- For the reasons I have set out above, I am satisfied that in so far as reliance is concerned, there was reliance placed by the Intervenors on clear representations given to them by both H and W as to ownership of the barn and the basis of their occupation. It was agreed that the barn would be the Intervenors home. The details of the arrangement were not discussed, but I am satisfied that there was an understanding between the parties as to the [not completed]. 3) At paragraph 79 - I am satisfied, therefore, that the Intervenor's case on proprietary estoppel is made out, and I am satisfied that I should make orders that place the Intervenors in the position that they were expressly led to believe they would be in, namely, owners of the barn. As the Intervenors’ expected remedy was full ownership of the barn mortgage-free, reflecting the original understanding that they would have the barn to themselves without an encumbrance imposed by W.

65. The findings which form the basis of Ground 2 of this appeal are the macro findings I have referred to before. They are central to the issue in this case, namely was this an assurance of ownership or one of a right to occupy.

66. On behalf of the wife, it is argued that in coming to those findings HHJ Watkins does not mention a number of documents that point towards an assurance of a right to occupy rather than one of ownership. They are (i) The letter the husband wrote to his parents in 2007 asking them to leave the Barn (ii) The email from the male Intervenor to the husband on 30 August 2013 stating in terms “we have always been aware that we had no security of tenure” and referring to them claiming some form of ‘squatters rights’ (iii) The evidence that the Intervenors had taken legal advice from a solicitor that day. (iv) The certificate of occupancy (v) The occupiers’ consent which the Intervenors signed, (vi) The email from the husband dated 18.1.18 stating categorically that the Barn had been lent to his parents “so we still own it and it has separate title deeds (in our name) to the remainder of our estate”

67. Within his judgment, HHJ Watkins states at paragraph 48 that he had looked carefully at such contemporaneous documents as there were, but he does not proceed to consider the specific documents above. On behalf of the Intervenor the broad response is that such documents had extremely limited probative value and were not determinative of the case. I accept that amongst them there is no one “bombshell” document nor is there one document that would provide the “knockout blow”. However in a case, as here, where the primary contention of the Intervenors is that an assurance can be implied or inferred from the words and conduct of the parties and that context is important, it seems to me that the learned judge ought to have considered the documents, considered the weight to be attached to them and to have weighed them in the balance. In my judgment, in a case that is based on a course of conduct over many years and in which what can be inferred or implied from conduct of the parties and their interaction with each other is key, the documents ought to have been considered as part of the context. In those circumstances, in my judgment their omission as part of the analysis is a material omission and a procedural irregularity.

68. Further and in my judgment importantly nowhere within his judgment did the Learned Judge set out his clear reasons for determining that the assurance in this case was that of ownership rather than a right to occupy. I consider that given the importance of the central factual issue to the outcome of the case, that he ought to have provided adequate reasons to enable the parties and the court to understand why he came to the conclusion that he did.

69. Hence for the reasons I have set out above, I grant the wife permission to appeal on Grounds 1 (to the extent set out above) and 2 and having done so proceed to allow the appeal and the supplemental substantive ground of appeal in relation to costs, arising from the court’s determination on Grounds 1 and 2. In those circumstances, I need not consider the remaining grounds raised on behalf of the wife or the intervenors. Accordingly, I order that the order of 8 July 2025 is set aside and the Intervenors’ application for a declaration of a proprietary interest in The Barn is remitted for hearing. I will permit written submissions on costs to be limited to 5 pages of A4 Times New Roman pt12. Such submissions are to be sent to me via my clerk no later than 2pm on 16 March 2026.

70. Given that I have remitted the case for rehearing, I make no comment whatsoever on the ultimate outcome of this case.

71. That is my judgment.