UK case law

David Johnson v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

[2026] UKFTT GRC 209 · First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Transport · 2026

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The verbatim text of this UK judgment. Sourced directly from The National Archives Find Case Law. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original ruling, under Crown copyright and the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Full judgment

Preliminary matters

1. References in this decision to a ‘section’ are references to the applicable section of t he Road Traffic Act 1988 .

2. In this decision, we use the following terms to denote the meanings shown: ADIs: Approved Driving Instructors (those whose name appear on the Register) . Appellant: David Johnson. Register: The Register of Approved Driving Instructors maintained by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency. Registrar: The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (the Respondent). Registrar’s Decision: The decision of the Registrar, by way of letter to the Appellant dated 24 July 2025, to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register . Introduction - b ackground to the appeal

3. This was an appeal against the Registrar’s Decision.

4. The reasons for the Registrar’s Decision were, in summary, that the Appellant had accrued six penalty points for two motoring offences – namely, a fixed penalty of three penalty points on 30 July 2024 for speeding and a fixed penalty of three penalty points on 31 May 2025 for speeding – and accordingly the Registrar considered that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. The appeal The grounds of appeal

5. The Appellant challenged the Registrar’s Decision, arguing that they were a fit and proper person. The Appellant’s appeal relied, in summary, on the grounds that: a. Removing him from the Register (and therefore depriving him of his job as an ADI) would be disproportionate to the speeding offences in question. b. He admitted the offences and accepted responsibility for them. c. He was not given prior warning of his potential removal from the Register and was not given an opportunity to undergo further training. The Registrar’s case

6. The Registrar resisted the appeal. The Registrar’s Statement of Case maintained that the Appellant’s driving licence being endorsed with six penalty points cannot be ignored. The Registrar accordingly upheld their view that the Appellant was not a ‘fit and proper person’ to have their name on the Register.

7. The Registrar also stated that the Appellant had not given notification of the two offences within 7 days, despite an obligation to do so pursuant to their registration as an ADI. Mode of hearing

8. The proceedings were held by the cloud video platform. The Tribunal Panel, the Appellant and Mr Russell (on behalf of the Registrar) joined remotely. The Appellant initially had some difficulties connecting to the cloud video problem and as a result of those difficulties he joined the hearing by telephone only. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way. Once the hearing was underway, there were no interruptions of note. The evidence and submission

9. The Tribunal read and took account of a bundle of evidence and pleadings.

10. We heard from the Appellant directly, as well as hearing oral submissions from Mr Russell on behalf of the Registrar .

11. All of the contents of the bundle and the parties’ submissions were taken into account, even if not directly referred to in this decision. The relevant legal principles

12. Section 123(1) prohibits the giving of instruction in the driving of a motor car for payment unless the instructor’s name is entered in the Register, or they are the holder of a current licence issued under section 129 .

13. Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require a person to be, and continue to be, a “fit and proper person” pursuant to section 125(3)(e) and section 127(3)(e).

14. A person’s name may therefore be removed from the Register under section 128(2)(e) if the Registrar considers that they have ceased to be a “fit and proper person”.

15. The requirement to be a “fit and proper person” is not simply that the person is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, but that they are a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. Accordingly, the requirement to be a “fit and proper person” extends beyond instructional ability alone and, in assessing whether someone is a “fit and proper person”, account has to be taken of their character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of all material matters, including convictions, cautions and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters in context, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate.

16. The entry of a person’s name on the Register carries with it an ‘official seal of approval’ and consequently maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. The Registrar therefore has the duty of ensuring that ADIs are ‘fit and proper’ persons to have their names entered in the Register. As part of that, the Registrar exercises functions of scrutiny and that is why there are stringent disclosure requirements expected of ADIs and those wishing to become an ADI.

17. In cases involving motoring offences, it is expected that anyone who is to be an ADI will have standards of driving and behaviour above that of an ordinary motorist. Teaching people of all ages (including those aged under 18) to drive safely, carefully and competently is a professional vocation requiring a significant degree of responsibility. Such a demanding task should only be entrusted to those with high personal and professional standards and who themselves have demonstrated a keen regard for road safety and compliance with the law.

18. In cases involving non-motoring offences, the standing of the Register could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidence could be undermined, if it were known that a person’s name had been permitted onto, or allowed to remain on, the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours, or been convicted or cautioned in relation to offences, substantially material to the question of fitness. Indeed, it would be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observing the law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

19. Some of the factors in the preceding paragraph can also be relevant in cases involving motoring offences. The role and powers of the Tribunal

20. An appeal to the Tribunal against the Registrar’s Decision is undertaken by way of a ‘re-hearing’; the Tribunal ‘stands in the shoes’ of the Registrar and takes a fresh decision on the evidence before it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s Decision (as the Registrar is tasked by Parliament with making such decisions). The Tribunal does not conduct a procedural review of the Registrar’s decision-making process but, in reaching its decision, the Tribunal may review any findings of fact on which the Registrar’s Decision was based and the Tribunal may come to a different decision regarding those facts.

21. The powers of the Tribunal in determining the appeal are set out in section 131(3). In summary, for the purposes of the appeal, the Tribunal is empowered to make an order for the removal or the retention of the Appellant’s name in the Register, as it thinks fit.

22. However, under section 131(4A), if the Tribunal considers that any evidence adduced on the appeal had not been adduced to the Registrar before the Registrar’s Decision, it may (instead of making such an order) remit the matter to the Registrar for him to reconsider the Registrar’s Decision.

23. Where the Tribunal makes an order for the removal of the Appellant’s name in the Register, it may also, pursuant to section 131(4), direct that (in essence) the Appellant cannot apply to have their name entered in the Register for a period of up to four years. Discussion and findings

24. In this case, the Appellant had accrued six penalty points for the two motoring offences noted above.

25. Although the Appellant had argued in his grounds of appeal that removing him from the Register would be disproportionate, given that this would deprive him of his job as an ADI, he stated in the hearing that he had actually already ceased operating as an ADI. This was based on his misunderstanding of the Registrar’s Decision, which the Appellant had thought meant that he could no longer operate as an ADI from August 2025 notwithstanding his pending appeal.

26. That misunderstanding was linked to another of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, namely that he was not given prior warning of his potential removal from the Register. However, the Appellant recognised during the hearing that he had misunderstood the Registrar’s Decision.

27. The Appellant suggested that the wording of the Registrar’s Decision could benefit from improvement in terms of its clarity. That is an issue which the Registrar may wish to consider.

28. Regarding the Appellant’s other grounds of appeal, as we have noted, the Appellant admitted the offences and accepted responsibility for them. In respect of the first offence (30 July 2024), the Appellant he accepted that he may have been travelling at more than 40 mph in a 30 mph zone. The Appellant stated that that this was inadvertent but he also admitted that he had previously been on a speed awareness course. As a result of that offence, the Appellant should have been on notice about his conduct.

29. However, approximately 10 months later (on 31 May 2025), he failed to heed that and was caught speeding again. The second offence involved three penalty points for speeding on the motorway. The Appellant stated that he was travelling at 80 mph on that occasion and he admitted deliberately speeding because he wanted to ‘make up lost time’ on his journey.

30. As we have noted, the Registrar has the duty of ensuring that those who have their names entered in the Register are ‘fit and proper’ persons. Part of this is ensuring that ADIs understand their responsibilities and can show that they not only know the rules but follow them.

31. The Registrar cited statistics of injuries and deaths relating to driving offences. The Registrar considered that he could not condone motoring offences such as those which the Appellant had been found guilty of. The Registrar’s view was that allowing the Appellant to remain on the Register could undermine the public’s confidence in it.

32. We agree with the Registrar’s view in respect of this case. Aside from being an ADI, the Appellant was a Police Officer for 30 years and should know the risks of speeding and the potential consequences of harm or injury to the driver, passengers and other road users. As we have noted, he was on notice of the first offence (which occurred after a previous speed awareness course) and then choose to speed on the motorway 10 months later.

33. Whilst the Appellant argued that he was not given an opportunity to undergo further training, we consider that argument to be immaterial. The Appellant had already attended a speed awareness course yet was caught speeding on two subsequent occasions, despite being both an ADI and an ex-Police Officer. Given his career history, the Appellant would have more experience and more insight than most into the risks and potential consequences of speeding and therefore, in our view, to knowingly and deliberately speed in committing the second offence demonstrates an alarming lack of judgement.

34. For all of the reasons we have given, we find that the Appellant does not currently meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person to have their name retained in the Register. On balance, taking into account all the circumstances, we conclude that the Registrar’s Decision was correct.

35. We therefore dismiss the appeal and we order that the Appellant’s name be removed from the Register. Signed: Stephen Roper Date: 7 February 2026 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal

David Johnson v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2026] UKFTT GRC 209 — UK case law · My AI Insurance