Involve Visual Collaboration Ltd v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a public procurement case. I have before me two applications. The first, dated 17 July 2025, is made by the Defendant, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (“DWP”) to lift the automatic suspension of the contract to be awarded by it to Accenture (UK) Ltd (“the Application to Lift”). The unsuccessful bidder for this contract was the Claimant, Involve Collaboration Ltd (“Involve”). DWP’s Contract Award Notice dated 7 April 2025 informed Involve that it had been excluded from the tender process because its bid had been deemed non-compliant. That was because it failed to achieve the required minimum score under Question 6.4 of the Technical Envelope part of the Invitation To Tender (“ITT”).

2. On 1 May 2025, Involve issued its claim against DWP, challenging that decision, on 24 April 2025. It served the Particulars of Claim on 1 May 2025 and the Amended Particulars of Claim on 14 May 2025. DWP filed its Defence on 10 June and Involve filed its Reply on 1 July 2025.

3. On 3 September 2025, the Application to Lift was listed for hearing on 9 October 2025. On 8 September 2025, Involve issued the second application before me. This was for an expedited trial of the claim, to take place in December 2025 (“the Expedition Application”). This will be considered in the context of the Lift Application. The latter application and the proceedings generally are governed by the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (“the PCR”), not by the Procurement Act 2023 . While the latter is now in force, it only governs procurements which commenced on or after its commencement date, being 24 February 2025. The procurement at issue here was commenced on 25 June 2024 (“the Procurement”). The SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE procurement

4. The Procurement concerns the provision to DWP of audio-visual facilities (“Facilities”) for use by it when communicating with its customers, typically those who are receiving or seeking to receive the very wide range of benefits provided by DWP. The Facilities enable DWP to conduct interviews with customers by video conference, as opposed to by telephone or at a face-to-face meeting.

5. At the moment, Involve supplies Facilities to DWP pursuant to a contract for a Strategic Video Channel dated 1 December 2021 (“the Existing Contract”) and is therefore the incumbent supplier. I refer to the service provided by the Existing Contract as “the Existing Solution”. I refer to the service to be provided by the contract to be awarded pursuant to the Procurement as “the New Solution” and the contract itself as “the New Contract”.

6. The Existing Contract was due to expire on 30 November 2023, but has been extended on several occasions, to 30 November 2024, 31 August 2025 and most recently to 28 February 2026.

7. The Existing Solution provided under the Existing Contract is in connection with health assessments carried out by or on behalf of the DWP (“Health Assessments”). The video-conferencing platform supplied by Involve is called Attend Anywhere (“AA”). This platform was not developed and is not owned by Involve, but rather by a third-party supplier, namely Induction Healthcare Group Plc (“IHG”). Involve effectively re-sells AA to parties such as DWP pursuant to a license granted to it by IHG

8. At the moment, the only other element of DWP which uses Facilities is Universal Credit. Again, the platform employed is AA, but this is not supplied to DWP by Involve directly and it does not form part of the Existing Contract.

9. The aim of the New Solution is, on any view, to expand considerably the use by DWP of Facilities. In particular, and as set out in the first witness statement (“WS”) of Jeremy Edwards, the Head of Digital Channels at DWP, dated 17 July 2025: “20. The Contract is a Strategic Reference Architecture project (‘SRA’). SRA underpins DWP’s ambitions for how DWP Digital will increase collaboration across teams and support the transformation of departmental services in line with DWP strategy. The solution is intended to provide a high quality, modern and importantly single source video conferencing channel solution to enable DWP to interact with its customers, and which is capable of being rolled out across DWP’s various lines of business (the “New Solution”).

22. SRA aims to benefit from the adoption of common technologies, for example a single video platform, to deliver additional value. The New Solution aligns to this ambition through the provision of a single platform across all lines of business, supporting a unified approach to customer-facing video appointments, encouraging collaboration and further innovation to the benefit of all functions.

23. The primary intent of the New Solution is to provide a better service to benefit claimants (as set out below under Key Benefits), who are often some of the most vulnerable members of society. It is envisaged that the New Solution will become available to a wider set of DWP customers who prefer or for whom video conferencing is the preferred method of communicating with DWP, in a way the incumbent service has not been able to deliver. This would include by way of example, those for who travelling is an impediment for cost, distance or disability reasons…

25. The New Solution is intended to replace video conferencing solutions currently deployed by DWP in its Health Assessment and Universal Credit directorates, which are the only services currently offering a video conferencing channel and whose contracts are coming to an end. The New Solution will be used by: • Health Services (health assessments) • Child Maintenance Services • Retirement Services • Fraud and Error Services • Universal Credit Services • Visiting • Disability Services • Working Age • Other miscellaneous lines of business”

10. DWP contends that the New Solution will be a very considerable improvement upon the Existing Solution, not merely in terms of the scope of deployment of Facilities, but also in terms of quality. According to Mr Edwards, it was not possible to roll out the AA platform supplied by Involve more widely because of security and functionality issues. This is not accepted by Involve but for present purposes, this does not matter. On any view the New Solution is intended to be a much more expansive programme for the rolling-out of Facilities across DWP’s business lines.

11. Involve receives an annual revenue from the Existing Contract of around £450,000. Its total turnover for 2023 was £15.98 million, yielding a gross profit of £6.47 million and an operating profit of £1.35 million.

12. The Claim Form intimates a claim for loss of profits (as a result of not being awarded the New Contract) of £4.98 million.

13. It is Involve’s case that the advent and scope of the New Solution provided it with the opportunity to develop its own video-conferencing platform which it would then supply to DWP. It would therefore move from being a simple re-seller of AA to being a significant provider of Facilities in its own right.

14. Further details about the subject matter of the Procurement and otherwise will be addressed below. The claim

15. As already noted, Involve’s claim centres upon what took place in relation to the marking of its answer to Question 6.4. While DWP agrees that there is a serious issue to be tried here, it is important to understand the nature and scope of the claim because it bears upon the nature and length of any trial, as well as the significance of the relief sought by Involve.

16. Question 6.4 read as follows: “Please provide a description of how the overall the proposed solution will meet the GOV.UK related requirements detailed in Attachment 1 Specification. The [Defendant] requires a Video solution that provides a Customer interface which is consistent with the rest of the GOV.UK pages, it looks and feels like GOV.UK page and complies to GOV.UK structure and styles requirements set out in the Specification. Your response should include, as a minimum:

1. A description of how the solution will ensure that the Customer interface is integrated and provided from within DWP web pages that adhere to the standard GOV.UK styles as described in https://www.gov.uk/service-toolkit and https://design-system.service.gov.uk

2. Describe how the solution will be architected to ensure that DWP customers will be consuming the Video service from within GOV.UK web pages, without being aware that they are using a third-party Video product.”

17. I can then summarise the process, as alleged by Involve in paragraph 27-32 of the Amended Particulars of Claim, from information supplied to it by DWP, as follows: on a date prior to 8 November 2024 the 3 evaluators of Involve’s answer to Question 6.4 awarded Involve scores of 7, 7 and 1 (1 being the lowest) respectively. Between 8 and 18 November they met to moderate the scores and after the moderation they agreed jointly on a score of 7. Evaluator C who had originally given Involve a score of 1 had expressed the view that Involve’s proposed URL masking would not meet the requirement for the solution to be integrated and provided within the DWP/GOV.UK webpages. Subsequently, the moderation was reopened and Evaluator C reiterated his earlier concern, and the re-moderation resulted in a new score of 1. DWP essentially admits those factual allegations - see paragraphs 19-27 of the Defence.

18. In respect of these matters, Involve contends that: (1) The decision to re-moderate was in breach of DWP’s transparency obligation and was manifestly erroneous; (2) The actual process of the re-moderation was in breach of its transparency, equal treatment and proportionality obligations, and (3) The actual score awarded was itself manifestly erroneous.

19. Involve then says that absent these breaches, it would have been awarded a score of 7 on Question 6.4 and so would not have been excluded. Had it not been excluded (and having regard to what it was awarded under the Commercial Envelope) it would have won the bid, as providing the Most Economically Advantageous Tender (“MEAT”), alternatively it has lost the opportunity to win the bid.

20. In terms of relief, Involve claims a declaration that DWP’s decision on the Procurement was unlawful, an order that it should be set aside, an order that the New Contract should now be awarded to Involve and damages for lost profits under the New Contract and/or wasted tender costs.

21. What is not claimed by Involve here are any sums representing compensation for loss to its reputation as a result of being unsuccessful in the bid, and being seen to be such. In one sense, that is not surprising because Involve’s case is that damages would not be available to cover this kind of loss, it being too uncertain and/or remote. The evidence

22. In support of the Application to Lift, DWP filed WSs from Mr Edwards, dated 17 July 2025 (as already noted) and 3 and 6 October 2025 (“JE1”, “JE2” and “JE3” respectively”) and from Lawrence Hurren, who works within the Contract Management and Partner Delivery function of DWP, dated 16 July 2025. In opposition to the Expedition Application, DWP also filed the WS of Gary Duffy dated 2 October 2025.

23. Involve filed a WS from Robert Pasqualino, its Managing Director, dated 29 September 2025 in opposition to the Application to Lift and the second WS of Daniel Butler in support of the Expedition Application. The law

24. It is common ground that American Cyanamid principles govern the Application to Lift generally. As O’Farrell J put it at paragraph 48 of her judgment in Camelot UK Lotteries v Gambling Commission [2022] EWHC 1664 (TCC): “48. The relevant questions for the court, when determining an application to lift automatic suspension in a procurement challenge case, are as follows: i) Is there a serious issue to be tried? ii) If so, would damages be an adequate remedy for the claimant(s) if suspension were lifted and they succeeded at trial; is it just in all the circumstances that the claimant(s) should be confined to a remedy of damages? iii) If not, would damages be an adequate remedy for the defendant if the suspension remained in place and it succeeded at trial? iv) Where there is doubt as to the adequacy of damages for either of the parties, which course of action is likely to carry the least risk of injustice if it transpires that it was wrong; that is, where does the balance of convenience lie?”

25. In this case, and for the purpose of the Lift Application, DWP agrees that there is a serious issue to be tried, as noted above.

26. For its part, Involve contends that damages would not be an adequate remedy for it. It accepts that they would be, insofar as it has made a claim for loss of profit from the putative New Contract and/or wasted bid costs. However, it says that it would suffer a loss of reputation and the opportunity to win further important contracts as a result of not being awarded the New Contract and being seen to be such. Here, Involve says that damages would not be an adequate remedy.

27. I therefore refer to some of the case-law in this area. I begin with the observation made by Joanna Smith J in Kellogg Brown & Root Ltd v Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime [2021] EWHC 3321 (TCC) that the application of the principles will involve consideration of the circumstances of the particular case and every case will turn on its own facts. There is an obvious need for careful analysis of the reasons for the outcome in other cases and the extent to which the court in the instant case is concerned with a similar factual scenario - see paragraph 25 of her judgment.

28. This is reflected in the observation made by O’Farrell J in Bombardier Transportation v London Underground [2018] EWHC 2926 (TCC) at paragraph 58 of her judgment: “Each case must be considered on its own facts. In most cases, unsuccessful bids are part of the normal commercial risks taken by a business and will not have any adverse impact apart from potential wasted costs of the tender and lost profits. Not every failed bid will result in damage to reputation causing uncompensatable loss. There must be cogent evidence showing the loss of reputation alleged would lead to financial losses that would be significant and irrecoverable as or very difficult to quantify fairly”.

29. In Openview Security Solutions v London Borough of Merton [2015] EWHC 2694, the whole topic of loss of reputation in this context was given detailed consideration by Stuart-Smith J (as he then was). In particular: “37. I am not persuaded that loss of reputation as such affects the question of adequacy of damages as a remedy. If damages were otherwise an adequate remedy, I can see no reason why the ‘reputation’ of a tendering party as such should affect the giving or withholding of interim relief. With commercial parties, what ultimately matters is whether the loss of the contract in question will reduce their profitability in a way which is not recognised by the normal principles on which damages are awarded. This in turn suggests that what is generally of concern is whether the aggrieved tenderer will lose out on other contracts that it might have obtained if it had added lustre to its reputation by getting the contract at issue. In other words, the real subject of the ‘loss of reputation’ argument is financial losses which the law of damages does not normally recognise…

38. This points to the answer to the second question: the constituency of interest is future prospective contracting authorities (or other contracting parties) who might be influenced to give work to a party which has the contract at issue rather than to a party who has not. The answers to the two questions explain in many cases why the ‘loss of reputation’ does not normally sound in damages in the first place: the loss is speculative and legally too remote. They also provide good reason for restraint on the part of a court which is urged to adopt ‘loss of reputation’ as a reason for holding that the damages that would be awarded are not adequate compensation.

39. What then are the criteria to be applied before a court accepts that ‘loss of reputation’ is a good reason for holding that damages which would otherwise be adequate are an inadequate remedy for American Cyanamid purposes? In the absence of prior authority directly in point (none having been cited by the parties) but with an eye to the approach adopted by the court [in previous cases] I suggest the following: (i) Loss of reputation is unlikely to be of consequence when considering the adequacy of damages unless the court is left with a reasonable degree of confidence that a failure to impose interim relief will lead to financial losses that would be significant and irrecoverable as damages; (ii) It follows that the burden of proof lies upon the party supporting the continuance of the automatic suspension and the standard of proof is that there is (at least) a real prospect that would retrospectively be identifiable as being attributable to the loss of contract at issue but not recoverable in damages; (iii) The relevant person who must generally be shown to be affected by the loss of reputation is the future provider of work.”

40. These are general criteria, which need to be reviewed and considered in the light of the facts of each case. I readily accept that there is more to be said on the subject and the principles such as those I have suggested are not be applied by rote.”

30. I now turn to some particular cases dealing with arguments about loss of reputation whose outcome was relied upon by one or other of the parties here.

31. In Vodafone v Secretary of State for Foreign Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2021] EWHC 2793 (TCC) , Kerr J held that the Claimant could not be adequately compensated by an award of damages. The loss of the contract in issue was significant because it would lead to a loss of opportunities to bid for and win other contracts “on the back of this one”. The contract was a very large and important one and in that case, the claimant’s submission was actually supported by what the successful bidder, Fujitsu, had said in a letter dealing with the effects on it of any delay in the award of the contract. It explained how developing the system for the contract to be awarded would help it to obtain similar contracts for other public sector clients such as the National Crime Agency, the Ministry of Defence, HMRC and NHS.

32. Kerr J said this: “84. Here, the immediate value of the contract is relatively low, though it is fair to hold the defendants to their own estimate of £184 million overall, taking account of opportunities to obtain call off contracts. I accept that the contract is highly prestigious. ..

85. I am prepared to accept Vodafone’s assessment, not directly contradicted by the defendants, that in the field of international global communications this contract is second only in prestige to an equivalent contract to supply those services to the government of the USA. Such opportunities do not arise frequently; the last one was 11 years ago.

87. In the end, what helps to persuade me that it would not be just to confine Vodafone to its remedy in damages is the unquantifiable loss of opportunities to bid for and win other contracts on the back of this one. I do not accept that the evidence of this was vague and speculative, as the defendants suggested.

88. The disparity between the relatively modest value of the services immediately to be provided and the overall estimated value of £184 million shows the difficulty of quantifying losses that are, in my judgment, likely to prove irrecoverable as damages in future. While Vodafone can bid for other government and public sector contracts without having won this one, it would not be able to secure call off contracts and build its standing by that means.

89. I also find persuasive Vodafone’s point that Fujitsu has heavily relied in its letter on threats to its future business opportunities and relationships with suppliers arising from any risk that it might, after all, not hold onto this contract. I see no reason why the same logic should not hold good for both companies.”

33. On the other hand, in Alstom Transport v London Underground Ltd [2017] EWHC 1521 (TCC) , Stuart-Smith J (as he then was) held that the evidence submitted by Alstom in support of its submission that damages would not be an adequate remedy was surprisingly lacking in detail and that the picture painted by it was partial and that both scrutiny and scepticism were justified. On analysis, its evidence that if it did not get the contract in question it was highly unlikely that it would be able to maintain the centre of expertise for traction technology, was barely credible. He therefore rejected the submission that damages would be inadequate.

34. Finally, on this topic, I refer to the Northern Island case of TES Group Ltd v Northern Island Water Ltd [2020] NIQB 62. At paragraphs 32 and 33 of his judgment Horner J said this: “[32] But no company can expect to be successful in every tendering competition it enters. If an unsuccessful tenderer is intending to make the case that the loss of a competition will spell financial ruin, then it should provide convincing evidence as to why this is likely. There has been a complete failure to provide such evidence. I have already commented on the expert opinion of Mr McAllister. Indeed, it is difficult not to conclude that there has been a deliberate attempt to keep the court in the dark as to how TES will perform should it lose this tender by starving it of up to date financial information as to how TES is currently performing. If TES had wanted to make such a case, namely that winning Lot 2 was essential for its long-term survival, I would have expected the following evidence to be provided at a bare minimum: (a) Up-to-date management accounts and detailed financial information as to turnover etc. (b) A breakdown of how TES’s turnover was made up and what was attributable to Water Services. (c) What contracts TES had in the Water Services sphere apart from those with the defendant. (d) What alternative work sources there were in the Water Services sphere available to it. (e) What plan TES had if it was unsuccessful in this tender to seek other work. If it had no plan how and why had it become so dependent on winning this particular contract. (g) The effect of a successful claim on its finances and its ability to retain its employees. [33] In the circumstances I remain deeply unimpressed by the claim made by TES of financial ruin if it fails to win this contract and by its failure to provide any cogent financial evidence to support it.”

35. The very citation of these three last cases illustrates how the outcome of a consideration of the inadequacy or otherwise of damages in the context of loss of reputation is highly fact-sensitive.

36. One further useful statement of principle is that to be found in paragraph 47 of the judgment of Eyre J in Medequip v Kensington and Chelsea [2022] EWHC 3293 (TCC) where he said this: “47. Particular considerations arise when addressing this question in the context of procurement cases where the defendant will be a public body. There will be cases where damages will demonstrably be an adequate remedy even for such a body if the suspension is kept in place and it is precluded from placing the contract in accordance with its procurement process. This will be the position where awarding the contract would mean that the authority was able to obtain particular goods or services at a particular price and where the restraint on awarding the contract means that it has to obtain identical goods or services for a higher price. There, an award in due course of the difference between the two amounts would adequately compensate the authority in question for the inability to place the contract at the lower sum at the earlier time. In such a case the same goods or services will have been obtained during the period of the suspension but at a higher price than would have been the position in the absence of the suspension. There will, however, be circumstances where damages will not be an adequate remedy for a public body. This will potentially be the position where the contract is to provide particular services for the public or to provide those services in a particular way and where the maintenance of the suspension means that for a period of time the services will not be provided or will not be provided in the way desired by the authority. Such an impact on the provision of services by the public body in question will not be measurable in financial terms and damages would not normally be an adequate remedy for a defendant authority in those circumstances (see per Lord Goff in R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame [1991] 1 AC 601 at 673 A-B).” Analysis (1): damages as an adequate remedy for involve?

37. The first question is whether damages would be an adequate remedy for Involve if deprived of the automatic suspension. If they are, then the suspension should be lifted without more.

38. There is detailed evidence before me on this question from Mr Pasqualino. I set out the relevant parts of his WS as follows: “45 The new Contract is prestigious and would be the largest video platform contract delivered across the public sector in the United Kingdom. Being awarded the Contract would not only deliver commercial rewards in itself, but is also likely to be viewed by potential customers, and in the marketplace generally, as a “flagship” project which would immediately open interest and opportunities in other public and private organisations which might not be currently available to Involve. The successful award of the new Contract to Involve would give major public and private sector organisations confidence in engaging with Involve. It would also serve as an excellent use case to introduce the New Solution developed by Involve to major system integrators like BT, Capita, Serco, Vodafone and Atos, who bring together various component subsystems into a whole. These system integrators have large framework access, and the exposure of the New Solution developed by Involve to these private organisations (a number of whom are providers of assessment services to the DWP) via the new Contract would be invaluable, and could lead to them seeking to contract with Involve directly in order to use the New Solution for other lines of business in their organisations. 46 Development of the New Solution by Involve also represents a material change in direction for Involve's business, pivoting away from a pure services business delivered over or in conjunction with third party-owned technology, towards more direct provision of technology owned by Involve which would, subject to being awarded the Contract, lead in time to a business valuation greater than Involve would achieve as a pure services business. 47 The New Solution represents the first opportunity for Involve to offer proprietary, bespoke software solutions and, as I have explained above, the prestige attached to the new Contract would enable Involve to exploit bigger and more lucrative market opportunities with major system integrators as a result. This unique level of interest likely to flow from the new Contract, and the resulting opportunities to which I have referred to above, would enable Involve to develop its business model so that it has far greater direct product control, differentiating Involve from other similar providers in the market. This in turn will boost shareholder value and change the perception of Involve away from a business leveraging third-party intellectual property towards a business with important and valuable proprietary solutions of its own. By giving Involve the ability to diversity its product and service portfolio, it would also serve as a material hedge against the potential loss of other central government contracts which are critical to Involve's business. None of these benefits are readily quantifiable in damages. 48 Further, and as I mention above, the technology for the New Solution has been developed by Involve at considerable cost, and the New Solution contains a significant amount of valuable intellectual property. A failure by Involve to secure the Contract would compromise the willingness of Involve's shareholders to invest further in developments of this nature, which could impair Involve's ability to pivot in the direction of providing its own proprietary technology, rather than simply being a reseller of third party services.”

39. As to that, DWP makes a number of points. First, it says that the claim for loss of reputation and goodwill should have been pleaded. I accept that sometimes, this is done but if it is Involve’s case that such losses would not sound in damages it is hard to see that it needs to be. It is not an answer to say that a claim for such losses might get over the hurdle of remoteness, for example, and therefore should have been pleaded. Moreover, the point about loss of reputation was clearly intimated in the letter from Involve’s solicitors dated 22 May 2025.

40. Second, DWP says that it would appear from Involve’s own evidence that it is already a leading player in the industry, working with various government departments and has an excellent reputation. In other words, if its reputation is already established, there is no room now for an argument about loss of reputation. I do not consider that this is an answer to Mr Pasqualino’s evidence here. This is because he is saying that Involve had the opportunity to enhance its reputation much further now, by now taking on the role of a direct supplier in relation to a contract which is one of the largest of its kind.

41. Third, DWP says that notwithstanding the terms of paragraph 45 of Mr Pasqualino’s WS, there is not sufficient evidence that the New Contract was indeed a “flagship” or prestigious contract. I disagree. The first point to note about all of this is that Mr Edwards did not seek to dispute any of the facts alleged in those paragraphs in JE2. Indeed, he did not address them at all. It is correct that at paragraph 8 of JE2, Mr Edwards says that insofar as he has not dealt with a particular point he should not be taken as agreeing it. I also take note of the fact that Mr Pasqualino’s evidence was served at a late stage - on 29 September, for a hearing on 9 October which meant that DWP had only a few days to respond to it. Nonetheless, Mr Edwards was able to deal in detail with other parts of Mr Pasqualino’s evidence and it is very hard to see why he would have been unable to deal with the paragraphs in question if DWP had really wanted to tackle them. It is not said, for example, that such matters were outside his knowledge. So it remains the case that there is no specific evidence to contradict what Mr Pasqualino has said.

42. Further, there is no reason why Mr Pasqualino is not in a good position to speak about the importance of the New Contract, given his knowledge of the market in which Involve operates and the way in which video-conferencing facilities are provided and can be provided. Indeed, the importance of the New Solution is stressed by DWP itself in terms of what it says it will be able now do for its customers across all of its business lines by virtue of the New Solution.

43. DWP then says that there is not sufficiently detailed or “cogent” evidence as to the “specific but uncompensateable loss” that would flow in the absence of the New Contract. However, I disagree. On the basis of the prestigious nature of the New Contract and its significance, it seems to me to be plausible that major public and private sector organisations would now have the confidence to engage with Involve and after all, Mr Pasqualino does identify specific companies who are major system integrators like BT, Capita, Circo, Vodafone and ATOS which have large framework access.

44. The context to all of this, of course, is Involve’s specific intention now to be a direct creator and provider of its own video-conferencing product, as opposed to acting merely as a reseller. This would enable it to have far greater direct product control and differentiate its products from others in the market. See paragraph 47 of Mr Pasqualino’s WS.

45. The point is taken that there is no specific financial information provided in relation to these matters, and that is true, both as regards the development costs of Involve’s new “home-grown” product and also in relation to the returns to be made from further contracts which Involve would be able to make on the back of the New Contract. I do not see this as fatal to Involve’s position on the adequacy of damages. As to development costs, these are not the critical point here; indeed, in theory, they may be capable of being claimed as an alternative to damages for loss of profit on the New Contract itself. As for expected revenue from further contracts, it is hard to see what figures could be produced at this stage beyond saying that there is a specific and lucrative market out there which Involve could tap into.

46. In this respect, this case is quite different from TES where the contention was that, absent the putative contract, the claimant was facing financial ruin, and where, on that basis, the failure to adduce proper financial information, so that the Court was “kept in the dark”, was held fatal to the claim that damages would be an inadequate remedy.

47. Nor can it be said that the evidence adduced by Involve here is so unsatisfactory as to be rejected, in the way that the claimant’s evidence was in Alstom .

48. As for Vodafone , I take the point that one of the factors which Kerr J took into account was information provided by Fujitsu which mirrored the position taken by Vodafone. However that was not the whole story as his judgment makes clear. See paragraphs 85-87 thereof, cited at paragraph 32 above, which focus on the same sort of considerations as have been raised by Involve here.

49. Overall, and having regard to the particular facts of this case, I do not consider that the evidence provided by Mr Pasqualino can be dismissed as “mere assertion”. In my judgment it is plausible, and sufficient to support the contention made by Involve that being deprived of the New Contract would indeed expose it to serious losses of opportunity to develop its business in specific ways which could not be compensated by an award of damages. That being so, it is now necessary to consider whether damages would be an adequate remedy for DWP if the suspension is not lifted. analysis (2): damages as an ADEQUATE remedy for dwp

50. Involve now accepts that damages would not be an adequate remedy for DWP if the suspension was (in the event wrongly) maintained. Rather, it disputes the extent or importance of that inadequacy, submitting that DWP’s case here is overstated.

51. Since the extent of any inadequacy may be relevant on the question of the balance of convenience (see below) I need to say something about it. The matters set out below are relied upon by DWP.

52. First, the Existing Solution does not allow for the recording of any video conference. It appears that recording is a functionality that exists within AA but it is not being provided under the Existing Contract. Each side blames the other in that regard, but the fact is that as matters stand there is no recording facility. This is important because there are certain cases where recording of any video interview is mandatory. That being so, in those cases, DWP cannot presently use the Facilities at all. Other means of communication have to be employed. That said, such cases represent only three particular lines of DWP’s business, all dealing with fraud, which, according to Mr Pasqualino, would only represent about 3% of the total utilisation of AA.

53. DWP sees it as a priority to roll out recording and transcription services across all of its business lines and this roll-out will be delayed, for so long as the award of the New Contract is itself delayed. In March 2025, the Government published its Green Paper entitled Pathways to Work: reforming Benefits and Support to Get Britain Working (“the Green Paper”). This referred to an intention to move to an opt-out footing for audio recording of Health Assessments as recommended by the Work and Pensions Committee’s report dated 14 April 2023. While it appears that the Green Paper did not specify an implementation date for the role-out of recording, I think it is reasonable for DWP to see it as a priority especially as the relevant Minister has directed DWP to proceed with it. The longer the delay, the more DWP may be open to criticism for not adopting it.

54. Secondly, DWP says that there is presently a disbenefit in respect of any request in relation to the operation of AA, whether a change request or reporting a problem, because such a request has to be “ticketed” for action by Involve rather, rather than being capable of resolution by the DWP itself. Mr Edwards states in JE1 at paragraph 36 that this introduces the risk of an operational incident causing service disruption and possible disruption to the benefit claims process, especially where there are multiple video-conferencing solutions. The New Solution will bring control in-house, so that DWP can itself rapidly respond to operational incidents. This clear improvement will be delayed if the award of the New Contract is delayed.

55. Third, I agree that there will be a benefit under the New Solution in that it can be customised for different lines of business, all being controlled within DWP. This should allow the solution to be used by a greater variety of business lines and customers, more efficiently and at lesser cost. See paragraph 37 of JE1.

56. Fourth, the New Solution will follow GOV.UK styles and will be accessed from within GOV.UK which will engender recognition and trust on the part of customers. See paragraph 39 of JE1.

57. A further feature of the New Solution concerns security. At paragraph 40 of JE1, Mr Edwards says that one of the key security benefits is the hosting of the New Solution in subscriptions controlled and managed by DWP which will allow for end-to-end internal monitoring and security controlled by it, rather than relying on third-party security measures as happens at the moment. There will also be oversight by the Cyber and Domains Protection Team which monitors public sector domains to keep them safe. The security advantage will apply to recording, transfer and storage of recordings as well. On the face of it, these are significant benefits which cannot be enjoyed while the implementation of the New Solution is delayed.

58. As to this, Mr Pasqualino makes the point at paragraph 30 of his WS that the ITT for the New Solution did not refer to where it would be hosted, nor did it include a requirement for it to allow posting on subscriptions controlled and managed by DWP. So this is not a guaranteed benefit. I follow that, but it is not suggested that if the subscriptions referred to by Mr Edwards are implemented within the New Solution, this would not then be a significant benefit.

59. The loss of all the above benefits caused by a delay in the award of any New Contract is something which, in my view, cannot be compensated for in damages. It falls within the second part of the observations made by Eyre J in Medequip , cited at paragraph 36 above.

60. A further and separate point made by DWP is that such uncompensateable losses will be significantly increased if, as a result of the suspension and the inability to award the New Contract, there is then a period during which DWP cannot provide any video-conferencing facilities at all. This would arise if the Existing Contract were to expire without immediately being replaced by the New Contract. Of course, that is correct, but it all depends on whether this is likely to happen in the period leading to trial. In my view, it will not, for the reasons given below in relation to balance of convenience.

61. Accordingly, damages would not be an adequate remedy for DWP here although I accept that it is not as if the position would be catastrophic for it, if it had to maintain the present video-conferencing service under the Existing Contract as opposed to moving now to the New Contract. After all, the Existing Solution was used in 373,000 Health Assessments between August 2021 and July 2025 according to Mr Pasqualino at paragraph 22.5 of his WS. Balance of convenience

62. With that, I turn to balance of convenience. It is in this context that I need to consider when a trial is likely to take place, and the Expedition Application.

63. The present position is this: the current extension to the Existing Contract made between Involve and DWP will expire on 28 February 2026. If the suspension is in place and there is no further extension, then DWP will be without any video-conferencing facilities. Further, the Procurement was undertaken within the aegis of DWP’s Dynamic Purchasing System (“DPS”). The DPS itself is due to terminate also on 28 February 2026. If DWP is not able to award the New Contract by that date, then it will be necessary to undertake a fresh procurement which itself will engender further delay.

64. So far as the question of any extension to the Existing Contract is concerned, matters have moved on significantly since Involve put in its evidence and filed its Skeleton Argument. Its original position was to say that IHG, the owner of AA, had indicated verbally that it would be prepared to enable Involve to grant an extension, but there was little more detail than that. This, of course, is a case where the grant of an extension is not entirely in the hands of the incumbent supplier, since Involve is simply a licensee of IHG.

65. Then, during the hearing, Mr Patel KC for Involve produced an email from IHG dated 3 October 2025 which said this: “Hi Rob/Mick, Thanks again for your time last week. I’m pleased to confirm that we are happy to support an extension of the DWP contract for the provision of the Attend Anywhere service beyond the current expiry date of 28th February 2026. We’re open to discussing the length of the extension based on the customer’s requirements, and any extension would continue under the existing terms and conditions of the current contract…”

66. Given that the date of this email is 3 October, it is unclear to me why it could not have been produced prior to the hearing. In any event, while it is an encouraging development, if matters were left there, it would be unclear as to how long any extension might be.

67. As it seemed to me that there was in principle a willingness to grant an extension with the consent of IHG, I enquired of Mr Patel KC whether his clients would be willing to undertake to the court that the Existing Contract will be extended on the same terms for a period of up to 12 months as from 28 February 2026. Any such extension would obviously provide a very useful breathing space, as it were. After taking instructions, he confirmed that they would be so willing. At the end of the hearing on 9 October I invited Involve to provide any further information that might be relevant on the question of extension.

68. They did this on Monday 13 October, when Involve’s solicitors wrote to the Court and enclosed the licensing agreement made between Involve and IHG in redacted form. This shows that in fact, Involve has the power to extend underlying contracts, such as the Existing Contract for the provision of AA, in the event of termination of the licence agreement and for an indefinite period. This, it was said, reinforces the undertaking which Involve says it will give, as well as supporting the position taken by IHG.

69. Given all of that, I consider that it can safely be said that insofar as is necessary, the Existing Contract will indeed be extended beyond 28 February 2026. To the extent that no New Contract was awarded before 28 February 2026 and it was therefore necessary to run a fresh procurement, there should be ample time to do so before the extension expired on 28 February 2027. The period of extension should also be sufficient to allow for the transition period from the Existing Solution to the New Solution which is now put at 4.5 months – see JE3. What all of this means is that there is now no risk that the maintaining of any suspension to trial will mean that DWP will lose its ability to provide any video-conferencing. The prejudice to it consists simply in the delay to bringing in the New Solution with the various benefits which that will entail.

70. On one view, it might be said that this extension is sufficiently generous to allow for a trial to take place even in late 2026, and certainly not one which needs to be expedited.

71. On the other hand, if it is possible to have a trial at some point before 28 February 2026, it would be advantageous because it would then eliminate the need for a fresh procurement.

72. I therefore turn to the parties’ respective positions on the question of trial date. The position taken by Involve in its Expedition Application is that the trial should take no more than three working days and that it can fairly be held at some point in December 2025. That of course assume that judicial resources can be made available as a matter of expedition.

73. DWP’s position is that the trial will require a minimum of two working weeks and that it is impossible to have a fair timetable running up to such a trial in December 2025, even if such a trial could be listed.

74. As it so happens, the court can now accommodate a two-week trial which commences on 13 January 2026, without the need for any order for expedition. If the trial were to take place then, it may be possible (I say no more than that) for a judgment to be given a little time before 28 February 2026 so that if DWP was successful but the suspension in the meantime had been in place, it could then award the New Contract to Accenture.

75. The question then becomes whether a trial could fairly be held in January 2026. It is to be recalled that the issue between the parties on the claim is relatively narrow. It concerns one decision in relation to one qualifying question and a re-moderation of that decision. The key time period is 8 November to 19 December 2024. Within that, the relevant dates are 8 to 18 November 2024 which covers the original moderation, and then 19 December 2024 when the re-moderation took place.

76. DWP says that it intends to call up to seven witnesses, including the four evaluators (because one of the evaluators from the first moderation was not available for the second moderation and had to be replaced). Other witnesses would be from DWP’s Digital Team. Involve says that it would call one or two witnesses and their evidence would be very limited. Although the dispute is of a narrow compass, I can see that it might not be possible to start and finish a trial within effectively three working days if the first day was pre-reading for a judge, and even if openings were brief. In my view, the appropriate trial length would be up to 2 working weeks.

77. So far as disclosure is concerned I also think that this should be of a narrow compass. The preponderance of documents will of course come from DWP as the decision-maker. It has already provided a significant amount of information and documents to Involve. Indeed, at one point, DWP informed Involve that the latter had now received the key documents where they existed. Notwithstanding that, Mr West KC argued that there would still need to be a further significant amount of time spent on completing the disclosure exercise. I disagree, and I think that disclosure (including dealing with the models for disclosure) could be completed relatively quickly.

78. It has been pointed out that Involve has nonetheless applied for some specific disclosure from DWP, although no hearing date has yet been obtained. However, even this is narrow: Involve seeks the notes of the new evaluator but DWP says they have already been disclosed. Then Involve seeks the documents evidencing the decision to re-moderate as to which DWP says that the decision was taken after verbal discussions and emails. Finally, Involve has sought documents containing the process for having a re-moderation. I do not consider that this application will add very much to the time spent on disclosure.

79. Against that background, it seems to me that a trial could take place in the near future. After all, the statements of case are closed and the areas of dispute have been articulated for some time. That said, even if the Court could make two weeks available in December 2025 (which is difficult at the moment), I think that would be too soon for the trial. On the other hand, I see no reason why the trial could not commence on 13 January 2026. There is no reason why disclosure and the provision of witness statements cannot be completed within two months from now, in other words by mid-December 2025. That will then allow a period of time for trial preparation and agreeing bundles, and written submissions can be produced in early 2026.

80. Nonetheless, DWP maintains that it should not be effectively pressurised into an early trial. In this regard, I need to say something about delay on the part of DWP in the context of these proceedings.

81. As already noted, Involve’s Particulars of Claim were served on 1 May 2025. By its letter dated 15 May 2025, DWP’s solicitors, being the GLD, sought Involve’s consent to an application to lift the automatic suspension and it explained its case for doing so in some detail. By 22 May 2025, DWP knew that Involve would not consent to a lifting of the stay because its solicitors said so in a letter of that date.

82. However, no application to lift the stay was made until 17 July 2025, almost 2 months later. This was a serious delay in proceeding, in my view. Mr Pasqualino so commented in paragraph 36 of his WS. At paragraph 20 of JE2, Mr Edwards responded by saying that DWP had to spend time undertaking due diligence and appropriate levels of assurance to ensure that the Application to Lift was properly authorised and that the right approach strategically was being taken, so that any perceived delay was simply the result of necessary co-ordination, legal preparation and internal governance.

83. I do not accept that this is a good reason for such a long delay. Paragraph 49 of Appendix H to the TCC Guide emphasises that applications to lift must be made expeditiously in circumstances such as this. Moreover, it is hard to see how DWP could have reserved its right to issue an application to lift without further notice to Involve, in its letter of 15 May 2025, if it was not already in a position from a governance point of view to do so. On any view, if it is being suggested that nearly 2 months was required to obtain some final clearance to issue the application already foreshadowed, that is an unacceptably long time, even taking into account a no doubt hard-pressed government department. One also needs to bear in mind that there should have been a degree of urgency on the part of DWP in any event since from its perspective, it was going to be in serious difficulties in providing a video-conferencing facilities to its customers at any time after 28 February 2026.

84. This delay has had serious consequences. The application was made two weeks before the legal vacation and it seems that the first step taken about listing the application, from counsel’s clerks, was on 31 July and then there were discussions about fixing dates going through most of August. Because of the vacation and counsel being away this took longer than normal and indeed it was only when I was alerted to the position on 2 September that I took steps to have the application listed at the first available opportunity, being 9 October. That date was fixed on 3 September.

85. Had DWP acted timeously, it could and should have obtained a hearing for the Application to Lift well before the end of the summer term. Had it done so, it might then have secured a trial this term. If the result of the delay is that DWP must now set to work to prepare for a trial in January 2026, then it is the author of that situation. Having said that, I am of the firm view that a trial commencing on 13 January 2026 does not in any event pose any serious problem for DWP in terms of production of WSs, disclosure and preparation – the trial can fairly be commenced on that date.

86. If all of this was an appropriate course to take, as I believe it is, then the balance of convenience would resolve firmly in favour of Involve. That is so, even though DWP may suffer some uncompensatable losses as a result of the delay in adopting the New Solution, to the extent set out above. The inability on the part of Involve to have the opportunity to win new contracts (as set out above) is a more serious matter, in my view. conclusion

87. For all those reasons, the Application to Lift must be dismissed. There is no need to make any order on the Expedition Application, since the trial will be fixed in accordance with dates available in any event.

88. I am very grateful to Counsel for their very helpful and succinct submissions. I would invite them now to agree suitable directions to trial. Involve should also now submit to DWP the form of the undertaking which it has agreed to make in relation to the extension. These matters will be dealt with at the consequentials hearing on Friday at 2pm.