Jamie Taylor & Anor v Nicholas Crabb & Anor

1. This matter was listed before me on 30 October 2025, with a time estimate of 1 day. It transpired that the time estimate was over optimistic. I heard oral testimony from 3 witnesses who had filed and served witness statements. There was insufficient time for closing submissions and judgment. I adjourned the matter for a further hearing that took place before me on 24 November 2025. It therefore occupied the Court for the better part of two days. As time was running short, I gave a short ex tempore judgment granting a final charging order over the property and dismissing an application made by the First Respondent. I indicated that given the shortage of time I would be prepared to provide further detailed reasons in due course. These are my reasons and I ordered the usual extensions of time should matters be taken further. For the purpose of this judgement, I shall refer to the First and Second Respondents as Mr and Mrs Crabb.

2. This hearing concerned two applications. Each related to a property located at 16 Leamington Road, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, SS1 2SN (the “ Property ”) which was previously the matrimonial home of Mr and Mrs Crabb and their two adopted children. The first application was issued by the Applicants in their capacity as the joint liquidators of Courtside Recycling Limited. They have a judgment debt against Mr Crabb in the sum of £2,927,429.43. It arises from a claim brought by the Applicants by way of an Insolvency Act application issued on 20 May 2022 against the First Respondent, Mr Crabb following a 5-day trial. He was pursued as the former director and shareholder of Courtside Recycling Limited (“ the Company ”) for fraudulent trading (pursuant to section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“ IA86 ”)) and fraudulent breach of duty pursuant to s. 212 IA86.

3. The Court found that Mr Crabb had caused the Company persistently and deliberately to under-declare its VAT liability to HMRC. The judgment held that he had caused cash withdrawals totalling approximately £2.5 million to be made from the Company with no documentary explanation or justification. Further, he had deliberately destroyed the Company’s books and records. Mr Crabb was ordered to pay the sum of £2,575,796 plus interest and costs to the Applicants. Mrs Crabb was not involved in this litigation.

4. An application for a charging order was issued on 21 February 2024. The matter came before ICCJ Prentis on 26 March 2024 when he granted an interim charging order over the Property. The order provided for a further hearing to be listed for 19 July 2024 for the purpose of determining whether it should continue of be discharged.

5. Shortly before that hearing took place, the solicitors for the second Respondent wrote to the Applicants. They asserted that when Mr and Mrs Crabb separated in 2019: “ it was agreed by the parties that: [Mrs Crabb] would retain 100% of the beneficial interest in the Property and that Mr Crabb would retain 100% of the beneficial interest in a property in London, formerly jointly owned by them .”

6. The reference to the London property related to Flat 216, City View House, 463 Bethnal Green Road, London, E2 9QY (“ Flat 216 ”), a property that had in fact, since its purchase by Mr Crabb in 1992, been solely owned by him. This property was sold by the Applicants in April 2024, with the proceeds of sale, amounting to some £170,000.00, being applied against the outstanding judgment debt.

7. On 17 December 2024, Mrs Crabb issued the Part 8 Claim which sought the following relief: a. A declaration that the express declaration of trust was varied, affected or superseded by proprietary estoppel in favour of Mrs Crabb; and b. A declaration that Mrs Crabb is the sole beneficial owner of the Property as a result of an equity by estoppel (or such other remedy as the Court thinks just).

8. I heard oral testimony from Mr and Mrs Crabb concerning the arrangements they believed had been agreed. I also heard oral evidence from a Mr Davis who is Mrs Crabb’s sister’s partner. I also received a witness statement from a Ms Oyekanmi a neighbour and friend of Mrs Crabb who provided a witness statement, but whose evidence was taken as read at the hearing.

9. The nature of the evidence filed by Mr and Mrs Crabb alleged that Mrs Crabb is the sole beneficial owner of the property albeit, as Ms Shuffrey submits, on different bases. As such, she is able to resist the granting of a final charging order. This was in the face of an express declaration of trust that was recorded in writing on a form TR1 when the property was purchased by them in 2001. It was said by Mr and Mrs Crabb that the reason for making the declaration of trust was because of legal advice that they had received to deal with what they described as “probate issues.”

10. In her application made under CPR Part 8 and invoking the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 , (the “ ToLATA Claim ”), Mrs Crabb sought two declarations. The first was that the express declaration of trust contained within the TR1 was varied, affected or superseded by proprietary estoppel in favour of Mrs Crabb. The second declaration sought by her was that she is the sole beneficial owner of the Property as a result of an equity by estoppel (or such other remedy as the Court thinks just.

11. In contrast, the Applicants seek a final charge on Mr Crabb’s beneficial interest in the Property on the footing that the beneficial interest is held by Mr and Mrs Crabb in equal shares. The effect of the Charging Order would sever the joint beneficial interest. Consequently, the share held by Mr Crabb would be subject to the realisation under its terms. The result of that would enable the Property to be sold and the proceeds applied to reduce the outstanding judgment debt owed by Mr Crabb to the Applicants. It is this outcome that Mrs Crabb seeks to avoid by the pursuit of the ToLATA Claim. The legal principles and submissions

12. There was general agreement concerning the principles that have to be applied. An express declaration of trust is conclusive as to the parties’ interests unless varied by subsequent agreement or affected by proprietary estoppel (see Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106 which was cited with approval in at paragraph 49 of the judgment of Baroness Hale in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at paragraph 49.

13. There is common ground concerning the legal principles that apply. In his skeleton argument, Mr Nicklin for Mrs Crabb, set them out as follows. An equity by estoppel arises where: a. A (in this case Mr Crabb) induces, encourages or allows B (Mrs Crabb) to believe that she has or will enjoy some right or benefit over his property, providing it is not specifically limited to mere personal use; b. In reliance thereon, Mrs Crabb acts to her detriment to the reasonably determined knowledge of Mr Crabb; and c. Mr Crabb then takes unconscionable advantage by denying B the right or benefit that B expected to receive.

14. The basis that Mr Nicklin put forward for the declaratory relief in this case to defeat the declaration of trust is reliance on a proprietary estoppel that arose shortly after the separation of Mr and Mrs Crabb in 2019. However, it is important to note that there is some disparity between the accounts of Mr and Mrs Crabb in relation to the alleged events at that time that Ms Shuffrey identified. Clarity what it is that the object of the estoppel is to be estopped from denying or asserting and clarity as to the interest in the property in question that that denial, or assertion , would otherwise defeat. (See Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR1752 at [28].

15. Having realised Flat 216, the Applicants have now turned their attention to realising the interest Mr Crabb still holds in the Property. Effectively, it is subjecting Mrs Crabb to the exposure to the consequences of the Applicants’ claim that is the genesis of the estoppel claimed, rather than say, a breach of a promise by way of a sale of the Property that he voluntarily instigated. Either way, no steps have been taken by either Mr Crabb or Mrs Crabb to formalise the agreement upon which the estoppel is based. At the same time, although they agreed to separate in 2019, no steps have been taken to present a divorce petition since.

16. The representation must be sufficiently clear. This depends on the context in which it is made and whether, objectively assessed, the promise made by Mr Crabb was intended to be taken seriously and relied upon to her detriment by Mrs Crabb. That detriment may take many forms and may be unconnected with property owned by Mr or Mrs Crabb. In considering detriment, The Court will take into account any countervailing benefits. Mrs Crabb must have acted in reliance on the promise or representation which can be inferred from the detriment she claims to have suffered. The onus will then be on Mr Crabb or, in this case, his creditors to show there was no such reliance (see Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property , 10th ed. at 15-019 p.711.) The detriment she claims relates to not making a claim to a share of the proceeds to Flat 216 claiming that this was a direct result of the conversations that had taken place. She also paid for a number of improvements and white goods replacement again she asserts as a result of the discussion she had with her husband.

17. This is an equitable remedy, the Court has a broad discretion whether to invoke it. It must have regard to all the circumstances so as to avoid an unconscionable wrong, including, but not limited to the expectations and conduct of the parties (including in this case, the Applicants). It is therefore relevant to consider the conduct of Mr Crabb and the effect of his conduct on his creditors, which in turn engages the approach the Court can adopt in relation to the continuation of the Charging Order to which I will refer in due course.

18. I was referred by Mr Nicklin to the Supreme Court decision in Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27 . I was also taken to the history of the arrangements that Mr and Mrs Crabb had going back to their marriage in 1998. These included a division of their real estate portfolios with each party looking after their own investments. Mr Crabb attended to the London Property. Mrs Crabb described her property portfolio and the investments she had made to secure her re-entry into work after taking adoption leave when they took care of their adoptive son and daughter and the acquisition of the Property. This included arrangements with her late father which were taken in recognition of the fact that Mr Crabb contributed nothing to the original purchase price paid for the Property which was financed in the main by a gift to her from her father which took the form of an accelerated distribution of his estate.

19. In summary, there was a separation of financial affairs and interests with the exception of the Property in which they were still registered legal owner under the terms of the declaration of trust. I was advised that both parties had paid the mortgage from time to time. I heard evidence from the witnesses as to conversations that the parties had with them following their separation in 2019. Mr Nicklin identified five sperate occasions by which Mr Crabb indicated to Mrs Crabb that he would make no claim on the property. He took me through in some detail the elements of detrimental reliance that Mrs Crabb must show based upon the fact that she asserted that she gave up any claim on Flat 216 in return for the assurances she received that Mr Crabb would not make a claim over the Property. I heard testimony from Mr Davis to the effect that contemporaneous comments confirming Mr Crabb’s intentions which it was said corroborated Mrs Crabb’s account. I do find that having heard the oral evidence from the witnesses, that the conversations did take place on the balance of probabilities. As I said in my ex tempore judgment, I found that each of the witnesses were witnesses of truth, doing their best to assist the Court. However, I find that they are of little probative value in deciding the main issue in this case.

20. Mr Nicklin submitted that it would be unconscionable for Mrs Crabb to be removed from a position of security to a position of financial exposure to Mr Crabb’s creditors as a result of actions he took without her knowledge. It is impossible not to have considerable sympathy for Mrs Crabb and the situation she finds herself in. Ms Shuffrey informed me, quite correctly that she would receive a 50% share of the proceeds of sale to provide her with some security; albeit that any predicted sum would be eroded by any costs order that may be made against her.

21. In her submissions to me, Ms Shuffrey took issue with the availability of the estoppel on the facts of this case and as a matter of law. She drew my attention to the fact that where an interim charging order has been made and there are no divorce proceedings, there is no reason for refusing the order, since the ToLATA proceedings can protect the position of the spouse as it does in this case. The charging order can only bite upon the beneficial interest of Mr Crabb. She took me to the provisions in Section 1(1) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 (the “ COA 1979 ”) which provide as follows: “ Where, under a judgment or order of the High Court or the family court or the county court, a person (the “debtor”) is required to pay a sum of money to another person (the “creditor”) then, for the purpose of enforcing that judgment or order, the appropriate court may make an order in accordance with the provisions of this Act imposing on any such property of the debtor as may be specified in the order a charge for securing the payment of any money due or to become due under the judgment or order .”

22. Section 1 (5) COA goes on to say that the Court is to consider all the circumstances of the case in deciding whether to make a charging order, including, in particular, any evidence before it as to the: (a) the personal circumstances of the debtor; and (b) whether any other creditor of the debtor would be likely to be unduly prejudiced by the making of the order. The interests of the Applicants are relevant not only to this provision, but also to the exercise of the Court’s unfettered equitable jurisdiction to recognise a proprietary estoppel, even if the factors are present.

23. Ms Shuffrey also took me to the notes to Section 2 of COA 1979 , at paragraph 73.0.04 in the White Book on the COA 1979. These state in relation to interim orders that a judgment creditor is justified in expecting that an interim order over one spouse’s beneficial interest will be made final. In addition, as a general rule, in any contest between a judgment creditor and a joint owner of the property or any adult or child resident therein, the interests of the judgment creditor will, sooner or later, prevail. Mrs Crabb is the only adult residing in the property, her adult children having moved out some time ago.

24. In this case there was ambiguity concerning the nature of the promise with both parties making different accounts such as to cast doubt on the promise that was made. It must be unambiguous. Ms Shuffrey made a number of submissions concerning ambiguities in the witness statements filed by both Mr and Mrs Crabb. Tshe submitted that if it can be proved that Mrs Crabb would have acted irrespective of the promise made to her by Mr Crabb, no equity can arise. In this case, despite the conversations that took place, no action was taken by her to formalise the arrangements. She has taken no steps to present a petition for divorce over the 6 years since the separation took place. If a petition had been presented, the issues of ancillary relief may have provided clarity. She took no steps to amend the proprietorship register at the Land Registry. That she did not, causes uncertainty on her intentions and with it, ambiguity contrary to the certainty that is required by the Court for it to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. Disposal

25. Both the terms of the COA 1979 and the exercise of the Court’s discretion to acknowledge a proprietary estoppel involve invoking of a broad discretion. Both involve an obligation to consider the effect on other parties. These unquestionably include the Applicants in their capacity as judgment creditors of Mr Crabb. They are entitled to expect the court to consider their interests before exercising its equitable jurisdiction to recognise a proprietary estoppel. Similarly, they are entitled to expect the Court to recognise its statutory duty to consider their interests when considering their statutory duties under the COA 1979. Indeed, it could be said that a refusal to take these interests into account would cause an unconscionable outcome for the Applicants.

26. The Applicants are also entitled to expect that having been granted an interim charging order, it will sooner or later be made final. Further, an express declaration of trust defining parties’ respective interests in a property (such as that contained in a TR1 form) is conclusive as to those interests, such that there is no room for the doctrine of resulting or constructive trusts to arise, unless and until the conveyance is set aside or rectified. The reason for that provision is to ensure that the integrity of the principles regarding the recognition of trusts in the Law of Property is maintained.

27. It was for those reasons that I made the order on 25 November 2025 continuing the Charging Order and dismissing the ToLATA claim.