Jeffery Falloon v Adnan Ali Khan & Anor

1. This is my judgment on a Part 8 claim seeking rescission of a contract of sale of land and consequential remedies, including rectification of the register to replace the current registered proprietor (the first defendant, Adnan Khan) and to remove a charge granted by Mr Khan to the second defendant, Kuflink Security Trustees Limited (“ Kuflink ”).

2. In the claim as currently constituted, the claimant, Jeffery Falloon, brings the claim as representing his mother Clephane Falloon, who sadly died after commencement of the claim, on 27 December 2024. Mrs Falloon had 4 (now adult) sons, including the claimant, and Paul Falloon, and a stepson Alvin Falloon. Without intending any disrespect, I refer to them by their first names.

3. The property which is the subject of the claim is 25 Church Drive, London NW9 8DN (“ the Property ”).

4. The claim form was issued on 11 December 2023 by Paul, as “trustee, carer, power of attorney for” Mrs Falloon, when she was still alive, though sadly, by this time suffering from dementia. Paul, and later Jeffery, have acted in person throughout.

5. The details of claim accompanying the claim form set out that Mrs Falloon reached the following agreement with Mr Khan : (1) Mr Khan would buy the Property at the agreed below market price of £250,000; (2) After payment of the sums secured on the Property, the balance remaining to be paid would be £75,000; (3) This £75,000 would be paid in 3 equal instalments of £25,000 within 18 months of “the contract start date”; (4) The Property would remain in Mrs Falloon’s ownership until the balance was paid; (5) Mrs Falloon could continue to live in the Property rent free until she died.

6. The claim alleges that contrary to that agreement, Mr Khan transferred the Property into his own name before he had paid the second instalment, and that the third instalment was never paid. It also alleges that Mrs Falloon was not aware of any clauses in the agreement allowing Mr Khan to take ownership of, rent out, dispose of or use the property in any investment scheme before full payment had been received. This is relied upon as “misrepresentation, mistake of law or breach of fiduciary obligations” by Mr Khan.

7. The remedies sought were: (1) rescission of the contract on the grounds of misrepresentation, mistake of law or breach of fiduciary obligations; (2) an order that Mr Khan transfer “all profits, interest and other financial benefits” to Mrs Falloon; (3) an order that any monies owed by Mrs Falloon as a result of rescission of the contract be set off against the sums due from Mr Khan under (2).

8. Mr Khan’s opposition to the claim is set out in his first witness statement dated 25 March 2024: “1 The claimant agreed to sell the property at an under-market value at £210,000 with its existing value at the time was in the region of £280,000.

2. She was to receive a balance of the equity of £75,000 which was the difference between the amount she owed, and the sale price agreed between us.

3. The equity was to be paid over 18 months and could be offset against the future rental payments which was agreed at £600 per month after a 1 year rent free period, with the current market rent being more than £1,200 per month.

4. The Claimant agreed that we would set up a client account in her name as she did not want the proceeds of the sale to affect her pension contribution and benefits as she would lose her entitlement if received any sums over £10,000 into her own account.

5. The claimant agreed to set the contract price higher at £250,000 so that we would not distort the market and agreed that the full balance proceeds would be sent into her client account which comprised of my deposit and proceeds of sale of the Claimant.

6. The Claimant also agreed to enter into an AST agreement after 1 year post completion.

7. The Claimant also stated that she was entering into this agreement with no duress and was in sound mind as she was fully capable in dealing with this matter as the principal head of the family.”

9. The documents exhibited to that statement (set out at para. 42 below) recited that the debt secured on the Property totalled £135,000. The claimant accepts that this is the correct figure.

10. Kuflink was not originally a party to the claim. On 8 February 2024, I directed that it be joined as a defendant. On 26 March 2024, Deputy Master Scher directed Points of Claim and Points of Defence.

11. The “Re-stated Statement of Claim” dated 7 May 2024 (“ Am SoC ”) affirms the existence of the agreement, but does not set out its terms as differing from those alleged by Mr Khan. It is a lengthy document making multiple (and inconsistent) allegations, including that: (1) Mrs Falloon was unable to afford independent legal advice, did not fully understand the pricing or the terms of the agreement and relied on “the words of” Mr Khan; (2) Mr Khan transferred the Property into his own name in December 2010 without Mrs Falloon’s knowledge or consent; (3) (for the first time) Mr Khan had concealed £40,000 of net sale proceeds from Mrs Falloon, and concealed the true purchase price of £250,000 from her; (4) the agreement was not valid under section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 because it was only signed by Mrs Falloon; and for various other reasons; (5) the TR1 form is invalid – though no grounds are stated.

12. In his skeleton argument dated 19 September 2025, the claimant articulated the basis of challenging the TR1 as being that it falsely stated that Mrs Falloon received £250,000; whereas £114,644.29 was paid into an account in the name of Mr Khan’s company, Belgrave Residential Services Limited (“ Belgrave ”) and dissipated.

13. Kuflink’s primary defence to the claim as against it is that the claim is barred under section 8 of the Limitation Act 1980 as an action upon an agreement by deed, for which the limitation period is 12 years.

14. At the first hearing in the claim, before Deputy Master Scher on 26 March 2024, Paul informed the court that he had a valid power of attorney in respect of Mrs Falloon’s “legal affairs”. This was untrue. He then obtained Mrs Falloon’s signature on a lasting power of attorney on 7 June 2024; but it is clear from the evidence of Mary O’Donoghue (see para 83 below) that Mrs Falloon lacked capacity to execute the power of attorney by that date.

15. My order dated 17 September 2024 appointed Paul as Mrs Falloon’s litigation friend.

16. As will be seen, the claimant seeks to challenge a number of the documents in evidence. My order dated 17 September 2024: (1) provided a deadline of 1 October 2024 for the claimant to serve on the other parties a list of the documents she alleged were forgeries; (2) gave her permission to apply for permission to rely on expert evidence as to handwriting. Neither of these were done.

17. Rule 32.19 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (“ CPR ”) provides: “(1) A party shall be deemed to admit the authenticity of a document disclosed to him under Part 31 (disclosure and inspection of documents) unless he serves notice that he wishes the document to be proved at trial. (2) A notice to prove a document must be served – (a) by the latest date for serving witness statements; or (b) within 7 days of disclosure of the document, whichever is later.”

18. No such notice has been served by the claimant.

19. Following Mrs Falloon’s death on 27 December 2024, Jeffery (who is her executor under her will dated 29 December 2017) was appointed to represent her estate. Witnesses Claimant’s witnesses

20. The witnesses called on behalf of the claimant were: (1) Jeffery; (2) Paul; (3) Alvin, who is the claimant’s half brother; (4) Mary Donohue. Jeffery

21. Jeffery did not live with Mrs Falloon at any relevant time, and has no direct knowledge of any of the relevant events. He said that, because Paul lived with Mrs Falloon, this claim is made “from his eyes”. He gave some evidence as to what he was told by Mrs Falloon about her agreement with Mr Khan. He accepted that Mrs Falloon was in debt in 2010, and that her family had not offered any solution. He did not know the exact nature of the debt, nor that Mrs Falloon was threatened with possession proceedings. His factual evidence was therefore of limited assistance. He showed an unwillingness to accept the authenticity of documents, without putting forward any substantive ground to challenge them. Paul

22. Paul has lived with Mrs Falloon at the Property since the age of 2, and remains living there after her death. He was also not involved in the discussions between his mother and Mr Khan; and his evidence as to what was agreed between them was said to be based on what his mother and Mr Khan told him. His evidence was coloured by his animosity towards Mr Khan, and, like his brother, an unwillingness to accept the authenticity of documents. His evidence also has of course to be evaluated in the context of the available documentary evidence. Insofar as his evidence as to what Mrs Falloon told him at the time of entering into the transaction is inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents, I do not accept it. Alvin

23. Alvin had no knowledge of the transaction between Mrs Falloon and Mr Khan. He gave evidence that the electrical safety report produced by Mr Khan in respect of the Property did not accurately reflect the fuse board at the Property. This has no material relevance to the outcome of this claim. Mary Donohue

24. Ms Donohue has lived at 27 Church Drive since 1987 and was a neighbour and friend of Mrs Falloon. She had regular conversations with her both on the street and in each other’s houses. She was an entirely disinterested and straightforward witness, and I accept her evidence. First Defendant’s witness evidence

25. The only witness who gave evidence on behalf of Mr Khan was himself. In assessing his evidence, I take into account that Mr Khan has misled others to achieve his commercial objectives. Thus, on his case, he misrepresented to his mortgagee (and his solicitors) that the agreed purchase price of the Property was £250,000 and that vacant possession of the Property was being given on completion. His reasons for doing so were that it enabled him to obtain a larger mortgage loan, and reduced his liability for CGT on an onward sale (although it did result in higher Stamp Duty Land Tax). The reason he gave to Mrs Falloon for the higher price on the papers was also untrue: that it would devalue the surrounding properties.

26. I therefore approach his evidence with caution, and evaluate it in the context of the documentary evidence. Having said that, Mr Khan’s evidence was generally consistent with that evidence, and ultimately I have concluded that he was a credible witness. Second Defendant’s witness evidence

27. The evidence originally filed by Kuflink was 2 witness statements dated 28 February 2024 and 18 October 2024 of Narinderjit Khattoare, a director of Kuflink. He had no direct knowledge of any of the dealings between Mrs Falloon and Mr Khan, nor of any of the other matters set out in his witness statements. Both statements are almost entirely commentary on documents produced by all the parties and argument. They were of little assistance to the court.

28. In any event, Mr Khattore, was unavailable to give evidence at trial, having left Kuflink’s employment on 7 June 2025. Kuflink applied unsuccessfully to rely on the first witness statement dated 5 September 2025 of Nattalie Weekes on the basis that her evidence was consistent with that of Mr Khattoare, and did not introduce any additional substantial evidence in relation to any of the issues of fact to be decided at trial. However, I permitted Ms Weekes to give evidence, so far as she was able, as to the matters in Mr Khattoare’s statements, and she was cross-examined by the claimant. Documentary evidence

29. This case has a number of features which mean that the contemporaneous documentary evidence is particularly important. First, the relevant events happened 15 years before the trial. As many judges have observed, not only do memories fade over this length of time, but they become less accurate and more susceptible to distortion. Secondly, one of two primary protagonists, Mrs Falloon had lost capacity before the claim was commenced. Her recollection of events was therefore unavailable in the articulation of the claim, or the oral evidence before the court. Thirdly, neither the claimant nor Mr Khan called any independent witnesses as to the matters in dispute. The claimant’s witnesses were himself and his siblings, and Mr Khan himself was his only witness.

30. Having noted that, there were a number of important absences in the documents. The solicitors’ conveyancing files for Mrs Falloon and Mr Khan were not before the court. The claimant did not produce any documents evidencing or relating to the transaction. Thus, all of the documents originated from Mr Khan. However, these included documents signed by Mrs Falloon and documents apparently originating from a range of third parties, including the company who introduced Mrs Falloon to Mr Khan, the conveyancing solicitors instructed by both sides, Mr Khan’s mortgagee and its solicitors.

31. The claimant challenged the authenticity of all of these documents, although he did concede the authenticity of some of them in his oral evidence. So far as documents apparently signed by Mrs Falloon are concerned, the signatures appears to be her signatures, and Mr Khan’s evidence is that she signed them. The claimant has not adduced any expert evidence to show that they are not. Moreover, Jeffery’s explanations as to why he has not adduced that expert evidence were inconsistent and unconvincing. Initially, he said that he and his brothers did not have the money for that evidence. However, when challenged on this, he changed his evidence to say that they did not see any value in spending money on that evidence – notwithstanding the terms of my order dated 17 September 2024.

32. The evidential position has, in my judgment, to be evaluated in the context of Jeffery’s position as to documents generally. He accepted that his mother’s practice was to retain paperwork (in her bedroom), and that he and his brothers had reviewed that paperwork for documents relevant to this case. They had, he said, not found a single relevant document. Similarly, he said that he had checked Mrs Falloon’s emails and found none relating to the transaction. He invited the court to conclude that all of the arrangements in respect of the sale of the Property were by an informal oral agreement. This submission is inconsistent with the claimant’s pleaded case, which expressly refers to the sale and rental agreement. It is also, in my judgment, inconceivable that Mrs Falloon (or Mr Khan) would have conducted such a significant transaction on a purely oral basis. It is also inconceivable that Mrs Falloon would not have retained documents relating to such a transaction. Thus, if documents supporting the claimant’s case existed, I would have expected them to be before the court. Their absence means that the documents produced by Mr Khan are the only documents purporting to record or evidence the transaction entered into by Mrs Falloon, and are uncontradicted. Facts

33. I find the following facts on the basis of the evidence before me.

34. Mrs Falloon was born on 31 December 1940. She bought the Property with her husband in 1970. He, sadly, died in 2003. Mrs Falloon had worked as a secretary for the Crown Prosecution Service, but by 2010 she was 69 years old, had retired and was receiving the state pension. She was an active, organised and hardworking person. She owned a PC and had an email address: [email protected].

35. By 2010, Mrs Falloon was experiencing financial difficulties. There was a first charge securing £90,000 on the Property in favour of Oakwood Homes, and a second charge securing £45,000 in favour of Blenheim Finance. She had significant mortgage arrears with Oakwood Homes. It had obtained a possession order against her, and had instructed county court bailiffs to repossess the Property.

36. On 17 September 2010 she phoned Succession Properties Limited (“ Succession ”), a company whose business was “quick property sales”.

37. Her initial call asked to be called back to discuss the sale and rental back of the Property, which Succession did. She told Succession that the Property was a 3 bedroom end of terrace property valued at £325,000, but that she would accept £210-225,000. She explained that she was facing imminent eviction.

38. Succession sent the above information and her contact details on to Mr Khan in an email of Monday 20 September 2010. Mr Khan had bought properties before which had been referred to him by Succession, typically at below market value and with an arrangement made under which the seller remained living in the property after selling it to Mr Khan.

39. Mr Khan initially spoke to Mrs Falloon on the phone to obtain details as to the reasons why she was selling, and the current debts she had on the Property. He arranged to visit her at the Property to discuss the matter further.

40. Mr Khan attended the meeting with his property manager, Feride Ibrahim. At that meeting, Mrs Falloon explained her financial difficulties to him. Her son Paul and his son were living with her at the Property. She told Mr Khan that Paul was long term unemployed, and that she was supporting him and his son (her grandson), and could not cope with the mortgage payments and the bills.

41. At the end of the meeting, Mr Khan and Mrs Falloon agreed that she would sell the Property to Mr Khan in order to pay off her secured debts; and that Mr Khan would rent the Property back to her, as she wanted to continue living in it. Mrs Falloon did not want to receive the proceeds of sale into her own account because it would affect her pension credit and benefits if she received more than £10,000 into her own account. Mr Khan’s evidence refers to “ pension contribution”, but this must in my judgment be a reference to pension credit, entitlement to which is affected by holding more than £10,000 in savings.

42. The following Monday, 27 September 2010, Mr Khan provided Mrs Falloon with a document (“ the sale and rental agreement ”) comprising 3 parts: (1) a letter dated 27 September 2010 entitled “Sale & Rental Customer Agreement”; (2) “Summary of Agreed Terms for the Sale and Rental of 25 Church Drive, Kingsbury, London, NW9 8DN” (3) “Statement of Agreement and Acceptance of Sale and Rental of 25 Church Drive, Kingsbury, London, NW9 8DN” – this was signed by Mrs Falloon and dated 30 September 2010 . As discussed below, her signature was not challenged by the claimant, but he disputed that the documents accompanying it were those she signed.

43. The key terms set out in these documents were: (1) The price was £210,000; (2) From this Mrs Falloon’s secured debts totalling £135,000 would be paid, leaving an “equitable amount” of £75,000; (3) This sum would be paid to Mrs Falloon over the 18 months after completion of the sale; (4) Mr Khan would make an “equity advance” of £2,500 by 30 November 2010; (5) The “sales contract” would show the price as £250,000 and that the sale was on a vacant possession basis; (6) Mr Khan agreed to pay Mrs Falloon’s legal expenses for the sale, and that she would have independent legal representation; (7) The proceeds of the sale would be paid into a “client account" which would be “administered” by Belgrave; from which Mrs Falloon’s equity and Mr Khan’s deposit would be recovered; Mr Khan used this expression to refer to the sum of £62,493, being the balance due from him to Winchesters in respect of the transaction, after credit was given for the mortgage loan funds of £192,500 (8) On completion of the sale, Mr Khan would pay the buildings insurance, and would “issue” Mrs Falloon with a tenancy agreement with a rent free period of one year and thereafter £600 per month; (9) Mrs Falloon would have the option of offsetting her rental payments against the equitable amount due to her. Once the equitable amount had been paid in full, the monthly rental would require to be paid under the tenancy agreement.

44. The document entitled Statement of Agreement and Acceptance of Sale and Rental of 25 Church Drive, Kingsbury, London, NW9 8DN included the following: “I, Clephane Falloon of 25 Church Drive. Kingsbury. London. NW9 SDN. Under UM Land Registry Title NGL65826 have read and understood the terms offer dated 1st October 2010 provided to me by Mr Adnan Khan for the sale and rental of my property and agree fully with the terms and conditions of this offer. I declare that I am fully competent in making this decision and I have no mental impairment or are under any duress in agreeing to the offer proposed by Mr Adnan Khan and agree to the terms of this agreement selling and then renting my property of my own free will. I have been advised to seek independent legal advice on the option of selling and renting my property and 1 understand if I proceed, then I do so with the full knowledge and understanding of the terms of the agreement.”

45. The claimant initially (in the Am SoC at para 8) asserted that Mrs Falloon entered into the sale and rental agreement. However, in his oral evidence Jeffery only accepted that Mrs Falloon signed one page of it, but not that the documents accompanying it (and referred to by it) were those in the copy before the court. Not only was this inconsistent with the claimant’s pleaded case, but no basis was put forward for doubting the authenticity of the sale and rental agreement as a whole. I find that Mrs Falloon did sign it in the form before the court.

46. On 1 October 2010, Succession prepared a Memorandum of Sale. This shows: (1) a purchase price of £250,000; (2) Mr Khan’s solicitors as Winchesters Solicitors; (3) Mrs Falloon’s solicitors as Gummer & Singh Solicitors.

47. The claimant sought to impugn the authenticity of this document by reference to the fact that Succession was dissolved in 2019, and its “owner” Ross Richards was jailed for 10 years in 2014 (no evidence was adduced to support the latter). This is plainly insufficient to show the inauthenticity of the Memorandum. I find that Gummer & Singh were recommended to Mrs Falloon by Succession. Their fees were paid by Mr Khan.

48. On 1 October 2010, Succession raised an invoice for £4,800 to Mr Khan as a fee in connection with sourcing the Property. Mr Khan paid this on 5 November 2010.

49. On 5 October 2010, Mrs Falloon signed an estimate of costs and expenses, apparently attached to a client care letter addressed to her from Gummer & Singh (“ the client care letter”) . The body of the letter itself is in entirely generic form, other than its heading which sets out the Property’s address. The date of the letter is shown as “25 March 20242010”. Mr Khan’s explanation of this is that he was sent an electronic copy of a “contract pack”, and Mrs Falloon was sent the original posted copies. The copy he produced is, he said, an electronic copy, into which the date it was printed was automatically inserted. Mrs Falloon had no access to a printer or scanner, and asked him to print documents. He helped her to fill out the documents, and would take them back to his office to scan them to her solicitors.

50. The claimant’s case is that Mrs Falloon was unrepresented in the transaction. He challenged the authenticity of the letter on Gummer & Singh’s letterhead on the basis of the date discrepancy, and the fact that the letter mistakenly refers in one passage to their being instructed in the purchase of the Property.

51. However, the authenticity of the client care letter is supported by multiple other documents: (1) the Memorandum of Sale dated 1 October 2010 prepared by Succession in which Mrs Falloon’s solicitors are said to be Gummer & Singh; (2) the letter dated 22 October 2010 from Mr Khan’s solicitors, Winchesters to Gummer & Singh, in which Gummer & Singh’s client is referred to as Falloon; (3) the copy of that letter signed by Mrs Falloon; (4) the letter dated 10 November 2010 from Gummer & Singh to Mrs Falloon addressed to the Property, asking for a reply to an earlier letter; (5) the declaration of solvency dated 26 November 2010 signed by Mrs Falloon, the draft of which was sent by Winchesters to Gummer & Singh, and must have been sent on by them to her; (6) the letter dated 26 November 2010 signed by Mrs Falloon to Gummer & Singh; (7) the email dated 26 November 2010 from her email address to Gummer & Singh; (8) an HSBC statement showing that on 1 December 2010, Gummer & Singh transferred £114,644.29 to an account in the name of Belgrave, subtitled “Client Account C Falloon”;

52. In any event, Jeffery did not challenge his mother’s signature on the costs estimate said to be enclosed with the client care letter. In my judgment, the most likely explanation for Mrs Falloon signing that estimate is that it was sent to her under cover of that letter.

53. The claimant also challenged whether Gummer & Singh were a genuine practising firm of solicitors. He based this challenge on the fact that on 12 October 2010, the two members of Gummer & Singh LLP (“ the LLP ”) applied to strike it from the register. However, there is no evidence that the LLP traded as Gummer & Singh Solicitors (which had 3 partners); and Gummer & Singh’s letterhead shows it as a partnership, not an LLP. This is confirmed by the records at Companies House, which show that the LLP never traded. In addition, the claimant has made no attempt to contact Raminder S Uberoi or Mins Bal, who are the signatories of the letters from Gummer & Singh in the evidence.

54. I therefore reject the claimant’s submissions that the client care letter is a forgery and that Mrs Falloon did not instruct Gummer & Singh.

55. Mr Khan’s purchase of the Property was funded by a loan of £192,500, secured by a mortgage to Bridge Co Ltd. Their valuer visited the Property on 14 October 2010 and was given access by Mrs Falloon. In order to obtain the mortgage, Mr Khan misrepresented to Bridge Co that the sale price was £250,000, and that vacant possession was to be given.

56. On 22 October 2010, Winchesters wrote to Gummer & Singh, acknowledging their letter of 12 October 2010, enclosing a draft contract, raising various requisitions, and asking for a fixtures and fittings form.

57. On 10 November 2010, Gummer & Singh wrote to Mrs Falloon, referring to an earlier letter of 11 October 2010 , enclosing a copy of this letter, and asking her to provide her response to it. A copy of the letter was signed by Mrs Falloon and dated 11 November 2010 This was not in the evidence before the court , with the answers to the requisitions hand written on the letter by Mr Khan. Mrs Falloon also signed the fixtures and fittings form The claimant challenged this signature but did not put forward any basis for doing so other than “it doesn’t look like her signature”. I find that Mrs Falloon did sign this document. . This is not challenged by the claimant

58. She also signed an express authority (undated) to exchange contracts in a typed standard form.

59. On 25 November 2010, Mr Khan transferred to Mrs Falloon the “equity release” payment of £2,500 he had agreed to pay. On the same day, Winchesters emailed to Gummer & Singh a draft declaration of solvency for signature by Mrs Falloon.

60. On 26 November 2010, Mrs Falloon signed the declaration of solvency before a solicitor/commissioner of oaths at Tibb & Co Solicitors. She also signed a letter to Gummer & Singh confirming the sale price of £250,000, that she was aware that this price was below the market valuation and that she was not under duress. Finally on that day she emailed Gummer & Singh (copying in Mr Khan) bank details for the account to which the net sale proceeds should be sent. The claimant accepted that the signature “looks like her signature”

61. Although, the account name of that account was stated to be “C Falloon”, she was not in fact the account holder, which was Mr Khan’s company, Belgrave. I refer to it as “ the Belgrave Account ”.

62. The claimant submitted that that email was a forgery. He relied on various discrepancies between the copy exhibited to Mr Khan’s first witness statement, and a copy produced during the trial by Mr Khan: 1 st copy email 2 nd copy email Bcc bcc Re Subject Clephane Fallon Clephane

63. Mr Khan could not explain these discrepancies, which are minor and immaterial to the content of the email. However, the net proceeds of sale were transferred to the account detailed in the email. If Mrs Falloon had not authorised this, then one would have expected correspondence from her complaining about this. There is no such correspondence. I find that the email records Mrs Falloon’s instructions to Gummer & Singh that the net proceeds of sale should be paid to the Belgrave account.

64. On 30 November 2010, Mr Khan paid the sum of £62,500 to Winchesters. He referred to this as his “deposit”. This was the sum shown, on a completion statement prepared by Winchesters, as due from him on his purchase, with purchase price of £250,000 and a mortgage advance of £192,500.

65. The TR1 in respect of the Property is also dated 30 November 2010. It is signed by Mrs Falloon and witnessed by Feride Ibrahim, Mr Khan’s property manager. It would appear that completion took place on 1 December 2010: on that date Gummer & Singh transferred £114,644.29 to the Belgrave Account. In his oral evidence, Jeffery said he “didn’t know” if it was signed by Mrs Falloon. I accept Mr Khan’s evidence that she did sign it.

66. On the same day, Mr Khan transferred out of or paid from the Belgrave Account a total of £81,644. This was followed by further transfers, so that by 10 December 2010, the balance in the account was nil.

67. On 30 November 2010 Mr Khan emailed Belgrave’s portfolio manager Daniel Baker asking him to prepare an assured shorthold tenancy for the Property: “Dear Daniel Could you please prepare and send a ast for 25 Church drive, London, nw9 8dn • Tenant is Mrs Clephane Evaline Falloon • Rent is £600 per month maximum • Term is standard 12 month - renewable for her lifetime every year subject to the adherence of the tenancy terms and conditions • 1st year rental has been paid in advance -please credit her account in our system - wiman if I could e-mail clephane directly that would be great.”

68. The claimant’s case is that this email is a forgery (§35, Re-Am SoC), because it is dated Thu 30/11/2010, and in 2010, 30 November was a Tuesday. That is an anomaly that indicates that the date may have been altered, but it is immaterial when the court has the assured shorthold tenancy (“ AST ”) itself, signed by Mrs Falloon.

69. The AST is dated 30 November 2010, although it appears that Mrs Fallon may have signed it later, after making a trip to Jamaica. The claimant accepted that the signature to the AST “could be her genuine signature”

70. Consonant with the sale documents, the AST provided: (1) the parties were Mr Khan as landlord and Mrs Falloon as tenant; (2) the leased property was the Property; (3) the term was 12 months commencing on 30 November 2011; (4) the rent was £600 monthly; (5) no deposit was payable.

71. Between December 2010 and April 2016, Mr Khan made payments by bank transfer to Mrs Falloon or one of her sons totalling £18,700. He also withdrew cash totalling £20,925 from the Belgrave account, and his case is that this was paid to Mrs Falloon or as directed by her.

72. In October 2011, Mr Khan approached Mrs Falloon to explain that he would be unable to pay the £75,000 outstanding within the agreed 18 month period, which would expire on 1 June 2012. They agreed that the rent due under the AST would be set off against the debt due from Mr Khan, whilst he would continue to make interim transfers and cash payments. Mrs Falloon did not ever make any rental payments due under the AST.

73. By 1 June 2012, Mr Khan had paid £10,700 by bank transfer, and £4,800 in cash, totalling £15,500; and Mrs Falloon was liable for 6 months rental payments totalling £3,600.

74. On 18 March 2013, Mr Khan transferred the Property to Mr Abdul Raif.

75. By the mid 2010’s, Mr Falloon was showing clear signs of memory loss and confusion and her conversations with Ms Donohue became less coherent.

76. In about 2016, the rent due and payments made reached the £75,000 owed by Mr Khan. In April 2016, he stopped making payments to Mrs Falloon, but did not pursue Mrs Falloon for rent. He did not do so because he was aware that her health had deteriorated, and was reluctant to bring repossession proceedings.

77. Around 2018, Mrs Falloon had some falls out on the main road and was becoming increasingly frail.

78. On 27 May 2019, Succession was dissolved.

79. On 30 October 2019, Mr Raif transferred the Property back to Mr Khan.

80. By about 2019, Mrs Falloon had become housebound due to her mental and physical health. She showed clear signs of confusion and not recognising where she was. She would occasionally escape from the Property and wander away from home. On a number of occasions, Ms Donohue had to run out in to the street and re-direct her back home, or bring her in to her home for a cup of tea whilst she contacted Paul.

81. On 8 January 2020, Mrs Falloon’s GP’s notes record her as having memory impairment.

82. The evidence includes a handwritten letter signed by Mrs Falloon and dated 21 February 2020 in the following terms: “Mr Khan I do not want to lose my home, I have had this property for so long Again, I have commitments at this home and it has to be done from this house. I will refund your money as soon as possible. Clephane Falloon Please Respond.”

83. By 2020, Mr Falloon was able to recognise Ms Dononhue’s face and knew her as a neighbour but had forgotten her name. Ms Donohue’s evidence, which I accept, is that Mrs Falloon no longer had the capacity to discuss anything of a complex nature after around 2020.

84. On 13 March 2020, Mr Khan confirmed to HMRC that he had been the beneficial owner of the Property since November 2010.

85. On 15 April 2021, Mrs Falloon was formally diagnosed with dementia (Alzheimer’s disease). At some time in 2022, she could no longer remember where she knew Ms Donohue from, without prompting.

86. On 24 May 2022, Mr Khan and Kuflink entered into a facility agreement providing for a loan of £596,250, secured by a first legal charge on the Property. This was registered at HM Land Registry on 1 July 2022.

87. On 27 March 2023, Kuflink made a formal demand for repayment. On 2 August 2023, Kuflink appointed receivers pursuant to the Law of Property Act 1925 , and the receivers accepted the appointment. That day, the receivers wrote to the occupiers of the Property.

88. Paul replied on 28 September 2023: “Mrs Clephane Falloon did not know or understand that the property title had been transferred to Mr Adnan Ali Khans’ name until receiving your notice. Mr Adnan Ali Khan did not pay all the proceeds legally due to Mrs Clephane Falloon from his purchase of 25 Church Drive, Kingsbury, London NW9 8DN at the time of sale/purchase completion and payment of the full purchase price and what is owed to Mrs Clephane Falloon remains unsettled up to the date of this email.”

89. By 29 November 2023, the sum outstanding by way of rent was £86,400.

90. On 14 December 2023, Mrs Falloon’s GP confirmed that she had memory impairment and episodes of not being orientated in space and time; and, effectively, that she lacked capacity to litigate.

91. On 24 October 2024, Paul wrote: “we will shortly be serving notice on Adnan Ali Khan, who has failed to perform on the contract, still owing Mrs Falloon approx. £25,000 to the present day, failing to purchase the above property, and unlawfully enriching himself from the same.” Analysis and conclusions

92. The claimant’s case depends upon the following facts being found: (1) The price agreed by Mrs Falloon was £250,000: §9, Paul’s witness statement dated 8 December 2023. (2) Alternatively (and inconsistently), Mr Khan concealed the purchase price of £250,000 from Mrs Falloon: §29, Am SoC. (3) Mr Khan misled Mrs Falloon as to the amount of her secured debts: Jeffery’s witness statement dated 26 August 2025 §§13, 14, 38, 39, Am SoC. (4) Mrs Falloon did not instruct Gummer & Singh and did not know that they were acting for her: §14, Am SoC. (5) Mr Khan instructed Gummer & Singh to act as Mrs Falloon’s legal representative: §33, Am SoC. (6) The client care letter dated 1 October 2010 from Gummer & Singh to Mrs Falloon was a forgery: §35, Am SoC. (7) The transfer of £114,644.29 to the Belgrave Account was not authorized by Mrs Falloon: §34, Re-Am SoC; the email dated 26 November 2010 from Mrs Falloon’s email account to Gummer & Singh was a forgery: §35,Am SoC; (8) Mrs Falloon and Mr Khan agreed that legal title to the Property would only pass to him when he had paid all of the £75,000: §7, original Details of Claim; (9) Mrs Falloon did not intend to transfer title to the Property when she signed the TR1: §10, original Details of Claim.

93. As to these: (1) I have found that Mrs Falloon agreed a price of £210,000 with Mr Khan. This is consistent with the selling price she suggested to Succession, and is the price stated in the sale and rental agreement. (2) The suggestion that Mr Khan concealed the purchase price of £250,000 from Mrs Falloon is inconsistent with the claimant’s case that she agreed that price: the notion of an agreed price being concealed by one side from the other is incoherent. (3) I reject the suggestion that Mr Khan misled Mrs Falloon as to the amount of secured debts on the Property. This would have required her to be otherwise unaware of the amount, and for Mr Khan to have been the only source of this information. However, she would have regularly received statements from both lenders, and there is no suggestion that she would have been unable to read and understand such statements. Mrs Falloon knew the amount of debt secured on the Property, and could not have been misled by Mr Khan as to it. (4) For the reasons given in paragraphs 49 to 52 above, I reject the suggestion that Mrs Falloon did not instruct Gummer & Singh or know that they were acting for her. The documents discussed in those paragraphs show that she did instruct them and did know they were acting. (5) There is no evidence that Mr Khan instructed Gummer & Singh. (6) For the reasons above, I reject the submission that the client care letter was a forgery. (7) For the reasons above, the transfer of £114,644.29 to the Belgrave Account was authorized by Mrs Falloon by her email dated 26 November 2010 to Mins Bal of Gummer & Singh.

94. As to (8), in my judgment, the claimant’s factual case borders on the fanciful. On their case, Mr Khan would have paid £135,000 to Mrs Falloon (to discharge her secured debts) without obtaining any interest in the Property or other means of obtaining repayment if the legal title were not transferred to him. It would also expose him to the risk of her selling or charging the Property. That would be commercial folly. The claimant’s case is also inconsistent with the practical realities of Mr Khan obtaining funding for the purchase: in order to obtain a mortgage loan, Mr Khan had to acquire the legal title to the Property, against which his mortgagee’s charge would be and was registered.

95. Similarly, as to (9), there is no basis for concluding that Mrs Falloon did not understand the effect of the TR1 (which is clear on its face), or that when she signed it she did not intend to transfer title to the Property to Mr Khan.

96. The claimant’s case is based entirely on the oral evidence of Paul (and to a lesser degree Jeffery) about what Mrs Falloon told them about her arrangements with Mr Khan, and wide ranging unsubstantiated allegations of forgery. Mrs Falloon did not at any stage complain about or challenge the transaction. Indeed, her letter dated 21 February 2020 is consistent with Mr Khan’s case and inconsistent with the claimant’s case. The claimant has not adduced any documents in support of his case, and that case is inconsistent with the documents before the court.

97. On the evidence, the proper analysis of the transaction is that Mrs Falloon agreed to transfer her legal and beneficial interest in the Property to Mr Khan for £210,000, on the basis that £75,000 of the purchase price would remain outstanding to be paid over the next 18 months. That agreement was later varied as set out above, to provide for Mr Khan’s payment to be made partially by setting off the rent due under the AST.

98. As to the claimant’s argument that the sale and rental agreement was unenforceable, I accept that it fails to comply with section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 , and could not therefore have been enforced by Mr Khan to compel the transfer of the Property to him. However, although, the conveyancing files are not available, the evidence shows that the transaction was carried out as a conventional conveyancing transaction, in which the solicitors would have exchanged contracts in the usual way. For example, Mrs Falloon signed an authority for Gummer & Singh to exchange contracts on her behalf. In any event, and more importantly, the TR1 was executed and delivered, and its effect was to transfer Mrs Falloon’s interest in the Property to Mr Khan. Whether or not the agreement which preceded it was enforceable is immaterial.

99. As to the claimant’s argument that the TR1 itself was invalid because it misstated the consideration as being £250,000, Mr Khan’s completion statement shows the sum of £250,000 being paid to Gummer & Singh. No completion statement for Mrs Falloon was in evidence, but the sum of £114,644.29 plainly represents the sum remaining after payment of the 2 loans secured on the Property, which was then paid to the Belgrave account pursuant to the agreement between Mrs Falloon and Mr Khan.

100. In my judgment, the fact that the consideration of £250,000 stated in the TR1 did not reflect the “real” price agreed by Mrs Falloon and Mr Khan did not prevent it from being effective to transfer title to the Property to Mr Khan.

101. I conclude therefore that the claimant has not shown any basis for impugning the TR1, nor, therefore, Mr Khan’s registered title at HM Land Registry. It follows that it is not necessary to consider the claim against Kuflink nor the limitation defences raised by it.