Klotho Brands Limited v Kevin Gerald Stanford

HHJ PAUL MATTHEWS :

1. This is an application by notice on behalf of the defendant, Kevin Gerald Stanford, dated 21 July 2025, whereby he asks for an immediate stay of all enforcement proceedings arising from the 2022 declaration, including contempt, unless and until the fraud on the court is rebutted under oath. Now, that needs unpacking a little bit, because it is not immediately understandable as it is. Enforcement proceedings arising from the 2022 declaration, including contempt, is clearly a reference to the fact that the claimant in this case has made an application, dated 23 June 2025, for the defendant to be adjudicated as in contempt of court.

2. The 2022 declaration is part of the order made by Deputy Judge Clare Ambrose on 5 April 2022, by which she declared that the defendant had no right to certain shares in the company known as All Saints Retail Limited, which he formerly owned but which had been sold by a share purchase agreement in 2011. This agreement was also the subject (or residual rights in which were also the subject) of a settlement agreement made in 2012. The judge also granted a permanent injunction, restraining the defendant from asserting any rights in such shares in the future.

3. Then the application by the defendant uses the words “unless and until the fraud on the court is rebutted under oath”. This appears to be a reference to the allegations which he has made (and which he made in the 2022 proceedings) that he had been induced by fraud by two Icelandic banks to enter into a transaction with them, which gave them the right ultimately to sell the shares in All Saints to the claimant.

4. Now, this application is supported by an affidavit of the defendant which is headed “Affidavit of record, fraud on the court and abuse of process”. It was sworn before a notary public on 18 July 2025. I will not read it out, as it is a lengthy document, but I have read it myself. In that document, the defendant says, first of all, that he has not been properly served in accordance with his “lawful enrolled identity” (those are the words). I take that to be a reference to the fact that Mr Stanford has changed his name, or at least appears to have changed his name, to a new name which is very similar to his old one. He was from birth known as Kevin Gerald Stanford. He has now changed it by deed poll to “Kevin-gerald Stanford”. So he says, “I have not been served, because you have served someone with a different name”, and following from that he says that he has not been joined to the contempt application.

5. Then he says, in addition, that the sealed order made by Leech J on 11 July 2025, by which the judge expedited this contempt of court application, was addressed to KEVIN-GERALD STANFORD (all in capitals). What the defendant says is, “That is a reference to a private unlimited company which I incorporated, and because it is unlimited it does not bear the word ‘limited’ at the end of the name. Therefore that order has no effect on me. It may have effect on the company, but the company does not know anything about this. There is no service on the lawful identity, Kevin-gerald Stanford”.

6. Then he also says that the order of 5 April 2022 was obtained by fraud. He says that the fraud was committed by an officer of the claimant company called Lyndon Lea. Hr further says that unfortunately this evidence of Mr Lyndon Lea which he says was fraudulent, was never tested, because the proceedings before the judge in 2022 were constituted under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and not under Part 7.

7. The difference between the two categories is well known to lawyers. Under Part 7, proceedings are brought when there is likely to be a dispute of fact. Proceedings are brought under Part 8 when it is a question of law rather than a question of fact, for example the construction of documents. As I understand it, the claimant chose to issue under Part 8, because that was precisely the point. It was the construction of documents that mattered and not a dispute of fact, And, as I understand it further, the defendant attempted to persuade Marcus Smith J in February 2022 that the proceedings should be transferred from Part 8 to Part 7 precisely because the defendant urged upon the judge that there was going to be a dispute of fact. Nevertheless, the judge refused that and refused to transfer the proceedings from Part 8 to Part 7.

8. That order, as I understand it, was not appealed. The matter then went to trial in April 2022. The judge, having dealt with the matter under Part 8, gave a lengthy and detailed judgment, which I have read. In that judgment she rejected the allegations of fraud that were made by the defendant, and both made the declaration and granted the injunction sought by the claimant. So, the evidence which the defendant now says was fraudulent was taken into account, and the judge reached the conclusion that it should be accepted.

9. Now, that decision of the judge in 2022 has not been appealed or challenged. No application has been made to set aside the order of the court, for example on the grounds that it was obtained by fraud. Therefore that order, that injunction, stands. I should also say that the defendant did not attend the trial in 2022 but it is clear beyond any doubt that he had the opportunity to do so, and that there was no reason why he could not have attended.

10. So, in those circumstances, he now asks for a stay. I will just read the text of his email to the court this morning: “For the avoidance of doubt, my N244 application dated 21 July 2025 was submitted for paper determination under CPR 23.8. It raises matters that are independent of the contempt application, to which I have never been lawfully joined under CPR 19.4 or served in accordance with CPR 81.8(1)(a). I respectfully maintain that it would be procedurally improper and a potential violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights for the court to collapse or dispose of that application within the contempt hearing, or to treat my non-attendance at that hearing as submission in relation to the N244. A formal judicial notice titled ‘Judicial Notice of Non-Joinder, Statutory Classification, and Risk of Unlawful Enforcement under POCA 2002 ’ was filed earlier today via CE-File and is being served on all parties. It preserves the procedural and evidential record in full.”

11. I have read the document which he refers to. There is attached to that email a document headed “Judicial Notice of Non-Joinder, Statutory Classification, and Risk of Unlawful Enforcement under POCA 2002 ”. It is stated to be from Kevin Gerald Stanford, written in the way which the defendant prefers, and is addressed to me, to the claimant’s solicitors and also to Ernst & Young. It says: “This notice is served further to the N244 application filed by Kevin Gerald Stanford on 21 July 2025 via CE-file marked for paper determination under CPR 23.8. The application was supported by a sworn affidavit dated 18 July 2025 raising unrebutted allegations of fraud on the court, procedural dishonour, live classification of criminal property, improper market use of a tainted judicial declaration. I have not been lawfully served in relation to the committal proceedings as required under CPR 81.8(1)(a). No joinder application has been made under CPR 19.4. My N244 application was made independently under CPR 23.8 and was expressly marked for determination on the papers. No hearing was requested, no appearances made. If the court now proceeds to dismiss or dispose of my N244 application which was lawfully filed, a paper determination under CPR 23.8 on the basis of non-attendance at the hearing of a separate contempt application to which I was never lawfully joined, this will constitute a procedural breach, a denial of the right to be heard and a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. My N244 application remains unrebutted and lawfully preserved. I do not waive service of the contempt application. No submission arises. I do not evade the court. If I am lawfully served in the lawful identity Kevin-gerald Stanford as recorded by the Royal Courts of Justice under enrolled deed polled entry number 867/24, I will instruct counsel and attend court as required. I confirm that I do not appear at today’s hearing. I do not submit to its jurisdiction. I have not been lawfully joined or served under CPR 81.8(1)(a). Any attempt to collapse this application into committal proceedings without adjudication on the issues raised constitutes procedural dishonour and breach of the common law obligation to uphold due process in quasi criminal matters.”

12. There is then a lengthy notice to the court and all copied parties about the provisions of POCA to which he has already referred. Then there is a paragraph headed: “Final position. This record will not be withdrawn. It is now preserved. Any judgment, order, committal or enforcement action issued in its absence will be treated as dishonourable, potentially void and subject to future application to appeal, regulatory disclosure or private enforcement. For the avoidance of doubt, no hearing was requested, scheduled, or attended in relation to my N244 application because it was made lawfully under CPR 23.8 for a paper determination. I have not been served into the committal proceedings and no joinder application has been made under CPR 19.4 In quasi criminal proceedings where liberty is at stake there must be no uncertainty as to the identity, service, or standing. It would be procedurally improper to treat silence as submission where service has not occurred and where standing has been expressly reserved. If a court having been put on formal notice of unrebutted criminal property proceeds anyway, it becomes legally concerned in an arrangement which is precisely what section 328 POCA prohibits. All rights are reserved, no waiver is given. Any such order may be subject to setting aside under CPR 3.1(7) reversal on appeal or enforcement under statutory duty [and it is signed] respectfully preserved, Kevin-gerald Stanford.”

13. So, that is the material which the defendant has put forward in support of the application for a stay. I may say at once that CPR rule 23.8 does not give the right to a party to insist upon an application being dealt with on paper. On the contrary, it is facultative, in giving the court the opportunity to deal with some applications on paper where that would save money or costs, or the parties are agreed that that is the sensible way of proceeding. But the default position is that an application is dealt with in open court, as indeed it is being dealt with now. The fact that there may be other applications which have to be heard on the same occasion one after another is not a good reason for not dealing with it in open court. So that is the point about rule 23.8.

14. The point about violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is a bad one. The article in question does not give an unfettered right to have matters dealt with in court by a method which you prefer. Instead, it confers a right to be accorded a fair trial before an impartial and independent tribunal (which this court is). But it does not apply to everything that happens in court. In particular it applies only to the determination of civil rights. The question whether an application ought to be dealt with in one way rather than another way is not a determination of anyone’s civil rights. So, Article 6 is simply irrelevant.

15. Then Mr Stanford, the defendant, says “You have not served me properly, because I have changed my name”. I am very sorry that the defendant has taken this position, because it is simply nonsense. A person who changes his or her name does not become a different person. It is simply a different name by which to call the same person. So if the order is made against Kevin Gerald Stanford spelt in the usual way, and he then changes his name to Kevin-gerald Stanford, he does not become a different person. That order still binds him. It does not make any difference, either, if he has incorporated a private unlimited company with the same names in capitals. Although that does create a different legal person, it is perfectly obvious that the person who was intended to be affected by the order of the court was the defendant, and not the unlimited private company. So that is an end of that point.

16. The question therefore is: is there any merit at all in this application for an adjournment of the contempt application? What Mr Stanford says is that there is this allegation of fraud that has not been dealt with. However, on the contrary, it was dealt with in 2022. It was dealt with by a procedure which was lawfully initiated, the Part 8 claim. The defendant tried to change it to a Part 7 claim, but, after hearing him, Marcus Smith J said No. The proceedings continued before the deputy judge, Clare Ambrose, in April 2022 and resulted in the declaration and the injunction to which I have already referred. That order has never been appealed and nor has any application been made to set it aside, whether on the grounds of fraud or otherwise.

17. That order still stands, and it is not open to me at the instance of the defendant, even if he alleges fraud, to go behind it in this way. The ways in which he might have done it would be to appeal, which he did not do, or to apply to set it aside, which he has not done. Therefore, in these circumstances, any allegation to the effect that the order of 5 April 2022 was obtained by fraud is simply irrelevant to the present proceedings.

18. However, there is another and a shorter way to reach the same conclusion and that is this. Where a court makes an order, in this case an injunction, a court of competent jurisdiction such as the High Court is, because the High Court possesses universal jurisdiction in England and Wales, then that order must be obeyed unless and until it is either overturned on appeal, or set aside by a proper application to that effect. That applies just as much to an injunction as it applies to any other order. As authority for that proposition there are a considerable number of decisions. I mention just two. One is a decision of the Privy Council called Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97 , and the other is a case called Majera v The Home Secretary [2022] AC 461 , which is a Supreme Court decision.

19. So, even if it was open to the defendant to apply to set aside or to appeal out of time against this order, the fact is that, unless and until it is overturned or set aside, it is binding upon the defendant. If he has breached that order then he may find himself in contempt of court. It is nothing to the point, therefore, that he would like to see what the result of the Ernst & Young review is going to be. So, for all these reasons, I dismiss this application for an adjournment. (For proceedings after Judgment see separate transcript)

20. This is an application by notice dated 17 July 2025 for a stay of the current contempt of court application brought by the claimant against the defendant. But this application is not made by the defendant. I have already this morning dealt with an application by the defendant to stay the proceedings, which I rejected. This application however is made by the DS Family Trust. Of course, the DS Family Trust is not a legal person, and cannot make any application to the court. The person who actually makes the application is the trustee. The trustee is, or is claimed to be, the son of the defendant, Lukas Kevin Stanford. It is supported by an undated witness statement, in fact two witness statements, of Mr Lukas Stanford.

21. The primary problem here is that Mr Lukas Stanford claims to have been appointed as trustee by a letter of appointment dated 5 June 2025. Then Mr Lukas Stanford has signed a separate notice of appointment of the trustee dated 9 June 2025, which he has sent to various interested parties, including the claimant. The letter of appointment, however, is a curious document, because it is made by someone called Sanjay Dhir “acting in my capacity as the settlor of the DS Family Trust constituted by deed dated 2 March 2009”.

22. I have seen a copy of this deed as it was provided in the bundle. The DS Family Trust was indeed made on 2 March 2009 by Sanjay Dhir, defined as the settlor, with Axis Fiduciary Limited, a private limited company incorporated in the Republic of Mauritius, who is defined as the trustee. Then clause 12 of that trust deed provides that a trustee shall cease to be a trustee on the happening of “any of the following events”. Subparagraph (c) refers to being removed in accordance with subclause 12.3. Subclause 12.3 says the protector shall have the power to remove any or all of the trustees, with or without cause, and then notice has to be given and so on and so forth. Next, subclause 12.4 says: “The power of appointing new or additional trustees shall be vested in the protector or if the protector shall be incapacitated or otherwise unable or unwilling to act or if there shall be no protector in the trustees.” Then clause 12.7 says: “Any appointment under this clause shall be in writing signed by the person making the appointment and by the new or additional trustee so appointed.”

23. The problem here is that the letter of appointment by Mr Sanjay Dhir is made by him in his capacity as settlor , whereas under clause 12 of the trust deed it is the protector who has that power. So far as one is aware, Mr Sanjay Dhir is not the protector. Moreover, if there is no protector, then it is the trustee who has the power to appoint a new trustee. But Mr Sanjay Dhir is not the existing trustee, Axis Fiduciary was the original trustee, and may, for all I know, still be the trustee. So, in those circumstances, it seems to me that Mr Lukas Stanford does not appear to be a trustee at all. Therefore, has no standing to make this application.

24. Leaving that on one side, in his witness statements Mr Lukas Stanford repeats the allegations of fraud which the defendant has made in his application to stay the contempt of court application, and which I have dealt with in a judgment which I gave earlier this morning. In that judgment I said that it was not open to me to go behind the decision in 2022, and that no application had been made for an appeal out of time or to set aside the judgment on grounds of fraud or any other grounds. So, on the basis that there was an order currently in place, there is no basis for staying the contempt of court application.

25. There is a further point, however, made by Mr Lukas Stanford and that is this. It is that the trust was a party to both the SPA in 2011 and the settlement agreement in 2012, but the trust was not joined to the 2022 proceedings which resulted in the order of Deputy Judge Clare Ambrose. Then, according to Mr Lukas Stanford, CPR rule 19.2(3) requires the joinder of a person whose rights may be directly affected by the outcome. This is not in fact correct. It is not rule 19.2(3), but rule 19.2(2) which is relevant. But what that says is that joinder may be ordered, if it is desirable for one of two stated reasons to do so. So, Mr Lukas Stanford is relying on a misunderstanding of what the provisions of the rules say.

26. What he concludes is that the trust’s exclusion from these proceedings in 2022 rendered those proceeding procedurally defective. However, even if rule 19.2(2) had said what Mr Lukas Stanford says it means, rule 3.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules says that a failure to comply with a rule does not invalidate a step taken in the proceedings, or indeed (of course) the proceedings themselves. So, the proceedings are not, in fact, invalidated merely because, if it were the case (which it is not), that a rule had not been followed. But, in any event, the general rule in the English courts is that a claimant can sue who it wants to. There is an old authority for that called Dollfus Mieg v Bank of England . [1951] Ch 33

27. In this case, the claim that was being made by the claimant was only about the defendant’s interest in All Saints shares, not the trust’s shareholding in All Saints shares. So, the trust would not have been, indeed could not have been, prejudiced by the 2022 proceedings, because it did not affect their shareholding. Any rights which the trust had before the declaration made by the deputy judge in 2022 it still has.

28. So, the trustee is not a party, and it is not necessary as a party to these proceedings. But, because of the way in which I have already explained that the allegations of fraud are irrelevant to the present proceedings, even if the trust were joined, the result would be exactly the same. This is because the trust is in no better position, indeed one might say a weaker position, compared with the defendant himself. I say “weaker” simply because the trustee is not in danger of contempt of court proceedings; that is not what is on the table.

29. So, for all those reasons, I conclude that this application to stay is simply ill-founded, and must be dismissed. (For proceedings after Judgment see separate transcript)

30. This is the hearing of an application by notice dated 23 June 2025 by the applicant who is the claimant in the litigation against the respondent, Kevin Gerald Stanford, for a committal for contempt of court based on alleged breaches of an order of the High Court dated 5 April 2022. For present purposes, I should say simply this: that the problem which I am addressing in this judgment is the problem that although leading counsel for the applicant is present and has addressed me, the defendant is not present or represented. So, the question arises quite naturally whether I should proceed at all in these circumstances, or whether I should take some other step, whether by simply adjourning, or whether by issuing a bench warrant.

31. In circumstances where a contempt of court application is made, there are a number of matters which the court should take into account in deciding whether to proceed in the absence of the respondent. In Sanchez v Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam) , Cobb J, sitting in the Family Division of the High Court, set out some relevant considerations in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of his judgment. These have been subsequently applied, in other judgments, in particular a more recent one of Bryan J in Madison Pacific v Groza [2024] EWHC 2307 (Comm) . I am not going to set these out seriatim in my oral remarks today, but I will treat them as incorporated by reference into the judgment. The judge in Sanchez explained why it was unusual, but not exceptional, to determine a committal application in the absence of a respondent. The judge addressed a number of important issues.

32. In the present case, first of all there is the question of service, I am entirely satisfied, on the material before me, and if necessary to the criminal standard, that the respondent has been served with all the relevant documents, including the notice of the hearing. Leech J, on the 11 th of this month, held that the respondent had been properly served with the application. Since then, indeed, there have been a large number of communications from the defendant to the court dealing with the application, so that is entirely clear.

33. Secondly, I am entirely satisfied that the defendant has had sufficient notice to prepare for the present hearing today. It is exactly a month since the application notice was issued, it was served within a few days thereafter and it is two weeks or so since the hearing was actually listed for today. The defendant has, in fact, instructed a firm of criminal solicitors, not precisely to represent him in this matter, but in an allied matter. This shows that he is perfectly capable of instructing solicitors if he wishes. In any event, he has previous experience both of litigation in general as a businessman, but also, unfortunately, of committal proceedings brought against him. So he knows exactly what he should be doing.

34. The third point is whether there is any good reason given for his non-attendance. In the present case he has said “I am not there because I am not properly served, and I have not been properly joined”. I have rejected both of those two allegations. No other good reason is put forward. For example, he has not said he is unwell, or that he has to care for a sick relative, or anything of that sort. So, no good reason for non-appearance has been given.

35. The next point is whether he has waived his right to be present. Now, this is not a formal process. It is simply saying, can I be sure from the material in front of me that he really does not want to come. Is he really saying “No, I am not planning to come. I do not want to come”? In the present case, I am entirely satisfied that he knows what is going on, that he knows that the hearing is taking place. He has written a number of communications to the court in which he has set out a lot of what he wants to say. It is as plain as a pikestaff that he is waiving his right to be present.

36. Would an adjournment facilitate his attendance in the present case? There is absolutely no suggestion that, if I were to adjourn this hearing, of which he has had proper notice, to another date, let us say in October, that it would be more likely to secure his attendance. So, I can see no basis for saying that an adjournment would facilitate his attendance.

37. How far would it be a disadvantage to the defendant to proceed in his absence? In the present case, he has already communicated enormously with the court, setting out in witness statement and affidavit form his objections to these proceedings, and his defence (in effect) to the contempt of court. It is not clear to me that there can be any disadvantage to the defendant, therefore, in proceeding in his absence. If there is any prejudice or disadvantage to the defendant, it is small.

38. Is there any prejudice to the claimant? In my view, yes, there is because the very reason why the judge granted expedition of the hearing of this committal application was precisely because of the disruption that was being caused to the claimant and the claimant’s business by the conduct of the defendant. So the matter needed to be dealt with as soon as possible.

39. Will there be any undue prejudice caused to the defendant in his absence? For example, is there any suggestion that he wished to instruct counsel to appear at this hearing? Again in my view, there is none of that. Instead, we have a lot of paper from him telling us what his position is. He has had effectively every opportunity to attend and to take part, even sending an email yesterday to the court and an email this morning to the court with his various points.

40. So, I turn lastly, therefore, to the question of the overriding objective which is to deal with cases justly in the way that is set out in CPR Part 1. Here, the only person prejudiced, in my view, to any substantial extent, is the applicant, who wants to enforce the order of 5 April 2022. The defendant has had every opportunity. Nothing that has happened in the last few days has changed anything. So, in these circumstances, it seems to me that this is one of those unusual but not exceptional cases where it is appropriate to proceed in the absence of the respondent. (For proceedings after Judgment see separate transcript) - - - - - - - - - - Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Tel No: 020 7067 2900. DX: 410 LDE Email: [email protected] Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com