Loudmila Bourlakova & Ors v The Estate of Oleg Bourlakov & Ors

Andrew de Mestre K.C.: I Introduction

1. This is my judgment on an application issued by the First and Fourth Claimants (“ the Bourlakovas ”) on 20 October 2025 for orders that the Twelfth Defendant (“ Edelweiss ”) should: (i) provide the Bourlakovas with the statements of case, evidence and procedural orders in an arbitration in Moscow in which a Mr Ploshchenko is seeking a very substantial sum, just over $101 million, from Edelweiss (“ the Arbitration “); (ii) notify the Bourlakovas if Edelweiss becomes aware of an award or enforcement procedure related to the Arbitration; (iii) not pay out any sums in satisfaction of any such award without notice; and (iv) use its best endeavours to obtain (and provide to the Bourlakovas) a transcript or recording of any hearing in the Arbitration.

2. Mr Kitchener KC, who appeared on behalf of the Bourlakovas, said that the orders were required in order (i) to ensure the effectiveness and proper policing of undertakings previously given to the Court by Edelweiss, and (ii) to enable the Bourlakovas to take such further steps as may be required to safeguard Edelweiss and its assets pending the resolution of these proceedings.

3. Mr Dunning KC, who appeared on behalf of Edelweiss, said, by contrast and in broad terms, that the application should be dismissed because there is no risk of dissipation of Edelweiss’s assets as it is bound by existing undertakings and has provided additional confirmations in correspondence; Edelweiss is defending the arbitration properly; this is a further illegitimate attempt by the Bourlakovas to intervene in the management of Edelweiss; the orders sought have no practical utility; and the materials which the Bourlakovas are seeking are subject to arbitration confidentiality which the English court should not interfere with in the circumstances of this application.

4. The application is one aspect of a very substantial dispute which has been on foot in this jurisdiction since 2020 and also involves multiple sets of proceedings in other jurisdictions including Panama, Switzerland and Bahamas. The proceedings here involve some twenty defendants and are being managed by Mr Justice Richard Smith as the assigned Judge.

5. The application was released by the assigned Judge because the Bourlakovas had asked for a judgment before 19 November 2025 and that could not be accommodated given the relatively short timescale involved and the Judge’s other commitments. It was in those circumstances that the application came before me on 13 November 2025.

6. Given the urgency, this judgment is somewhat more summary in nature than it might otherwise have been given the detailed nature of the written materials and oral submissions which I received. It focusses on the points which were emphasised in the oral submissions at the hearing. I have nonetheless taken into account all of the materials I was asked to read and all of the submissions made to me both orally and in writing in reaching the decisions below. Further, nothing I say below is intended to reach any final conclusion on matters of fact at this interlocutory stage when such matters will be considered by the Judge at trial. II Background

7. As will be apparent from the brief description above, the proceedings have a very substantial history, the majority of which is not relevant to the application. However, the parties did each refer to particular aspects of the background which they said supported their position on the application. The background was also useful in explaining, at least in part, why the application was so hard fought and why the levels of distrust between the parties have reached such extreme levels.

8. In the following paragraphs I will set out in more detail the parts of the recent background on which particular reliance was placed by both parties at the hearing namely (i) a summary judgment/strike-out and injunction hearing before Mr Justice Richrd Smith in March 2025 and his ruling on that and (ii) the sequence of events after the Arbitration was first referred to in correspondence by the Bourlakovas on 11 July 2025. (i) The summary judgment/strike-out and injunction applications

9. The nature of the claim between the Bourlakovas and Edelweiss was the subject of detailed consideration at a hearing on 11-13 March 2025 which resulted in a judgment of Richard Smith J dated 18 July 2025 and reported at [2025] EWHC 1792 (Ch) . Paragraph references in paragraph 10 below are to this judgment.

10. By his judgment, the Judge: 10.1. Dismissed an application by Edelweiss and several other defendants that the claims against them be struck out or reverse summary judgment be granted. The Judge concluded that the Fourth Claimant’s case in relation to the ownership of Edelweiss had a real prospect of success. 10.2. Rejected an application by the Claimants for a worldwide freezing order against Edelweiss on the basis that there was no sufficient risk of dissipation: see [180]-[194]. 10.3. Ruled that the Claimants had made out a case for a proprietary freezing order against Edelweiss and others for which risk of dissipation was not a requirement (see [195]-[200]). The Judge’s conclusion on the proprietary freezing order against Edelweiss is the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to permission granted by Lord Justice Zacaroli on 9 October 2025.

11. Following the handing down of this judgment, there was a consequentials hearing (on 23-24 July) to deal with the terms of the order which resulted in a ruling from the Judge on 29 July 2025. As Edelweiss offered an undertaking not to dispose of its assets other than in the ordinary course of business, this was accepted in lieu of an order for an injunction (as recorded in paragraphs (2) and (3) of Schedule 1 to the Order dated 29 July 2025).

12. The undertaking in relation to Edelweiss’s assets (“ the Undertaking ”) provides as follows: “(2) Until further order of the Court, Edelweiss undertakes not to in any way dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any of its assets whether they are in or outside England and Wales.”

13. There were then carve-outs from the Undertaking in paragraph (3) of Schedule 1 for (a) dealings with assets in the “ ordinary and proper course of business ”, (b) legal advice and representation, (c) certain specific payments, (d) lending funds to Silver Angel Yachting Ltd, and (e) the legal costs and expenses of the Representative of Mr Bourlakov (the First Defendant to the proceedings). Edelweiss also undertook (in paragraph 4(d) of Schedule 1) to provide, amongst other things, a quarterly list of Edelweiss’s “ liabilities and all claims asserted against it ” which exceed a value of $50,000 and specified details of those liabilities/claims.

14. The correspondence in relation to the Arbitration started shortly before the consequentials hearing when the Bourlakovas’ solicitors, Mishcon de Reya LLP (“ MdR ”), wrote to Edelweiss’s solicitors, Wallace LLP, on 11 July 2025. In their letter MdR referred to the discovery of the Arbitration which had been filed in the International Commercial Arbitration Court (“ ICAC ”) in Russia by Mr Ploshchenko “ making a very substantial claim with a value in excess of USD 100 million concerning the sale of Burneftegas in March 2014 ”. The letter also shows that MdR knew that X, a law firm is Moscow, was acting for Edelweiss in the Arbitration but did not identify the source of MdR’s knowledge about the Arbitration or the date when it was first acquired. The letter went on to refer to the arbitration as “ likely to be fraudulent ”, questioned whether Edelweiss or its associates may be “ parties to a fraudulent claim ”, and sought the provision of additional information and confirmations. Whether or not the Arbitration is fraudulent or collusive formed a substantial part of the hearing before me as I shall explain further below.

15. The response from Wallace on 17 July 2025 started by asking for the source and timing of MdR’s knowledge and referred back to earlier events involving the CT Group (which Richard Smith J referred to at [10]-[14] of the July judgment]). The letter went on to say that Edelweiss was “ robustly defending its position ” in the Arbitration but would not provide any further information because the Bourlakovas were not entitled to it and its provision would cause Edelweiss to be in breach of its confidentiality obligations.

16. Just under a week later, at the consequentials hearing, the Bourlakovas’ leading counsel made an oral application for the provision of documentation and information in relation to the Arbitration. Although the scope of the material sought was not the same as the application before me, there was a substantial overlap. The Judge dealt with that application in [40]-[41] of his consequentials ruling in which he recognised both that the existence of the Arbitration was a “ not insignificant concern ” and that the issues of confidentiality which had been raised by Edelweiss could not be “ lightly ignored ”. As a consequence, the Judge declined to order the disclosure sought by the Claimants but ordered Edelweiss to provide an explanation as to the nature of the Arbitration and to provide copies of pre-arbitration correspondence (as recorded in paragraph (5) of Schedule 1 to the Order dated 29 July 2025).

17. In his submissions on this application, Mr Dunning KC relied on the fact that the information about the existence of the Arbitration did not cause the Bourlakovas to ask the Judge to revisit his conclusion about the absence of a risk of dissipation by Edelweiss. I consider this further below. (ii) Events since the consequentials hearing

18. Edelweiss provided its explanation of the Arbitration on 7 August 2025. In it, Edelweiss set out the commencement date of the Arbitration, the amount being claimed, the nature of the claim (under a services agreement relating to the sale of Burneftegaz), and some of the grounds on which it was defending the claim – [ sentence redacted ]. Edelweiss also confirmed that there were no written intimations of the claim prior to the commencement of the Arbitration and repeated its request for an explanation as to how MdR and the Bourlakovas had come to be aware of the Arbitration.

19. MdR complained on 26 August 2025 that the explanation was inadequate and sought additional information. In the Bourlakovas’ original evidence for this application it was asserted that Edelweiss had only “ purported ” to comply with its undertaking (Pigott 10 at ¶23) but, in their evidence in reply, the Bourlakovas accepted that Edelweiss had complied but complained that the explanation was based on a narrow interpretation of the Order (Pigott 13 at ¶9).

20. Wallace replied on 9 September 2025 in a letter on which Edelweiss placed emphasis at the hearing because it provided additional detail in relation to the issues in dispute in the Arbitration, the grounds on which Edelweiss was defending the claim, and the nature of the agreement relied on by Mr Ploshchenko.

21. The 9 September letter also repeated the request for an explanation as to how the Bourlakovas and MdR had come to know of the Arbitration and asserted that it was, in fact, Edelweiss which was concerned that it was the Bourlakovas who were “ somehow involved in orchestrating the bogus claim of Mr Ploshchenko in order improperly to extract value from Edelweiss having failed in their lawfare attempts before the Panamanian Courts to seize control of Edelweiss and its assets. ”. This was said to be an “ inexorable conclusion ” which led to the inference that the Bourlakovas and/or MdR had, by omission, deliberately misled the English Court at the consequentials hearing. Although this allegation did not form part of Edelweiss’s submissions before me, it is the most vivid illustration of the extreme levels of distrust which permeate this case.

22. The correspondence continued until 30 September 2025 with MdR continuing to seek additional information and documentation, and Wallace continuing to seek the source of the Bourlakovas’ knowledge of the Arbitration. Of relevance to this application, on 19 September 2025, Wallace said that the hearing of the Arbitration had been listed for 19 November 2025 and confirmed that Edelweiss would (i) notify MdR of any award against Edelweiss in the Arbitration and its amount as soon as reasonably practicable; (ii) not pay out any sums in satisfaction of that award without giving 28 days’ notice to MdR; and (iii) notify MdR as soon as reasonably practicable after becoming aware of any court process seeking to recognise or enforce that award. Edelweiss said in the letter that there was no basis for these confirmations to be given by undertaking.

23. The application was issued on 20 October 2025. It has generated extensive evidence from the parties in the form of (a) on the Bourlakovas’ side, two witness statements from Ms Pigott at MdR (Pigott 10 and Pigott 13) and two expert reports on Russian law from Mr Gerbutov and (b) on Edelweiss’s side, a witness statement from Mr Weinberg at Wallace (Weinberg 9) and an expert report on Russian law from Mr Holiner. At the hearing Edelweiss withdrew its objections to the admission of the expert evidence and I permitted each party to rely on the expert evidence they had served. The bundles for the hearing also included copious amounts of evidence which had previously been served for different applications in the proceedings but I was only taken to a fraction if it. (iii) The detail of the Arbitration

24. As a result of the correspondence described above, the following can be said about the Arbitration: [ Sub-paragraphs redacted ]

25. [ Paragraph redacted ]

26. Although Edelweiss declined in Wallace’s letter of 9 September 2025 (referred to in paragraph 20 above) to say expressly that the Arbitration was a fraud, later in the same letter they did say that it was “ bogus ” as part of their assertion that Edelweiss was concerned that the Bourlakovas were orchestrating the Arbitration. Edelweiss’s Counsel repeated this description in their skeleton argument for the hearing but without the allegation against the Bourlakovas. I therefore understood it to be common ground that the Arbitration is not just a claim which is bad in law (for example on limitation grounds) but is an apparently dishonest attempt by Mr Ploshchenko to obtain an award against Edelweiss which has no proper basis. Even if Edelweiss had not adopted this position, I would have concluded that the Bourlakovas has established a strongly arguable case to this effect for the purposes of the application.

27. There was a substantial dispute between the parties as to whether the Bourlakovas have established in addition that the Arbitration is or might also be collusive (and I return to this below) but in the light of the apparent agreement that it is, at the very least, “ bogus ”, it might have been expected that the parties to this application (and indeed to the proceedings more generally) would want the Arbitration to fail and so would cooperate to achieve that. After all, if it succeeds, it would result in Edelweiss’s assets being diminished by over $100 million to the detriment of both Edelweiss itself and whoever may ultimately benefit from those assets, whether Hemaren (which claims to be the owner of Edelweiss), the Bourlakovas (as the Fourth Claimant claims to be the owner of Edelweiss), or Mr Kazakov (who is, in effect, the sole discretionary beneficiary of Hemaren).

28. However, as I have referred to above, this case has seen a series of remarkable events the result of which is a total breakdown of trust and cooperation such that it falls to the Court to determine whether the circumstances justify the relief sought by the Bourlakovas. III The law

29. I was referred in the skeleton arguments to a wide range of authorities about the ability of the Court to order ancillary relief in the context of a freezing order. However, the submissions at the hearing focussed on a smaller subset of these authorities which explain the purpose of ancillary orders, the test which the Court should apply, and the limits on the jurisdiction.

30. It was common ground that the purpose of a freezing order is to preserve assets to enable and facilitate the enforcement of a prospective money judgment (see Lord Leggatt in Broad Idea Ltd v Convoy Collateral Ltd [2021] UKPC 24 ) and that the Court can make orders ancillary to a freezing injunction, including the disclosure of documents and information, “ to ensure that the freezing order is effective ”: Mr Justice Zacaroli (as he then was) in HMRC v Malde [2020] EWHC 100 at [26].

31. In the same judgment, Zacaroli J considered a number of the authorities which I was shown. In [27]-[32] he: 31.1. Drew together various earlier authorities which had referred to an ancillary order as being essentially “ protective: its purpose is to ensure that the assets are not disposed of in (disguised) breach of the freezing order ” (Christoper Clarke J in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2011] EWHC 2664 at [47]) or for the purpose of “ policing ” the injunction (Joanna Smith QC, as she then was, in PJSC Commercial Bank Privatbank v Kolomoisky [2018] EWHC 482 at [33]); 31.2. Set out a non-exhaustive list of reasons why an order may be justified (at [28]); 31.3. Explained at [30] that, in his view, there was no material difference between the various formulations which had been used in earlier authorities to describe the test for such orders, such as “ practical utility in requiring such evidence and that it is necessary to enable the freezing order properly to be policed ” (Hildyard J in Mezhprom Bank v Pugachev [2016] 1 WLR 781 at [39]) or “ just and convenient” to ensure that the injunction is effective (Christopher Clarke J in Ablyazov at [47]). 31.4. Concluded that, where the order is sought subsequent to the making of the original order, on the grounds that there was a concern that the defendant was committing breaches of it, there must be “ grounds to believe that there is a real risk that the injunction may be being broken ” (at [32]).

32. The decision of Trower J in PJSC Commercial Bank Privatbank v Kolomoisky [2022] EWHC 1445 (Ch) provides an illustration of the width of the relief which can be granted. In that case, the Court referred to being able to make whatever ancillary orders are necessary to make the freezing order effective (at [39]) and, applying this test, made orders which required a party subject to a freezing order to take positive steps in relation to an particular asset where there was “ a real risk that, if further steps were not taken, the proper and appropriate preservation of that asset for the purposes of any future enforcement may be jeopardised ” (at [65]).

33. In a subsequent case between the same parties reported at [2025] BCC 393 , Trower J summarised the question for the Court at [10]: “whether the grant of relief sought is just and equitable for the purpose of safeguarding the assets which are the subject of the freezing order. Is it an ancillary order which is just and convenient to make in order to render the freezing order itself effective”.

34. As regards the disclosure of documents, in the earlier instalment of the Privatbank litigation reported at [2018] EWHC 482, Joanna Smith QC said: 34.1. At [33(5)]: “The corollary of the previous paragraph is that a disclosure order should not be made if it extends beyond information that is necessary for the purposes of policing the injunction. In particular, it should not be made for the purposes of enabling a claimant to investigate the issues in the substantive claim.” 34.2. And at [52]: “I accept Mr Akkouh’s submissions that the court has jurisdiction to make an order for asset disclosure, which might include disclosure of documents, where such an order is required to enable a claimant, first, to identify the nature and extent of a defendant’s interest in assets, and, second, to decide whether and, if so, what further steps it should take to protect its position, such steps being an important aspect of its ability to police the freezing order.”

35. The limitations on ancillary relief found expression in the decision of Hildyard J in Pugachev where the Judge said at [39]: “As it seems to me, the court must be persuaded that there is practical utility in requiring such evidence and that it is necessary to enable the freezing order properly to be policed. It will be vigilant to prevent the abuse of seeking further evidence for some other purpose: such as to expose further inconsistencies, unduly pressurise a defendant who has already been cross-examined, yield ammunition for an application for contempt, or provide further material which might be of assistance, even if not actually deployed, in the main (foreign) proceedings.”

36. I was also referred to various authorities which deal with the relevance of arbitration confidentiality and the approach of the English court to it. I will consider these below. IV The argument

37. The Bourlakovas said that they come within the legal principles identified above because: 37.1. The purpose of the application was to protect the value of Edelweiss’s assets which were subject to the undertaking. The existence of the Arbitration and the prospect of a substantial award being granted places those assets at risk, particularly as it was common ground between the parties that any such award could not be paid in the ordinary course of Edelweiss’s business (and so was not within the exception in the Undertaking). The risk was enhanced because the Arbitration may be collusive and because of historic events involving Edelweiss, namely attempts made in about 2018 to extract its assets through the use of agreements which were said to be forgeries. 37.2. The documentation which was sought would enable the Bourlakovas to consider and, if necessary, to take further steps which better preserved the assets of Edelweiss. This was particularly the case where, once an award has been issued in an arbitration, there is a substantial policy in favour of enforcement where the New York Convention applies. As such, there was practical utility to the proposed order. 37.3. In so far as the documentation was subject to arbitration confidentiality, that was not a bar to disclosure in the circumstances of this case.

38. Ultimately, the Bourlakovas summarised their position as involving a real risk that they would be caught in “the perfect storm” by which the assets of Edelweiss could be removed by means of a private, foreign process in which they were not currently involved but which could result in an award which would benefit from the enforcement processes under the New York Convention which make it extremely difficult to resist enforcement.

39. Edelweiss disputed this analysis at every stage. I will therefore identify the parameters of the argument in the remainder of this section before turning to my conclusions. Risk to the assets

40. The Bourlakovas started from the proposition that the assets of Edelweiss (which were the subject of the Undertaking) were self-evidently at risk because of the “ bogus ” or fraudulent nature of the Arbitration which I have referred to above. But more than that, they said that the circumstances suggested a real risk that the Arbitration was collusive. They referred in particular to the following features: 40.1. The timing of the Arbitration. It was issued without warning or pre-action correspondence shortly before the hearing of the injunction application by Richard Smith J in March 2025 and served shortly after that hearing had ended so that it did not feature in the argument about whether Edelweiss should be subject to a freezing order. 40.2. The absence of any reference to the Arbitration from Edelweiss in the period between service on 20 March 2025 and MdR’s letter of 11 July 2025 during which time the Judge was considering his judgment. The Bourlakovas characterised the fact that Edelweiss was under a potential liability exceeding $100 million as a matter which it was “critical” for the Judge to be told, and described the Arbitration as having been concealed by Edelweiss. 40.3. The fact that Mr Kazakov – the sole discretionary beneficiary of Hemaren whose interest as such would appear to be prejudiced by the loss of $100 million from Edelweiss - appeared to have no knowledge of the Arbitration and had shown no apparent curiosity about it. His solicitors stated in a letter dated 2 October 2025 that knew no more about the Arbitration than he had been told in these proceedings. 40.4. No requests had been made of the Bourlakovas either for documents or for their assistance with responding to the claim in the Arbitration despite the fact that they had access to documents from the Family Office as well as documents obtained pursuant to court orders in Cyprus. 40.5. [ Sub-paragraph redacted ] 40.6. Edelweiss’s use of witness evidence in the Arbitration from the same firm which was also representing it. The Bourlakovas had a particular concern about the evidence of the likely witness given evidence he had previously given. 40.7. Edelweiss’s provision since 11 July 2025 of limited information and no documentation.

41. As might be expected, Edelweiss’s position was the polar opposite. It said that the correct starting point was that the Judge had held that there was no risk of dissipation in relation to Edelweiss’s assets in July 2025, and that had not changed. Indeed, when the Judge had finalised his order accepting undertakings in lieu of a proprietary injunction, he had known about the existence of the Arbitration and had not been asked by the Bourlakovas to revisit his conclusion on risk of dissipation. Moreover, despite knowing of the Arbitration (and of the earlier history of Edelweiss’s alleged involvement in the use of forged documents in 2018/19 to remove its assets), the Judge had refused the disclosure sought by the Bourlakovas and had made a much narrower order (referred to in paragraph 16 above) which it was accepted Edelweiss had complied with. Since then (a) Edelweiss had provided further information and confirmations which provide the Bourlakovas with sufficient comfort and protection, and (b) the Bourlakovas had appealed the finding in relation to the risk of dissipation but had not sought to adduce fresh evidence in relation to the Arbitration.

42. As regards the issue of collusion, Edelweiss pointed out that, even at its highest, the Bourlakovas’ evidence did not depose to a belief that collusion is taking place. It referred simply to the “ possibility of collusion ” (Pigott 13 at ¶26) which Mr Dunning KC described as merely conjecture and speculation without any substantial basis. As regards the points relied on by the Bourlakovas, Edelweiss submitted that: 42.1. The Arbitration had not been concealed by Edelweiss. It was not known about until 20 March 2025, and the fact that nothing was said about it after that was not evidence of collusion but reflected that it is a confidential process. 42.2. Edelweiss could not be faulted for its approach to the provision of information in relation to the Arbitration. It had provided sufficient information and was entitled to take the stand it had on confidentiality. Indeed, it was caught between the risk of a penalty for breach of arbitration confidentiality and being accused of collusion. 42.3. Edelweiss could not be criticised for not approaching the Bourlakovas. The episode with the CT Group including emails being hacked and conversations recorded, as well an attempt by one of the Claimants’ lawyers in Panama to place a fake judgment on the court file, meant that Edelweiss had, for good reasons, a distrust of the Bourlakovas which could not be underestimated. This had been compounded by the failure of the Bourlakovas to explain clearly how and when they had come to know of the Arbitration, the explanation in Pigott 10, ¶26 being inadequate. In that evidence, the following explanation was given: “To the best of the Bourlakovas’ belief, the information relating to the Arbitration was volunteered by a source whose identity is not known to the Bourlakovas. The fact of the Arbitration was not discovered as a result of any request for information by the Bourlakovas or anyone on their behalf. The Bourlakovas do not know the identity of the source, who has communicated though third partes (who are not inquiry agents). 42.4. Leaving aside the distrust, the Bourlakovas could have provided documents and other assistance without first being asked. 42.5. The absence of pre-action correspondence was not evidence of collusion. It was routine in international arbitration. 42.6. The use of X in the Arbitration when they had been involved in the earlier transaction relating to Burneftegaz was entirely explicable given that they would have useful underlying knowledge of the transaction. 42.7. The Court should not criticise, draw any inference from, or second guess the way in which the defence of the Arbitration was being conducted. Edelweiss’s strategic approach to the Arbitration, including which witnesses had been approached, was privileged and it would be wrong to draw an inference where Edelweiss was relying on its privilege, as it was entitled to do. It had said it was defending the Arbitration robustly and that is what it is doing.

43. Edelweiss also submitted that the relief sought by the Bourlakovas was not ancillary to the Undertaking or for the purpose of policing it where the action to which the relief was directed – the potential loss of an asset through the enforcement by a Court of an arbitral award – would not itself amount to a dissipation of the relevant asset. As the enforcement of an arbitral award would be a court-ordered process rather than a voluntary act by Edelweiss, there would be no dissipation of its assets by Edelweiss and so the Undertaking would not be engaged or broken. In these circumstances, the Undertaking was not being “policed” by the relief sought and there were no grounds to believe that the Undertaking was being breached (which was described as a key requirement identified in the authorities).

44. I do not accept this latter submission. The purpose of a freezing order or proprietary injunction (and so also an undertaking in lieu of an order) is to protect the identified assets either for the purposes of enforcement or so that the claimant is able in due course to vindicate its proprietary claim. The principal method by which that purpose is achieved is, in broad terms, by ordering the party who has the assets not to dispose of or deal with them. Obviously, such an order does not prevent a third party from saying that it has a better or prior claim to the assets or wishes to enforce its own claim against them, and I agree that an injunctive order does not, of itself, provide security or give priority. Equally, it may well be the case that a freezing order would not be breached where enforcement against the frozen assets takes the form of a court process which is involuntary from the perspective of the party who is subject to the order. That party will not have taken any positive steps to deal with its assets.

45. However, the fact that a particular loss of assets would not be a breach of an order or undertaking does not mean that an order to provide information or documentation in relation to the basis for that loss of assets is not for the purpose of policing the freezing order. As I have referred to above, the underlying purpose is the protection of assets, and if some event is happening which could result in a loss of the assets which are otherwise covered by the order/undertaking, then the provision of information about that event would, in my view, be for the purpose of policing the order/undertaking. In other words, there is no requirement for a real risk that the injunction is being broken. A real risk that assets within the order/undertaking may be lost would be sufficient and the key question is whether it is just and convenient in the circumstances to order that the information relevant to that risk be provided. Practical utility

46. There was also a substantial dispute between the parties about whether the provision of the documentation sought would have any practical utility as described in the authorities. In their evidence, the Bourlakovas had identified four steps which they said they might be able to take once they had considered the documentation sought. This list had changed and expanded to seven steps in their skeleton argument. Mr Dunning KC took issue with each of them.

47. As regards the seven steps relied on by the time of the hearing, the nature of each step and Edelweiss’s response was as follows: 47.1. Take steps in the Arbitration either unilaterally or by seeking to assist Edelweiss. The Bourlakovas relied on the provisions of the ICAC Rules which allowed the arbitrators to seek additional documentation and evidence (ICAC Rules, ¶29(1)). Edelweiss said that the Bourlakovas could not, on the expert Russian law evidence, become parties to the Arbitration but, in any event, if they had wished to take steps to provide evidence or documentation to the arbitrators they had been free to do so since July 2025. The fact that they had not suggested that their protestations were, Mr Dunning KC said, “ just a bit of hot air ”. 47.2. Challenge any award in the Arbitration in the Russian courts. Edelweiss said this was a new step identified for the first time in the skeleton argument and about which there was no expert evidence. In any event, the Bourlakovas did not need any further information beyond what they already knew to take this step. 47.3. Intervene in and/or help Edelweiss to resist any attempt to enforce any award in the Arbitration in the Bahamas and/or Switzerland. Edelweiss said that the Bourlakovas did not need the orders sought for this purpose as Edelweiss had confirmed that it would provide notice of any award and a copy of any enforcement process. The Bourlakovas were free to seek to intervene if it was necessary and their case on standing to do so would not be improved by having sight of the arbitration documents. 47.4. Join Mr Ploshchenko into the current proceedings and seek interim orders against him. Edelweiss said this was a step which the Bourlakovas could take now and for which they did not need disclosure. Further and in any event, it was not a proper purpose of ancillary orders to launch a fishing expedition for the purpose of obtaining material to join new parties to the substantive proceedings (or to bring new claims against existing parties). 47.5. Seek further relief from Mr Kazakov and/or Mr Anufriev or other existing defendants to these proceedings. Edelweiss said it was difficult to see how this could be achieved given that the previous injunction application against these individuals had been withdrawn following the revelations about the CT Group and it was inherently unlikely that the materials sought would provide any basis for relief against them. This step was described as a makeweight. 47.6. Apply for orders prohibiting Edelweiss from satisfying any award or claim by Mr Ploshchenko pending the resolution of these proceedings. Edelweiss made the point that it was already bound by the Undertaking and had confirmed that it would not satisfy any award voluntarily. 47.7. Seek the Court’s permission to enforce these injunctions in the Bahamas and/or Switzerland and/or Panama, in whole or in part, and/or initiate proceedings in those jurisdictions. Edelweiss said that this was a new step identified for the first time in the skeleton argument but that there was an extensive history of litigation in these jurisdictions and there was no reason why the Bourlakovas could not take steps there now if they wished. Confidentiality

48. The third substantial aspect of the dispute between the parties related to the existence and extent of any arbitration confidentiality which applied to the documents sought. As referred to above, I permitted the parties each to rely on expert evidence on Russian law going to this point. The experts were Mr Gerbutov for the Bourlakovas and Mr Holiner for Edelweiss. There were substantial disputes between the experts which it is not possible for me to resolve on an application such as the present.

49. Edelweiss said that I could nonetheless conclude from the evidence that the ICAC rules (which govern the Arbitration) impose a duty of confidentiality on the parties (ICAC Rules, ¶46); that this duty would be breached by Edelweiss if it disclosed the documents sought by the Bourlakovas; that there was at least a risk of prejudice to Edelweiss or a risk that a penalty would be imposed on it if it made disclosure; and the existence of an interim order of the English Court requiring disclosure would not provide Edelweiss with a defence to its breach of confidentiality. It was accepted that these conclusions would not form a knockout blow to the application but were a powerful factor which I should take into account. They would, Edelweiss said, heighten the focus on the questions of necessity and practical utility given that I should not cause Edelweiss to be in breach of its obligations save to the extent truly necessary.

50. For their part, the Bourlakovas emphasised different aspects of the expert evidence. In addition to referring to Mr Gerbutov’s view as to the effect of the ICAC Rules, they said in particular that: 50.1. It was common ground between the experts that Edelweiss could have provided the Bourlakovas with information and documentation in relation to the Arbitration where the purpose was for them to assist with Edelweiss’s defence (for example, Gerbutov 1 at ¶50-51 and Holiner at ¶40). 50.2. Both experts identified circumstances in which confidentiality would not be upheld. Mr Holiner referred to three types of abuse of rights which could have this result (in ¶52). 50.3. On Mr Holiner’s evidence, there was no reference to the possibility of an interim injunction (Mr Gerbutov having said that no such interim remedy was available) and the risk of a penalty being applied to Edelweiss pending specific performance of its obligations was limited because the purpose of the penalty was to ensure that Edelweiss did not benefit from its unlawful or bad faith conduct (Holiner at ¶62). However, in this case Edelweiss would not benefit from disclosure and would be complying with an order of the English Court.

51. I was also referred to authorities in this jurisdiction relating to the approach the Court should take to issues of confidentiality arising in a different jurisdiction. The position where disclosure of documents might give rise to a risk of liability or other sanction was considered in The Public Institution for Social Security v Al Wazzan [2023] EWHC 1065 (Comm) at [43]-[53] where the risk related to a breach of Swiss criminal law and in Various Claimants v Standard Chartered Plc [2025] EWHC 2136 (Comm) at [18]-[41] where the risk related in part to potential enforcement penalties for breach of obligations owed to regulatory authorities. The central issue was the actual risk of prosecution rather than simply whether there would be a breach of the foreign law, and if a respondent cannot show a real risk of criminal prosecution then reliance on “ some lesser form of regulatory action or even paying due deference on the grounds of comity to the public policy grounds for preserving confidentiality ” is not likely to suffice to prevent disclosure ( Standard Chartered at [41]). These were not cases involving ancillary disclosure orders in support of a freezing order or injunction but they do illustrate the way that the balance falls in favour of disclosure even where potential criminal liability is engaged. Other factors to weigh in the balance

52. In deciding whether or not the orders sought were necessary, Edelweiss said that I should also take into account the fact that the Bourlakovas had not been open and frank with the Court as to the source and timing of their knowledge of the Arbitration. Although Mr Kitchener KC had described the discovery of the Arbitration as having been made “ adventitiously ”, there was not sufficient evidence as to how it had come about in the passage from Pigott 10 which I have set out in paragraph 42.3 above. Given that the Claimants had previously been (to put it neutrally) caught up in illegal evidence gathering, the need for candour in this application was enhanced. I was also referred by Edelweiss to the attempts by the Bourlakovas to take control of Edelweiss in 2022, which had, they said, been consistently rejected by the Courts in Panama (and which were the subject of detailed consideration by the Judge on the summary judgment/strike-out application).

53. The Bourlakovas referred, in response, to the fact that the Judge had known of these matters when he made his rulings about there being a case for a proprietary injunction against Edelweiss and when requiring information to be provided about the Arbitration. I was also referred to the Bourlakovas’ evidence that they were not a party to the illegality by CT Group but were also victims of it in that they too had been duped. V Discussion

54. Both parties referred to this as a highly unusual case. I would agree. The events giving rise to the claims are replete with allegations of forgery, fabrication and dishonesty. There have then been multiple sets of proceedings in numerous jurisdictions which have themselves seen extraordinary events, including the episodes relating to the CT Group and the Panamanian court file. This background explains the almost total absence of trust between the parties. It is important however, to focus on the current position in relation to the assets of Edelweiss and the Arbitration in order to assess whether the orders sought are “ necessary ” or “ just and convenient ” as those terms have been described in the authorities referred to above.

55. While it is correct that, in July 2025, Richard Smith J held that there was no risk of dissipation in relation to Edelweiss’s assets and declined to order similar disclosure to that now sought by the Bourlakovas, he did conclude that Edelweiss’s assets should be protected and his approach to disclosure about the Arbitration was in the context of relatively limited information about it. The position is different and more advanced now. It is now common ground that the Arbitration is at least “ bogus ”. Objectively judged, there is therefore a substantial threat to a material portion of Edelweiss’s assets – more than $100 million or some 10% of those assets – which the Judge intended should be protected and which are subject to the Undertaking.

56. The battleground between the parties concerns the appropriate response to this threat. The Bourlakovas say that the Court should respond to it by providing them with access to the underlying Arbitration documents. Edelweiss says that, as the owner of the threatened assets and defendant to the Arbitration, it is for it to determine how to respond to the Arbitration and it is defending its position robustly.

57. Having considered the arguments made by the parties, I have concluded that (subject to the points made in section VI below) it is just and convenient to make the orders sought by the Bourlakovas. I am satisfied that those orders are necessary for the purpose of ensuring that the assets of Edelweiss which are the subject of the Undertaking are protected and therefore that the Undertaking is effective. I am also satisfied that the orders will have practical utility as they will allow the Bourlakovas to determine whether to take additional steps to protect the interests which the Judge decided in July 2025 merited protection. Further, although the Arbitration documents sought are (or are likely to be) subject to confidentiality under the ICAC Rules, that confidentiality does not provide a sufficiently countervailing factor in the circumstances of the case. I explain the reasons for this conclusion in more detail below.

58. First, the “ bogus ” nature of the Arbitration is, of itself, a compelling factor. Even if Mr Ploshchenko is acting alone, the nature of the threat to Edelweiss’s assets means that the ancillary orders are justified to ensure that those assets are protected and the Undertaking is effective. I have already explained why I do not accept that the fact that Edelweiss does not intend to satisfy any award voluntarily takes this case outside of the requirements for ancillary orders.

59. However, the features of the Arbitration which make it “ bogus ” also give rise to a question as to whether the Arbitration is part of a wider attempt to extract assets from Edelweiss. There seems to me to be a real (as opposed to fanciful) risk that such an attempt is being made given, in particular, the timing of the Arbitration (at a time when the Court here was considering injunctive relief against Edelweiss), its unusual nature (being an enormous claim made nearly 12 years after the event and with no prior warning), and Mr Kazakov’s apparent lack of interest or curiosity in it as shown by the letter from his own solicitors. I do not consider that I need to identify any particular individual or entity which is more likely than others to be involved. It is the fact that the Arbitration may well involve parties beyond Mr Ploshchenko which means that the threat to the assets of Edelweiss is heightened.

60. [ First sentence redacted ] While I accept that it is for Edelweiss to determine its approach to the Arbitration in the first instance and that I should not draw any inference from its reliance on legal privilege in relation to its approach to the Arbitration, this does not mean that the Bourlakovas should be prevented at least from considering what steps they may wish to take to protect Edelweiss’s assets in the light of the approach which Edelweiss itself has taken. This consideration requires access to the Arbitration documents.

61. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that, applying the approach of Joanna Smith QC (set out in paragraph 34.2 above), the jurisdiction of the Court to order disclosure as to the nature and extent of a defendant’s assets also includes information as to material threats to those assets, particularly where that threat is so large (in monetary terms) and so irregular (a bogus and potentially collusive arbitration).

62. Second, I am satisfied that the orders sought will have a real practical utility to the Bourlakovas and I do not accept that they are already in a position to take the steps they have identified and which I consider to be most relevant to this application.

63. Here, the most significant risk seems to me to arise from the prospect of an award being made in the Arbitration. If such an award is made, the prevailing policy in favour of enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention will mean that any party subsequently seeking to prevent enforcement – whether Edelweiss or the Bourlakovas – will be on the back foot notwithstanding the exceptions to enforcement in Articles V.1 and V.2(b) of the Convention. As such, justice in this case requires the Bourlakovas to be allowed to consider the steps they might wish to take to protect their position in the Arbitration before an award is issued. This was the first of the potential steps the Bourlakovas had identified and it is, in my view, a legitimate purpose for the ancillary order sought.

64. Further, although time is short before the hearing on 19 November 2025 and the expert evidence of Mr Holiner was that the Bourlakovas could not be joined as parties to the Arbitration without the consent of the existing parties, neither of these points would, in my view, denude the order of practicality utility. Given the nature of the threat to the assets of Edelweiss I have identified, the Bourlakovas should have the opportunity, even if it is time-limited, to take steps in the Arbitration. It appears to be open to the arbitrators under the ICAC Rules to seek additional evidence or information and there does not appear to be any reason why a third party cannot seek to engage this power of the arbitrators.

65. Further, the fact that steps may be taken in the Arbitration also explains why I do not consider that the confirmations which Edelweiss has already provided (set out in paragraph 22 above) are sufficient. While I recognise that Edelweiss was seeking to assist the Bourlakovas in providing these confirmations, they will all post-date the making of an award in the Arbitration by which time it may be too late for enforcement to be resisted or, at least, such resistance may be more difficult. Indeed, the ability to make points in opposition to enforcement may depend on whether and to what extent such points were taken in the Arbitration.

66. As regards the submission from Edelweiss that the Bourlakovas could already take steps in the Arbitration given what they already know about it, I do not accept that this provides an answer. If the Bourlakovas took steps now, they would be acting blind and could potentially do something which would harm rather than assist Edelweiss in the Arbitration. It is not realistic to expect them to take this approach.

67. I should say that it was less obvious to me that disclosure was necessary for each of the other steps which the Bourlakovas identified when those steps were looked at in isolation, but I accept that the steps in relation to resisting enforcement would be better informed by production of the Arbitration documents now. I also consider that the potential steps should also be considered as a package rather than only looked at in isolation and disclosure now is necessary for the Bourlakovas to have a choice from the full package. I also consider that the other steps would be legitimate uses for the documentation and information to be disclosed provided that the potential use in the existing proceedings - such as joining Mr Ploshchenko or seeking additional relief from other existing Defendants – is limited to measures to protect the assets of Edelweiss rather than, say, advancing a new substantive case.

68. Third, I am not satisfied that confidentiality of the Arbitration documents provides a reason not to make the order which is otherwise justified. Given my conclusions as to the nature of the Arbitration and the value of the threat to Edelweiss’s assets, those factors comfortably outweigh the confidentiality which is provided for by the ICAC Rules, ¶46.

69. As to this: 69.1. Although I cannot at this stage resolve the disputes between the experts, I have proceeded on the basis of Mr Holiner’s explanation of the nature of the confidentiality (in his sections responding to Questions 1 and 2). That explanation seemed to me to represent a more orthodox approach to the impact of arbitral rules although I recognise that Mr Gerbutov has expressed a different view. On this basis, the documents which the Bourlakovas are seeking are subject to confidentiality from the incorporation of the ICAC Rules into the alleged relationship between Edelweiss and Mr Ploshchencko. 69.2. However, the confidentiality imposed by the ICAC Rules is not absolute. A party can use confidential materials for the purpose of advancing its case. Further, the exercise of civil rights is, even on Mr Holiner’s evidence, subject to exceptions for the abuse of rights (Holiner, ¶51-52). 69.3. A breach of the confidentiality imposed by the ICAC Rules would not, without more, be a criminal offence (Holiner, ¶61). There is therefore no prospect of criminal prosecution for disclosure. The English authorities on disclosure which I was shown identify the absence of a real risk of such prosecution as a potentially decisive factor, at least where disclosure (in its CPR Part 31 sense) is concerned. 69.4. The risk which Mr Holiner identifies is that Edelweiss may be subject to a penalty (Holiner at ¶62). However, the risk that such a penalty would be imposed is unclear (as it would be part of an action by Mr Ploshchenko for specific performance) and, in any event, the nature of the penalty – “ to ensure that the defendant does not benefit from its unlawful or bad faith conduct” (Holiner at ¶62) – does not suggest a material risk in this case given that Edelweiss would not benefit and would be complying with a Court order which it resisted. Edelweiss also has the benefit of a cross-undertaking from the Bourlakovas to compensate it for any loss caused by complying with the order. 69.5. The other risk canvassed at the hearing was that the disclosure could result in negative consequences for Edelweiss in the Arbitration due to the breach of the ICAC Rules. It seems to me that, insofar as there is such a risk (and it is hard to assess given the relatively limited information about the arbitrators and the progress of the Arbitration), it does not carry much weight, particularly when balanced against the risk to Edelweiss’s assets. Moreover, it may be that the Bourlakovas are satisfied by the approach which has been taken when they see the Arbitration documents. 69.6. The draft order prepared by the Bourlakovas includes an undertaking to keep the information confidential and only to use it for limited purposes. This should provide additional comfort that the intrusion in the ICAC confidentiality regime is limited. 69.7. The Bourlakovas also relied on the fact that disclosure is sought in this case by parties claiming to be the 100% owners of Edelweiss and so the effect of any breach of confidentiality would be limited where the disclosure is from company to owner. I do not however, attribute any material weight to this point given the substantial dispute as to the claims by the Bourlakovas.

70. Fourth, I do not consider that the other factors identified by Edelweiss – the lack of a full explanation of the source and timing of the Bourlakovas knowledge of the Arbitration and the previous attempts at interfering in the affairs of Edelweiss in 2022 – undermine or outweigh the reasons for making the order I have set out above.

71. The steps which the Bourlakovas might take in or in relation to the Arbitration do not have the same quality as the events which were the subject of the Panamanian judgments (which I understand concerned the use of a bearer share certificate to hold meetings and pass resolutions going directly to the control of Edelweiss). Edelweiss will remain the party to the Arbitration able to take its own decisions as to how to proceed. Likewise, I do not consider that there is a sufficient parallel between the events concerning the CT Group (and they were inevitably explained to me only at a very high level) and the explanation given for the source of the Bourlakovas’ knowledge of the Arbitration for me to conclude that the limited nature of that explanation provides a factor of any real weight against the ordering of disclosure. VI The Order

72. There were also some relatively minor issues covered in evidence about the form of the order proposed by the Bourlakovas. I will set out my views on these and other issues relating to the draft order below in order to assist the parties with the drafting of the order which follows from this judgment: 72.1. In the undertaking from the Bourlakovas in relation to the use of the information to be disclosed, I consider that item (b), which concerns the use of the information in the present proceedings, should be limited to “ taking further steps in the present proceedings for the preservation or protection of the assets of Edelweiss ”. In so far as the information might be relevant to other steps in the proceedings, they will have to seek the permission of the Court before taking those. 72.2. Paragraph 1 should reflect the permission given to each side to rely on expert evidence. 72.3. Paragraph 2 sets out the documents which should be provided. I am satisfied that each of the three categories should be provided. 72.4. Paragraph 3 provides for the provision in future of any documents falling in the three categories identified in paragraph 2. I am satisfied that this paragraph should be included to ensure that the disclosure is complete. 72.5. Paragraphs 4 relates to notification and provision of a copy of any award. There was a difference as to the timing between the proposed order and the confirmation provided by Edelweiss – “forthwith” or “as soon as reasonably practicable” – and a dispute as to whether copy of the award itself should be provided. I will order Edelweiss’s formulation of the timing to allow for the award to be notified from Russia to England and then on to the Bourlakovas. Given the terms of my ruling above, a copy of the Award should be provided. 72.6. Paragraph 5 relates to Edelweiss not paying out any sum in satisfaction of the award without giving 28 days’ notice to the Bourlakovas. Edelweiss has already confirmed that it will do this, but I consider that it should be included in the order so that the order is comprehensive in relation to the Arbitration. 72.7. Paragraph 6 relates to notification and provision of any court process seeking enforcement. It contains the same difference as to timing referred to in paragraph 72.5 above and also a dispute as to the width of the order for provision of documents. I agree with Edelweiss as to the timing issue and that the formulation “ all documents relevant to that Enforcement Process ” is too wide. The order should be for the provision of copies of all documents which comprise the Enforcement Process. The addition of “ relevant ” documents imposes an obligation to search for such documents which is not justified at this stage given that the Arbitration documents will already have been provided. 72.8. Paragraph 7 relates to the transcript or recording of any hearing in the Arbitration. Mr Dunning KC accepted that this paragraph rose or fell with the earlier paragraphs and I consider that it should be included.