UK case law
Margaret Ann Jones v Neil Stanley Jameson
[2026] UKFTT PC 297 · Land Registration Division (Property Chamber) · 2026
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Full judgment
Case referred to: JA Pye (Oxford) Limited v Graham [2003] 1AC 419 Introduction
1. On the 3 September 2021 the Applicant applied in Form FR1 to the Land Registry to register her title to the property described above. Her title was based on the acts of adverse possession detailed at panel 5 of her form ST1 dated the 26 August 2021.
2. On the 21 December 2022 the Respondent objected to the application. He questioned the sufficiency of the acts of possession relied on by the Applicant.
3. The Applicant and her husband, Michael David Jones, are together the registered freehold proprietors of Holmlea, 38 Chapel St, Amlwch. The property comprises mostly some open land immediately to the east of Holmlea. The property is identified by blue colouring on the plan accompanying the Land Registry's case summary to the Tribunal. I will refer to it as the blue land.
4. The Respondent is the registered freehold proprietor of Carmel Chapel and has been since he bought it in January 2018. The Chapel adjoins the blue land. The Chapel is in the course of being converted by the Respondent into residential units. The Respondent is concerned that if the application is successful, it will amongst other things, impede his access to the land at the rear of the Chapel.
5. The parties were unable to reconcile their differences and on the 29th of August 2023 the Land Registry referred the dispute to the Tribunal. On the 13 October 2025 I conducted a site visit and on 14 October and 9 December the case was heard by me in Caernarfon. The Applicant was represented by Mr Barrow of counsel and the Respondent by Mr. Jones of counsel.
6. The Tribunal has to consider the matter as at the 3 September 2021, being the date of the Applicants application to the Land Registry. Conveyancing history
7. Holmlea was bought by the Applicant’s father and the Applicant’s uncle in March 1950. The Applicant was born on the 19 October 1952 and her mother suffered a stroke shortly after the birth. The result was that the Applicant was brought up by her grandmother at 39 Llanellea Road. She did not live at Holmlea.
8. In or about 1954 the Applicant's parents both moved out of Holmlea. The Applicants uncle, Thomas Richards Roberts, remained at Holmlea. When her father died he left his share in Holmlea to his brother (the Applicant’s uncle). In about 1994 the uncle moved into a care home leaving Holmlea unoccupied
9. TR Roberts died in November 2005. He left a half share in Holmlea to the Applicant and the other half to a Mr Elias Jones. The fees for the care of TR Roberts had mounted up and it was decided to sell Holmlea at auction to generate the funds needed to pay the account.
10. A firm called Mawn Properties were instructed in the auction. The Applicant and her husband bid for it and were successful although, no doubt, they only had to pay half of the price, given she already held a half share
11. The transfer to the Applicant and her husband was made on the 28 September 2007. This emerges from the official copy of the register of title number CYM369866 (page D33 of the trial bundle).
12. The Respondent bought the Chapel at auction and was registered as freehold proprietor under title number CYM286621 on 9 January 2018. The register of title refers to a right of way for the benefit of the Chapel over some land to the north. The right is not included in the registration: the register states that it is simply claimed through long use. It is to be noticed that part of the land so claimed forms part of the blue land.
13. The foregoing is taken from the unchallenged oral evidence of the Applicant and her witness statement made on the 13th of May 2024 and from the official copies in the trial bundle. Issues for decision
14. The case raises the question whether the Applicant has shown sufficient acts of adverse possession and an intention to possess by her or by those acting on her behalf over a sufficient interval of time to mean that she is entitled to be registered as proprietor of the blue land.
15. Given the title to the blue land is unregistered the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 are applicable. Case for the Applicant
16. At the hearing Mr Barrow said that he relied predominantly on possession by the Applicant from 2007 onwards. He called the Applicant and her husband to give evidence at the hearing. I will deal with the detail of this when making the findings of fact. The Applicant was doing her best to be a truthful witness but she was perhaps a little overawed by the formality of the Tribunal. This made her hesitant in her recollection of some of the history. Her husband was more confident with his evidence and, save where stated, I accept the truth of what he said. Case for the Respondent
17. The Respondent does not dispute the Applicant’s title to those parts of the blue land on which the frontage and porch of Holmlea have been constructed. He does challenge the Applicant’s title to the remainder of the blue land. He does this by reference to photographic evidence of the blue land prior to 2018. From 2018 onwards he relies on his observations and knowledge of the blue land and those of his partner, Natalie McKibbin.
18. The Respondent accepts that the open parts of the blue land have been used for access but says that the other acts of possession are not proven. The Respondent says that the use of the blue land for access is not enough to give a title by adverse possession.
19. The Respondent gave evidence at the hearing. He is a professional builder but his oral evidence was necessarily confined to his period of ownership. The same position obtained with his partner who assists him with administrative tasks in the redevelopment. Subject to this, both were truthful witnesses. Findings of fact
20. The Tribunal makes the following findings of fact.
21. Holmlea originally consisted of three cottages (known as 38 40 and 42 Chapel Street) constructed before 1950. I base this on the copy of the Assent dated the 2 March 1950 made by Mary Hughes (page J8 of trial bundle). This is indirectly confirmed by the plan attached to the statutory declaration of G Davies made on 21 April 2006 (page H49 of the trial bundle) in connection with the use made by people visiting the Chapel.
22. The Applicant with her husband bought Holmlea on the 28 September 2007. Homlea had been empty since at least 1994 when the Applicant's uncle went into the care. By 2007 it was uninhabitable. I base this finding on the photograph at page G57 of the trial bundle.
23. The Applicant and her husband obtained planning permission to demolish and rebuild Holmlea on the 14th of May 2008 which they proceeded to do.
24. A professional builder was engaged and two semi-detached dwellings were erected in place of the three dwellings. The Applicant could not remember the name of the surveyor they used at. She thought the builder was called Gerwyn but was unsure of this.
25. The footprint of the semi-detached dwellings was not identical with the footprint of the demolished buildings. This is shown in the reply to the Land Registry Survey Requisition dated the 16 November 2022. This document is not in the Trial Bundle. However, it did accompany the Land Registry Case Summary dated 29 August 2023 (page D75 of Trial Bundle).
26. The Land Registry mapping of the title to Holmlea on its first registration in October 2007 was based on the title to the undemolished dwellings. The subsequent construction of Holmlea with the footing slightly further east and a porch on its eastern wall has given rise to some of the difficulties in this case. I find that Mr. Jones was mistaken when he said in cross-examination that Holmlea was constructed with the same footprint. In my judgement there was never a porch at the front of the demolished dwellings.
27. There was evidence from the Applicant that there was until 1953 a low wall enclosing a small garden on the eastern side of the 3 cottages. It was argued that this was to regarded as part of the footprint and that Holmlea when reconstructed fell within it. I do not consider on the balance of probabilities that this has been shown. There are no pre-registration plans to help with this point. (This is not a criticism of anyone’s record keeping). The only plan is taken from the pre-registration title to Carmel Chapel. The draftsman of that plan cannot be looked to for an accurate depiction of the garden in front of the 3 cottages. The Applicant put forward as evidence of the boundaries in 1953 the plan at page E7 of the Trial Bundle. This is based on the November 2023 edition of the Ordnance Survey map. This has to be rejected. It is not contemporaneous. The Applicant was one year old in 1953 and cannot herself have any memory of the matter.
28. As part of the building work there would have been vehicles equipment and people using the blue land. Materials and scaffolding would likely have been stored on it. This is borne out by the photograph at page H28 of the Trial Bundle taken in 2009.
29. I accept the Applicant’s evidence that by 2011 the building work was complete.
30. Prior to this on the 11th of August 2008, the northern semi-detached dwelling was sold to the Applicant’s son, Christopher Wyn Jones. This dwelling (which became known as Carmel Cottage) was incomplete at this point. As the Applicant's husband put it: ‘my son bought a work in progress’.
31. After the building work was finished Holmlea was let to a Mr and Mrs Bennett. Mr Bennett was a mechanic and kept vehicles on the blue land. I accept that while Holmlea was let Mr. Jones was in the habit of visiting the property every two weeks or so
32. Mr. Jones said in evidence that a large van was parked by Mr Bennett on the blue land because he could not fit it into the parking area to the south of Holmlea. Mr Bennett erected some Heras fencing to provide security for the van. I accept also that other vehicles have parked on the blue land from time to time.
33. On the balance of probabilities, wheelie bins, plant pots and seating have been placed on the blue land at least since the building work was finished. There is no evidence of where or how often this happened. I reject the Applicant’s evidence that she with her husband had been in exclusive occupation of the blue land since 2007. The Applicant has never lived at Holmlea. Occupation of the blue land has throughout been by the tenants of Holmlea.
34. The Respondent’s title to the Chapel includes some overgrown land on its northern side which was enclosed by a low stone wall and railings. After he bought the Chapel, the Respondent demolished the wall and cleared the vegetation. (I accept the Applicant’s evidence that she was a member of the congregation and that the Chapel closed in 2005).
35. On the 17 September 2019 Mr. Jones and his son installed some metal gates and a wooden panel supported by wooden posts with the effect of dividing the blue land along its eastern boundary from the cleared land in front of the Chapel.
36. The Respondent attended at the Chapel on the 18 September 2019 because a site meeting with planning officials from Anglesey Council had been arranged. When he saw what had happened he removed the gates from their hinges and dismantled the wooden panel. Decision
37. Counsel are agreed in this case on the applicable law. The Applicant has to demonstrate factual possession and the intention to possess: JA Pye (Oxford) Limited v Graham [2003] 1AC 419. Further, the rule is that adverse possession by a tenant of land outside the tenancy enures for the benefit of the landlord unless there is evidence of a different intention. This was not disputed by Counsel for the Respondent in argument. See Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property (10 th Ed.) at paragraph 7.042 et seq. There was no evidence from the tenants before the Tribunal.
38. The burden is on the Applicant to show a title through adverse possession. This she seeks to do by relying on the use made of the blue land while the works of construction were going on and thereafter through the acts of the tenants of Holmlea.
39. As to the first of these, it is impossible to accept that the erection of scaffolding or the delivery of building materials or the parking of vehicles on the blue land are evidence of an intention to possess. To the contrary, they are all activities associated with a temporary state of affairs namely, the reconstruction and improvement of what were some dilapidated cottages.
40. As to the occupation by the tenants, the evidence of possession in my judgement falls short of what is required. The placing of wheelie bins or pot plants or seating on adjoining land in a connection with the enjoyment of a dwelling does not, in my judgement, support an intention to possess. There was no evidence of the number of wheelie bins or the location of the bench or seats on the blue land. In Pye the intention to possess was described as the “intention in one's own name and on one's own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow”. In my judgement this test has not been met.
41. Mr Barrow drew attention to the parking of Mr Bennett's van and the erection of the Heras fencing. This is at first sight rather more substantial. It was explained to the Tribunal that such fencing consists of a series of galvanised metal grids in the vertical plane, supported at each end by a concrete block resting on the ground. It can be opened at any point by lifting one end of the grid out of the block and swinging it through 90 degrees. It is commonly used by the construction industry to enclose land temporarily while redevelopment work takes place. In my judgement Heras fencing bears witness to a temporary state of affairs. It is equivocal on the question of intention to possess.
42. There is another difficulty with the Applicant case. From 2011 the Applicants factual possession was through the tenants of Holmlea. No copy of the tenancy agreement was in evidence. There is no evidence to show that the Applicant was the sole landlord under the tenancy. On the contrary, the register of the freehold title to Holmlea points to the landlord being the Applicant and her husband. Possession is single and indivisible so it is these individuals who would have a title by adverse possession through their tenants, had there been such. Mr Barrow had no answer to this point when it was put to him at the hearing.
43. In my judgement no significance can be attached to the construction of the fence and gate in September 2019. It was instantly removed. It might be regarded as showing an intention to possess but it is too fleeting to carry any weight.
44. There will be an order directing the cancellation of the Applicant’s application so far as it relates to the unbuilt-on parts of the blue land.
45. The Respondents have submitted an application for summary assessment of their costs. I would ask for the Applicants submissions on the form of the order no later than 5:00pm on the 17 February 2026 Michael Wear Dated this 3 February 2026