Marius Nicolae Frunza v Gaesti Law Court, Romania

Mr Justice Foxton :

1. This is an appeal against the decision of District Judge Law of 23 December 2024 in which he ordered Mr Frunza’s extradition to Romania. The sole ground of appeal, for which permission was granted by Ellenbogen J on 7 August 2025, is whether the District Judge erred in dealing with the issue of delay. The background

2. Mr Frunza’s extradition is sought pursuant to an arrest warrant, which I shall refer to as “the Warrant”, issued on 21 November 2022 by Gaesti Law Court. I shall refer to the Respondent as “the Romanian Court”. The Warrant was certified by the National Crime Agency on 18 February 2023. Romania is a Category 1 territory and, consequently, Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“ the 2003 Act ”) applies.

3. I can take the facts relating to the offences from the District Judge’s judgment. i) Mr Frunza first came to the UK in 2018. ii) Mr Frunza was present for his trial in Romania on 9 September 2021. He pleaded guilty to the following offences: a) On 5 June 2017, driving two co-defendants to an address where they stole an unknown number of turkeys, which Mr Frunza later sold. b) Driving the vehicle without a driving licence on that occasion. c) Driving a vehicle without a driving licence on 30 November 2018, 19 May 2018, 31 May 2018 and 14 August 2018. iii) He was present when sentence was passed, which was for a total of 4 years’ imprisonment. iv) Before the sentence took effect, he left the country without telling anyone and did not return. v) The District Judge found Mr Frunza to be a fugitive from justice, having deliberately placed himself beyond the reach of the Romanian Court’s legal process. vi) The District Judge also found that Mr Frenza deliberately left no means for the Romanian Court to communicate with him. vii) Mr Frunza has lived in the UK since 2018 with his partner, and begun to establish a new work and private life here from that point. The District Judge’s ruling

4. After identifying factors in favour of and against ordering extradition, the District Judge concluded that the balance fell decisively in favour of ordering expedition.

5. Mr Frunza now appeals that determination, arguing that in the balancing exercise conducted under Article 8 of the ECHR by reference to Mr Frunza’s right to a private and family life, insufficient weight was given to the three years delay between the offending and trial, and the further delay between the imposition of sentence and the issuing of the Warrant. The test on appeal

6. In order to succeed on appeal, Mr Frunza must satisfy the conditions of either section 27(3) or section 27(4) of the 2003 Act : “(3) The conditions are that— (a) the appropriate judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently; (b) if he had decided the question in the way he ought to have done, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge. (4) The conditions are that— (a) an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing; (b) the issue or evidence would have resulted in the appropriate judge deciding a question before him at the extradition hearing differently; (c) if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge. ”

7. I was referred to a number of authorities considering the issue of unexplained delay in the Article 8 context, each of which reflected the particulars facts of the case before the court. The applicable principles in this area have recently been summarised by Fordham J in Gomulka v Poland [2024] EWHC 460 (Admin) at [19]-[20], and I gratefully draw upon that summary: i) Delay and the passage of time may (a) diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest in extradition and/or (b) increase the impact of extradition upon private and/or family life. ii) In considering whether and to what extent delay and the passage of time does (a) diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest in extradition and/or (b) increase the impact of extradition upon private and/or family life, all relevant circumstances will be considered. iii) The fact that person whose extradition is sought is a fugitive from justice does not exclude the operation of Article 8, but “is nevertheless a powerful feature when considering the passage of time in the Article 8 evaluation. It can illuminate and inform both (a) the question of any diminution in the weight to be attached to the public interest and (b) the question of the impacts of extradition upon private and family life.” iv) There are limits to the appropriateness of interrogating the steps taken, or not taken, by the requesting state authorities and their UK agents, and in a case where the subject of the warrant is a fugitive from justice, this is especially the case. v) The weight to be attributed to the impact of extradition upon private and family life – for all affected individuals whose Article 8 rights would be interfered with – will always necessarily be informed by the passage of time, having regard to all the circumstances.

8. I was also referred to authorities distinguishing between unexplained and unreasonable delay. In Konecy v Czech Republic [2017] EWHC 2360 (Admin) , [42], Sir Wyn Williams cautioned against characterising delay as culpable simply because it is unexplained. Similar statements were made by Collins J in Wolack v Poland [2014] EWHC 2278 (Admin) , [9] and Zielinski v Poland ] 2007] EWHC 2645 (Admin) , [13] (Richards LJ). The District Judge’s judgment

9. The error which it was alleged that the District Judge made was said to arise from a conflict between two paragraphs in his judgment: i) Paragraph 32(e) which found “There has been no unreasonable delay in these proceedings”. ii) Paragraph 36 which found “the lack of any explanation for the delay does not matter”.

10. However, as the authorities referred to at [8] make clear, the mere fact that delay is unexplained does not of itself entail that it is necessarily unreasonable. There will be periods of delay of a sufficient length and/or due to surrounding circumstances which may lead a court to infer, in the absence of an explanation, that the delay is unreasonable. The District Judge concluded that this was not such a case. Decision on the appeal

11. I am not persuaded that the District Judge reached the wrong decision because of a failure properly to address the issue of unexplained delay or in any other respect. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the District Judge’s conclusion was plainly right: i) Mr Frunza moved to the United Kingdom in the same year after a serious of offences committed over the period from May 2017 to August 2018 (on his own evidence having been arrested and released by the Romanian police after each offence). ii) While there is no evidence that his move to the United Kingdom caused the Romanian Court any difficulties in prosecuting him for these offences, it is a relevant factor when considering the delay between August 2018 and September 2021, and whether it can be said to be “unreasonable”. iii) As the District Judge noted, Mr Frunza’s life in the UK commenced after a spate of criminal offending in Romania (and indeed after he had been arrested by the Romanian police). In those circumstances, the District Judge was entitled to find that Mr Frunza “could not have enjoyed any genuine sense of security during this period.” iv) The extent of the delay in the period before Mr Frunza was summoned for the offences is unclear. His own evidence is that he was in Romania for 8 months in 2021, and asked for his case to be dealt with by a simplified procedure to speed tings up. However, setting aside the length of any pre-trial process (which would not, on its face, constitute “delay” at all) I am not persuaded that the three-year period between offending and trial can be characterised as unreasonable, particularly given the circumstances in i) and ii) above. v) In relation to the 11 month delay after the imposition of sentence before the Warrant was issued, Mr Frunza was a fugitive from justice who, on the District Judge’s findings, took steps to make it more difficult for the Romanian Court to communicate with him. That is of obvious relevance when considering the further period which elapsed until the Warrant was issued. vi) As the District Judge found, Mr Frunza can have had no genuine sense of security in his life in the UK in the period after 2021. vii) The mere fact that the Romanian Court had not itself offered an explanation for the timing of either the commencement of criminal process or the issuing of the Warrant does not persuade me that I should conclude that there has been unreasonable delay in respect of those periods. At best for Mr Frunza, there is unexplained delay against a background which would be capable of offering some explanation for it, and given that, the period of delay cannot be said to be excessive. viii) Further. Mr Frunza has not adduced any evidence of any particular impact of the period of delay upon him or his behaviour. On his own evidence, his daughter lives in Romania and his partner spends six months of each year there.

12. Against that background, the District Judge was fully entitled to find that the factors in favour of extradition which he outlined at paragraph 32 of his judgment outweighed Mr Frunza’s Article 8 right arising from the life he and his partner had sought to establish here since 2018, particularly having regard to the factors identified by the District Judge at [35] of his judgment.

13. Accordingly, Mr Frunza’s appeal is dismissed.