MHP Food UK Limited v Sanson Foods Limited & Ors

1. On 30 July 2025 Andrew Mitchell KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court made a freezing order and a proprietary injunction against each of the Defendants. The orders were made on the application of the Claimant (“MHP”) at a hearing of which the Defendants had no notice and so there was a return date. On 15 August 2025 His Honour Judge Tindal, sitting as a Judge of this Court, continued the order.

2. This is the Second Defendant’s application to discharge the orders and the application that led to the orders being made. Hardly any aspect of the presentation of the application escapes criticism. The Second Defendant goes further and says MHP and its solicitors have behaved so badly since the order was made that it should, on that basis, be discharged. The hearing on 30 July 2025

3. The without notice application was supported by affidavit evidence from Sophie Ashcroft, the solicitor with conduct of MHP’s claim and Illia Vinnik, MHP’s then Managing Director. Mr Daniel Khoo of counsel represented MHP at the hearing as he does today. In the skeleton argument prepared for the hearing he summarised the background to the claim in this way: “ MHP is a wholesaler of frozen chicken products. Since August 2024, it has been storing approximately £2.5 million of frozen chicken products (the “Assets”) with the First Respondent (“SFL”). Unbeknownst to MHP, the Respondents have misappropriated and sold the Assets to third parties. When MHP asked for information as to what stock was being held by SFL, the Third Respondent (“Mr Patel”) initially said that the bulk of the Assets were being stored with a different storage provider. That was not true. In fact, as the Second Respondent (“Mr Mohamed”) later admitted, the Assets have been sold. The whereabouts of the Assets and their sale proceeds is currently unknown to MHP .”

4. The skeleton addressed MHP’s causes of action (conversion, unlawful means conspiracy, breach of contract, inducing breach of contract) and explained why the relevant merits thresholds were met (“ serious issues to be tried ” for the proprietary injunction and “ good arguable case ” for the freezing order). It dealt with the risk of dissipation, the reasons for applying without notice, the cross undertaking in damages, and fair presentation including the point that the Second Defendant “ may seek to argue that he has no knowledge of the sale ”. The discharge application

5. The submissions before me have rightly been focussed on the 30 July hearing. Plainly MHP was under a duty of full disclosure and fair presentation (perhaps a better way of expressing the familiar duty of “full and frank disclosure”). The main thrust of Mr Hannant’s submission was that MHP failed in that duty because it failed to put before the Deputy Judge a good deal of evidence which, he suggested, indicated that the Second Defendant was not involved in running SFL’s business and which supported the existence of what he referred to as a “side deal” made between Mr Patel and MHP or Mr Vinnik.

6. Mr Hannant also argued that there was no sufficient risk of dissipation to warrant the grant of the freezing order and that MHP’s conduct after the order had been made raises concerns of such seriousness that the order should be discharged. Late in the day (for the first time in the skeleton) Mr Hannant also raises an argument that the merits test (or tests) was not passed. The hearing before the Deputy Judge

7. It is helpful to explain how the hearing before the Deputy Judge progressed and what evidence he saw. I have carefully considered the skeleton argument prepared for the hearing by Mr Khoo and also the note of the hearing before the Deputy Judge and the Deputy Judge’s judgment. Mr Hannant did not take me to any of those important documents.

8. Whilst there is no criticism of the Deputy Judge’s approach (the criticism is reserved for MHP) I bear in mind that he is a very experienced commercial practitioner, that he is plainly familiar with the discretion he was to exercise and that (as is clear from the judgment and the note of hearing) he had read and very carefully considered the papers before the hearing. In particular it is notable that he was keen to understand the basis of the case against the Second Defendant who, on the evidence, had no direct involvement in the sale of the stored goods.

9. A copy of a short form storage contract signed by Mr Usman Afzal on behalf of SFL and Mr Vadim Filipov of MHP was produced. MHP’s case was that the contract was genuine and that it related to storage of frozen goods for a period of 12 months starting in August 2024: “[The First Defendant] have provided 500 pallets worth of no charge cold storage to [MHP] for a period of 12 months starting August 2024 to July 2025. The no charge is applied as [the First Defendant] are processing and repacking for [MHP] various poultry products ”

10. There was evidence before the Deputy Judge (at paragraphs 19 to 23 of Mr Vinnik’s affidavit) that MHP delivered the goods referred to in the storage contract (frozen chicken) to SFL from July 2024 onwards and then instructed SFL to process and deliver some (but not all) of the stock. The result was that by July 2025 “ a large proportion of the products delivered ” remained in storage, but some had been processed. Those that remained were said, on the evidence, to have a cost price of in excess of £2m and a weight of well in excess of 350 tonnes. Mr Vinnik’s information of these matters was derived from Mr Filipov and MHP’s stock management system. These points could not therefore easily be dismissed.

11. The evidence dealt with the following: a. On 24 June 2025 Mr Filipov contacted SFL to secure the return of the goods being held under the storage contract. By then Mr Patel had explained that some of the goods were stored off-site by a third party (Lineage in Heywood). b. By 1 July 2025 the stock had not been returned. Mr Vinnik began pressing. In a message of 2 July 2025 he said: “ Could you please keep your promise and finalise today: full stock transfer from the external warehouse to our account…. This is what was promised by you multiple times but not delivered ”. c. On 3 July 2025, Mr Patel suggested that MHP should invoice SFL for the goods rather than demand their return. d. By 13 July 2025 the goods had still not been returned and Mr Patel was not responding to messages. On that date Mr Vinnik messaged Mr Patel to ask: “ where [are] our products? ” e. On 12 and 13 July 2025 Mr Mohamed incorporated 2 new companies, Xpress Foods Limited and Xpress Foods Chilled Limited. f. On 14 July 2025 Mr Patel messaged Mr Vinnik to say “ I have spoken to [the Second Defendant] about the above points and he will discuss with you tomorrow in your meeting thank you. ” Mr Vinnik replied with the following: “ Nothing but giving us back products or money will work…. you stole our money ” g. There was a meeting on 14 or 15 July 2025 between MHP and SFL represented by the Second Defendant. Mr Patel was not present. At the meeting the Second Defendant explained that Mr Patel ran SFL and that he (the Second Defendant) was merely an investor. He said that Mr Patel had sold the products and that SFL “ no longer had the proceeds of sale ”. h. On 23 July the Second Defendant resigned as a director of SFL. Mr Musa became a director in his place. i. There was a second meeting on 25 July 2025. The fact that the meeting had been arranged was referred to in Mr Vinnik’s evidence before the Deputy Judge, but the detail was not set out.

12. At the hearing, it was explained that the Second Defendant was at the meeting of 25 July 2025. Mr Patel was also present and said he had to sell the stock “ to cover [SFL’s] cashflow deficit ”.

13. The Deputy Judge was told: Mr Mohamed is the man in the background who should be in the foreground. He is the sole shareholder and was, until [23 July 2025] sole director. But he seems to be totally absent. How has Mr Patel had access to £2.5 million worth of products and could sell them without Mr Mohamed’s knowledge? They must have gone to an existing customer base which Mr Patel must know about. Even if the selling started over a year ago they either went to existing or connected entities. Mr Patel, Mr Mohamed and Mr Musa are all involved in connected companies and it is no surprise that Mr Musa is taking over. Mr Mohamed and they are connected and have history. Mr Patel is Mr Mohamed’s brother-in-law and they have been in business for years. During the 14 July meeting there was no explanation from Mr Mohamed as to how – let’s imagine it was Mr Patel who did the actual selling – how that happened without his knowledge. And he hasn’t said for example “Mr Patel has done a terrible thing, we’re investigating fully” or “he has sold products we had no idea about so we have investigated and have kicked him out”. I accept the case is weaker against Mr Mohamed, but is there a serious issue to be tried? Absolutely.

14. The Deputy Judge’s judgment noted as follows: I’m satisfied that the Claimant has a good arguable case against all three Respondents on the basis that the goods remained the property of Claimant while stored by the First Respondent. The contract is short and silent on this point but it is called a “storage” contract, so as I read it the First Respondent was bailee of the goods. The First Respondent may have been able to process goods on instruction and that may well have involved a sale and sale back, but no such instruction was given. Therefore, there is a good arguable case that there has been a conversion and the First Respondent has breached the contract, and that the Second and Third Respondents induced that breach, or may themselves have converted the goods. Likewise with Unlawful Means Conspiracy, though this cause of action does not add much. I do have more doubts about the Second Respondent based on the evidence – it is largely inferential at this stage. It is largely based on the fact that he was at the material time the sole director and shareholder, and that he hasn’t been particularly forthcoming in relation to what has happened to the products. He claims that he did not know what had happened, and he was an investor. It is possible that he was trying to sort out what happened after the event, and was acting in good faith as a director at all times. So I have more concerns in relation to him, but I am persuaded that there is a good arguable case against him. That is not a high hurdle at this stage. The material relied on by the Claimant is quite sufficient at this stage.

15. Dealing with the risk of dissipation and discretion, the Deputy Judge said: The risk of dissipation – the nature of the claim does suggest dishonesty and attempt to move assets beyond reach of claimant. Mr Patel does appear to have lied about goods being stored at Lineage, and there is an evidential basis, to put it mildly, that Mr Mohamed has not been as transparent or as helpful as he could have been, which does give evidence of risk of dissipation and evasion. Mr Khoo makes the point that Mr Mohamed must have known, so there is some suggestion of dishonesty by him as well, and there is a suggestion that he is moving assets into new corporate structures. It is unclear when the assets were sold – it may be some time ago. It may be difficult to work out what happened. But there has been no delay by the Claimant. Generally, I am satisfied that it is just and convenient to make injunction re the misappropriated assets. After the order was made

16. Since the grant of the without notice order, banks statements for accounts held with Virgin Money in the name of SFL, Sanson Holdings Limited (“SHL”) and SNK Inv. Limited (“SNK”) have been provided to MHP’s solicitors. The Second Defendant says these documents were obtained improperly and that alone would justify the discharge of the order.

17. Mr Mohamed’s evidence and position (see his witness statement in support of the discharge application at paragraphs 109 to 134) is that MHP has inappropriately used the injunction to obtain the bank accounts and that MHP’s solicitors put pressure on the bank to produce the bank statements and used the freezing injunction “ as a tool by which it could gain control over bank accounts of other non-parties without any suggestion that those parties were in any way involved in the dispute ”.

18. Unsurprisingly, MHP’s solicitors have responded to these serious allegations. The response is set out in a witness statement provided by Deliya Meylanova and dated 8 January 2026. Put simply, the bank has explained that it provided the bank statements in error. It has offered compensation to the account holders and accepted full responsibility. It is clear that that error was not induced in any way by MHP or their solicitors and it is clear (and was not challenged) that MHP are entitled to deploy the statements.

19. The statements show that SFL transferred £174,000 to SHL in the period 28 April 2025 to 20 May 2025 and then SHL transferred £659,690 to the Second Defendant between 30 May 2025 and 23 June 2025 with the result that SHL’s account was left with a nil balance. The 12-month period of the storage contract was due to end in July 2025. MHP’s pleaded case

20. MHP’s pleaded claim proceeds on the basis that the stock was sold and the money used by SFL. That is the natural inference to be drawn (at this stage) from the July meetings where both Mr Mohamed and Mr Patel accepted that the sale proceeds had been paid to SFL (if SFL “ no longer ” had the sale proceeds it follows that it must have had them at some point). MHP pleads that it has “limited information” about the proceeds of sale but pleads the transfers to the Second Defendant mentioned above.

21. The allegations pleaded in the Particulars of Claim are denied by the Second Defendant. He pleads that the money was transferred to him from SFL because notice was given that the SHL account would be closed on or about 21 July 2025. I note that an apparent letter from Virgin Bank to corroborate the closure is not exhibited to a witness statement and is incomplete. It has no signature strip and appears to be only the first page of a letter. I note also it states “ if there is a credit balance on your account you can contact your local branch or complete the enclosed nominated account form and return it… ” that suggests (unsurprisingly) it would have been possible to transfer the entirety of the balance to another nominated account. That leaves a question mark as to why the account balance was transferred over some 20 days (mostly in tranches of £30,000) from the SHL account rather than all at once.

22. It is notable that Mr Mohamed has not explained what became of the sums that were transferred to him.

23. The Second Defendant’s main defences to the claim are (insofar as relevant) as follows: - a. He was not involved in the day to day running of the First Defendant, knew nothing about its contractual relationships and that the relationship between MHP, SFL, Mr Patel and Mr Vinnik was “actively concealed” from him. In any event, the storage agreement he says, is a sham. b. In or around November 2024 Mr Patel and Mr Vinnik agreed that Mr Patel would (in effect) act as an agent for MHP and sell their goods (frozen chicken). He would receive a commission on each sale of 5p or 10p per kilo. The purchase price would then be paid to SNK which would retain 20% of the sale price and remit 80% to MHP. This arrangement was hidden from the Second Defendant (“the side deal”)

24. The side deal is potentially important, and certainly regarded as central by Mr Mohamed. If established at trial it might go some way to explaining why (assuming the storage agreement was not a sham) MHP’s goods were at SFL’s premises and why the goods were being used. Mr Patel’s Defence pleads that SNK then transferred some £1.4m to MHP. The deal may therefore also provide some explanation as to how the proceeds of sale came to SFL. Grounds for discharge

25. The argument that there was no serious issue to be tried at the time the matter came before the Deputy Judge was raised for the first time in the skeleton argument for the Second Defendant. In my view that is plainly too late.

26. For that reason alone I would in normal course decline to deal with the argument. MHP is entitled to know what case it must meet at the outset. There is a clear and obvious procedural unfairness (at least in the abstract) in raising substantial points so late in the day. However, Mr Khoo’s objection to this late point was not pursued with vigour. It seems to me the point was used as an example of the fast and loose approach adopted by the Second Defendant to this application. I have come to the view, despite its lateness, that I should deal with the merits point. Serious issue to be tried or good arguable case

27. There was some disagreement about the correct merits threshold, at least for the freezing order. It may be that the difference between the parties is limited and stems from Mr Hannant’s decision to cite Orri v Moundreas [1981] Com. LR 168 as the source of the test. That decision (of Mustill J as he then was) dealt with the merits threshold for service out applications. It is now clearly established that the service out test and the freezing order test are different (see paragraph 96 of Unitel SA v dos Santos [204] EWCA Civ 1109). The former is more demanding than the latter as explained at paragraph 99 of Dos Santos , not least because the service issue will not be re-visited at trial.

28. The correct test is that set out by Popplewell LJ at paragraph 126 of Dos Santos and is (see also paragraph 81 and the then Chancellor’s agreement in the first instance decision of Madof Securities International Ltd v Raven [2012] 2All ER (Comm) 634) the same test as that required to defeat summary judgment (“ It is not enough that the defence or claim respectively is merely arguable; it must carry some degree of conviction ”): “A claim which is more than merely arguable and carries some degree of conviction is no different in substance from one which is more than barely capable of serious argument, which is the Niedersachsen [good arguable case] test.”

29. Looking at the facts before the Deputy Judge I am satisfied that he was plainly right to reach the view “ the material relied on by the Claimant is quite sufficient at this stage ” to justify the conclusion that there was a good arguable case against the respondents including the Second Defendant. The threshold, which is a low one, was easily passed.

30. It may be that in due course, the Second Defendant’s position will be completely vindicated. But it is plain that before the Deputy Judge there was a sufficiently arguable case to justify the grant of interim relief: a. There was evidence the frozen chicken (the stock) had been delivered. b. There was evidence of the terms on which the stock was held and when the storage of the stock would come to an end. c. The stock was not available for collection at the end of the storage contract d. Mr Patel had confessed that the stock had been sold to cover a cash flow deficit at SFL (there was a good arguable case in respect of conversion at the very least). e. Mr Mohamed was the sole director of SFL throughout the period of the storage contract. It follows that he was the sole director when the stock was sold and when the proceeds were used to find SFL’s cashflow. He was under a duty (broadly) to supervise the operation of SFL and any claim that he was ignorant had to be treated with care. f. Mr Mohamed had incorporated new companies at around the time MHP discovered the loss of its goods, and when he discussed the situation with MHP he had no useful information at all (there was a good arguable case at that stage that Mr Mohamed was involved and that he knew what was happening, not least because as a director he plainly ought to have known). Risk of dissipation

31. The parties were once again at odds on the correct approach to this issue. Mr Hannant submits that “solid evidence” of a risk of dissipation is needed so that MHP’s reliance on inference is quite simply wrong. I am unable to accept that submission.

32. I agree with Mr Khoo that is important to have in mind that all that needs to be established is “a real risk” that a future judgment will not be met because of unjustified dissipation.

33. The relevant principles are set out by Popplewell J in Fundo Soberano De Angola v Santos [2018] EWHC 2199 (Comm) . They are conveniently set out at paragraph 61 of the judgment of Males LJ in Mex Group Worldwide Limited v Ford [2024] EWCA Civ 959 and were adopted by Haddon-Cave LJ, subject to two additions, in Lakatamia Shipping v Morimoto [2019] EWCA Civ 2203 at paragraph 34.

34. I need not set them out in full. It can however be seen that the point made by Mr Hannant is derived from Males LJ’s second principle: “ The risk of dissipation must be established by solid evidence; mere inference or generalised assertion is not sufficient. ”

35. In order to understand this second principle, the following further principles need to be considered: (4) It is not enough to establish a sufficient risk of dissipation merely to establish a good arguable case that the defendant has been guilty of dishonesty; it is necessary to scrutinise the evidence to see whether the dishonesty in question points to the conclusion that assets [may be] dissipated…. (7) Each case is fact specific and relevant factors must be looked at cumulatively.

36. The additions made by Haddon-Cave LJ are: (1) Where the court accepts that there is a good arguable case that a respondent engaged in wrongdoing against the applicant relevant to the issue of dissipation , that holding will point powerfully in favour of a risk of dissipation. (2) In such circumstances, it may not be necessary to adduce any significant further evidence in support of a real risk of dissipation; but each case will depend upon its own particular facts and evidence.

37. I accept Mr Khoo’s submission that it would be rare (but not impossible) to have direct evidence of a risk of dissipation. In this context there are two important factors to bear in mind, first, the dissipation must be unjustified (see Males LJ’s principle 6) and secondly it will necessarily be something that might happen in the future. A defendant who plans to dissipate assets to defeat a future judgment is unlikely to leave a clear evidential trail. Just as fraud operates in the shadows so plans to dissipate are likely not to be made in the open.

38. It follows, as Mr Khoo puts it at paragraph 54 of his skeleton argument “ a risk of dissipation is almost always an inference from primary facts ”. Henshaw J makes the point very clearly in Arcelormittal v Ruia [2020] EWHC 740 (Comm) at paragraph 219 where he notes that the claimant should depose to objective facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant is likely to move assets or dissipate them; unsupported statements or expressions of fear have little weight ( O’Regan v Iambic Productions (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1378 (per Sir Peter Pain)). The same point is made by Nugee J (as he then was) in Holyoake v Candy [2016] 3 WLR 357 at paragraph 20: “ a freezing injunction is a type of what used to be called “quia timet” injunctions, and it is well established that a claimant cannot obtain such an injunction simply by saying “timeo” or “I fear”. On the other hand what one is looking for is a risk of dissipation; at this stage it is not unusual for a claimant to be unable to prove that dissipation either has happened or will happen, but only that there are objective facts from which such a risk can be inferred. ”

39. Simply saying “I fear there may be dissipation” because I have a claim is not good enough. It is a “generalised assertion” or a “mere inference”. Inference is permissible but only if from “solid evidence” (or objective facts).

40. The Deputy Judge had before him evidence that goods belonging to MHP had been misappropriated (see paragraph 30 (a) to (d) above). Misappropriation in that context is dishonest. The plain evidence of what had been discussed at the meetings in July was that the proceeds of sale had been put into the general coffers of SFL (SFL “ no longer ” had the proceeds of sale and the proceeds were used for SFL’s cashflow) and no explanation had been given of where they had been paid or if any remained. Mr Mohamed was at the relevant time the sole director of SFL and in practice “must have known” what was going on (see paragraph 30 (e) and (f) above). In my view these points represent solid evidence (or objective facts) from which the inference of a risk of dissipation can be drawn. The Deputy Judge felt that the recent incorporation of new companies supported the view.

41. It is plain that the Deputy Judge was entitled to conclude that there was a risk of dissipation.

42. The Deputy Judge did not know (and MHP did not know) that SFL and related companies had transferred almost £660,000 to Mr Mohamed in the recent past. Full and Frank Disclosure

43. I turn to that part of the application that took up the vast majority of the argument, failures of fair presentation and full disclosure.

44. It is helpful, before dealing with these points to consider how an application to discharge on these grounds ought to be brought. a. The key guiding principle is that applicants should exercise a “ degree of restraint and a sense of proportion ” (see Males LJ in Mex Group at paragraph 112) b. Applicants should identify failures that are clear-cut and important (“big-ticket” allegations: see Coulson LJ in Mex Group at paragraphs 127 and 128 and Males J as he then was in National Bank Trust v Yurov [2016] EWHC 1913 (Comm) at paragraph 15). Concentrating on “big-ticket” allegations means the obvious danger of conducting a “mini-trial” is avoided (see National Bank Trust at paragraph 19 and Tugushev at paragraph 9(vii)). c. The matters relied on (the big-ticket allegations) should be clearly identified in the application, or, at the latest in the evidence in support (see Males J as he then was in National Bank Trust at paragraph 14 and Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 at paragraph 7(vii)).

45. Where an applicant fails to adopt this approach they might expect the court to direct at an early stage a limitation on the failures that might be relied upon (see National Bank Trust at paragraph 15). It is not for the court to separate out the “ wheat from the chaff” and, if the applicant fails to conduct that exercise, the Court “ should simply decline to consider the issue at all ” (see Mex Group at paragraph 112).

46. This guidance has been ignored. Mr Khoo has compiled a schedule of 21 apparent allegations advanced by Mr Mohamed of unfair presentation or a failure to produce relevant evidence. Mr Hannant says his skeleton argument raises only four points set out at paragraphs 126(a) to (d) of his skeleton argument. But an analysis of those paragraphs shows a different story. They present 16 specific complaints as examples of four broader general complaints: a. There is a general allegation at paragraph 126(a) of a failure to disclose “relevant documentation” or present it fairly in respect of risk of dissipation. Thereafter five examples (introduced by the words “in particular” are set out). The category is not specific and in fact is entirely open ended. b. There is a general allegation at paragraph 126(b) of a failure to disclose “relevant documentation” or present it fairly in respect of Mr Mohamed’s involvement in the business. There are then four examples (introduced by the word “including”). c. There is a general allegation at paragraph 126(c) of a failure to disclose “relevant documentation” or present it fairly in respect of the stored goods. I understand the points to be whether the goods were in fact delivered and if there was another reason for the goods to be there. There are then five examples (introduced by the words “in particular”). They include the “side deal”. d. At paragraph 126(d) it is said there was a failure to identify the arguments Mr Mohamed would have advanced. I note that In Re Stanford International Ltd [2011] Ch. 33 , an authority relied on by Mr Mohamed, refers to the similar high duty of a prosecutor seeking not on notice relief. I note that the Deputy Judge was leading counsel for the SFO (the effective prosecutor) in that case. Two examples are provided which at first sight appear out of place: a departure from the model order and that merits went not only to the merits test but to the exercise of discretion.

47. There has been no attempt to find big-ticket points or (to put the same idea in a different way) to separate the wheat from the chaff. Indeed there seems to have been an attempt to widen the inquiry to the broadest possible extent. I am satisfied that in accordance with what was said by the Court of Appeal in Mex Group I am entitled in those circumstances to decline to deal with this part of the application.

48. Despite that, I have come to the view that some of the points raised need to be dealt with in case there is any concern that a refusal to deal with those parts of the application would be unjust. To do that I will need (as the Court of Appeal did in Mex Group ) to “separate the wheat from the chaff.”

49. It seems to me that the big picture points (as understood by Mr Mohamed) relate to messages that should have been put in evidence and the failure to mention the “side deal” to the Deputy Judge as (as I understand it) the true reason for the storage of goods. The messages that should have been put in deal (as Mr Mohamed reads them) with the fact that Mr Mohamed was not involved in any dealings, that when he became involved he worked diligently to sort things out and they evidence the side deal.

50. In my view, even if these are the big picture points, there is nothing in them of any substance.

51. It may be in due course that Mr Mohamed will be vindicated and there will be a finding that the side deal existed and a finding that the existence of the side deal helps his case. But at present it seems to me it is no more than a potential defence. MHP strongly denies the existence of the side deal. At its lowest, MHP’s position is that if there was side deal (and it has no evidence there was) it knew nothing about it. How then can MHP have come under a duty to raise its existence before the Deputy Judge? The answer to that, provided by Mr Mohamed, is that MHP is concealing the fact that it was aware of the side deal. Whether there was a side deal and whether MHP knew about it is plainly a matter for trial and it cannot be resolved now. Absent a finding that there was a side deal and a finding that MHP was aware of it, there can be no breach of the obligation to provide full disclosure or of the duty to present the evidence fairly.

52. There are many problems with Mr Mohamed’s point on the messages. The real issue is that in my view there is no clear reference (no smoking gun) in the messages that supports Mr Mohamed’s case. The absence of any reference to Mr Mohamed’s direct involvement in discussions with MHP (at least in the messages) is not positive evidence that he was not involved in the apparent sale of the stored stock.

53. Mr Mohamed was the sole director of SFL at the relevant time and so had duties (for example) to promote the success of the company and to act with reasonable, care, skill and diligence. It is difficult to see how a director acting in accordance with those duties would not be aware of the presence in his storage facility of hundreds of tonnes of stock belonging to a customer which were being stored effectively free of charge, or of a cash-flow issue which was solved (seemingly) by the effective theft of that stock or a side deal of the kind he describes.

54. Even if the messages show that Mr Mohamed was working hard to sort out the problem that does not in my view amount to evidence that he did not play a part in creating the problem.

55. I am satisfied that there was no failure to give frank disclosure and no failure of fair presentation. Further points

56. I turn then to deal with some final points raised in one way or another by Mr Mohamed.

57. There was a complaint about deviations from the standard form order. Again these issues were raised late and so I am satisfied the fair course is not to deal with them. There is in any event nothing in them. The points are minor and in my view add nothing. There is no application to vary the order.

58. As to conduct after the order was made there is nothing in the bank statement point for the reasons I have given. There is concern that death threats have been made by a third party. I am satisfied that if those threats were made they were not instigated or encouraged by MHP.

59. Finally, Mr Mohamed suggests that the balance of convenience test (or the just and convenient test), as I understand the submission, ought to have led to a refusal of injunctive relief or should lead to a refusal now. In my view this is simply a rehash of the arguments I have dismissed. Mr Hannant submits that four factors militate against grant: the merits (which should be considered at this stage as well as at the threshold or jurisdiction stage); post grant conduct (which is plainly a matter for me on considering whether to maintain or to regrant the relief were I to discharge it), the risk of dissipation (which again needs to be reconsidered afresh at this stage) and finally what is described as the fragility of MHP’s financial position.

60. I do not accept that MHP is in a fragile financial position. Far from it. There is no suggestion it is not good for the cross undertaking and there is no application for the cross undertaking to be fortified. I have seen a witness statement from Oleksii Pribiega, the managing director of MHP Trade BV a company in the same group as MHP. He has oversight of MHP’s operation and financial position. He explains that the MHP had a turnover of around £65.8m in 2024 and assets of £43.7m and net revenue of £115m in the first 11 months of 2025. At 31 December 2024 it had ready realisable cash of £4.8m and around £4.2m in November 2024. It also has the benefit of support from its ultimate parent company which in the year ended 31 December 2024 revealed group gross profit of 848m USD and net current assets of 1 bn USD.

61. I am satisfied for reasons I have already given that the Deputy Judge was right to grant the orders, that the balance of convenience favoured the grant and that it was just and convenient to do so. Alternative approach

62. Were I wrong and if the orders or one of them was discharged I would remake the orders now. I would do so because the evidence that has come to light since the Deputy Judge’s order heightens concerns about the risk of dissipation and does nothing to weaken the conclusion that there is a good arguable case against Mr Mohamed.

63. I regret to say that I have come to the view that this is precisely the kind of discharge application that should not be brought. It sets out an unfocussed attack contrary to Court of Appeal guidance, has (in my view unhelpfully) involved serious but wholly unfounded criticism of solicitors and has in effect invited a mini-trial of issues (for example the existence of the side deal) that could not possibly take place.