Michal Krupa v Government of Poland

FORDHAM J: Introduction

1. This is an extradition case about whether extradition would be “unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time” (“UOPT”). That is a familiar question in extradition appeals in the High Court. In this case, it has come before the Court in a special way. I have had an original jurisdiction, with a primary fact-finding function, hearing oral evidence with cross-examination. Acronyms

2. In this judgment, I will be using the following acronyms: CPB the Circuit Prosecutor at Bydgoszcz DCB the District Court at Bydgoszcz DCS the District Court at Swiecie RCB the Regional Court at Bydgoszcz RPB the Regional Prosecutor at Bydgoszcz UOPT unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time WMC Westminster Magistrates Court UOPT under the 2003 Act

3. As I have indicated, the High Court usually encounters the UOPT question on an appeal. Appeals are pursuant to the Extradition Act 2003 ss.26 -29, 103-106. In such an appeal, a judge at Westminster Magistrates Court (“WMC”) will have made a decision applying the UOPT test, with findings of fact and a reasoned evaluative judgment. There, the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction involves asking whether the WMC judge’s decision was “wrong”. Under the 2003 Act , the UOPT question arises from the 2003 Act s.14 (with s.11(1) (c)) and s.82 (with s.79(1)(c)). Those provisions describe a “bar” to extradition “by reason of passage of time”. They ask whether: it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite [the person] by reason of the passage of time since [they are] alleged to have – (a) committed the extradition offence (where [they are] accused of its commission), or (b) become unlawfully at large (where [they are] alleged to have been convicted of it. UOPT under the 1989 Act

4. In the present case, the UOPT question is found in s.11(3) (b) of the Extradition Act 1989 , as it stood immediately prior to the general repeal of the 1989 Act on 11 December 2003. Here is s.11(3) (b), underlined within s.11(1) -(4) as they stood at that time:

11. Application for habeas corpus etc. (1) Where a person is committed under section 9 above, the court shall inform [them] in ordinary language of [their] right to make an application for habeas corpus, and shall forthwith give notice of the committal to the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers. (2) A person committed shall not be returned – (a) in any case, until the expiration of the period of 15 days beginning with the day on which the order for [their] committal is made; (b) if an application for habeas corpus is made in [their] case, so long as proceedings on that application are pending. (3) Without prejudice to any jurisdiction of the High Court apart from this section, the court shall order the applicant’s discharge if it appears to the court in relation to the offence, or each of the offences, in respect of which the applicant's return is sought, that – (a) by reason of the trivial nature of the offence; or (b) by reason of the passage of time since [they are] alleged to have committed it or to have become unlawfully at large, as the case may be ; or (c) because the accusation against [them] is not made in good faith in the interests of justice, it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return [them] . (4) On any such application the court may receive additional evidence relevant to the exercise of its jurisdiction under … subsection (3) above.

5. In Steblins , the 1989 Act was applicable because the extradition request predated the 2003 Act . In the present case, the 1989 Act is applicable because the Applicant was arrested on the Isle of Man where he was resident. This is the statutory position. By s.29 of the 1989 Act , Parts 1 to 5 of that Act applied to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, “as if each of them were part of the United Kingdom”. By s.4(1) of the 1989 Act , where general extradition arrangements had been made, an Order in Council could direct that the Part 3 1989 Act extradition procedures were to apply as between the United Kingdom and the foreign state, subject to any prescribed limitations, restrictions, exceptions or qualifications in the Order. The relevant general extradition arrangements are the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957. The 2003 Act came into force from 1 January 2004, pursuant to Article 2 of a 2003 Order in Council (SI 2003 No. 3103). That included those provisions of the 2003 Act which repealed the 1989 Act . But that repeal was “subject to the saving[] contained in” Article 5 of the 2003 Order. Article 5 provided that “the coming into force of the repeal of the [1989 Act] by section 218(b) of, and Schedule 4 to, the [2003] Act shall not apply for the purposes of … the Isle of Man … until such time as any [replacement] provision … is made [and] comes into force”. No replacement provision has ever been made. A Statutory Habeas Corpus Application

6. And so the UOPT question ( s.11(3) (b)) comes direct to the High Court under the originating jurisdiction of a statutory habeas corpus application ( s.11(2) (b)), at which it is appropriate to receive and hear evidence ( s.11(4) ). The Parties

7. The requested person is “applicant” ( s.11(3) ). A question arose about naming other parties. In the end, Counsel agreed that the sole “respondent” should be named as the requesting Government. That is what happened in Steblins . This is not a case of habeas corpus “for release” (CPR87 Part II) and there is no relevant custodian. I do not think WMC is a respondent; nor the Secretary of State. About the UOPT Question

8. It is common ground that s.11(3) (b) is posing directly for this Court an identical question to the one posed directly for WMC, in 2003 Act cases, under ss.14 and 82. That makes the authorities used in cases on ss.14 and 82 of the 2003 Act reliably applicable to s.11(3) (b) of the 1989 Act . In fact, so well-established are the principles applicable to the UOPT question that the two cases whose guidance was emphasised by Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska were themselves statutory habeas corpus cases and not 2003 Act cases. Kakis v Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 777 was a statutory habeas corpus case pursuant to s.8(3) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 . Lord Diplock explained (at pp.782-783): “Unjust” I regard as directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial itself, “oppressive” as directed to hardship to the accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration; but there is room for overlapping, and between them they would cover all cases where to return him would not be fair. Delay in the commencement or conduct of extradition proceedings which is brought about by the accused himself by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest cannot, in my view, be relied upon as a ground for holding it to be either unjust or oppressive to return him. Any difficulties that he may encounter in the conduct of his defence in consequence of the delay due to such causes are of his own choice and making. Save in the most exceptional circumstances it would be neither unjust nor oppressive that he should be required to accept them. As respects delay which is not brought about by the acts of the accused himself, however, the question of where responsibility lies for the delay is not generally relevant. What matters is not so much the cause of such delay as its effect; or, rather, the effects of those events which would not have happened before the trial of the accused if it had taken place with ordinary promptitude. So where the application for discharge under section 8(3) is based upon the “passage of time” under paragraph (b) and not on absence of good faith under paragraph (c), the court is not normally concerned with what could be an invidious task of considering whether mere inaction of the requisitioning government or its prosecuting authorities which resulted in delay was blameworthy or otherwise.

9. Steblins was a 1989 Act statutory habeas corpus case. Scott Baker LJ recorded (at §9): the various principles that are not in dispute. They are: (1) The passage of time is to be measured from the date of the commission of the offence until the hearing of the application for habeas corpus. (2) If for any of the reasons specified in section 11(3) it appears that the return would be unjust or oppressive there is no room for any exercise of a residual discretion by the court. The applicant must be discharged. (3) Where the passage of time is due to dilatory conduct on behalf of the requesting government, it tells in favour of the fugitive, whereas if the passage of time was inevitable it would not. (4) Delay on the part of the applicant, ie, by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest, cannot, save in the most exceptional circumstances, count towards making his return unjust or oppressive. (5) Although unjust and oppressive are terms which can overlap, the term “unjust” is directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused and the conduct of the trial itself, whereas “oppressive” is directed to hardship to the accused from changes in his circumstances during the period to be taken into consideration. (6) The injustice or oppression must be causatively linked to the passage of time. They cannot be merely incidental to it. The Present Case

10. The Applicant is wanted for extradition to Poland. That is in conjunction with two extradition Requests (1989 Act s.7(1)). He has been “committed under section 9” (1989 Act s.11(1) ). That was by DJ Snow (“the Judge”) at a committal hearing at WMC on 13 October 2023. The Applicant was represented at that hearing by Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska, as he has been before me.

11. The Judge discharged the Applicant (s.9(11)(a)) in relation to one of his convictions (the “Officer Offence”). That was an offence of insulting and threatening a tax officer on 14 December 2015. The discharge was because the Officer Offence did not meet the statutory definition of an “extradition crime” (s.9(8)), since an equivalent offence here would not be punishable by 12 months imprisonment (s.2(1)(a)). On the other matters, the Judge issued the requisite certificate (s.9(9)).

12. The Judge informed the Applicant ( s.11(1) ) of his right to make a statutory habeas corpus application, which he exercised by Part 8 claim form (N208) on 27 October 2023. Conditional bail, with an electronically-monitored curfew, was granted at WMC on 27 March 2024. Complications were encountered in this Court as to whether criminal legal aid was available. That involved communications with the Court from November 2023 onwards. There were Court-ordered directions in January and February 2024. Then there was resolution (in the Applicant’s favour) at an oral hearing before Sir Peter Lane on 27 November 2024. Legal aid was secured on 28 November 2024 and extended on 16 December 2024. A one-day substantive hearing was fixed for 20 March 2025, with a Polish interpreter so that oral evidence could be received. The Accusation Request: VAT Invoices

13. The first extradition Request (1989 Act s.7(1)) is an Accusation Request dated 3 September 2021. It was issued by CPB (the Circuit Prosecutor in Bydgoszcz). Attached to the Request are a decision of DCB (the District Court in Bydgoszcz) dated 4 November 2019 and an All-Points Bulletin issued by CPB dated 15 January 2020. The Accusation Request is supported by other documents including a “Further Information” document dated 22 August 2023, issued by RPB (the Regional Prosecutor in Bydgoszcz). The Accusation Request relates to six counts. I will call them “the VAT Invoices Allegations”. Named members of the organised criminal group, which the Applicant is said to have headed in relation to the VAT Invoices, include Sebastian Jedykiewicz, Teresa Jedykiewicz, Maciej Firyn and Artur Krzywdzinski. Here is how the VAT Invoices Allegations were summarised in the witness statement (27 October 2023) of James Chaplin, the Applicant’s solicitor: the Applicant’s extradition is sought in relation to 6 offences. The offences are described in the Polish authorities’ response to a request for further information dated 8 April 2022. However, in short, between 7 March 2013 and 2015, he is alleged to have played a leading role in a conspiracy to commit VAT fraud by lodging VAT returns based on sham transactions for construction services which triggered unjustified VAT repayments from the Polish tax authorities. He is also accused of conspiring to launder the proceeds of the VAT fraud. The Accusation Request says that “the total value of VAT loss amounted to PLN 2,577,135.86”. PLN stands for Polish zloty. That would be £0.5m at today’s exchange rates. Mr Hearn called it equivalent to “hundreds of thousands of pounds”, a description with which Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska did not disagree. The VAT Invoices Interrogation on 26 June 2018

14. RPB’s Further Information records that the Applicant was “interrogated on 26 June 2018” in relation to the VAT Invoices Allegations and “gave an extensive statement”. The DCB Decision of 4 November 2019 (attached to the Accusation Request) says the Applicant “provided very extensive testimony” and gives references to 9-pages within a file of documents. The Applicant accepts that he was interviewed on 26 June 2018 in Poland, as part of what I will call the “VAT Invoices Proceedings”. But there is an important factual dispute about what happened on and after that interrogation (see §§26-28 below), which I will need to resolve (see §30i below). The Conviction Request: Audi and Excavator

15. The second extradition Request is a conviction Request dated 6 September 2021. It was issued by DCS (the District Court in Swiecie). Attached to the Request are Judgments of DCS dated 16 January 2018 and 7 November 2018. The convictions described in the Conviction Request are twofold. First, for what I will call the “Audi Offence” which was the subject of the “Audi Proceedings” (reference IIK 614/17), proceedings which also included the Officer Offence (§11 above). Second, for what I will call the “Excavator Offence” which was the subject of “the Excavator Proceedings” (reference IIK 255/17). In the Excavator Offence, the victim was Robert Jeszke, and the Applicant falsely described himself as Artur Krzywdzinski. Here are Mr Chaplin’s summaries of the Audi Offence and the Excavator Offence: The [Audi Offence] occurred on 11 December 2015 in Swiecie, it states the Applicant presented tax collectors with a fictitious contract of sale in relation to an Audi 8 vehicle. The contract purported to show that he was no longer the owner of the vehicle. However, investigations by the tax office established that he was still the owner of the vehicle. A sentence of 8 months was imposed in respect of this offence. In relation to [the Excavator Proceedings], the Applicant’s extradition is sought to enforce a sentence of 1 year 2 months imprisonment for a single offence. The [Excavator Offence] was committed in March 2015 in Swiecie and relates to an offence of deception relating to the purported sale of an excavator, which led to the Applicant misappropriating PLN 50,000. A sentence of 1 year and 2 months imprisonment has been imposed. Facts about the Extradition Proceedings

16. The facts within this paragraph were documented and uncontroversial; and I am satisfied that I can rely on them as factually correct. On 7 August 2018, information was received by the Polish authorities that the Applicant might be staying on the Isle of Man. An application was made on 25 July 2019 for a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”). Official documents describing the Applicant were issued on 16 August 2019. An EAW was issued by DCB on 10 March 2020. On 11 May 2021 RCB shared with RPB intelligence that the likely whereabouts of the Applicant was “Mona Terrace” in Douglas, Isle of Man. Also on 11 May 2021 it was recognised that it would be necessary to make a different sort of application for extradition. The Conviction Request was drawn up on 26 May 2021. RPB filed a motion on 30 June 2021 requesting extradition. The Requests were issued on 3 and 9 September 2021. Further Information was issued on 8 April 2022 and 22 June 2022. The Secretary of State on 24 November 2022 issued the necessary “authority to proceed” and schedule of charges (see 1989 Act s.7(1) and s.9(8)). Domestic arrest warrants were issued on 22 March 2023 by DJ Zani at WMC (see 1989 Act s.8 ). The Applicant was arrested at a pharmacy on the Isle of Man on 19 May 2023 and taken to WMC for an initial hearing later the same day (see 1989 s.9(1)). Further Information was dated 22 August 2023. The committal hearing took place before the Judge on 13 October 2023 and the statutory habeas corpus application followed (27 October 2023). The Applicant was held at HMP Wandsworth on qualifying remand (for 10 months 8 days) from 19 May 2023 until his bail on 27 March 2024. In the 12 months since that date, he has been the subject of an electronically-monitored curfew (10pm to 5am), living at a friend’s home in Taunton. Facts about the Applicant

17. The facts within this paragraph were the subject of unchallenged evidence; and I am satisfied that I can rely on them as factually correct. The Applicant is a single man aged 42. He was born in April 1982 in Swiece, Poland. He has a 20 year old son (born in January 2005) and an 18 year old daughter (born in April 2006). They were both born and brought up in Poland, and both still live there. The Applicant is separated from their mother. The Applicant’s mother Elzbieta is 65. His father – Elzbieta’s husband – died in 2007. The Applicant has a 37 year old sister Joanna and a 25 year old sister Andzelika, both of whom live in the Isle of Man. Andzelika and her partner have a 3 year old daughter. The Applicant also has two brothers Darek and Andrzjev, both in their forties who live in Poland. Joanna went to the Isle of Man in around 2009, aged around 21. Andzelika and Elzbieta went to the Isle of Man in around 2013, when Andzelika was aged around 12. By 2018, Elzbieta had returned to Swiece in Poland due to ill health. She lived at a flat in Swiece known as 4a/5 Polna. The Applicant had also lived at 4a/5 Polna and was living there in 2017. He had previously come to the UK (Newcastle) in around 2009, where he found work as a carpenter. He left Poland for Hannover in Germany in July 2017 for 3 months, and was back in Poland in October 2017. He left Poland for the Isle of Man in October 2017, where he lived (at Belmont Terrace) with Elzbieta and Andzelika. Waiting for a work permit there, he returned to Hannover for two months in January 2018. Having received his work permit, he was back in the Isle of Man in March 2018. He retained his name. He has had a documented position there. He had his work permit. He registered with a GP. He has worked in various types of job: in a kitchen; doing scaffolding; and as a licensed security guard. While living with Andzelika and her partner (from October 2018 at Teveril Street), he saved money and was able to move into his own place (from December 2019 at Monar Terrace). He remained in contact with his two children in Poland. Prior to his arrest in May 2023, he was sending £500 per month for their maintenance. He is close to Joanna. He is close to Andzelika and his niece, providing support and assistance including when Andzelika’s partner is working. He has committed no criminal offence since December 2015. Disputed Factual Matters

18. The Audi Proceedings, the Excavator Proceedings and the VAT Invoices Proceedings all involve material factual disputes. I will set out, in respect of each set of Proceedings: (i) what the Respondent’s documentary evidence described; (ii) what the Applicant’s evidence described; and (iii) what were the key points made on the Applicant’s behalf. Having done all that, I will proceed to my findings of fact, and the reasons why I arrived at those findings. Each time I turn to what the Applicant’s evidence described I will use the first person, to try best to encapsulate what he was telling me. I start with the Applicant’s evidence in relation to a feature which became a repeated theme in the arguments advanced on his behalf. It concerns his travels to and from Poland. Travelling to Poland: Applicant’s Description

19. The Applicant’s evidence was this. From October 2017, I travelled to Poland around 40 times, up to May 2020. My two children were in Poland with their mother, my partner. From 2018, my mother Elzbieta was there too at 4a/5 Polna. So were my two brothers. I went at Christmas, my children’s birthdays, Easter, bank holidays, summer holidays. Then in 2020 the Covid-19 pandemic came and I stopped. I did not start again. I did not travel to Poland in the period between May 2020 and me extradition arrest in May 2023. At first, that was because of the pandemic. But after the pandemic, it was because I discovered that my partner in Poland had cheated on me with my friend. After that, I never went back. Audi Proceedings (i): DCS’s Description

20. DCS’s description was in the Further Information dated 22 August 2023, put alongside the Conviction Request and attached court documents. The Audi Offence was committed on 11 December 2015. The charges were presented at a hearing on 21 March 2016, at which the Applicant was “heard”. The indictment was submitted to the court on 25 April 2016. A default judgment was issued (31 May 2016) to which defence counsel (15 June 2016) and then the prosecution (16 June 2016) filed objections. From 21 June 2016, the Applicant was informed that he was obliged both (i) to provide a correspondence address and (ii) to notify the conducting authority of any change of residence or stay beyond 7 days. He was “heard” at DCS on 25 August 2016, but did not appear at hearings at DCS on 15 September 2016 and 29 March 2017. Other hearings at DCS had been scheduled for 3 November 2016 and 6 March 2017. At a hearing at DCS on 12 April 2017, the court gave its judgment, with a reasoned justification which followed on 15 May 2017. The prosecutor (5 June 2017) and defence counsel (9 June 2017) filed appeals. The appeal was determined by RCB on 6 October 2017, at which the DCS judgment was quashed and the case remitted to DCS. The Applicant did not attend at hearings at DCS on 12 December 2017 and 12 January 2018. At a hearing on 16 January 2018, DCS gave its fresh judgment (attached to the Conviction Request) at which the Audi Offence attracted the sentence of 8 months custody, with a reasoned justification which followed on 9 February 2018. Defence counsel filed an appeal on 14 March 2018 which RCB rejected on 19 July 2018, so that the sentence (8 months) then became final and binding. A summons was issued on 4 September 2018 for execution of the sentence and a Defence request (12 September 2018) for deferred execution was refused on 15 October 2018. A Defence appeal against the refusal of deferred execution was filed on 31 October 2018 and dismissed by RCB on 18 January 2019. A wanted person notice was issued on 13 February 2019. Meanwhile, on 7 August 2018, information had been received that the Applicant might be staying on the Isle of Man and the EAW application was made on 25 July 2019 (§16 above). During the Audi Proceedings there were delays: because, among other things, defence counsel twice submitted trial postponement requests; and because of asset-seizure court orders appealed by the parties. Delays in executing the sentence (16 January 2018, final and binding on 19 July 2018) stemmed from the Applicant’s departure from Poland, having never indicated the Isle of Man as his place of residence despite his obligation (from 21 June 2016). Audi Proceedings (ii): Applicant’s Description

21. The Applicant’s description came to this. I knew about the Audi Proceedings at the start. I had a lawyer in Poland (Adam Wilczynski), who I paid to represent me. I was aware of two hearings. There was a first appearance which I attended. There was then a hearing where evidence was heard, from which I was excused. I was acquitted and a letter arrived at my registered address in Poland (4a/5 Polna) to tell me that. I had given a letter of authorisation at the first hearing for Mr Wilczynski to represent me. I don’t remember everything. I gave my registered address (4a/5 Polna). I was not told I had to notify any authority of any change of residence or stay beyond 7 days. It was after the acquittal that I went to the Isle of Man. After the acquittal, it was all handled by the lawyer on my behalf, without reference to me. By the summer of 2017 I was in Hannover and I was keeping in touch with my lawyer. I visited Poland very frequently from the Isle of Man, to see my children and family. My registered address in 2016-18 was 4a/5 Polna. I was never aware of any summons relating to the Audi Proceedings arriving there, including in 2018 when my mother was back there, and including in September 2018. I had no knowledge of, or input into, any appeals or applications made on my behalf. That includes any application to defer execution of a sentence. Everything was done by the lawyer. The lawyer did call me on my mobile in October 2018 and said he had to make an application and I said “OK”. Everything was arranged on the phone. But I don’t remember exactly. I think the last time I spoke to my lawyer was the end of 2017. Audi Proceedings (iii): Applicant’s Key Points

22. Based on the Applicant’s oral evidence, Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska made – as I saw it – three key points. First , that the Applicant’s version of events fits with the key features of DCS’s description. His clear description of an acquittal fits with there having been a judgment on 12 April 2017, which the prosecution appealed (5 June 2017) and to which the Applicant’s lawyer responded (9 June 2017). It is credible that the lawyer Mr Wilczynski would have acted in the Applicant’s interests while the Applicant continued to work abroad. Secondly , the Applicant did provide a correspondence address (4a/5 Polna). His credible and consistent account – supported by his actions in returning to Poland multiple times – is a basis for rejecting DCS’s evidence that on 21 June 2016 he was informed that he was obliged to notify the conducting authority of any change of residence or stay beyond 7 days. Thirdly , whatever he was or was not informed, his credible and consistent account – supported by his actions – is a basis for concluding that he genuinely did not believe that he had to give the authorities in the Audi Proceedings any Isle of Man address. Excavator Proceedings (i): DCS’s Description

23. DCS’s description was in the Further Information dated 22 August 2023, put alongside the Conviction Request and attached court documents. The Excavator Offence was committed at the beginning of March 2015. The charges were presented at a hearing on 25 April 2017, at which the Applicant was “heard”. From 25 April 2017 he was informed that he was obliged (i) to provide a correspondence address and (ii) to notify the conducting authority of any change of residence or stay beyond 7 days. After that, he continued consistently to indicate that he resided at 4a/5 Polna. The indictment was presented on 28 April 2017. There was a default judgment (9 May 2017), to which both the prosecution (15 May 2017) and then the defence (18 May 2017) filed objections. The Applicant was “heard” at DCS on 18 July 2017 and 27 October 2017. He did not attend – but was not required to attend – hearings at DCS on 12 September 2017, 5 December 2017, 12 December 2017, 16 January 2018, 30 January 2018, 13 March 2018, 8 May 2018, 21 June 2018 or 23 August 2018. Until 30 August 2018 he was “represented by a defence counsel”, but on that date his defence counsel revoked the power of attorney. On 3 October 2018 the Applicant “independently submitted a request for a defence counsel ex officio”. DCS rejected that request on 5 October 2018. By judgment on 7 November 2018 (attached to the Conviction Request), DCS imposed a sentence of 14 months imprisonment, which became final and binding on 21 November 2018. On 6 February 2019 an order was issued for the Applicant to be brought to prison. Meanwhile, on 7 August 2018, information had been received that he might be staying on the Isle of Man and the EAW application was made on 25 July 2019 (§16 above). During the Excavator Proceedings there were delays caused by the inability to determine the location of a witness Artur Krzywdzinski (who the Applicant had pretended to be when committing the Excavator Offence), resulting in multiple adjournments; and delays, among other things, caused by lending documents for use in another court in a civil claim. Delays in executing the sentence (7 November 2018, final and binding on 21 November 2018) stemmed from the Applicant’s departure from Poland, having not adhered to the obligation (from 25 April 2017) to notify his place of residence. Excavator Proceedings (ii): Applicant’s Description

24. The Applicant’s description came to this. I knew about the Excavator Proceedings at the start. I attended court for one hearing. I gave my evidence. The judge told me: that I did not need to attend any more hearings; that I would probably get a suspended sentence; and that I was permitted to travel abroad for work. I was told that if I received a suspended sentence I would need to come back to Poland to sign a document; and that I could be in contact with probation by phone from abroad, coming back to Poland every three months or so. I did not sign a document. But I did have to make contact with the probation officer, and I did that. Probation had my mobile number and contacted me on my mobile phone. I went back to Poland every few months, as part of my frequent visits to see my children and family. As part of the suspended sentence I had to pay PLN 50,000 to the victim, which I did. I also had to pay court costs of PLN 1,200. I went back to pay the PLN 1,200. It was after being told about the suspended sentence that I went to the Isle of Man. I would not have gone if I had known I would be sentenced and sent to prison. I had a lawyer who acted on my behalf. I did not submit any request in October 2018. I never received any documents. I provided my correspondence address (4a/5 Polna). I was not told I had to notify the conducting authority of any change of residence or stay beyond 7 days. The judge knew I was going abroad to work. Probation knew I was abroad and had my mobile phone number. Excavator Proceedings (iii): Applicant’s Key Points

25. Based on the Applicant’s oral evidence, Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska made – as I saw it – three key points. First , that the Applicant’s version of events fits with the key features of DCS’s description. It fits that a suspended sentence could have been imposed in 2017 or 2018, and then superseded by the DCS judgment of 7 November 2018. It fits with the prosecutor objecting (15 May 2017) and the Defence responding (18 May 2017). It is credible that the lawyer would have acted in the Applicant’s interests while he was working abroad. Secondly , the Applicant did provide a correspondence address (4a/5 Polna). His credible and consistent account – supported by his actions in returning to Poland multiple times – is a basis for rejecting DCS’s evidence that on 25 April 2017 he was informed that he was obliged to notify the conducting authority of any change of residence or stay beyond 7 days; that his description of a suspended sentence is to be preferred to the DCS description of a custodial sentence imposed on 7 November 2018 (albeit attached to the Conviction Request); that his description of compliance with a suspended sentence is to be preferred to the DCS description of an order to bring him to prison; and that he did not on 3 October 2018 the Applicant “independently” submit any request for a defence counsel ex officio. Thirdly , whatever he was or was not informed and whatever did or did not happen, the Applicant’s credible and consistent account – supported by his actions – is a basis for concluding that he genuinely did not believe that he had to give the authorities in the Excavator Proceedings any Isle of Man address; and that he believed he had a suspended sentence, with which he complied. VAT Invoices Proceedings (i): RPB’s Description

26. RPB’s description was in the Further Information dated 22 August 2023, put alongside the Accusation Request and attached court documents. The alleged VAT Invoice offences took place between 7 March 2013 and April 2015. A decision to present charges was made on 16 January 2018. A decision to amend those charges was made on 5 June 2018. The Applicant was interrogated, on 26 June 2018, as a “suspect”. The charges were presented to him. He gave an extensive statement in which he largely admitted the offences with which he was “charged”. As it is recorded in a decision of DCB dated 4 November 2019 (attached to the Accusation Request) the Applicant – as “suspect” – “provided very extensive testimony regarding the offences indicated in the decision to present charges announced to him”, and “substantially confessed to the crimes he was charged with”. The same day (26 June 2018) preventive measures were imposed on the Applicant. That included police surveillance, which involved obligations (i) to report to the Poviat Police Headquarters in Swiecie every two weeks and (ii) to give notification of any change of address. He was “cautioned” as to these obligations. The preventive measures also included a bail bond and a ban on leaving the country. He did not comply with the imposed obligations connected with police surveillance. He did not report to the police headquarters. He did not notify RPB or the Bydgoszcz police of any change of his current residence. Nor did he comply with the ban on leaving the country. On 7 May 2019, because the Applicant was hiding from the prosecution authorities, the investigation was brought to completion with respect to the other suspects, with an indictment being lodged with RCB. On 8 May 2019, the decision was taken to divert (spin-off) the materials relating to the Applicant, to be dealt with in separate proceedings. The investigation against the Applicant was stalled – it being impossible to advance the investigation or take measures contributing to its completion – because the search for the Applicant continued and no procedural actions requiring his participation could be taken. The decision of DCB dated 4 November 2019 (attached to the Accusation Request) granted a prosecutor’s motion, imposing a preventive measure requiring the Applicant’s pre-trial detention. DCB describes the testimony of Sebastian Jedykiewicz, Teresa Jedykiewicz, Maciej Firyn and Artur Krzywdzinski. Defence counsel for the Applicant lodged a complaint against the DCB decision of 4 November 2019, which was heard – in the Applicant’s absence – by DCB on 16 November 2019. On 15 January 2020, the CPB issued an All-Points Bulletin (attached to the Accusation Request) ordering a search for the Applicant. The recorded “recent place of residence” was 4a/5 Polna. The “recent place of employment” was “United Kingdom”. VAT Invoices Proceedings (ii): Applicant’s Description

27. The Applicant’s description came to this. I knew about the VAT Invoices Proceedings. I did not attend any hearings. I was interviewed. But that was as a witness, not as a suspect. It was at the prosecutor’s office and it was conducted by a person called Anna. I agree that it was on 26 June 2018. I was back in the country from the Isle of Man on one of my many visits. In fact, I went to pay the PLA 1,200 relating to the excavator, because the suspended sentence had by then been imposed. I was driving in Poland when the personal assistant at the prosecutor’s office rang my mobile phone, asking me to pop in. That was 25 June 2018. The next day was my interview, as a witness. I gave a statement, in which I denied the allegations. It was claimed that I was the leader of the group, but “I pointed out the person who actually was managing the group”. There were no preventive measures. There was no police surveillance, no obligation to report to the police, no obligation to give notification of a change of address, no bail bond, and no ban on leaving the country. I told Anna I worked abroad. The prosecutor told me they knew I worked abroad, and told me I could leave the country. The prosecutor’s office had my mobile phone number. I knew any documents would be sent to 4a/5 Polna. I heard no more about it. I continued to travel from the Isle of Man to Poland frequently. Nobody stopped me. VAT Invoices Proceedings (iii): Applicant’s Key Points

28. Based on the Applicant’s oral evidence, Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska made – as I saw it – three key points. First , that the Applicant’s version of events fits with the key features of RPB’s description. The Applicant agrees that he attended for interview on 26 June 2018. He was not arrested or summonsed. He went for interview voluntarily. His version of events relating to that interview is credible. There was no subsequent hearing for him to attend. The proceedings continued against the co-defendants. Secondly , the Applicant did provide a correspondence address (4a/5 Polna). His credible and consistent account – supported by his actions in voluntarily attending the interview and returning to Poland multiple times – is a basis for accepting that he had given the prosecutor’s office his mobile phone number; and that he was told he could leave the country. It is a basis for rejecting DCS’s evidence that on 26 June 2018 there were obligations to report to the police, or to give notification of a change of address, or a bail bond, or a ban on leaving the country. Thirdly , whatever he was or was not informed, his credible and consistent account – supported by his actions – is a basis for concluding that he genuinely did not believe that he had to give the authorities in the VAT Invoices Proceedings any Isle of Man address; or that he was banned from leaving the country. My Findings of Fact

29. I turn now to make my findings of fact. I had the advantage of oral evidence from the Applicant, with cross-examination, re-examination and questions from the Court. I had the unchallenged proofs of evidence from Andzelika and Elzbieta. I had all the documentary evidence in the case. I have the facts which I have already accepted, including those aspects of the Applicant’s own evidence which were unchallenged. I had the assistance of submissions about the evidence. At my invitation, Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska provided focused submissions as to what contents of the Further Information I should reject, in light of the Applicant’s oral evidence. At my invitation, Mr Hearn provided focused submissions as to what contents of the Applicant’s oral evidence I should reject, in light of the questioning and documentary evidence. I also had a detailed narrative of the Applicant’s previous convictions and sentences, within a DCS judgment (5 December 2024) on which the Applicant relied. I pause to record that the Applicant had been given two suspended sentences in relation to previous convictions. One was an 18-month suspended sentence in May 2011 (aged 29) at the District Court in Tuchola, with a fine, for 2010 offending. Another was a 4m suspended sentence in February 2015 (aged 32), for 2013 offending.

30. I find the following as facts: i) On 26 June 2018 the Applicant was interviewed as a “suspect” in the VAT Invoices Proceedings. He attended without having been arrested. The charges had been amended on 5 June 2018. These were put to him, as charges. He gave an extensive statement. He largely admitted the offences. He was familiar with the group described in the charges. The prosecutors’ office imposed obligations on him. These were explained to him. He was to report to the police every two weeks. He was to notify any change of address. He was required not to leave the country. The prosecutor’s office did not have his mobile phone number. There was no call to his mobile the previous day. They did not have any address for him in the Isle of Man. They had the 4a/5 Polna address. He knew all of this. He also knew the scale and seriousness of the VAT Invoices allegations. He knew, if convicted, he would face a substantial sentence of imprisonment. After 26 June 2018, the Applicant returned to the Isle of Man. He knowingly breached the ban on leaving Poland. He knowingly failed to provide any residence address (at that stage, 36 Belmont) in the Isle of Man. ii) On 19 July 2018, RCB dismissed the Applicant’s appeal from the DCS judgment of 16 January 2018 in the Audi Proceedings. The Applicant knew about this appeal. It was filed on his behalf, on 14 March 2018, by his lawyer. He was instructing, and paying, that lawyer. The lawyer needed to be able to make contact with the Applicant, to get instructions and to get paid. He had the Applicant’s phone number. The Applicant knew about the continuing work and was able to continue to pay the lawyer for it. By now (2018), Elzbieta was back at the 4a/5 Polna address. Documents relating to the Audi Proceedings continued to be received at that address. They did arrive. There was a summons on 4 September 2018 for execution of the sentence. The Applicant knew about that, because his lawyer – who he was instructing and paying – made a request on 12 September 2018 for deferred execution. When that failed (15 October 2018), the lawyer – who he was instructing and paying – filed an appeal against the refusal (31 October 2018). The Applicant was now at the final stage and he knew it. He knew there was the custodial sentence (8m for the Audi Offence and 4m for the Officer Offence, aggregated to 10m). There was no qualifying remand to deduct. His previous sentences in Poland had been fines and suspended sentences. On 18 January 2019 his lawyer’s final attempt failed. RCB dismissed the appeal against the refusal to defer execution. The Applicant knew he was wanted to serve his sentence. Sure enough, a wanted person notice was issued on 13 February 2019. The Applicant did not believe that the Audi Proceedings had ended with his acquittal. He knew that the authorities only had the 4a/5 Polna address. He did not provide his residence address in the Isle of Man. He had been notified on 21 June 2016 of his obligation to inform the authorities of any new residential address. He breached that obligation. He did not notify Belmont Terrace after October 2017; or Teveril Street after October 2018; or Monar Terrace after December 2019. The information received on 7 October 2020 and 11 May 2021 followed the wanted person notice (13 February 2019) and the EAW (10 March 2020), and the All Points Bulletin in the VAT Invoices Proceedings (15 January 2020). That information did not come from the Applicant or Elzbieta. iii) There was no suspended sentence in the Excavator Proceedings. No judge told the Applicant that there “would be” – or would “probably” be – a suspended sentence for the Excavator Offence. Nobody told the Applicant that a suspended sentence had been imposed, or its duration or conditions. There was no probation supervision, using the mobile phone number and with visits from the Isle of Man, or payments under the terms of a suspended sentence. There was a hearing on 15 April 2017, which the Applicant attended. It preceded the indictment (28 April 2017) and default judgment (9 May 2017), which led to remittal by RCB (6 October 2017). The Applicant was informed, at the hearing on 15 April 2017, that he was obliged not only to provide a correspondence address but also to notify the conducting authority of any change of residence. The Applicant did not believe that the Excavator Proceedings had ended with a suspended sentence. He had a lawyer up to 30 August 2018, when the lawyer revoked the power of attorney. He knew about that, and he knew his trial was looming, because he made an application himself. It was on 3 October 2018. It was not made by the previous lawyer, who stopped acting on 30 August 2018. Nor by a new lawyer. It was made by the Applicant acting as an individual. It was an application for a court-appointed defence counsel. It was refused on 5 October 2018. He knew about that, just as he knew that the previous lawyer had stopped acting. He knew about his imminent trial. He did not attend on 7 November 2018. He was convicted and sentenced to 14 months imprisonment by DCS, the same court which had convicted him 9 months earlier (16 January 2018) of the Audi Offence. By now (2018), Elzbieta was living at 4a/5 Polna. He knew he would be wanted to serve his 14 month sentence, as indeed he was (6 February 2019). In the Excavator Proceedings – in the same court as the Audi Proceedings – the Applicant knew that the authorities only had the 4a/5 Polna address. He did not provide his residence address in the Isle of Man. He had been notified on 25 April 2017 of his obligation to inform the authorities of any new residential address. He breached that obligation. He did not notify Belmont Terrace after October 2017; or Teveril Street after October 2018; or Monar Terrace after December 2019. The information received on 7 October 2020 and 11 May 2021 followed the wanted person notice (13 February 2019) and the EAW (10 March 2020), and the All Points Bulletin in the VAT Invoices Proceedings (15 January 2020). The information did not come from the Applicant or Elzbieta. iv) By February 2019, three things had happened. One was that the Applicant had left Poland following the 26 June 2018 interrogation at RPB in the VAT Invoices Proceedings (facing a substantial term of custody if convicted). The second was that the end of the road had been reached in the Audi Proceedings (10m custody), because of the 18 January 2019 appeal decision at RCB. The third was the end of the road reached in the Excavator Proceedings (14m custody), because of the sentence and 6 February 2019 order to be brought to prison. By being in the Isle of Man at a location and address not disclosed to the authorities, whose sole contact details for him was the 4a/5 Polna address, the Applicant knowingly obstructed any attempt by the authorities to bring him to justice to serve his two custodial sentences and stand trial. v) The Applicant did not continue to travel multiple times to Poland after June 2018. Nor after February 2019. He did not fly “40 times” from the Isle of Man to Poland in the 32 months between October 2017 and May 2020. But even if – and to the extent – that there were flights to and from Poland after June 2018, or after February 2019, these were in circumstances where the authorities did not have his address in the Isle of Man or his mobile phone number. He knew that. He also knew he had two unserved custodial sentences. And he knew he had a serious matter in which he had not yet come to trial. He also knew that he had breached a ban on leaving the country. And he knew he had breached obligations to give the authorities his residential address. vi) The Further Information from DCS and RPB is factually accurate. Where there is inconsistency between that information and the Applicant’s account, the Further Information is the factually correct version of events. The Applicant has not been truthful in his description of key events, in his evidence as to his knowledge, and in his evidence about his state of mind. Reasons

31. My reasons for making these findings of fact are as follows. i) DCS and RPB provided very detailed and comprehensive accounts in all three sets of proceedings. They are corroborated by the court documents attached to the Requests. In the Audi and Excavator Proceedings they are from a court (DCS). In the VAT Invoice Proceedings they are from a prosecutor (RPB), but they are supported by court documents (from DCS). They fit with the information in the Requests. No internal inconsistency has been identified. No inherent implausibility has been identified. The narrative is balanced. One example is in spelling out where the Applicant’s attendance was not required. Another is in acknowledging where there were delays and giving reasons. The accounts are consistent with the detailed recitals in a recent DCS judgment (5 December 2014), on which the Applicant has placed reliance. The Applicant has had the comprehensive accounts – including their Polish versions – for 19 months. He has had legal aid for 3 months. This is notwithstanding that he has lawyers in London and in Poland (who are currently appealing the December 2014 judgment). ii) Not a single item in the DCS and RPB descriptions – provided 19 months ago in August 2023 – has been shown to be inaccurate by pointing to any document. For example, the Applicant has not produced a document to show that – on a date when he is said to have been “heard” – he was in the Isle of Man. He has not produced anything from his Polish lawyers to support his version of events or undermine any aspect of the description. The Applicant spoke in his oral evidence of checks and the court computer in Poland. He had a formidable team of specialist extradition lawyers for the October 2023 committal hearing, and again for this hearing. I was told that the Applicant has lawyers in Poland, currently appealing the December 2014 judgment. iii) There are multiple instances of inherent implausibility in what the Applicant is asking me to accept. Here are prominent examples. (1) He was only a witness and not a suspect on 26 June 2018. That was 21 days after the “charges” had been amended. It was in case where he was said to be the group leader, and he accepts that it was being put to him in June 2018 that he was the group leader. (2) The RPB office has had his mobile phone all along – the same mobile phone he used to liaise with his lawyer in the Audi Proceedings – so that the personal assistant could call him on 25 June 2018. And yet they have not been able to track him down, had to proceed with a separate trial against the co-defendants (after 8 May 2019) and issue a search (15 January 2020). They simply had to call his mobile phone, all along. (3) He had knowledge of all three sets of proceedings, and he had contact with his Audi Proceedings lawyer, but only at the start. Only when Audi was an acquittal; only when Excavator was a suspended sentence; only when VAT Invoices was an interview. He had no knowledge at all, of anything, when it was adverse. He even had no contact with a lawyer – whom he was continuing to pay – when steps were being taken to appeal or suspend adverse decisions. He was only a phone call away. Yet he knew nothing. Pausing there, I have recorded that this slipped at one point in the Applicant’s evidence, when he revealingly told me that the lawyer did call him in October 2018, to say he was making an application. (4) Someone else must have made the application on 3 October 2018, in the Excavation Proceedings. But his own lawyer had terminated the power of attorney on 30 August 2018. The application was for – not by – a new lawyer, appointed by the court. (5) No fewer than three occasions are recorded – 21 June 2016 (Audi), 25 April 2017 (Excavator) and 26 June 2018 (VAT Invoices) – when he was told about obligations including notifying a new residential address. But not one of these happened. Or the Applicant totally misunderstood what he was being told, all three times. (6) A suspended sentence (Excavator) was imposed, at some unidentifiable point, and it was complied with. But nothing in the court record reflects that. Or the court (DCS) has misread the file or deliberately mischaracterised the position. And the latest DCS judgment (5 December 2014) faithfully reflects two previous suspended sentences, of the District Court in Tuchola (18 May 2011) and DCS itself (11 July 2013). The Excavator suspended sentence – whose conditions were supposedly complied with – is missing. It inexplicably became a custodial sentence. iv) I did not find the Applicant to be a convincing witness on any of the aspects of the case where I have made adverse findings of fact. There were many aspects of his evidence on which I could rely, and on which I was satisfied that he was telling me the truth. He told me convincingly about his family, his children, his earnings, his maintenance payments, the ill-health of his mother Elzbieta, the breakdown of his relationship with his ex. I accept that he went abroad to work, and that by remaining in work he could support his children and pay for a lawyer. I accept that he retained his identity, registered as a GP, and obtained a licence to work in security. I accept that the June 2018 interrogation was a voluntary attendance at RPB, which is also a point in his favour. I accept that he travelled from the Isle of Man to Poland to see his children after October 2017. I accept that he has committed no offences, still less of dishonesty, since 2015. I accept that he is a trusted and licensed security guard. I accept that his criminal past is behind him. I have taken full account of all of this in assessing his credibility. On the other hand, he is resisting extradition. The key parts that I was unable to accept were his narrative to support that resistance. The evidence I have rejected was self-serving. It was unsupported by any documentary evidence. I was unable to believe it. I am satisfied – and I am quite sure – that the Applicant did not have his professed ignorance of what was happening in his cases; or his professed ignorance of his obligations. v) Then there was the evidence about flying to Poland. The Applicant volunteered that this had been prolific and had stopped, giving the date of May 2020. But I was not able to accept the truthfulness of what he was telling me. He accepted that he could have travelled after the pandemic. I accept that there was a breakdown in the relationship with his partner. But his children were in Poland. By May 2020, they were aged 15 and 14. His mum was at 4a/5 Polna. That is the address where he said they previously lived together. She had been there from 2018 because she was suffering from ill-health. He was single and had no dependants in the Isle of Man. He was earning good money. And yet he stayed away from Poland in 2021; and again in 2022; and again into 2023 (being arrested in May 2023). I do not accept that his relationship break-down was the reason for staying away from Poland. I did not find this evidence credible or reliable. Especially when put alongside the claim to have travelled 40 times in 32 months from October 2017 to May 2020. Two months of that time were spent in Hannover. That would mean 40 trips in 30 months, while holding down jobs in the Isle of Man, for holidays and birthdays and bank holidays and at other times. No documents were produced as to any of this flying, to Poland and back. Given the obvious significance of travel, especially after June 2018 and after February 2019, it would not have been difficult to produce documentary evidence of this prolific travel. There was none. UOPT Analysis I: Fugitivity

32. Mr Hearn for the Respondent submitted that I can be satisfied – to the criminal standard – that the Applicant has been a “fugitive” during the relevant passage of time. There being no “most exceptional circumstances”, that fugitivity would disentitle him from invoking the UOPT extradition bar. The test for fugitivity is that the requested person knowingly placed themselves beyond the reach of the legal process. Fleeing the country, concealing whereabouts and evading arrest are paradigm examples. Fugitivity is in essence an evaluative judgment, based on findings of fact. The court with the original jurisdiction – in the present case, this Court – has close regard to the facts and circumstances, the actions of the individual, the extent of their knowledge, and their state of mind.

33. In the light of my findings of fact, I find Mr Hearn’s submission unanswerable. In the Audi Proceedings, the Applicant knowingly breached a continuing obligation, of which he was aware from 21 June 2016, to provide the authorities with any new residential address. He knowingly breached that duty from October 2017, in failing to notify Belmont Terrace in the Isle of Man. He did so again from October 2018, in failing to notify Teveril Street. He did so again from December 2019, in failing to notify Monar Terrace. He became unlawfully at large on 18 January 2019. He was already a fugitive. He knowingly concealed his whereabouts. He knowingly evaded arrest. He had left Poland for the Isle of Man in October 2017, knowing and intending to breach that duty. He deliberately left the authorities with 4a/5 Polna as an address. That action had the known and intended consequence of impeding his being pursued. His fugitivity is not somehow purged by how openly he lived in the Isle of Man; nor by whether or how often he travelled to Poland. The same is true in the Excavator Proceedings, where the known and continuing obligation arose from the hearing on 25 April 2017. The same is also true in the VAT Invoices Proceedings, where the known and continuing obligation arose from the interview on 26 June 2018. Of all of this, I am sure, applying the criminal standard. There is a shorter route to an adverse finding on fugitivity. I am sure that the Applicant had a known obligation on 26 June 2018, which he then knowingly breached, not to leave the country. He could not be found. The VAT Invoices proceedings had to go ahead against co-defendants. The Audi and Excavator sentences could not be enforced. He left the country and concealed his whereabouts and evaded arrest. This fugitivity is not somehow purged by the fact that he was going back to a home and a job in the Isle of Man. Nor by how openly he lived there. Nor by whether or how often he travelled to Poland. Of all of this, I am sure. Reduced to its essentials, the Applicant cannot be heard to complain about how unfair it is that he now be extradited to face Polish justice after all this time. He has knowingly brought the passage of time on himself. Of that too, I am sure. That is the end of the case. UOPT Analysis II: Overall Evaluation

34. I will not stop there. On the contrary, I am going to proceed on the premise that I am wrong about fugitivity. What follows is my analysis of the case, had I found that the Respondent had not shown – to the requisite criminal standard – that the Applicant was a fugitive. I am asking whether the UOPT question, whether: it appears to the court in relation to the offence, or each of the offences, in respect of which the applicant’s return is sought, that … by reason of the passage of time since [they are] alleged to have committed it or to have become unlawfully at large, as the case may be … it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return [them].

35. Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska submitted, in essence as I saw it, as follows. i) The overall passage of time in this case is very considerable. The offending and alleged offending is very old. Since the VAT Invoices allegations are an accusation matter, the relevant passage of time reached back to the time when the Applicant is “alleged to have committed” the offence or each of the offences. That means the starting point is March 2013, a full 12 years ago, with the offending allegedly continuing until April 2015, a full 10 years ago. At that time the Applicant was a 30 year old with children aged 7 and 8. There has been a transformative change between the Applicant’s position and circumstances in 2013-2015 on the one hand and his position and circumstances in March 2025 on the other hand. His criminal past is behind him. He has committed no crime, nor been accused of any alleged crime, for a full 10 years. He has been settled in the Isle of Man for 7½ years. He is established in remunerative employment and able to support his 2 children. He is a devoted father, brother and uncle, as well as being a trusted employee. The VAT Invoices allegations are matters of seriousness but not at the top end of the spectrum of serious criminality. And there is serious prejudice so far as a trial in Poland is concerned. Firstly, because of the inevitable difficulties arising from the substantial passage of time since 2013-2015. That will include the problem of being able to adduce evidence and call witnesses, as well as the degradation in evidence and impairment to memory through the passage of so many years. Secondly, because of the perils of delays in the Polish justice system exemplified by the Strasbourg Court’s pilot judgment in Rutkowski v Poland (applications 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11; 7 July 2015). ii) Since the Audi and Excavator matters are conviction matters, the relevant focus is on the passage of time since the Applicant became “unlawfully at large”. That means 18 January 2019 (Audi) and 6 February 2019 (Excavator). It means a full 6 years that have elapsed. During that period there has been the consolidation in the transformation of the Applicant’s life and circumstances. He has demonstrated, through his conduct and contribution, that he is fully rehabilitated. And rehabilitation must be the primary function of any Polish criminal sentence. Added to which, the Applicant has materially been punished through the 10½ months of qualifying remand custody, in recognisably harsh conditions at HMP Wandsworth, to which are to be added the further 12 months of curfew. iii) There has been a manifest lack of due diligence in the pursuit of the extradition proceedings. Information regarding the Applicant’s possible whereabouts in the Isle of Man was received on 7 August 2020 and shared on 11 May 2021, at which point it was acknowledged that there was a need to apply for extradition. The EAW had been issued in March 2020. The Requests were issued in September 2021. The Applicant was not arrested until 19 May 2023. This timescale is not due diligence. The Respondent ought to have taken more proactive steps. Even after the Requests, it should have asked for the extradition proceedings to be expedited. Delays within the receiving state are relevant to the question of due diligence. It is now nearly 5 years since the receipt of the information about the Applicant being in the Isle of Man. None of that 5 year delay can properly be attributed to the Applicant. iv) There was also a lack of due diligence within the pursuit of the three sets of Proceedings in Poland. This is reflected in the acknowledgement in the DCS and RPB descriptions, within the Further Information of 22 August 2023. v) The impacts of extradition are harsh, for the Applicant and his affected family members. Extradition would in light of the passage of time and in all the circumstances be unjust. It would be oppressive. And, having regard to the overlap between injustice and oppression, and the overarching consideration of fairness, extradition in light of the passage of time and its implications would be unfair.

36. I am unable to accept these submissions. Here is why: i) I accept that the offences and alleged offences are old. The passage of time is significant. The Accusation Request passage of time goes back to 2013 to 2015; and the Conviction Request passage of time goes back to 18 January 2019 and 6 February 2019. The Applicant has worked hard. He has established a productive working life and family life with his sisters and niece in the Isle of Man. There is no reliant cohabiting partner or dependent child. The Applicant is single and lived alone at Monar Terrace. His children in Poland are now adults. There is, in my judgment, no harsh impact or implications for any blameless third party. ii) There is no “culpable” delay and Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska were right to avoid using that characterisation. I do not accept that there has been a lack of “due diligence”. I have set out in considerable detail the comprehensive description given of the sequence of events in relation to all three sets of Proceedings (§§20, 23 26 above). I will not repeat that description. Given the opportunity to identify where, in that detailed chronology of events, it was said that some lack of “due diligence” had arisen, Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska were in my judgment quite unable to pinpoint anything. What happened is described in detail. Insofar as there were delays, these are acknowledged and explained (§§21, 23 above). There is nothing in the passage of time and the documented sequence of events relating to the 3 sets of Proceedings approaching these sorts of serious delays and inaction seen within the pilot judgment of Rutkowski . Nor in my judgment is there any basis for supposing still less concluding that the VAT Invoices Trial which the Polish authorities have been waiting to undertake since it “stalled” back in May 2019 would involve a violation of Article 6 ECHR of the Rutkoswki kind. The Article presumption of compliance is applicable and the applicant has enforceable Article 6 right within the Polish process and under the Strasbourg system too. iii) I cannot accept that there has been a lack of “due diligence” in the extradition proceedings (§16 above). The wanted person notice (Audi) was issued on 13 February 2019. It was because searches for the Applicant had failed to locate him that the intended prosecution (VAT Invoices) “stalled” on 8 May 2019, and the trial proceeded against the co-defendants. By 25 July 2019 conviction applications had been made in Poland for the issue of an EAW, and the EAW was issued by DCB on 10 March 2020. That was after the All Points Bulletin had been issued, by reference to the United Kingdom, on 15 January 2020. It was the complication that the Applicant might be in the Isle of Man (7 August 2020) and the shared intelligence about Mona Terrace in the Isle of Man (11 May 2021) that led to the acknowledged need to make a special application (ie. under the European Convention on Extradition 1957). Requests were drawn up in May 2021 and issued by CPB and DCS in September 2021. Further Information was gathered in the first half of 2022. The Secretary of State’s authority to proceed was needed, and it came in November 2022. Domestic arrest warrants were also then required. These were obtained from WMC in March 2023. After that, the Applicant was arrested in May 2023. The passage of time since arrest has been the direct consequence of a legal process in which the Applicant has properly been invoking his legal rights to resist extradition and to due process of law with access to the court. He was produced immediately for his first appearance, on the day of his arrest. The matter was then properly before WMC, culminating in the committal hearing in October 2023 before the Judge. Then in the statutory habeas corpus proceedings there were delays because of the problems relating to the availability of criminal legal aid which were resolved, following various court ordered directions, at an oral hearing in November 2024. Meanwhile, bail had been granted in March 2024. I am unable to accept that there has been a lack of “due diligence” within the extradition proceedings before WMC, or before the Secretary of State, or in this Court. iv) I cannot accept that the passage of time renders extradition “unjust”, viewed in terms of fairness and the trial on the VAT invoices matters. The Applicant will be able to defend himself at any trial. As it happens, he was interviewed extensively and there is a record of what he did and did not say in the statements he made in that interview. Those will be available. No evidence has been adduced, and no example provided, of any concrete specific detriment. Article 6 ECHR considerations and guarantees will apply in Poland to the trial including whether a fair trial is possible in light of the passage of time. The applicable presumption is that the Polish authorities will comply with those human rights standards. The Applicant could have stayed in Poland for a trial against all of the defendants. He chose to return to the Isle of Man. v) The two custodial sentences in the Convention Request are 14 months (Excavator) plus 8 months (Audi), from which 10½ months qualifying remand falls automatically to be deducted. I cannot accept the argument that this – plus the 12 months curfew – constitute an achievement of rehabilitation which for extradition purposes achieves the rationale of the foreign sentences. Just as in Article 8 cases, there remain the clear and constant strong public interest considerations in support of extradition, underpinned by international agreement and mutual respect. vi) Whatever the legal analysis on the question of fugitivity, these facts remain. The Applicant returned to the Isle of Man. He did not give any of his Isle of Man addresses or any of them. He knew that he had not given any of his Isle of Man addresses. He knew that he had the opportunity to provide that information. On my findings of fact, he also knew that he had the obligation to give that information; and that he had the obligation not to leave the country after his June 2018 interrogation. Even if fugitivity were not – or were not available as – an on/off switch in terms of the UOPT question (see §§8-9 above), the circumstances and realities on the ground would remain directly relevant when considering any question of injustice or oppression. I am unable to find the Applicant’s extradition oppressive in terms of its impact on him or anybody else. Asking Lord Diplock’s composite question as a final cross-check (§8 above), it is quite impossible in my judgment to conclude that the extradition of the Applicant would be unfair. Disaggregation

37. Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska made two points relating to disaggregation of sentences. First, they point to the fact that the Audi sentence (8 months custody) was combined with the discharged Tax Officer sentence (4 months custody), to give rise to an aggregated 20 month sentence at DCS on 16 January 2018. That became final and binding when RCB dismissed the Defence appeal on 19 July 2018. This calls for an unperformed exercise in disaggregation, now that the Tax Officer matter has been discharged (§11 above), to ensure “speciality” protection post-surrender. Secondly, they point to the fact of the recent DCS judgment on 5 December 2024, which they say failed to solve the problem and in fact made it worse. That judgment is a fresh aggregation of sentence which not only includes the Tax Officer sentence but also a further non-extradition matter (reference II K 765/16) involving offences in 2008, 2009 and 2010-2011, themselves subject to a September 2018 aggregated sentence (14 months). The necessary disaggregation remains unperformed. Mr Hearn’s response is that there is no necessary disaggregation, because speciality protection can be secured post-surrender, by sorting it all out in Poland then. This was alluded to in apparent support of the criticisms regarding due diligence, in which context I am satisfied it has no traction. It calls for no ruling on this statutory habeas corpus application. Mr Cooper KC and Ms Grudzinska say they will take it up with the Secretary of State, who is the ultimate decision-maker in 1989 extradition surrenders. Conclusion

38. In all the circumstances, and for these reasons, the statutory habeas corpus application is dismissed. I decline to order the Applicant’s discharge (1989 Act s.11(3) ). That is because it does not appear to the Court, in relation to any of the offences in respect of which the Applicant’s return is sought, that by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed the offences (VAT Invoices) and to have become unlawfully at large (Audi and Excavator) it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return him ( s.11(3) (b)). Consequentials

39. All Counsel were agreed that the Court could and should, on this statutory habeas corpus application, adopt the usual confidential embargoed draft judgment mechanism used for reserved judgments in High Court extradition appeals. Having circulated this judgment as an embargoed confidential draft, I will be able to deal here with the appropriate order and any consequential matters.