Richard Ryan v The Information Commissioner & Anor

Background to Appeal

1. This appeal is against a decision of the Information Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) dated 25 September 2025 (IC-368655-Q7X4, the “Decision Notice”). The appeal relates to the application of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). It concerns information about processing costs for a specific type of application relating to drones that was requested from the Civil Aviation Authority (“CAA”).

2. The parties opted for paper determination of the appeal. The Tribunal is satisfied that it can properly determine the issues without a hearing within rule 32(1)(b) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (as amended).

3. On 7 January 2025, the Appellant wrote to the CAA and requested a set of information in four parts (A1, A2, B1 and B2) (the “Request”). The following request B1 is the subject of this appeal (the “disputed information”): “(B) Breakdown of PDRA Processing Costs

1. Average internal processing cost (i.e. labour and operational overheads) per PDRA-01 application under the DSCO platform. ◦ If exact cost data are not tracked per application, please provide any existing average or approximate calculations for direct staff time or overhead allocated to a single application.”

4. The Request also said, “ I would appreciate any additional guidance on the scope or wording of this request that might facilitate disclosure under the cost threshold ”. The Request followed an earlier request from the Appellant that had been refused under section 12 (cost limit) and section 43(2) (prejudice to commercial interests).

5. The Request relates to the system for authorising the use of complex drone operations, a pre-defined risk assessment called PDRA01. The CAA issues these authorisations. They are processed using an automated system, called Digitising Specific Category (“DiSCO”).

6. The CAA responded on 24 January 2025. It provided information for three parts of the Request, and said that it did not hold information for B1 in the format requested. The Appellant requested an internal review on the same day. The CAA’s response clarified some points in the original response. In relation to B1, it said, “ It would be CAA’s position that the average cost of processing is not held by the CAA. This level of detail is not held or maintained by the CAA…This internal review suggests the CAA provides a proxy or approximate figure. It would be the CAA’s position that to provide this would constitute the creation of new information, something the public authorities are not obligated to do in order to satisfy an information request .”

7. The Appellant complained to the Commissioner on 6 March 2025. The Commissioner obtained information from the CAA about its systems and the searches it had carried out. The Commissioner decided that, on the balance of probabilities, the CAA does not hold any further information falling within the scope of the Request. The Appeal and Responses

8. The Appellant appealed on 16 October 2025. His grounds of appeal are: a. Inadequate searches . The CAA has failed to search other locations where the requested information may be held, with reference to various examples. b. Use of existing records . The CAA should be able to create an average from existing records without creating new information, again with reference to various examples, including the response to a previous FOIA request. c. Failure to provide advice and assistance . The Appellant says that he invited aggregated/summary figures and asked for advice on scope under the cost threshold, but this was not evaluated by the Commissioner.

9. The Commissioner’s response maintains that the Decision Notice was correct. a. Inadequate searches . The Appellant has provided no evidence that records are structured as suggested or why the information would be held there, the CAA is in a stronger position to understand where it would be held, and the Commissioner is entitled to accept the CAA’s submissions at face value. b. Use of existing records . The Appellant’s suggestions provide no evidence to contradict the CAA’s position that it does not hold the information required to be able to provide average internal processing cost. c. Failure to provide advice and assistance . The Appellant’s request does not fit into any of the circumstances set out in his guidance, and this is not a request where the CAA could be reasonably expected to provide advice and assistance under Section 16 FOIA.

10. The CAA was joined as a party to the proceedings. The CAA’s response explains that they use DiSCO, a shared technical umbrella platform, for various services including PDRA. It provides a website frontend and automated backend processing. The cost of the DiSCO platform is a combined operating cost and has never been segregated between PDRA and other services. The CAA says, “ It is not possible to provide the appellant with the information requested in respect of section (B) of their request made under FOIA, because the relevant data has not been segregated and/or aggregated in the way that the appellant is suggesting it has been. In turn, staff time and or similar costs have also therefore not been recorded in such a way that addresses the appellant’s question .”

11. The Appellant submitted a reply which we address in the discussion below. Applicable law

12. The relevant provisions of FOIA are as follows. 1 General right of access to information held by public authorities. (1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. …. (4) The information— (a) in respect of which the applicant is to be informed under subsection (1)(a), or (b) which is to be communicated under subsection (1)(b), is the information in question held at the time when the request is received, except that account may be taken of any amendment or deletion made between that time and the time when the information is to be communicated under subsection (1)(b), being an amendment or deletion that would have been made regardless of the receipt of the request. …… 16 Duty to provide advice and assistance. (1) It shall be the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance, so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons who propose to make, or have made, requests for information to it. (2) Any public authority which, in relation to the provision of advice or assistance in any case, conforms with the code of practice under section 45 is to be taken to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1) in relation to that case. …… 58 Determination of appeals (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based.

13. In determining whether or not information is held, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. It is rarely possible to be certain that information relevant to a FOIA request is not held somewhere in a large public authority’s records. The Tribunal should look at all of the circumstances of the case, including evidence about the public authority’s record-keeping systems and the searches that have been conducted for the information, in order to determine whether on the balance of probabilities further information is held by the public authority. In accordance with section 1(4), the information is that held at the time the request is received.

14. A relevant and helpful decision is that of the First-Tier Tribunal in Bromley v the Information Commissioner and the Environment Agency (EA/2006/0072). In discussing the application of the balance of probabilities test, the Tribunal stated that, “ We think that its application requires us to consider a number of factors including the quality of the public authority’s initial analysis of the request, the scope of the search that it decided to make on the basis of that analysis and the rigour and efficiency with which the search was then conducted. Other matters may affect our assessment at each stage, including for example, the discovery of materials elsewhere whose existence or content point to the existence of further information within the public authority which had not been brought to light. Our task is to decide, on the basis of our review of all of these factors, whether the public authority is likely to be holding relevant information beyond that which has already been disclosed .” This decision was cited by the Upper Tribunal in Andrew Preston v Information Commissioner & Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2022] UKUT 344, which also confirmed the principle that the First-Tier Tribunal has consistently applied the balance of probabilities when approaching this question.

15. The duty to provide advice and assistance under section 16 is so far as would be “reasonable” to expect. A public authority will have complied with this duty if they have followed the standards of good practice in the 2018 Code of Practice issued under section 45 FOIA. The Commissioner’s guidance confirms that there are three main circumstances where this duty arises (based on the Code of Practice) – where there is reason to believe the applicant has not given their real name, where the request is ambiguous and requires clarification, and where the request would exceed the cost limit. Issues and evidence

16. The issue is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the CAA were correct to say that they did not hold information under part B1 of the Request, about average internal processing costs. The Appellant also complains that the CAA did not provide advice and assistance under section 16 FOIA.

17. By way of evidence and submissions we had an agreed bundle of open documents, which we have read and taken into account in making our decision. Discussion and Conclusions

18. In accordance with section 58 of FOIA, our role is to consider whether the Commissioner’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law. As set out in section 58(2), we may review any finding of fact on which the Decision Notice was based. This means that we can review all of the evidence provided to us and make our own decision. We deal in turn with the grounds of appeal.

19. Inadequate searches . The Appellant says that the CAA has failed to search other locations where the requested information may be held, with reference to various examples. In his expanded appeal grounds he refers to, “ time-recording/resource allocation, PMO/delivery tooling (e.g., sprints, resource plans), permit-throughput MI by type, or board/fee-setting/business case materials where responsive information is inherently likely to reside ”.

20. The CAA provided to the Commissioner a list of project information relating to DiSCO that had been searched, including financial modelling files which it said may contain some of the building blocks to answer the request but would not be sufficient. The CAA also reviewed all project folders, and determined that the level of held information did not go down to the granular level of “average processing costs” as requested.

21. Having considered the information from the CAA, we are satisfied that it carried out a reasonable and appropriate search for the requested information. The Appellant has speculated that the information may be available elsewhere. However, we have considered the CAA’s underlying explanation about how DiSCO operates. The CAA says that DiSCO is an automated digital application process that is used for PDRA01, and for two other types of application, UK SORA and DMRAS. This is a shared processing cost, and is not split between different types of application. Labour costs associated with processing would be only a small part of the data needed to collate an average cost. We understand that the Appellant may think the CAA ought to have an internal reporting system that gives an average cost per PDRA01 application, but we accept their position that they do not. We therefore do not see how the searches suggested by the Appellant would reveal the requested information.

22. Use of existing records . The Appellant suggests that the CAA should be able to create an average from existing records without creating new information, again with reference to various examples, including the response to a previous FOIA request. His overall point is that the underlying data will exist in a recorded form – “not tracked” does not mean “not held”.

23. The CAA’s position is that they do not track usage of the DiSCO and associated costs in a manner that would produce the data needed to fulfil the request. In their response to the Commissioner, the CAA explain that they could produce an average processing staff time/cost figure, but this would constitute creation of new information, and it would not cover the total cost. The CAA says that it does hold limited data on some of the individual component costs relating to a single PDRA01 – but even if all repositories of limited data are combined this would still not present a final figure. The CAA says that they would need to track and capture new information, which they are not required to do under FOIA.

24. The CAA has given a clear explanation that they do not hold the data required to calculate an average processing cost. They have also explained why this is the case, due to the automated DiSCO system which is used for various types of application. We therefore find on the balance of probabilities that the CAA does not hold the requested information itself, or data in an accessible form that would allow the requested information to be calculated.

25. We note the Appellant’s point that FOIA requires disclosure of information recorded in any form, even if not already compiled in the precise form requested. The Appellant is correct that a public authority is likely to hold a particular type of information if it has the “building blocks” necessary to produce that information. However, this does not require a public authority to create new information. In this case, we are satisfied that the CAA does not hold information on average cost per application. It does not record this information directly, and it does not hold all of the data that would be required to make this calculation. Again, the Appellant may think that they ought to do this, but that is a different question.

26. We note that the Appellant’s Request asked for “existing” average or approximate calculations. The CAA has explained that these calculations do not exist. The Appellant says that the CAA should have provided him with aggregated or approximate figures. However, this is not what he originally asked for. We also find that “approximate” figures are not something that a public authority can be required to calculate under FOIA – it is too unspecific and could be calculated in different ways. An approximate figure cannot be held information unless is has already been calculated and recorded.

27. The Appellant’s reply to the CAA’s response refers to hourly rate calculations that are set out in its Scheme of Charges. He suggests that this shows how a public authority can hold information where the answer can be produced by straightforward mechanical steps. This may provide an example of how to calculate hourly rates in general. But we do not agree that this shows the CAA holds the requested information. The Scheme of Charges is about what the CAA charges organisations and individuals for its services. This is completely different from the CAA’s own internal costs for specific types of application.

28. We therefore find that, on the balance of probabilities, the CAA were correct to say that they did not hold information under part B1 of the Request.

29. Failure to provide advice and assistance . The Appellant says that he invited aggregated/summary figures and asked for advice on scope under the cost threshold, but this was not evaluated by the Commissioner. We have considered this issue and we do not find that there was a failure by the CAA to comply with section 16 FOIA.

30. The Appellant did ask in his Request for any additional guidance that might facilitate disclosure under the cost threshold. However, there was no need for advice and assistance in relation to costs, because the Request was not refused on the basis of cost.

31. The Appellant also says that he expressly invited approximations, averages, aggregated totals, existing high-level cost summaries, and help to refine the request. Looking at the Request itself dated 7 January 2025, as already noted he had asked for “existing” average or approximate calculations. No such calculations existed. He also asked the CAA to consider disclosing aggregated or summary figures if they believed that certain items would “prejudice the CAA’s commercial interests”. The Request was not refused due to prejudice to commercial interests. We do not find that the duty to provide advice and assistance extends to providing aggregate or summary figures where the requester has not originally asked for this, and the actual requested information is not held. As already noted, approximations would not be held information unless already specifically recorded as such. None of the circumstances in the Commissioner’s guidance on advice and assistance apply, and there has been no failure to comply with the 2018 Code of Practice.

32. As a final point, the Appellant’s appeal form and grounds of appeal ask for specific orders for witness statements and explanations from the CAA. We do not consider that this is necessary in order to decide this appeal, having considered the information already provided by the CAA.

33. We dismiss the appeal for the reasons explained above. Signed: Judge Hazel Oliver Date: 20 March 2026