Stephen Turner v Coupland Cavendish Ltd

JUDGE ROWLEY:

1. I am dealing with the claimant’s application dated 22 nd August for an unless order against the defendant for failing to comply with paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the order made by Sweeting J on 7 th August 2025. In essence, the application is about the defendant responding to Part 18 requests previously served and having failed to do so, the claimant’s application seeks a striking out of the defendant’s bill and disputed entries of the cash account, together with an order for costs.

2. This is a long running case which ended up with a hearing last October before Sweeting J on an appeal from a decision of mine to refuse the Part 18 requests. He overturned that decision, and the order of 7 th August 2025 is the order on consequential matters made following the handing down of his judgment.

3. I have been referred to the judgment in respect of the consequential matters, rather than the substantive judgment, because the defendant’s argument against complying with the paragraphs of Sweeting J’s order is that they have appealed that order and have sought a stay whilst that appeal is heard. I am told those applications were made in time, but they have not yet been considered by the Court of Appeal. There is reference in Miss Bedford’s skeleton argument this morning to the Court calling for bundles. So it is on foot, but it has not been decided. And as I said during the submissions, the fact that the Court of Appeal were told about this hearing, but did not do anything ostensible about it, does not seem to me to be entirely surprising. I am sure they are dealing with other matters even outside term. So, I do not think I can take anything from the Court of Appeal’s approach to this, other than the fact that there is an application for a stay that is extant before the Court of Appeal.

4. Sweeting J did not think it was appropriate to stay compliance with his orders pending any appeal, and at paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment he looks at that and says: “I am not persuaded that refusing a stay would place the respondent in an unjust position or compel a breach of my order. Compliance with an order for information is an expected part of litigation, and the respondent has not demonstrated that compliance would create irreversible prejudice so severe as to warrant delaying the effect of the judgment. The balance of justice does not favour a stay in these circumstances. The immediate provision of this information could, in fact, facilitate the efficient resolution of the underlying dispute, particularly given the straightforward nature of the information sought regardless of any further appellate process.” and he mentions earlier in that paragraph the case of Edwards which was another appeal from me where Ritchie J took, I think, a similar view in relation to the possibility of information being provided by the defendant clarifying and resolving matters.

5. I have to say that I am afraid I take a different view. That is not to suggest that I have any better information, just that I have a different perspective. This case came before me several years ago now as part of six cases that all requested a detailed assessment hearings at the same time and, I recall, were all walking in step in terms of the procedural aspects. There were, I believe, in those cases, various other requests for Part 18 requests being made. My experience of another case where those requests have been answered is that they have still resulted in a hearing. Indeed, that hearing has not effectively resolved the case because I think that that judgment is in the process of being appealed.

6. I am afraid I take, therefore, a slightly more sanguine approach of whether answering these requests is going to make any difference to the litigation that is involved here, and that it is a much wider issue than the individual case which I take as being important from Sweeting J’s judgment. Similarly, my recollection of Ritchie J’s judgment was that he thought answering the requests would resolve the case before him. It may or may not do. But I think there is a much wider issue here which is why the Court of Appeal are being asked for permission to appeal.

7. It seems to me that the appeal to the Court of Appeal is something that it would be odd for a court at first instance to interfere with, and I do think that there is a risk that requiring the defendant to answer the requests would make the Court of Appeal think there was nothing to be decided.

8. I appreciate that Sweeting J is at a level above me on this, and I cannot simply go ahead and disregard what he says. But I do think there is no prejudice to the claimant in relation to adjourning this hearing to a later date because of - and this is no criticism of the parties - the length of time this case has taken to get here through other cases being heard and decided that were seemingly relevant to this case. This position means that I do not accept there is a rush to deal with today’s application.

9. It is said that there has been a wilful breach of a court order by solicitors and that ought to be acknowledged by the court. But it seems to me if a decision is appealed and an application is made for a stay, the solicitors are doing no more than exercising the same right as any other litigant. If there was not the opportunity to make an application to both courts, that is not what the rules would say. But the applications have been made, they are still outstanding, and it does not seem to me to be appropriate to make an order which inevitably would also be appealed, and I think I would have some difficulty in not giving permission to appeal, which would just increase the costs all round.

10. So I am going to adjourn this application until the Court of Appeal has decided whether to grant a stay. If they decide not to give it a stay or not to deal with the appeal, then I think that that will resolve the issue anyway.

11. I am not dealing with the Mazur point here. This case has been the acme example of dealing with things with a lack of formality, and so an application would be required. I am not going to go any further than that in relation to Mazur today. I note the application is signed by Mr Carlisle, and I note what it says. As he is not counsel, there is no reason why he cannot potentially give evidence about something whilst an advocate. But it - in the old phrase - calls for an explanation perhaps. But today is not the day for requiring that to happen.

12. So I am going to adjourn this case under my general case management powers until 28 days after the Court of Appeal has decided whether or not to grant a stay. - - - - - - - - - - - - - (This Judgment has been approved by the Judge.) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd., 2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP. Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDE Email: [email protected] Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com