Stonewater Limited v Harry Mitchell & Anor

1. THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Here is my decision on sentence after giving judgment on two allegations of breach of injunction a few moments ago. We had a pause in order to allow you, Mr Harry Mitchell, time to reflect on my findings that you committed two deliberate breaches of the injunction made on 17 September 2025.

2. The first proven breach is that you urinated directly outside the bedroom window of Denise Ward, a fellow resident at Leicester Court, on 18 December. You did so knowing that it was in view of her CCTV camera, likely to come to her attention, and whilst it certainly did cause her harassment, alarm and distress, I found that you did so deliberately intending it to cause harassment, alarm and distress. Secondly, four days later at 11.30 pm on 22 December, you deliberately played loud music on your mobile phone, made some noises as if singing along and lingered unnecessarily in the communal hallway outside the flat where your wife, Mrs Mitchell, is the tenant and which is the same hallway as Denise Ward’s flat, thereby causing harassment, alarm and distress to Denise Ward. So, two deliberate breaches of the injunction, specifically of paragraph 2 of the injunction that was made a final order on 25 November 2025, it having been imposed as in interim order in its current terms two months prior on 17 September 2025. You were represented by a barrister at both of those hearings, and in fact the injunction was made with your full knowledge and indeed your consent. You understood and did not oppose that injunction remaining in force as a final order.

3. It has taken a couple of hearings to reach this point. Denise Ward has attended today and given evidence. That was essential given that to prove these breaches to the criminal standard, I would have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that your behaviour had actually caused harassment, alarm and distress. I will not go over my judgment on the breaches, but suffice to say there have been two breaches of paragraph 2 proven. You have chosen not to say a lot about them in mitigation. One point that Ms Callaway for Stonewater, the social landlord who has brought these proceedings, made is that they took place soon after the final injunction was made. I do not attach to much weight to that because actually the injunction had been in force since before September, in interim form. It was only made a final order on 25 November and then these breaches followed on the 18th and 22 nd December. But looking at the wider context, I do put more emphasis on the other aggravating feature identified by Stonewater, which is that this is undoubtedly part of a campaign of antisocial and harassing behaviour against Denise Ward, a vulnerable near neighbour. Without going too far into the past, by way of illustration for this sentencing exercise, you have been convicted twice in 2025 of assaulting this older lady. She has disabilities including fibromyalgia. She has been having panic attacks because of the behaviour she has endured. She sets out in her statements that she has been prescribed medication and counselling for anxiety. She describes being exasperated by stress and trauma. She describes shaking with fear when she saw her CCTV camera footage of you urinating outside her house, and she concludes one of her statements by setting out that your behaviour has had a terrible effect on her life, living under constant stress and fear from you, and she is very scared that you would seriously hurt her. She talks about the assaults, she talks about the anti-social behaviour, being in floods of tears, shaking with fear. She tries to carry on, for example working in a charity shop. There is nothing to suggest she has played any willing part in any of this that has gone on. She is very much a victim of your pattern of malicious behaviour, and that is the context in which these two proven breaches of injunction on 18 and 22 December have taken place.

4. That is the factual background and context. The law I will keep brief, but I should make clear that there is a leading case that guides judges when dealing with committal proceedings such as this. It is Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631 , a Court of Appeal case from 2022. It provides guidelines for assessing the right response to breaches of injunction like this. It also talks about the principles that I should have in mind: that I should make the least severe penalty that I can; that I should bear in mind rehabilitation, deterrence (it is not simply about punishment, and indeed deterrence is a crucial principle); that if I believe these breaches of injunction (there have not been any prior to these two) cross the custody threshold, I should then go on to consider, particularly upon first breaches, whether the sentence can be suspended. I have in mind the principle of totality, and I put at the front of my mind deterrence here, because what we need more than anything is a cessation of this sometimes obvious, sometimes more underhand, and certainly very harmful behaviour. It is for Stonewater to consider whether they use these breaches as part of possession proceedings. My role today is to deal with these two breaches.

5. Bearing in mind those principles and looking at the guideline in that case, before I do that, I only want to mention one other principle, which is highlighted in the skeleton argument provided to me by Stonewater today. That is the need to consider mitigation from you. Ms Callaway references a Court of Appeal case from 2013 which says that mitigating features may comprise personal inadequacy, admissions of breach, low-level antisocial behaviour and efforts to reform. You have not particularly raised any mitigation. You have not taken the time I gave after setting out why I found these breaches proved to reflect and so perhaps to suggest that actually you were sorry or that they were a silly mistake. So there are no admissions nor an apology that I can bear in mind. I cannot call this low-level antisocial behaviour. There was no direct verbal confrontation, there was no physical harm caused but nonetheless, in the context of the history here, the antisocial behaviour is serious. There is nothing, given that you have not acknowledged the breaches, to suggest efforts to reform.

6. So, taking all of that into account - the background, the aggravating features and the mitigation – and now turning to sentence, I agree with Ms Callaway that both breaches are Culpability B and Harm Category 2. What that means is, in terms of culpability, your responsibility, is that they are both deliberate. I made that clear in my findings. These were not - as they might have been, had your intent not been demonstrated and proven - accidental. I found that you very clearly did commit them deliberately which is why they are categorised as deliberate breaches falling between categories A and C. In terms of harm, bearing in mind what I have read from Ms Ward, which I do not doubt, I accept in full, these are breaches causing more than little or no harm or distress, so they are at the higher end of category 2. They are medium range harm and distress. That is not to denigrate the level of harm, which is described in very full terms, but I have to bear in mind, I think, when looking at some factors in Mr Mitchell's favour here or in a more restrictive way, that some of what Ms Ward outlines about the effect on her relates to the ‘bigger picture’ here about the pattern of harassment. The harm caused by these two breaches is category 2.

7. I do find that the breaches are so serious that any adjournment of sentence or review hearing in the future would be inappropriate here. The custody threshold is clearly crossed. My start point is a month for one breach. There are two here, and looking at the principle of totality and the fact that the harm is at the upper end of category 2, I would impose a sentence of six weeks in custody for the first breach on 18 December, four weeks for the second breach on 22 December, but bearing in mind, as I say, totality and proportionality and imposing the shortest sentence that I think will punish and deter you, I will make those concurrent. So it is a six-week sentence.

8. Then to whether I can suspend that sentence or not. These are your first breaches. Because these proceedings have been ongoing which of itself is some deterrence, I am not particularly confident there will not be further issues in the future, but equally you have not committed any more breaches since December. We are now heading for March. I think there is just enough for me on these first two breaches to suspend that sentence, but it will be suspended for the duration of the injunction, which is through to 2027, and I need to make very clear that if you are found to have breached the injunction in the future then that six-week sentence will be activated and there will be a further sentence imposed for that subsequent breach. So you very, very likely would, if there is any further breach of this injunction, any further behaviour which causes harassment, alarm or distress to any residents of Leicester Court, be likely to have that six-week sentence and an additional one activated. If the sentence is activated, you will serve half its duration in custody, so you can take it fairly confidently that if a further breach is proved, you will be going to prison for at least three weeks. It could well be longer, depending on the nature of the further breach and the sentence for that.

9. Therefore, it is a suspended sentence of six weeks for the duration of the injunction. I hope that will be the deterrent necessary for you to take absolute care to not do anything to harass, alarm or distress Ms Ward or anybody else at Leicester Court. If you do, and we therefore go through the same process again then as I say the present suspended sentence is very likely to be activated. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected] This Transcript has been approved by the Judge