WW (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

LORD JUSTICE SALES:

1. This is a renewed oral application for permission to appeal made by the Secretary of State in an immigration matter.

2. Mr Sheldon, who appears for the Secretary of State today, correctly does not attempt to argue that the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice. He seeks to pin the Secretary of State’s case to the contention that this is a matter which passes the second appeals test on the “some other compelling reason” limb of the test. He submits that this is a strong appeal, although the Secretary of State shoulders part of the blame (I would interpose, a very considerable part of the blame) for the case not being argued below as she would like it now to be argued in this court. Nonetheless, he says this court should have regard to the consideration that this would be the first time in which the precise way in which the issues are now sought to be framed by the Secretary of State would be addressed in that way. He refers to the public interest in deportation of foreign criminals in appropriate cases and maintenance of public confidence in the immigration system. He also submits that there is a danger of subordinating the public interest to private interest in determining this application.

3. I am entirely unpersuaded that this is a case which satisfies the second appeals test. As noted, it plainly does not give rise to an important point of principle or practice, a point forcefully made by Burnett LJ when refusing permission to appeal on the papers. Nor do the matters mentioned by Mr Sheldon either singly or cumulatively indicate that there is a compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear this case. The fact of the matter is that this is a case which turns on its own particular facts. Whilst there might be arguable grounds for contending that errors occurred below, I make no further comment about that. There is no obvious injustice. It is a case in which the tribunals below sought to refer to the relevant principles and apply them to the particular facts of the case. I am satisfied that this is not a case where it could be said that there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the case. On the contrary, it seems to me to be a fairly run-of-the-mill immigration case which the Secretary of State happens to have lost.

4. For these reasons I dismiss this application. Order: Application refused