Wyldecrest Parks (Management) Ltd v North Northamptonshire Council

Introduction

1. This appeal concerns three conditions included in a new site licence issued under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 to the appellant, Wyldecrest Parks (Management) Ltd by the respondent , North Northamptonshire Council on 20 April 2023 . The licence regulates the use of a protected site known as Wilby Caravan Park, at Wilby in Northamptonshire, which contains 91 permanent pitches (the Site).

2. This is the second appeal to the Tribunal concerning the licence. In a previous decision handed down on 15 November 2024, the Tribunal (Judge Cooke), allowed Wyldecrest’s appeal against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, Property Chamber (the FTT), to strike out its challenge to the licence on procedural grounds after a hearing lasting almost two days. The original appeal was reinstated and remitted to the FTT for determination. The current appeal is against the FTT’s decision of 15 April 2025, issued after a further hearing, by which it varied a number of the conditions originally imposed by the Council, but dismissed Wyldecrest’s challenges to the remainder.

3. At the hearing of the appeal Wyldecrest was represented by its Estates Director, Mr David Sunderland. The Council was represented by Mr Matt Lewin. I am grateful to them both for their submissions. The legislation

4. The Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 prohibits the use of land as a caravan site without a site licence (section 1(1)). Licences are issued by the local authority in whose area the land is situated (section 3(1)) and should be issued within two months of an application by a person entitled to the benefit of a planning permission for the use of the land as a caravan site (section 3(4)). Where a local authority fails to issue a site licence within the required time, the person who applied for the licence does not commit an offence by using the site without a licence from the end of the period of two months until a licence is issued (section 6).

5. Local authorities may issue a licence subject to such conditions “as the authority may think it necessary or desirable to impose on the occupier of the land in the interests of persons dwelling thereon in caravans, or of any other class of persons, or of the public at large” (section 5(1)). In deciding what conditions to attach to a site licence a local authority is required to have regard to model standards specified by the Minister (section 5(6)).

6. The current edition of the model standards published under section 5 is the Model Standards 2008 for Caravan Sites in England.

7. Any person aggrieved by any condition included in a site licence may appeal to the FTT (if the site is in England). If the FTT is satisfied (having regard amongst other things to any model standards which may have been specified) that the condition is “unduly burdensome”, it may vary or cancel the condition (section 7(1)).

8. A local authority is given power to alter the conditions attached to a site licence at any time, but before exercising that power it is required to afford the licence holder an opportunity to make representations (section 8(1)). Any person aggrieved by any alteration of the conditions attached to a site licence or by the refusal of the local authority of an application by them for the alteration of those conditions, may appeal to the FTT.

9. The right of appeal to this Tribunal against a decision of the FTT under the 1960 Act is conferred by section 11 , Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 , insofar as the appeal is on a point of law, and by section 231 C, Housing Act 2004 , insofar as the appeal raises any other point. The Licence

10. A licence was first issued for the Site in 1961 when it was operated by members of the Barney family. A further licence was granted to four family members on 15 September 1997 and that licence was varied and regranted to Wilbrook Parks Ltd on 1 April 2017. Wyldecrest acquired the licence holder on 6 August 2021 and at the same time was granted a lease of the Site by the owner of the freehold. It applied initially for a transfer of the 2017 licence, but on 5 April 2023 it applied for a new licence.

11. The new site licence issued by the Council on 20 April 2023 (the Licence) contained 42 conditions, 2 schedules and a set of 31 site rules. The maximum number of caravans which could be stationed on the Site under the terms of the Licence was 85, a figure which had remained unchanged since at least 1997.

12. The only conditions which remain controversial are numbers 6, 11, and 34 in the Licence.

13. Condition 6 provided that: “The layout of the site shall not be varied without the prior written consent of the Council, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.”

14. Conditions 4 and 5 are not the subject of the appeal but are relevant to the issues concerning condition 6. Condition 4 required the site owner to provide the Council with a scale plan of the layout of the site within 90 days of being requested to do so and “at any time when significant alterations to the site layout are undertaken”.

15. Condition 5 required the licence holder to inform the Licensing Authority in writing prior to any caravan being removed, replaced or refurbished, prior to the siting of any new caravan, and prior to alterations being made to the site layout.

16. Conditions 4 is a variant of a condition found in the Model Standards which required that a plan be supplied with any application for a licence and when any material alteration is made to site boundaries or layout. Conditions 5 and 6 are not in the Model Standards but nor are they new, condition 6 having featured in the 1997 and 2017 licences, and condition 5 in the 2017 licence.

17. Condition 11 is also the subject of the appeal. It concerns access for emergency vehicles and is also based on the Model Standards. It specifies the required width and clearance for all roads and gateways and details of turning circles. The condition, which had been included in the 1997 and 2017 licences, was qualified by the following statement: “(The road system existing at the time of this licence will be accepted. However, if any significant alteration to the site layout is undertaken then the above condition shall be met in full in respect of the new site layout).”

18. Condition 34 is the final condition under appeal. It concerns parking and requires that: “Suitably surfaced parking spaces shall be provided on the site at a ratio of not less than one per caravan plus one further space for every five caravans.” The same condition had appeared in the 1997 and 2017 licences. It is more stringent than the corresponding paragraph of the Model Standards, which specifies only that suitably surfaced parking spaces are to be provided “to meet the requirements of residents and their visitors” without stipulating any number or ratio. The proceedings before the FTT and its decision

19. Wyldecrest originally challenged many of the conditions included in the Licence, but at the first hearing, which took place in March 2024, it dropped some of its objections and believed it had reached agreement with the Council for changes to accommodate others. The FTT reached no conclusion about any of the objections in its original decision, because it considered that the appeal had been made in the wrong form.

20. After the FTT’s first decision was reversed on appeal and the matter remitted to it for further consideration, the FTT ordered the Council to reconsider the Licence conditions and to produce the conditions which it now wished to impose. The Council produced revised conditions, but only in the context of the appeal. It did not exercise its power under section 8(1) of the 1960 Act to alter the conditions of the Licence, which remained the same, but it presumably intended that the FTT would exercise its power to vary the original conditions and substitute those it now proposed.

21. One change proposed by the Council was to the number of caravans which could be stationed on the Site, which the Council’s revised conditions increased from 85 to 92. Wyldecrest objected to the inclusion of any limit, arguing that that was a matter for the planning authority which had placed no limit on the number of caravans which could be stationed on the Site when it granted permission in 1968. The FTT confirmed the limit of 92 and there has been no further appeal from that determination.

22. The Council also proposed that the original condition 6 (which dated at least from 1997 and to which it had made no change when it issued the Licence) should now be varied by the addition of the words in italics below: “The layout of the site shall not be varied without the prior written consent of the Council, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and shall in any event be determined within 28 days of the date of request for consent .”

23. Wyldecrest objected to condition 6 in both its original and its amended forms, arguing that it was unduly burdensome to require it to obtain the licensing authority’s consent to a variation in site layout. It pointed out the Council’s record in dealing with requests (Wyldecrest’s requests to transfer the 2017 licence was made on 13 August 2021 and was neither granted nor refused until April 2023). It acknowledged the introduction of a 28 day time limit for the determination of requests for consent but questioned what would happen if the limit was exceeded and pointed out that there was no right of appeal against a non-determination by a licensing authority.

24. In its decision the FTT accepted the Council’s proposed addition of a 28 day time limit for the determination of an application for consent to change the layout of the Site. But it also sought to accommodate Wyldecrest’s concerns about delay and about the right of appeal by an addition of its own. In the form approved by the FTT the condition says this (with the FTT’s additions and excisions in italics or struck through): “ No material change may be made to the layout of the site shall not be varied without the prior written consent of the Council, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and shall in any event be determined within 28 days of the date of request. Failure to respond in time or the refusal of consent shall be treated as the refusal of consent to vary the condition so as to permit an appeal to the appropriate tribunal under .” section 8 of the 1960 Act

25. In explaining its additional wording the FTT referred to the decision of the Tribunal (HHJ Huskinson) in Wyldecrest Parks (Management) Ltd v Guildford Borough Council [2017] UKUT 433 (LC) (“ Guildford ”) which it said had involved a similar condition.

26. The Council also proposed a change to condition 11. In place of the qualification which appeared in the 1997, 2017 and 2023 licences which accepted the road system at the date of issue of the licence, the Council now proposed to stipulate that “The road system existing as of 1 st April 2017 will be accepted” but that any significant alteration to the site layout were required to satisfy the specified road and gate widths and turning circles.

27. Wyldecrest objected to the proposed change to condition 11 because of its apparently retrospective effect. It would have been content for the stipulated road widths to apply to new roads, and to apply to changes made after the licence, but suggested that it could not be held responsible for the layout of the Site before the condition came into force.

28. The FTT decided that there was no evidence that the condition in the amended form proposed by the Council was unduly burdensome and it was confirmed.

29. No change was proposed by the Council to condition 34 (other than to renumber it 28), but Wyldecrest continued to object to it as unduly burdensome on the basis that it would require 110 parking spaces, some of which did not exist and could not be provided. (The figure of 110 assumes 92 residents’ spaces and 18 for visitors).

30. The FTT confirmed the condition and found that there was no evidence to support the suggestion that the requirement to provide one additional space for each five caravans was unduly burdensome. The same condition had been included since 1997. The appeal against condition 6

31. In its decision the FTT relied on the Guildford case as justifying its approach to condition 6, and the focus of the appeal was on whether it had misunderstood what the Tribunal decided in that case.

32. Before looking at the Guildford case in more detail it is necessary to refer to well-known principles concerning covenants or conditions which provide that A may not do something without the previous consent of B, but that B may not refuse its consent unreasonably. Covenants of that type are common in contractual situations, including in landlord and tenant relationships. I suspect they are rather unusual in the context of licensing conditions and, with the exception of the Guildford case and FTT cases which are said to apply it, I was shown no other use of such a condition in a licence granted for a protected site or any other sort of licence.

33. In a lease or tenancy agreement a covenant that the tenant will not carry out alterations without the consent of the landlord, “which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld”, imposes no obligation on the landlord not to withhold its consent unreasonably. The landlord has agreed only that the tenant’s obligation should be qualified so that if the landlord unreasonably withholds its consent, the tenant will be free to make the proposed alteration without consent. An unreasonable refusal removes the requirement to obtain consent. This is a well-established principle (see Treloar v Biggs (1874) LR 9 Ex 151).

34. If the same approach is applied to a condition in a site licence that alterations may not be carried out without the consent of the licensing authority, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld, the effect of an unreasonable refusal would be that the site owner would be free to make the proposed alteration without the licensing authority’s consent. But it would be for the site owner, in such a case, to prove that consent has been withheld unreasonably, which may not be easy, especially if the licensing authority had not refused its consent expressly but had simply failed to respond or failed to decide whether to give consent or not.

35. The form of condition proposed by the Council addressed that difficulty by including the additional stipulation that not only was the Council’s consent not to be unreasonably withheld but that a request “shall in any event be determined within 28 days of the date of request for consent.” Applying the same reasoning, the effect of that condition would have been that if a request for consent was not determined within 28 days the restriction on making alterations would be dispensed with. It would no longer be necessary for the site owner to obtain the Council’s consent before making the alteration for which consent had been requested.

36. The FTT modified the condition proposed by the Council to spell out what it considered should be the consequences of a refusal or a delay in determining an application. According to the FTT’s condition: “Failure to respond in time or the refusal of consent shall be treated as the refusal of consent to vary the condition so as to permit an appeal to the appropriate tribunal under section 8 of the 1960 Act .”

37. This is highly problematic. The FTT’s condition appears to take away the normal common law consequence of an unreasonable refusal, and the additional consequence of a failure to respond in time (either of which, on the Council’s formulation, would have left Wyldecrest free to make its proposed alteration). And it does so by stipulating how a refusal of consent (any refusal of consent, reasonable or unreasonable) or any failure to respond in time is to be treated in future, namely, as a refusal of consent to vary the condition.

38. The first difficulty is that a request for consent pursuant to a condition is a fundamentally different thing from a request to vary the condition itself, and I do not accept Mr Lewin’s submission to the contrary. A request for consent to alter the Site layout is entirely in accordance with the condition. If it is granted, the person making the request has permission to make the alteration they have proposed but the condition itself remains unchanged. A request to vary a condition is not in accordance with the condition, it seeks to change it. If the request is granted, a different condition would be substituted for the original. Whether a request is of one type or the other depends on the terms of the request, and I do not see how a condition in a licence can change the nature of the request which has not yet been made.

39. Nor do I see how a condition in a licence can determine how a future court or tribunal should treat a request for consent. If there has been no application to alter a licence condition, but only a request for a consent required by the condition, no amount of deeming could compel a future decision maker to treat it as something which it is not.

40. There is then a problem of jurisdiction. The 1960 Act makes no provision for resolving disputes about unreasonable refusals of consent. The FTT’s jurisdictions are statutory and do not extend to resolving such a dispute. A dispute about consent does not raise any question under the Mobile Homes Act 1983 nor any question in respect of an agreement to which that Act applies, so the FTT has no jurisdiction under section 4 of the Act . Nor does the FTT have jurisdiction under the 1960 Act to determine whether consent has been unreasonably withheld.

41. The FTT does have jurisdiction under section 8(2) of the 1960 Act to entertain an appeal against a refusal of an application to alter a licence condition. But for that jurisdiction to be engaged there must have been a genuine application for a variation of a condition, which must have been refused. The jurisdiction under section 8(2) , 1960 Act, is not engaged by a refusal of consent to make an alteration to the layout of the Site, since that does not involve any variation of the condition. The FTT cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by stating in a licence condition that an application of one type, over which it has no jurisdiction, should be treated as if it were an application of a different type, over which it does have jurisdiction.

42. If a site owner made a request under the FTT’s version of condition 6, for consent to alter the site, and that consent was refused on grounds which the site owner considered unreasonable, it would have a right to apply to the court (not the FTT) for a declaration that consent has been unreasonably withheld. That would be an unusual piece of litigation and a very unwieldy means of resolving a disagreement about changes to a caravan site.

43. The FTT believed that the condition it favoured was justified by the Tribunal’s decision in the Guildford case. Specifically, it said that the addition it made to condition 6 was intended to make clear “that should the Council fail to respond within the stated time limit, the applicant may apply to the tribunal for an order under section 8 of the 1960 Act , as suggested in the Guildford case”. So it is necessary to consider what that case decided.

44. Guildford was an appeal by Wyldecrest against a condition imposed by the local authority in a licence issued under the 1960 Act . The condition stated: “No material change to the layout of the site shall be made without the prior written consent of the Head of Health and Community Care. Such consent will not be unreasonably withheld.”

45. Wyldecrest appealed to the FTT against the condition, arguing first that the local authority had no power to impose it under section 5 (1) of the 1960 Act , or alternatively that it was unduly burdensome and should be removed. The FTT was satisfied that the authority did have power to impose the condition, and that it could be modified so that it was not unduly burdensome. There was no evidence of any delay on the part of the authority in dealing with requests for consent, but the FTT considered that a time limit should be introduced as a procedural safeguard and to provide Wyldecrest with some certainty. It therefore modified the condition by adding the following “If a decision whether to grant consent is not made by the expiration of 28 days from the date on which the request for consent is received, the site owner may by written notice require that a decision is made within a further 14 days from the date of that notice. In default the Head of Health and Community Care shall be deemed to have withheld consent.”

46. Wyldecrest was dissatisfied with the FTT’s decision and appealed to this Tribunal, where the appeal was determined by HHJ Huskinson.

47. Wyldecrest repeated its argument that the local authority had no power to impose a condition. The Tribunal rejected that ground of appeal and held that section 5(1) of the 1960 Act was a wide power to impose conditions which could properly be employed to require that, in principle, alterations should not be made without the authority’s consent. Mr Sunderland did not challenge that conclusion in this appeal.

48. Wyldecrest’s alternative argument was that the condition was unduly burdensome. In particular, it suggested that the only way of challenging an unreasonable withholding of consent would be by expensive and lengthy judicial review proceedings. The authority disagreed and suggested an alternative approach, described by the Tribunal at paragraph 40, as follows: “The appellant could apply to the respondent for an amendment to the terms of the licence to introduce a proviso into condition 3.1 to the effect that the proposed change of layout (for instance as per a specified plan) was for the avoidance of doubt permitted. If such a proposed change was refused (as presumably it would be because the respondent would be contending it was reasonably withholding its consent to the proposed change of layout) then the appellant could appeal to the F-TT under section 8(2) of the Act and thereby invoke the comparatively swift and inexpensive remedy of challenging the matter in that forum.”

49. This suggestion appears to be the origin of the FTT’s understanding that an unreasonable refusal of consent could give rise to an application to the FTT in the form of an appeal under section 8 . But it is important to note what was being proposed. There was no suggestion that a refusal of consent should be treated as if it was a refusal of an application to vary the licence. What was being suggested was that, in the event of an unreasonable refusal of consent, the site owner could make a second application, this time to vary the condition to specify that the proposed change of layout was permitted although consent had not been obtained for it.

50. Wyldecrest’s application in Guildford was an application under section 8 of the 1960 Act to alter an existing licence by deleting the condition requiring the authority’s consent before any change could be made to the site layout. The application was not under section 7 because no new licence was involved. The Tribunal nevertheless accepted that, on an appeal to the FTT under section 8(2) , the appropriate question where there had been a refusal of an application to vary a licence condition, was whether the condition was unduly burdensome (the test under section 7(1)) (paragraph 52). But the appeal from the FTT to this Tribunal involved a review of the FTT’s decision, and the Tribunal was not considering what condition it would have imposed if the initial decision had been for it to take. The question for this Tribunal on the appeal was not whether the FTT had gone wrong in principle or left material factors out of account, or taken account of irrelevant factors, or reached a conclusion which was clearly wrong (see paragraphs 36 and 54).

51. The Tribunal concluded that the FTT had been entitled to consider that it was much better for everyone (site owner, local authority and especially the occupier of a caravan) that any problem regarding whether a proposed material change of layout should be permitted was sorted out in advance, rather than the authority having to seek to undo a change which had already been made. The other matters it had taken into account were also legitimate considerations. As for the suggestion that the only way of challenging an unreasonable refusal of consent would be by judicial review proceedings, the Tribunal accepted the argument of the authority, saying this, at paragraph 56: “56. The F-TT was entitled to conclude that there were other avenues open to the appellant, if consent was refused under condition 3.1, apart from judicial review. The F-TT correctly observed that if the appellant considered the respondent was unreasonably withholding consent to a proposed material change of layout then the appellant had the option of going ahead anyway. It is well-established in landlord and tenant law that where there is a covenant against doing something (for instance assigning a lease) without consent where such consent is not unreasonably to be withheld, then if the circumstances are that consent is being unreasonably withheld the tenant is allowed to assign such lease without consent. Similarly here. If the respondent was unreasonably withholding consent for a proposed material change of layout there would be no breach of the site licence if the appellant went ahead and made the material change of layout without the respondent’s consent. There is a further reason why the appellant is incorrect in saying that, in the event of refusal of consent, its only remedy would be by way of judicial review. I do not make any finding as to whether judicial review would be open to the appellant. I do however conclude that the appellant could bring the matter before the F-TT in the manner described in paragraph 40 above.”

52. The Tribunal therefore accepted that in the event of an unreasonable refusal of consent to a change of layout the site owner could either go ahead regardless, or follow the two stage procedure described in paragraph 48 above: first making an application for consent to carry out the alteration, and when that was refused, making a second application, this time to vary the licence either to substitute a new plan showing the revised layout as approved or exempting the proposed change from the requirement to obtain consent. If that second application was refused, the site owner would then be entitled to launch an appeal to the FTT against the refusal to vary the licence.

53. It can be seen that Guildford was not concerned with a licence condition in the form introduced by the FTT. There was no suggestion that a refusal of consent should be treated as a refusal to vary the licence, nor that such a refusal could in itself give rise to a right of appeal under section 8(2) . What was being identified was a route by which a site owner who had asked for and been refused consent to alter the layout of the site could engineer a decision which could then be the subject of an appeal to the FTT. That work around implicitly recognised that there was no right of appeal to the FTT against a refusal of consent to a proposed change to the layout of the site.

54. It is also important to remember that the Tribunal was not asked to express a view on the substantive merits of a condition requiring the licensing authority’s consent before an alteration could be made and it did not recommend the condition. It was asked only whether the FTT had been entitled to conclude, for the reasons which it gave, that the condition in that case was not unduly burdensome.

55. The FTT’s understanding of the Guildford case was flawed, and it did not provide the support which the FTT thought it did for the modified form of condition which it imposed. For the reasons given in paragraphs 37 to 42 above, the revised condition does not have the effect which they FTT intended it to have. I therefore allow Wyldecrest’s appeal and set aside the FTT’s decision so far as it concerns condition 6.

56. When this Tribunal allows an appeal, it may either remit the case to the FTT for further consideration or re-make the decision ( section 12(2) , Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ). If it decides to re-make the decision it may make any decision the FTT could make and may make such findings of fact as it considers appropriate ( section 12(4) ).

57. I do not think it would be fair to either party to remit the decision to the FTT for a second time. The better course, consistently with the Tribunal’s overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly, is to re-make the decision on the basis of the material which the parties have provided.

58. The appeal is against the condition included in the Licence before the variation proposed by the Council was introduced. That form had been included in licences for the Site since at least 1997 and provided simply that “The layout of the site shall not be varied without the prior written consent of the Council, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.”

59. The first issue is whether that condition is unduly burdensome. The context in which that question is to be answered includes, as the FTT found, that the Site is already very well developed so that it is not apparent that further material changes could be made to the layout without having an adverse impact on at least some of the residents. The context also includes that the Model Conditions do not include any such restriction on the right of a site owner to make changes to their site without first having to obtain the consent of the licensing authority. I bear in mind also that Licence includes conditions concerning separation distances between caravans and between caravans and roads, boundaries and other structures. It also requires Wyldecrest to supply a plan of the Site whenever any significant alterations are undertaken, and to notify the Council in advance before making any change to the layout of the Site.

60. In my judgment in its original form condition 6 was unduly burdensome, for these reasons: first, because it applied to any change to the layout of the Site, however minor or inconsequential; secondly, because it was inconsistent with condition 4 and therefore liable to cause confusion or uncertainty, as condition 4 requires the production of a new plan showing the layout of the Site only when “significant alterations to the site layout are undertaken”; thirdly, it included no time limit on the Council’s consideration of a request for consent which, given the history of delay in this case, it is important that there should be; fourthly, because there is no straightforward way of challenging a refusal of consent which is thought to be unreasonable (I will return to this shortly); and fifthly, because other conditions already included in the Licence adequately safeguard the interests of residents.

61. A number of these objections are capable of being overcome and were addressed either by the Council in its proposed amendments to its own condition and by the FTT in its decision. Thus, the FTT limited the changes for which consent must be obtained to those which were “material”; consistency with condition 4 could be achieved by changing “material” to “significant”, which would resolve the first and second objections. The third objection would be remedied by the addition, suggested by the Council, of a requirement that any application must in any event be determined within 28 days of the date of request for consent.

62. The fourth objection, namely the absence of a straightforward way of challenging a refusal of consent, returns to the issues debated in Guildford . As the Tribunal there explained (see paragraph 51 above) in the event of an unreasonable refusal of consent, the site owner would be free from the restriction and could make the proposed alteration without the need for consent. Alternatively, the site owner could respond to a refusal by seeking an appropriate variation of the licence and, when that request was also rejected, by appealing against the refusal under section 8(2) . But the first of those alternatives would leave the parties in a state of uncertainty. The site owner may think that the Council’s refusal of consent was unreasonable, but there are likely to be two sides to the argument; if the owner proceeded to make the alteration it would take the risk of enforcement proceedings (which would begin with a compliance notice under section 9 A of the 1960 Act , breach of which is an offence). The second option, in my view, is convoluted, lacking in transparency and unsatisfactory. Licence conditions should be clear and straightforward. A condition which requires consent and, if consent is refused, then requires the site owner to make another application in a different form, for an alteration to the licence, is far from clear or straightforward. There is no time limit on a local authority’s consideration of an application to alter the conditions of a licence and it cannot be assumed, given the history of this case, that the Council would deal with such an application promptly.

63. On the other hand, there are good reasons to require, in this case, that Wyldecrest seek consent before making alterations to the layout of the Site. There is said by the Council to be a history of gradual encroachment on the communal areas of the Site, or around the edges of occupied pitches, to create space for additional caravans. The number of caravans on the Site is said to have increased from 85 in 2017 to 90 or 91 after Wyldecrest acquired its interest and the FTT heard unchallenged evidence of encroachment on gardens and the removal of parking spaces and communal green spaces. It is also notable that the condition originally proposed by the Council has been included in licences since at least 1997, which speaks against it being unduly onerous.

64. In my judgment the real issue created by the Council’s revised condition is the lack of clarity about the consequences of a failure to deal with a request within the period of 28 days which the Council itself has proposed. The FTT sought to achieve clarity by deeming a refusal to be something that it was not. The better way of achieving certainty for all parties, it seems to me, is to adopt the Council’s proposed time limit for a decision but then to spell out the common law consequences of an unreasonable refusal or a failure to respond in time. That consequence is that Wyldecrest will be free to make the proposed change. It will remain subject to the other restrictions on the layout of the Site contained in the Licence, including on separation distances, access widths and the provision of parking, but it will not be left in limbo or be put to the expense of a lengthy application to the FTT if the Council is unable to comply with its own suggested time limit. Wyldecrest will also remain subject to condition 4 which requires it to provide a scale plan of the layout of the Site showing the alterations once they have been undertaken.

65. The condition I will substitute for the FTT’s condition 6 is therefore the following: “No significant change may be made to the layout of the site without the prior written consent of the Council, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Any request for consent shall in any event be determined within 28 days of the date of the request. If a request for consent is not determined within 28 days the change for which consent was requested may be made without consent and without causing any breach of this condition.” The appeal against condition 11

66. Wyldecrest’s appeal against the variation of condition 11 raises a procedural issue.

67. There is no challenge by Wyldecrest to the specified road widths and clearances which are the main subject of the condition. To a large extent these reflect standard specifications designed to ensure unobstructed access for emergency vehicles. But the Council has never insisted on the complete achievement of the specified standards and successive licences have made an exception for “the road system existing at the time of issue of this licence”. The effect of the condition, and the repeated derogation from it, has been that at the commencement of each new licence the Site has been treated as compliant and able to operate lawfully notwithstanding any historic infringement of the access standards. The operator has not been entitled to make any changes after being granted a new licence but has not been at risk of action because of any deficiencies in the historic layout.

68. The Licence issued by the Council on 20 April 2023 took the form of previous licences and accepted the road layout as it was at that date. I assume the Council had satisfied itself either that there had been no changes since the previous licence, or that any changes which had been made complied with the access standards specified in the 2017 licence.

69. The issue arises because of the FTT’s direction of 23 December 2024, after the first appeal to this Tribunal, that the Council must “reconsider the conditions in the light of the original hearing” and produce a version of the conditions which it now wished to have included in the licence. That direction must have been intended by the FTT as an opportunity for the Council to incorporate those concessions it had been prepared to make during the original hearing. But in its response to that direction the Council sought to vary condition 11 by removing its acknowledgement that the road layout had been compliant at the date of the Licence, i.e. 20 April 2023, and substituting an acknowledgement that it had been compliant only on 1 April 2017.

70. The explanation for this change given by the Council to the FTT by Mr Lewin was that it did not want to regularise breaches of condition 11 which had taken place since the Site was acquired by Wyldecrest in August 2021. There is no evidence before me that any such breaches had occurred, nor did the FTT refer to any. Mr Sunderland had objected that the change was unfair and that it put Wyldecrest at risk of being made responsible for breaches of the condition which may have existed before it acquired its interest in the Site.

71. The FTT accepted the Council’s proposal and included the condition in its revised form. The reasons it gave were: first, that that it could not vary or cancel the condition unless it was satisfied that it was unduly burdensome and there was no evidence that it was; secondly, that Wyldecrest had known the condition of the Site when it acquired it; and thirdly, that the FTT itself had directed the Council to provide new conditions in response to this Tribunal’s decision on the first appeal, and Wyldecrest could not now accept the condition in its original form.

72. The FTT’s reasoning was flawed. Wyldecrest’s appeal was against the Licence in the form in which it was issued in April 2023. By the time of the second hearing it was content with condition 11 in that form. Its objection was to the revision proposed by the Council. There was no onus on Wyldecrest to establish that the revision was unduly onerous, because the revision was not one of the terms of the Licence; it was simply a proposal by the Council. The purpose of the FTT’s direction was to narrow the issues between the parties, not to permit the Council to create a new issue. I can see no reason why Wyldecrest should not have been entitled to withdraw any objection it may previously have had and to accept the original condition.

73. The FTT’s error was in failing to appreciate that the subject of the appeal was not a moving target but was fixed. The subject of the appeal was the Licence issued in April 2023, which regulated Wyldecrest’s management of the Site from the date it was issued. The Council had the right to alter that Licence, but only by adopting the procedure in section 8 , which it did not do (as Mr Lewin confirmed). Had it done so Wyldecrest would have had a new right of appeal against the variation and would have been required to demonstrate that the variation was unduly burdensome. But in the absence of a variation there was no need for Wyldecrest to justify its acceptance of the condition which already applied. The FTT was therefore wrong to rely on the absence of evidence that the Council’s new condition was unduly burdensome.

74. Additionally, I accept Mr Sunderland’s submission that it was unfair for the Council to seek to change the condition it imposed in April 2023 and retrospectively to call into question the status of any changes which had been made by that date. The Council had the opportunity to satisfy itself that the Site was compliant (i.e. that any changes made since 2017 did not infringe the standard access requirements) before it issued the new Licence. A licence condition should be clear and readily capable of being understood. Having acknowledged that the Site was compliant it is not clear what effect the change sanctioned by the FTT was intended to have in relation to any variations which may have been made to the layout of the Site between April 2017 and April 2023. A condition which creates uncertainty about matters which have previously been acknowledged to be satisfactory could properly be described as unduly burdensome, had that been a relevant consideration. The appeal against condition 34

75. On examination, Wyldecrest’s appeal against the condition requiring one parking space per pitch plus an addition space for every 5 pitches, is without foundation. It is apparent that the same requirement has been included in licences since at least 1997 and it cannot be said to be unduly burdensome to repeat it. Mr Sunderland’s complaint was that the Council should have taken into account the capacity of the Site to accommodate the parking spaces which would be required to satisfy the condition. The Licence authorised 92 caravans on the Site which would require 110 spaces; if that number of spaces could not be fitted on to the Site the inclusion of the condition would be unduly burdensome. I do not agree. The FTT dismissed Wyldecrest’s objection on the grounds that there was no evidence that sufficient spaces could not be provided. It was entitled to do so.

76. Additionally, the increase in the number of pitches from 85 to 92 was at Wyldecrest’s request, made at a time when the same condition applied. Wyldecrest must either have been confident that it could find sufficient spaces to meet the condition, or been prepared to take the risk that it would be in breach the condition if it introduced as many caravans as were permitted. In either case there is no reason why a very long standing condition should be relaxed. If Wyldecrest cannot provide sufficient parking spaces to satisfy the condition, it should reduce the number of caravans on the Site until the condition is satisfied. Disposal

77. For these reasons I allow Wyldecrest’s appeal against conditions 6 and 11 but dismiss the appeal against condition 34. In place of condition 6 I substitute the condition at paragraph 65 above. In place of the modified condition 11 I confirm the condition in its original form included in the Licence issued on 20 April 2023.

78. The parties should now agree the final form of the Licence, making the changes indicated and those made by the FTT which have not been the subject of this appeal. The Licence should then be re-issued by the Council in that form. Martin Rodger KC, Deputy Chamber President 6 February 2026 Right of appeal Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.