Metro Bank PLC · DRN-6256178

The complaint Ms W complains that Metro Bank PLC (‘Metro’) won’t refund the money she lost after falling victim to a scam. What happened In 2024, Ms W found an investment advertised online. She made a number of payments as part of the investment, but when she tried to withdraw the funds, she was unable to. Ms W was then contacted by a third party who said that the people operating the investment had been arrested and they could help Ms W recover her funds. But Ms W was asked to pay fees to release her funds . Unfortunately, these were both scams. Ms W made the following payments from her Metro account. Ms W also made payments from accounts held with other banks. Date Pmt Details of transaction Amount 20.8.2024 1 Faster payment to Mr A £915 27.8.2024 2 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £1,950 27.8.2024 3 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £2,330 27.8.2024 4 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £3,000 30.8.2024 5 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £1,500 30.8.2024 6 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £2,000 30.8.2024 7 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £2,500 30.8.2024 8 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £3,950 2.9.2024 9 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £2,000 2.9.2024 10 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £3,000 2.9.2024 11 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £4,890 3.9.2024 12 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £2,700 3.9.2024 13 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £4,999 3.9.2024 14 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £4,900 4.9.2024 15 Faster payment to P – a company £3,600 8.9.2024 16 Card payment to purchase cryptocurrency £4,999 24.9.2024 Credit received from P £3,397.88 cr Ms W raised a scam claim with Metro through a professional representative. Metro say they contacted Ms W to get more information about the scam but didn’t receive a response. As she hadn’t received a refund, Ms W brought a complaint to our service. While the complaint was with our service, Metro offered to refund payments one and 15, less the credit Ms W received on 24 September 2024 – meaning a refund of £1,117.12.

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An investigator looked into Ms W’s complaint and upheld it. The investigator wasn’t satisfied that Metro’s intervention on 30 August 2024 went far enough and recommended that Metro refund all of the card payments from 30 August 2024 onwards. Ms W accepted the recommendation, but Metro disagreed and asked for an ombudsman to review the case. Having reviewed the case, I reached a different answer than the investigator. So, I issued a provisional decision explaining why and giving both parties a chance to respond before a final decision was issued. My provisional decision In my provisional decision “What I’ve provisionally decided – and why” section I said: In deciding what’s fair and reasonable, I am required to take into account relevant law and regulations, regulators’ rules, guidance and standards, and codes of practice; and, where appropriate, I must also take into account what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time. In broad terms, the starting position at law is that Metro are expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customer’s account. It’s not in dispute that Ms W authorised these payments, although she did so not realising she was the victim of a scam. So, the starting point is that Metro aren’t liable. There are, however, some situations where we believe that businesses, taking into account relevant rules, codes and best practice standards, shouldn’t have taken their customer’s authorisation instruction at “face value” – or should have looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the transaction before making the payment. Metro also has a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care, pay due regard to the interest of its customers and to follow good industry practice to keep customer’s accounts safe. Should Metro have intervened? By August 2024, Metro should’ve been aware of the elevated risk associated with cryptocurrency payments, following warnings issued by the FCA and Action Fraud in mid- 2018. They should also have been aware of multi-stage scams, where consumers can move money between their accounts as the result of fraud. So, just because the payments may’ve gone to an account in Ms W’s name, doesn’t mean that there wasn’t a potential risk of financial harm associated with them. Taking into account the size of payment four, and because it was identifiably related to cryptocurrency. I would’ve expected Metro to intervene – which they did.

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Did Metro’s intervention go far enough? When Metro contacted Ms W, they asked her questions to confirm that she had made the payment and that the payment was genuine. I’m not satisfied that this intervention went far enough. I would’ve expected Metro to ask open and probing questions and the reason for the payment and the other recent payments Ms W had made. Would a better intervention have prevented Ms W’s loss? I’m aware that another bank intervened on payments Ms W made as part of the same scam. These payments were made on 25 July 2024 and 31 July 2024 and were made to individuals, not to a cryptocurrency exchange (as was the case with the Metro card payments). When that bank intervened, Ms W told them the payments related to money she was sending to family members in relation to a birth, and separately, to funeral costs. So, Ms W wasn’t honest with that bank about the reasons for her payments. The other bank provided warnings to Ms W, however these related to impersonation scams, safe account scams and purchase scams. As these weren’t relevant to the scam Ms W was falling victim to, they didn’t resonate with her. But the payments Ms W made from her Metro account were identifiably related to cryptocurrency, which is information the other bank didn’t have. So, the reasons that Ms W had given the other bank about why she was making the payments, wouldn’t have made sense in relation to the payments from her Metro account. Metro should’ve asked questions about why she was making a number of cryptocurrency payments, what would ultimately happen to the cryptocurrency she was purchasing and whether anyone was assisting her in making the payments. I also would’ve expected a warning to have been given by Metro as part of their intervention. Regardless of the payment reason Ms W gave, I would’ve expected Metro to have given a cryptocurrency investment scam warning. I say this based on the nature and pattern of the payments, which mirror what we commonly see in cryptocurrency investment scam. This warning should’ve set out the key features of cryptocurrency investment scams which would include being endorsed by high-profile individuals, returns that are too good to be true, being advertised on social media sites, and capital being guaranteed (as these investments usually involve a level of risk). I would also expect Metro to have highlighted to Ms W that being told to lie about the reason for the payment, or being asked to download screen sharing software, meant she was most likely the victim of a scam as no genuine investment company would ever ask her to do this. Here Ms W had found the investment online, was promised an unrealistic return and was promised that her capital wouldn’t be at risk. So, if Metro had given the type of warning that I think it should’ve, I’m persuaded that it’s more likely than not Ms W would’ve been concerned and it would’ve prevented her from making any more payments. Especially as Ms W couldn’t afford to lose these funds, as she had to borrow money to make the payments. As I’m satisfied that Metro should’ve provided a better intervention and that it’s more likely than not that intervention would’ve prevented Ms W’s loss, Metro should refund Ms W from payment four onwards.

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However, I also have to consider whether Ms W should’ve been concerned and taken steps to mitigate her loss. Contributory negligence In considering this point, I’ve taken into account what the law says about contributory negligence as well as what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. It’s clear that Ms W was told to lie to the other bank about the reason for the payments, which should’ve concerned Ms W. No genuine company would ever ask her to do this. Also, I can’t see that Ms W performed any checks on the company she was investing with, or the people that contacted her as part of either scam. Ms W should’ve also been concerned about the pressure put on her to continue increasing her investment when she hadn’t been able to withdraw any funds. And, being asked to pay fees that hadn’t been disclosed upfront in relation to releasing her investment and as part of the recovery scam. I’m satisfied that there were enough red flags that Ms W should’ve had concerns about the legitimacy of what she was being asked to do and she should share responsibility for her loss with Metro. On that basis, the refund from payment four onwards should be reduced by 50%. Calculating the redress Metro have already refunded 100% of payments one and 15, which is more than I would’ve recommended. So, I’m not making an award in respect of these two payments. As part of their calculation, Metro apportioned all of the credit Ms W received of £3,397.88 against payments one and 15. So, I haven’t applied it to the additional payments I’m asking Metro to refund. On that basis, Metro should refund 50% of payments four to 16 (inclusive, but excluding payment 15), which means a refund of £20,219.00. As Ms W has been deprived of the use of these funds, Metro should pay simple interest on the refund of 8% per year, calculated from the date of the payments until the date of settlement. My provisional decision was that I intended to uphold this complaint. Responses to my provisional decision Metro responded disagreeing with the provisional decision and raising the following points: • Information about the scam requested from Ms W wasn’t provided. • The evidence suggests Ms W completed the transactions herself. • Once the funds were transferred from Ms W’s Metro account they went to a cryptocurrency account in her name and any liability lies with the cryptocurrency exchange. • The payments were flagged multiple times and Ms W confirmed them as genuine. Ms W responded saying she accepts the provisional decision.

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What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having carefully considered the points raised, I’ve reached the same answer as in my provisional decision. I’ll explain why. It is not disputed that Ms W made these payments, the payments were authorised and they went initially to a cryptocurrency account in Ms W’s name before moving to a wallet or account controlled by the scammer. However, that doesn’t mean that Metro can’t be held liable for Ms W’s loss. Ms W isn’t required to raise a complaint against the cryptocurrency exchange, and I can only look at the complaint that is before me. As I explained in the provisional decision, Metro should be aware of multi-stage scams where customers move money between accounts they control as part of a scam. These payments still have a potential risk of financial harm from fraud. The fact that the funds initially went to an account controlled by Ms W, doesn’t negate Metro’s responsibilities and potential liability. For the reasons already given in my provisional decision, I’m still satisfied that Metro should’ve identified a potential risk of financial harm from fraud when Ms W made payment four and intervened. Based on the information available to them, I would’ve expected Metro to have provided a warning about cryptocurrency investment scams. If they had, I’m persuaded it’s more likely than not Ms W wouldn’t have proceeded with making the payments and her loss would’ve been prevented. So, it’s fair for Metro to refund payments four to 16 inclusive, excluding payment 15 which has already been refunded. As no new points have been raised in relation to contributory negligence, I’m still satisfied that it’s fair for Ms W to share responsibility for her loss with Metro. Putting things right To put things right I require Metro Bank PLC to: • Refund Ms W from payment four onwards (excluding payment 15), which means a refund of £20,219.00, and • Pay simple interest of 8% per year on the refund, calculated from the date of the payments to the date of settlement. My final decision My final decision is that I uphold this complaint against Metro Bank PLC and require them to reimburse Ms W, as set out above. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Ms W to accept or reject my decision before 24 April 2026. Lisa Lowe Ombudsman

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